Event Notification Report for October 18, 2022
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
10/17/2022 - 10/18/2022
Power Reactor
Event Number: 56168
Facility: Browns Ferry
Region: 2 State: AL
Unit: [3] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4,[3] GE-4
NRC Notified By: Alex Neumann
HQ OPS Officer: Adam Koziol
Region: 2 State: AL
Unit: [3] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4,[3] GE-4
NRC Notified By: Alex Neumann
HQ OPS Officer: Adam Koziol
Notification Date: 10/18/2022
Notification Time: 22:08 [ET]
Event Date: 10/18/2022
Event Time: 14:40 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 10/18/2022
Notification Time: 22:08 [ET]
Event Date: 10/18/2022
Event Time: 14:40 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 10/18/2022
Emergency Class: Non Emergency
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(A) - Pot Unable To Safe Sd 50.72(b)(3)(v)(C) - Pot Uncntrl Rad Rel 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - Accident Mitigation
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(A) - Pot Unable To Safe Sd 50.72(b)(3)(v)(C) - Pot Uncntrl Rad Rel 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - Accident Mitigation
Person (Organization):
Miller, Mark (R2DO)
Miller, Mark (R2DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 3 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
STANDBY LIQUID CONTROL INOPERABLE
The following information was provided by the licensee via email:
"On 10/18/2022 at 1440 CDT, Browns Ferry Unit 3 declared both trains of standby liquid control (SLC) inoperable due to acceptance criteria failure of 3-SI-3.1.7.6, 'Standby Liquid Control System ATWS Equivalency Calculation for Newly Established Pump Flow Rate.' The purpose of this surveillance is to ensure the anticipated transient without scram (ATWS) calculation criteria is met after each pump flow test.
"Chemistry performed the surveillance following pump flow testing and the requirement for equivalency calculation failed low with a result of less than 1.0. CR 1810303 documents this condition in the corrective action program.
"This condition is being reported pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(A), 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(C), and 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D). This condition is also reportable as a 60-day written report in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A),10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(C), and 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(D)."
The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified of this event.
The following additional information was obtained from the licensee in accordance with Headquarters Operations Officer's report guidance:
The plant entered an 8 hour limiting condition for operation based on the above. The condition was resolved at 2053 CDT when the system was restored to normal operation.
The following information was provided by the licensee via email:
"On 10/18/2022 at 1440 CDT, Browns Ferry Unit 3 declared both trains of standby liquid control (SLC) inoperable due to acceptance criteria failure of 3-SI-3.1.7.6, 'Standby Liquid Control System ATWS Equivalency Calculation for Newly Established Pump Flow Rate.' The purpose of this surveillance is to ensure the anticipated transient without scram (ATWS) calculation criteria is met after each pump flow test.
"Chemistry performed the surveillance following pump flow testing and the requirement for equivalency calculation failed low with a result of less than 1.0. CR 1810303 documents this condition in the corrective action program.
"This condition is being reported pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(A), 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(C), and 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D). This condition is also reportable as a 60-day written report in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A),10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(C), and 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(D)."
The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified of this event.
The following additional information was obtained from the licensee in accordance with Headquarters Operations Officer's report guidance:
The plant entered an 8 hour limiting condition for operation based on the above. The condition was resolved at 2053 CDT when the system was restored to normal operation.
Agreement State
Event Number: 56180
Rep Org: Georgia Radioactive Material Pgm
Licensee: Northside Hospital Forsyth
Region: 1
City: Cumming State: GA
County:
License #: GA 748-1
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: Drake Brookins
HQ OPS Officer: Ian Howard
Licensee: Northside Hospital Forsyth
Region: 1
City: Cumming State: GA
County:
License #: GA 748-1
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: Drake Brookins
HQ OPS Officer: Ian Howard
Notification Date: 10/25/2022
Notification Time: 13:29 [ET]
Event Date: 10/18/2022
Event Time: 06:30 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 12/02/2022
Notification Time: 13:29 [ET]
Event Date: 10/18/2022
Event Time: 06:30 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 12/02/2022
Emergency Class: Non Emergency
10 CFR Section:
Agreement State
10 CFR Section:
Agreement State
Person (Organization):
Dentel, Glenn (R1DO)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFICATION (EMAIL)
Dentel, Glenn (R1DO)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFICATION (EMAIL)
EN Revision Imported Date: 12/5/2022
EN Revision Text: AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - DAMAGED SEALED SOURCE
The following information was provided by the Georgia Radioactive Material Program via email:
"On 10/18/2022 at 0630 EDT, a Cs-137 vial source was being used to measure dose calibrator constancy. The nuclear medicine [NM] technologist noticed a crack in the bottom of the sealed source vial and possible contamination surrounding the vial.
"The sealed source was placed in a leak proof container, the Radiation Safety Officer (RSO) was notified, and decontamination protocol was followed. A leak test of the vial confirmed there was more than 0.005 microcuries of removable Cs-137 contamination.
"Post-decontamination surveys and wipe tests of the staff and department indicated that there was no contamination in the department, but there was detectable contamination on the hands of one staff member. The staff member is the individual who was handling the sealed source and discovered the crack in the source. He repeatedly scrubbed his hands - first with lukewarm soap and water, then with Bind-It brand radioactive decontamination hand soap until there was no improvement in the surveys of his hands.
"A final survey of the individuals hands hands showed there was no detectable contamination on his left hand. A small area on his right-hand thumb still measured 1000 [Counts Per Minute] CPM above background, and another small area on his right-hand index finger measured 700 CPM above background using a GM probe. Measurements of the contamination on his fingers using the on-site well counter indicated it was Cs-137 contamination.
"Both the Radiation Safety Officer and Medical Director were notified of the incident. The RSO came on-site to supervise decontamination efforts and to secure the leaking source and decontamination waste.
"Dose calibrator measurements of the source by the RSO indicated the source had leaked approximately 6 microcuries total. Since 6 microcuries of Cs-137 is less than 10 percent of the annual limits on intake (ALI) for Cs-137 (100 microcuries ALI for oral ingestion as defined in Appendix B of 10 CFR 20), [the Program's] understanding is no individual bioassay monitoring is required for the individual.
"The sealed source has been placed back within its shielded container, sealed with tape, and marked as leaking and out-of-service. The waste generated during the decontamination process was placed in a leakproof plastic bottle and marked as containing Cs-137. Both items are currently stored in [a secure area]. We are contacting waste disposal companies to arrange disposal of both the leaking sealed source and decontamination waste. The NM staff was re-educated on the requirement to wear disposable gloves at all times while handling radioactive materials, which includes sealed radioactive sources, per the Model Rules for Safe Use of Radiopharmaceuticals."
Georgia Incident Number: 60
* * * UPDATE ON 11/08/2022 AT 1323 EST FROM SHEREE BUTLER TO BRIAN LIN * * *
The following information is a summary of information received via email:
The licensee supplied an updated report to the state of Georgia. Georgia Radioactive Material Program employees will finalize and close out the report after disposal of the leaking source and contaminated waste.
Notified R1DO (Werkheiser) and NMSS Events Notification email group.
* * * UPDATE ON 12/02/2022 AT 1500 EST FROM SHEREE BUTLER TO WILLIAM GOTT * * *
The following information is a summary of information received via email:
The licensee notified the Georgia Radioactive Material Program that the leaking source was returned and received by the manufacturer. The Georgia Radioactive Material Program has closed this report.
Notified R1DO (Cahill) and NMSS Events Notification email group.
EN Revision Text: AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - DAMAGED SEALED SOURCE
The following information was provided by the Georgia Radioactive Material Program via email:
"On 10/18/2022 at 0630 EDT, a Cs-137 vial source was being used to measure dose calibrator constancy. The nuclear medicine [NM] technologist noticed a crack in the bottom of the sealed source vial and possible contamination surrounding the vial.
"The sealed source was placed in a leak proof container, the Radiation Safety Officer (RSO) was notified, and decontamination protocol was followed. A leak test of the vial confirmed there was more than 0.005 microcuries of removable Cs-137 contamination.
"Post-decontamination surveys and wipe tests of the staff and department indicated that there was no contamination in the department, but there was detectable contamination on the hands of one staff member. The staff member is the individual who was handling the sealed source and discovered the crack in the source. He repeatedly scrubbed his hands - first with lukewarm soap and water, then with Bind-It brand radioactive decontamination hand soap until there was no improvement in the surveys of his hands.
"A final survey of the individuals hands hands showed there was no detectable contamination on his left hand. A small area on his right-hand thumb still measured 1000 [Counts Per Minute] CPM above background, and another small area on his right-hand index finger measured 700 CPM above background using a GM probe. Measurements of the contamination on his fingers using the on-site well counter indicated it was Cs-137 contamination.
"Both the Radiation Safety Officer and Medical Director were notified of the incident. The RSO came on-site to supervise decontamination efforts and to secure the leaking source and decontamination waste.
"Dose calibrator measurements of the source by the RSO indicated the source had leaked approximately 6 microcuries total. Since 6 microcuries of Cs-137 is less than 10 percent of the annual limits on intake (ALI) for Cs-137 (100 microcuries ALI for oral ingestion as defined in Appendix B of 10 CFR 20), [the Program's] understanding is no individual bioassay monitoring is required for the individual.
"The sealed source has been placed back within its shielded container, sealed with tape, and marked as leaking and out-of-service. The waste generated during the decontamination process was placed in a leakproof plastic bottle and marked as containing Cs-137. Both items are currently stored in [a secure area]. We are contacting waste disposal companies to arrange disposal of both the leaking sealed source and decontamination waste. The NM staff was re-educated on the requirement to wear disposable gloves at all times while handling radioactive materials, which includes sealed radioactive sources, per the Model Rules for Safe Use of Radiopharmaceuticals."
Georgia Incident Number: 60
* * * UPDATE ON 11/08/2022 AT 1323 EST FROM SHEREE BUTLER TO BRIAN LIN * * *
The following information is a summary of information received via email:
The licensee supplied an updated report to the state of Georgia. Georgia Radioactive Material Program employees will finalize and close out the report after disposal of the leaking source and contaminated waste.
Notified R1DO (Werkheiser) and NMSS Events Notification email group.
* * * UPDATE ON 12/02/2022 AT 1500 EST FROM SHEREE BUTLER TO WILLIAM GOTT * * *
The following information is a summary of information received via email:
The licensee notified the Georgia Radioactive Material Program that the leaking source was returned and received by the manufacturer. The Georgia Radioactive Material Program has closed this report.
Notified R1DO (Cahill) and NMSS Events Notification email group.
Agreement State
Event Number: 56229
Rep Org: Arkansas Department of Health
Licensee: Domtar, Ashdown Mill
Region: 4
City: Ashdown State: AR
County:
License #: ARK-0354
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: Don Betts
HQ OPS Officer: Karen Cotton-Gross
Licensee: Domtar, Ashdown Mill
Region: 4
City: Ashdown State: AR
County:
License #: ARK-0354
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: Don Betts
HQ OPS Officer: Karen Cotton-Gross
Notification Date: 11/17/2022
Notification Time: 18:08 [ET]
Event Date: 10/18/2022
Event Time: 00:00 [CST]
Last Update Date: 11/17/2022
Notification Time: 18:08 [ET]
Event Date: 10/18/2022
Event Time: 00:00 [CST]
Last Update Date: 11/17/2022
Emergency Class: Non Emergency
10 CFR Section:
Agreement State
10 CFR Section:
Agreement State
Person (Organization):
Gaddy, Vincent (R4DO)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFICATION (EMAIL)
Gaddy, Vincent (R4DO)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFICATION (EMAIL)
AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - GAUGE SHUTTER FAILURE
The following information was provided by the Arkansas Department of Health [the Department] via email:
"On October 28, 2022, the Department received notification from Domtar, Ashdown Mill of a failed shutter on October 18, 2022. The failure occurred during a site-wide nuclear gauge shutter check being performed by a licensed third-party consultant. The failure was due to the shaft that allows for the operation of the shutter broke and the rectangular shutter control interface was no longer able to control the shutter. The licensee's immediate corrective action included shutting down the process system and closing the shutter.
"The gauge with the failed shutter, a Berthold LB 7440, serial # 1460-5-90, internal 50 mCi Cs-137 source # 012-00022 was removed and placed into the licensee's storage facility. A spare gauge, a Berthold LB 7440-D-CR, serial # 2730-8-90, internal 100 mCi Cs-137 source #012-00089 was placed in service. Leak tests for both gauges were performed which indicated no contamination. The licensee confirmed no public or employee exposure occurred. The failed gauge in storage is currently waiting to be repaired or disposed of in December.
"The reporting requirement is under the Department's 'Rules for Control of Sources of Ionizing Radiation' RH402.c.5 and 10 CFR Part 31.5 (c)(5)."
Arkansas Event Number: AR-2022-9
The following information was provided by the Arkansas Department of Health [the Department] via email:
"On October 28, 2022, the Department received notification from Domtar, Ashdown Mill of a failed shutter on October 18, 2022. The failure occurred during a site-wide nuclear gauge shutter check being performed by a licensed third-party consultant. The failure was due to the shaft that allows for the operation of the shutter broke and the rectangular shutter control interface was no longer able to control the shutter. The licensee's immediate corrective action included shutting down the process system and closing the shutter.
"The gauge with the failed shutter, a Berthold LB 7440, serial # 1460-5-90, internal 50 mCi Cs-137 source # 012-00022 was removed and placed into the licensee's storage facility. A spare gauge, a Berthold LB 7440-D-CR, serial # 2730-8-90, internal 100 mCi Cs-137 source #012-00089 was placed in service. Leak tests for both gauges were performed which indicated no contamination. The licensee confirmed no public or employee exposure occurred. The failed gauge in storage is currently waiting to be repaired or disposed of in December.
"The reporting requirement is under the Department's 'Rules for Control of Sources of Ionizing Radiation' RH402.c.5 and 10 CFR Part 31.5 (c)(5)."
Arkansas Event Number: AR-2022-9