Event Notification Report for November 15, 2022

EN Revision Imported Date: 11/15/2022

EN Revision Text: PART 21 - PRIMARY/SECONDARY POWER SUPPLY FAILURES
The following is a summary of information provided by United Controls International (UCI) via email:

"On September 7, 2022, Dominion's Surry Power Station notified UCI that 3 Schneider Electric P/N: ASP840-000 Modicon Primary/Secondary Power Supply units failed to operate several days after installation at Dominion's Surry Power Station with hard failures that shutdown the associated [programmable logic controller]. The units were returned to UCI and initial observations indicated heavy shipping damage that was not present when initially supplied. Further evaluation of the damaged components requires manufacturer evaluation due to item complexity and proprietary design documentation. Investigation into the root cause(s) of the failures is ongoing. Evaluation of whether these failures represent deviations or failures to comply that would be associated with substantial safety hazards will be complete by January 3, 2023."

Contact Information: Anu Kulkarni, Quality Assurance Manager United Controls International (700- 496-1406)

* * * UPDATE FROM ANU KULKARNI TO DONALD NORWOOD AT 1514 EST ON 11/14/22 * * *

The letter date on the original transmittal letter from UCI to the USNRC was incorrectly listed as November 4, 2021. UCI is hereby submitting a corrected letter dated November 4, 2022.

Notified R2DO (Miller) and Part 21 and 50.55 Reactors email group.

AUTOMATIC REACTOR SCRAM

The following information was provided by the licensee email:

"On November 12, 2022, at 2319 CST, an actuation of the reactor protection system (RPS) initiated a full scram. The plant was in Mode 2, reactor pressure was 149 pounds. The high pressure coolant injection (HPCI) injection valve, HPCI-MOV-MO19, opened and injected cold water into the reactor vessel while HPCI system testing was in progress. The cause is still under investigation. All control rods inserted. Plant is currently in Mode 3 and stable. All systems operated as designed with no Primary Containment Isolation System group isolations. This event is being reported under two event classifications:

"50. 72(b)(2)(iv)(B) -- "Any event or condition that results in actuation of the reactor protection system (RPS) when the reactor is critical except when the actuation results from and is part of a pre-planned sequence during testing or reactor operation."

"50. 72(b)(3)(iv)(A) -- "Any event or condition that results in valid actuation of any of the systems listed in paragraph (b)(3)(iv)(B) of this section except when the actuation results from and is part of a pre-planned sequence during testing or reactor operation."

"The NRC Resident has been informed."

REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM (RCS) PRESSURE BOUNDARY DEGRADED

The following information was provided by the licensee via email:

"During a scheduled refueling outage, a walkdown inside containment discovered a small amount of boron on the 1B2 Reactor Coolant Pump (RCP) lower bearing temperature instrument. At 0730 EST on November 14, 2022, with Unit 1 in Mode 6, disassembly of the instrument indicated the source of the boron was from a leak in the thermowell. The thermowell is considered part of the reactor coolant system pressure boundary and as such the condition is reportable. Repairs for the condition are in progress.

"This event is being reported as an eight-hour non-emergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(A).

"There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."