Event Notification Report for October 25, 2022

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - STUCK SOURCE

The following information was provided by the State of Ohio via email:

"On 10/12/2022, during routine maintenance and source exchange on an Elekta Flexitron HDR [High Dose Rate] unit the source became stuck in an unshielded position. The Elekta engineer immediately vacated the room and notified the medical physics staff and RSO [Radiation Safety Officer]. The area was secured by the RSO, and measurements taken outside of the secured area were at background. Licensee security was posted outside of the area to prevent entry until Elekta personnel could secure the source.

"Additional Elekta staff arrived and secured the source on 10/13/2022, and it was shipped back to the vendor on 10/14/2022."

Ohio Item number: OH220010

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - GAUGE DISCOVERED IN SCRAP YARD

The following information was provided by the Arizona Department of Health Services (the Department) via email:

"The Department received notification on October 17, 2022, from American Metals Company in Chandler, Arizona that a load of scrap metal that was sent to be melted had set off the portal monitor at CMC Steel in Mesa, Arizona. The load was brought back to their facility and they were able to identify a gauge with partial markings and a reading of approximately 0.5 mR/hr. The Department responded to the facility and was able to identify the gauge as a Ronan Engineering Co., RLL-1 gauge, with a partial serial number of 204614. The gauge contains Cesium-137 with an activity of 0.45 mCi. The Department has requested additional information and continues to investigate the event.

"Additional information will be provided as it is received in accordance with SA-300."

Arizona Incident: 22-012

STAGE FOUR AUTOMATIC DEPRESSURIZATION SYSTEM (ADS) INOPERABLE

The following information was provided by the licensee via email:

"At 0405 EDT on 10/23/2022, with [Vogtle] Unit 3 in Mode 6 and the reactor subcritical for greater than 28 hours, it was discovered that all three required flow paths for the stage four ADS were simultaneously inoperable; therefore, this condition is being reported as an eight-hour, non-emergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v). The diverse actuation system was operable for manual stage four ADS during this time period.

"At 0432 EDT on 10/23/2022, two of the three required flow paths were restored to operable status, which exited the reportable condition. All required flow paths were operable at 0447 EDT.

"There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel.

"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."

REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM (RCS) PRESSURE BOUNDARY DEGRADATION

The following information was provided by the licensee via email:

"At 0830 PDT on 10/23/2022, during routine outage inspections on Unit 2, it was determined that the RCS Pressure Boundary did not meet ASME Section XI acceptance criteria on a 2-inch vacuum refill connection line. This event is being reported pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(A).

"There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel.

"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."

MANUAL REACTOR TRIP AND AUXILIARY FEEDWATER SYSTEM ACTUATION

The following information was provided by the licensee via email:

"On 10/24/2022 at 0857 EDT, with Unit 2 in Mode 1 at 7 percent power, the reactor was manually tripped due to a 2B train main feedwater pump trip. The trip was not complex, with all systems responding normally post-trip. The auxiliary feedwater (AFW) system started automatically as expected. Operations responded and stabilized the plant. Decay heat is being removed by the steam generators and discharging to the condenser. Unit 1 is not affected.

"Due to the Reactor Protection System actuation while critical, this event is being reported as a four-hour, non-emergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B). The automatic start of the auxiliary feedwater system is being reported as an eight-hour, non-emergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A).

"There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."

PART 21 - TIOGA PIPE PURCHASED AND SUPPLIED UNQUALIFIED PIPING

The following information was provided by Tioga Pipe via email:

"Tioga Pipe Inc. purchased unqualified [piping] from Maxim Tubes Company PVT. LTD. The unqualified [piping] passed all required tests and examinations in accordance with the requirements of ASME NCA-4255.5, however, the material was identified with multiple linear indications located on the inside diameter [surface] of the pipe. The indications were discovered by Duke Energy during their pre-fabrication inspection at the Catawba Nuclear Station. The indications ranged from one quarter of an inch to well over an inch in length. This material along with the material with the same heat number at McGuire Nuclear Station was returned to Tioga Pipe for further evaluation. The evaluation found these indications to be lap-like and thus, rejectable in accordance with ASME SA999 paragraph 28.12.

"All material supplied from Maxim Tubes Company PVT. LTD. has been identified by Duke, found not to be installed, and returned to Tioga Pipe. At this time, all of the defective material is in Tioga's possession and there is no risk of this defective material being installed into a nuclear facility."