Event Notification Report for September 26, 2022
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
09/25/2022 - 09/26/2022
Power Reactor
Event Number: 56119
Facility: FitzPatrick
Region: 1 State: NY
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4
NRC Notified By: Caleb Wallace
HQ OPS Officer: Bill Gott
Region: 1 State: NY
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4
NRC Notified By: Caleb Wallace
HQ OPS Officer: Bill Gott
Notification Date: 09/26/2022
Notification Time: 05:41 [ET]
Event Date: 09/26/2022
Event Time: 03:06 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 10/04/2022
Notification Time: 05:41 [ET]
Event Date: 09/26/2022
Event Time: 03:06 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 10/04/2022
Emergency Class: Non Emergency
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - Valid Specif Sys Actuation
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - Valid Specif Sys Actuation
Person (Organization):
Arner, Frank (R1DO)
Arner, Frank (R1DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | A/R | Y | 0 | Startup | 0 | Hot Standby |
EN Revision Imported Date: 10/5/2022
EN Revision Text: AUTOMATIC REACTOR SCRAM
The following information was provided by the licensee via email:
"At 0001 EDT on September 26, 2022, James A. FitzPatrick (JAF) removed the generator from service as part of a planned shutdown for refueling.
"At 0306 EDT, with the mode switch in Startup/Hot Standby and inserting rods, JAF experienced a spurious Scram and closure of seven out of eight main steam isolation valves (MSIV's). The reactor protection system (RPS) actuated during the event, resulting in all control rods being fully inserted.
"The cause of the closure of MSIV's and the Scram is being investigated.
"This condition is being reported as a four-hour NRC report per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) for RPS actuation, and as an eight-hour, non-emergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) for the safety system actuation based on the multiple main steam isolation valves closing on an isolation signal.
"There was no impact to the health and safety of the public. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."
* * * UPDATE ON 10/4/22 AT 2047 EDT FROM ANDREW WEAVER TO KERBY SCALES * * *
The following update was provided by the licensee via email:
"This Event Notification is being updated to clarify that the reactor was not critical when this event occurred. Therefore, the reporting requirement is changed from 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) to 10 CFR 50.72 (b)(3)(iv)(A) for Reactor Protection System (RPS) actuation along with Main Steam Isolation Valves (MSIV) system actuation.
"An analysis of reactor criticality was performed for the period of time prior to the RPS actuation event. Operators were inserting control rods per the shutdown Reactivity Management Plan. The Intermediate Radiation Monitoring (IRM) readings preceding the scram signal demonstrate a negative reactivity direction without control rod movement. The analysis concluded that the reactor was subcritical when RPS was actuated."
The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
Notified R1DO (Young).
EN Revision Text: AUTOMATIC REACTOR SCRAM
The following information was provided by the licensee via email:
"At 0001 EDT on September 26, 2022, James A. FitzPatrick (JAF) removed the generator from service as part of a planned shutdown for refueling.
"At 0306 EDT, with the mode switch in Startup/Hot Standby and inserting rods, JAF experienced a spurious Scram and closure of seven out of eight main steam isolation valves (MSIV's). The reactor protection system (RPS) actuated during the event, resulting in all control rods being fully inserted.
"The cause of the closure of MSIV's and the Scram is being investigated.
"This condition is being reported as a four-hour NRC report per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) for RPS actuation, and as an eight-hour, non-emergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) for the safety system actuation based on the multiple main steam isolation valves closing on an isolation signal.
"There was no impact to the health and safety of the public. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."
* * * UPDATE ON 10/4/22 AT 2047 EDT FROM ANDREW WEAVER TO KERBY SCALES * * *
The following update was provided by the licensee via email:
"This Event Notification is being updated to clarify that the reactor was not critical when this event occurred. Therefore, the reporting requirement is changed from 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) to 10 CFR 50.72 (b)(3)(iv)(A) for Reactor Protection System (RPS) actuation along with Main Steam Isolation Valves (MSIV) system actuation.
"An analysis of reactor criticality was performed for the period of time prior to the RPS actuation event. Operators were inserting control rods per the shutdown Reactivity Management Plan. The Intermediate Radiation Monitoring (IRM) readings preceding the scram signal demonstrate a negative reactivity direction without control rod movement. The analysis concluded that the reactor was subcritical when RPS was actuated."
The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
Notified R1DO (Young).
Power Reactor
Event Number: 56120
Facility: LaSalle
Region: 3 State: IL
Unit: [2] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-5,[2] GE-5
NRC Notified By: Jeff Nugent
HQ OPS Officer: Bill Gott
Region: 3 State: IL
Unit: [2] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-5,[2] GE-5
NRC Notified By: Jeff Nugent
HQ OPS Officer: Bill Gott
Notification Date: 09/26/2022
Notification Time: 06:39 [ET]
Event Date: 09/26/2022
Event Time: 02:38 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 09/26/2022
Notification Time: 06:39 [ET]
Event Date: 09/26/2022
Event Time: 02:38 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 09/26/2022
Emergency Class: Non Emergency
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS Actuation - Critical
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS Actuation - Critical
Person (Organization):
Szwarc, Dariusz (R3DO)
Miller, Chris (NRR EO)
Crouch, Howard (IR)
Szwarc, Dariusz (R3DO)
Miller, Chris (NRR EO)
Crouch, Howard (IR)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2 | M/R | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 0 | Hot Standby |
MANUAL REACTOR TRIP DUE TO REPORTED FIRE ON ISOPHASE BUS DUCT
The following information was provided by the licensee via fax email:
"At 0238 CDT on 9/26/2022 with Unit 2 in Mode 1 at 100 percent power, the reactor manually tripped due to a reported fire on the isophase bus duct. The trip was uncomplicated with all systems responding normally post-trip with the exception of the 2A reactor protection system power supply, which tripped and power was transferred to the alternate source. The fire was reported extinguished at 0240 CDT on 9/26/2022. Due to the reactor protection system actuation while critical, this event is being reported as a four-hour, non-emergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B).
"Operations responded using the emergency operating procedure LGA-001 and stabilized the plant in Mode 3. Decay heat is removed by discharging steam to the main condenser using the turbine bypass valves. Unit 1 is not affected.
"There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."
The following information was provided by the licensee via fax email:
"At 0238 CDT on 9/26/2022 with Unit 2 in Mode 1 at 100 percent power, the reactor manually tripped due to a reported fire on the isophase bus duct. The trip was uncomplicated with all systems responding normally post-trip with the exception of the 2A reactor protection system power supply, which tripped and power was transferred to the alternate source. The fire was reported extinguished at 0240 CDT on 9/26/2022. Due to the reactor protection system actuation while critical, this event is being reported as a four-hour, non-emergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B).
"Operations responded using the emergency operating procedure LGA-001 and stabilized the plant in Mode 3. Decay heat is removed by discharging steam to the main condenser using the turbine bypass valves. Unit 1 is not affected.
"There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."
Power Reactor
Event Number: 56127
Facility: Palo Verde
Region: 4 State: AZ
Unit: [1] [2] [3]
RX Type: [1] CE,[2] CE,[3] CE
NRC Notified By: Yolanda Good
HQ OPS Officer: Ernest West
Region: 4 State: AZ
Unit: [1] [2] [3]
RX Type: [1] CE,[2] CE,[3] CE
NRC Notified By: Yolanda Good
HQ OPS Officer: Ernest West
Notification Date: 09/26/2022
Notification Time: 21:16 [ET]
Event Date: 09/26/2022
Event Time: 11:00 [MST]
Last Update Date: 09/26/2022
Notification Time: 21:16 [ET]
Event Date: 09/26/2022
Event Time: 11:00 [MST]
Last Update Date: 09/26/2022
Emergency Class: Non Emergency
10 CFR Section:
26.719 - Fitness For Duty
10 CFR Section:
26.719 - Fitness For Duty
Person (Organization):
Kellar, Ray (R4DO)
FFD Group, (EMAIL)
Kellar, Ray (R4DO)
FFD Group, (EMAIL)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
| 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
| 3 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
FITNESS FOR DUTY (FFD) REPORT
The following information was provided by the licensee via email:
"On September 26, 2022, at approximately 1100 Mountain Standard Time, a Reactor Operator's test results were confirmed positive for use of a controlled substance following a random Fitness For Duty (FFD) screening test and it was determined that the individual violated the station's FFD Policy. The individual's unescorted access has been terminated in accordance with station procedures.
"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."
The following additional information was obtained from the licensee in accordance with Headquarters Operations Officers Report Guidance:
The licensee will conduct an investigation of the individual's work history.
The following information was provided by the licensee via email:
"On September 26, 2022, at approximately 1100 Mountain Standard Time, a Reactor Operator's test results were confirmed positive for use of a controlled substance following a random Fitness For Duty (FFD) screening test and it was determined that the individual violated the station's FFD Policy. The individual's unescorted access has been terminated in accordance with station procedures.
"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."
The following additional information was obtained from the licensee in accordance with Headquarters Operations Officers Report Guidance:
The licensee will conduct an investigation of the individual's work history.
!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
Power Reactor
Event Number: 56128
Facility: Saint Lucie
Region: 2 State: FL
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] CE,[2] CE
NRC Notified By: Ronald Cappillo
HQ OPS Officer: Ernest West
Region: 2 State: FL
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] CE,[2] CE
NRC Notified By: Ronald Cappillo
HQ OPS Officer: Ernest West
Notification Date: 09/26/2022
Notification Time: 22:39 [ET]
Event Date: 09/26/2022
Event Time: 17:41 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 11/11/2022
Notification Time: 22:39 [ET]
Event Date: 09/26/2022
Event Time: 17:41 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 11/11/2022
Emergency Class: Non Emergency
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - Accident Mitigation
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - Accident Mitigation
Person (Organization):
Miller, Mark (R2DO)
Miller, Mark (R2DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | N | 0 | Hot Standby | 0 | Hot Standby |
EN Revision Imported Date: 11/14/2022
EN Revision Text: SAFETY SYSTEM INOPERABILITY
The following information was provided by the licensee via email:
"At 1741 EDT on September 26, 2022, it was discovered that both trains of the chemical volume and control system were simultaneously inoperable due to an unisolable piping flaw detected during plant pressurization in preparation for startup following refueling outage.
"St. Lucie Unit 2 was not affected and remains at 100 percent power.
"This event is being reported pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D).
"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."
* * * RETRACTION FROM RICHARD ROGERS TO DONALD NORWOOD AT 1155 EST ON 11/11/2022 * * *
The following information was provided by the licensee via email:
"The purpose of this notification is to retract a previous report made on 09/26/2022 at 2239 EDT (EN 56128).
"Notification of the event to the NRC was initially made as a result of declaring both trains of U1 Chemical and Volume Control System inoperable due to a piping flaw detected during plant pressurization in preparation for startup following a refueling outage.
"Subsequent to the initial report, FPL [Florida Power and Light] has concluded that the flaw identified in line 2"-CH[1]104 did not exceed (with sufficient margin) the allowable axial flaw size utilizing the ASME Code Case N-869 methodology, and the Chemical and Volume Control System was Operable but degraded for the period of concern.
"Therefore, this event is not considered a Safety System Functional Failure and is not reportable to the NRC as a Licensee Event Report (LER) per 10 CFR 50.73. The NRC Senior Resident Inspector has been notified."
Notified R2DO (Miller).
EN Revision Text: SAFETY SYSTEM INOPERABILITY
The following information was provided by the licensee via email:
"At 1741 EDT on September 26, 2022, it was discovered that both trains of the chemical volume and control system were simultaneously inoperable due to an unisolable piping flaw detected during plant pressurization in preparation for startup following refueling outage.
"St. Lucie Unit 2 was not affected and remains at 100 percent power.
"This event is being reported pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D).
"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."
* * * RETRACTION FROM RICHARD ROGERS TO DONALD NORWOOD AT 1155 EST ON 11/11/2022 * * *
The following information was provided by the licensee via email:
"The purpose of this notification is to retract a previous report made on 09/26/2022 at 2239 EDT (EN 56128).
"Notification of the event to the NRC was initially made as a result of declaring both trains of U1 Chemical and Volume Control System inoperable due to a piping flaw detected during plant pressurization in preparation for startup following a refueling outage.
"Subsequent to the initial report, FPL [Florida Power and Light] has concluded that the flaw identified in line 2"-CH[1]104 did not exceed (with sufficient margin) the allowable axial flaw size utilizing the ASME Code Case N-869 methodology, and the Chemical and Volume Control System was Operable but degraded for the period of concern.
"Therefore, this event is not considered a Safety System Functional Failure and is not reportable to the NRC as a Licensee Event Report (LER) per 10 CFR 50.73. The NRC Senior Resident Inspector has been notified."
Notified R2DO (Miller).
Agreement State
Event Number: 56124
Rep Org: Illinois Emergency Mgmt. Agency
Licensee: NASHNal Soil Testing
Region: 3
City: Michigan City State: IN
County:
License #: IL-02440-01
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: Gary Forsee
HQ OPS Officer: Ernest West
Licensee: NASHNal Soil Testing
Region: 3
City: Michigan City State: IN
County:
License #: IL-02440-01
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: Gary Forsee
HQ OPS Officer: Ernest West
Notification Date: 09/26/2022
Notification Time: 15:19 [ET]
Event Date: 09/26/2022
Event Time: 00:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 09/26/2022
Notification Time: 15:19 [ET]
Event Date: 09/26/2022
Event Time: 00:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 09/26/2022
Emergency Class: Non Emergency
10 CFR Section:
Agreement State
10 CFR Section:
Agreement State
Person (Organization):
Szwarc, Dariusz (R3DO)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFICATION (EMAIL)
ILTAB, (EMAIL)
Szwarc, Dariusz (R3DO)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFICATION (EMAIL)
ILTAB, (EMAIL)
AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - STOLEN GAUGE
The following information was provided by the Illinois Emergency Management Agency (The Agency) via email:
"[The radiation safety officer of] NASHnal Soil Testing (RML IL-02440-01) contacted the Agency at approximately 1200 [CDT] on 9/26/22, to report the theft of a Troxler model 3440 moisture density gauge (S/N 29187) from a jobsite in Michigan City, IN, sometime between the afternoon of 9/24/22 and 0700 on 9/26/22. The Illinois licensee was working in the state of Indiana under Nuclear Regulatory Commission jurisdiction under reciprocity. Local law enforcement had been notified and already departed the scene. Reportedly, the locks on up to ten storage containers were cut and the contents stolen. Two additional gauges were stolen from another licensee, but were recovered on site. The gauges were not co-located and reportedly the stolen gauge was locked within a jobsite box, within a locked storage container. The Agency is actively inquiring if the gauge handle was properly locked and if the gauge was stolen within its transport container.
"Agency inspectors will perform a reactionary inspection this week, obtain a copy of the police report to update Nuclear Material Events Database, and any other updates added as they become available."
Illinois Event Number: IL220034
THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A 'Less than Cat 3' LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL
Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf
The following information was provided by the Illinois Emergency Management Agency (The Agency) via email:
"[The radiation safety officer of] NASHnal Soil Testing (RML IL-02440-01) contacted the Agency at approximately 1200 [CDT] on 9/26/22, to report the theft of a Troxler model 3440 moisture density gauge (S/N 29187) from a jobsite in Michigan City, IN, sometime between the afternoon of 9/24/22 and 0700 on 9/26/22. The Illinois licensee was working in the state of Indiana under Nuclear Regulatory Commission jurisdiction under reciprocity. Local law enforcement had been notified and already departed the scene. Reportedly, the locks on up to ten storage containers were cut and the contents stolen. Two additional gauges were stolen from another licensee, but were recovered on site. The gauges were not co-located and reportedly the stolen gauge was locked within a jobsite box, within a locked storage container. The Agency is actively inquiring if the gauge handle was properly locked and if the gauge was stolen within its transport container.
"Agency inspectors will perform a reactionary inspection this week, obtain a copy of the police report to update Nuclear Material Events Database, and any other updates added as they become available."
Illinois Event Number: IL220034
THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A 'Less than Cat 3' LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL
Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf
Agreement State
Event Number: 56335
Rep Org: Illinois Emergency Mgmt. Agency
Licensee: Jiva Resources
Region: 3
City: Sauget State: IL
County:
License #: GL 9223880
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: Gary Forsee
HQ OPS Officer: Bill Gott
Licensee: Jiva Resources
Region: 3
City: Sauget State: IL
County:
License #: GL 9223880
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: Gary Forsee
HQ OPS Officer: Bill Gott
Notification Date: 02/03/2023
Notification Time: 14:39 [ET]
Event Date: 09/26/2022
Event Time: 00:00 [CST]
Last Update Date: 12/11/2023
Notification Time: 14:39 [ET]
Event Date: 09/26/2022
Event Time: 00:00 [CST]
Last Update Date: 12/11/2023
Emergency Class: Non Emergency
10 CFR Section:
Agreement State
10 CFR Section:
Agreement State
Person (Organization):
Szwarc, Dariusz (R3DO)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFICATION (EMAIL)
Rivera-Capella, Gretchen (NMSS DAY)
Szwarc, Dariusz (R3DO)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFICATION (EMAIL)
Rivera-Capella, Gretchen (NMSS DAY)
EN Revision Imported Date: 12/12/2023
EN Revision Text: AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - SEALED SOURCE GAUGES INVOLVED IN A FIRE
The following information was provided by the Illinois Emergency Management Agency (the Agency) via email:
"The Agency was contacted on February 3, 2023, by Jiva Resources in Sauget, IL to advise that five Cs-137 gauges had been impacted by a fire in September 2022. A Jiva Resources representative called and initially reported the five radioactive gauges as stolen 'in the last week.' When Agency staff returned his call that same morning, the devices had been located but were identified as having been involved in a fire back in September 2022. While the container (sealed drum) holding the gauges was impacted by the fire, it is unclear if there was any impact to the gauges. The devices include two Ohmart model SH-F1 gauges (serial numbers 2879GK and 1652GK) and three Vega model SR-A gauges (serial numbers 2174GK, 2878GK, and 63008). All contain 20 millicuries of Cs-137 except for serial number 63008 which contains 30 millicuries of Cs-137. It should be noted the SH-F1 housings are identified in the Sealed Source and Device Registry as being fireproof (rated above 800 degrees Celsius for 30 minutes) while the SR-A housings are lead-filled cylindrical steel shells, which are noted for retaining the source should the lead shielding melt out. Exposure rates should be less than 5 mR/hr at one foot - which will be confirmed by Agency staff. Leak tests will be conducted and source security assessed. Additional regulatory requirements regarding proper disposal, storage, leak testing and reporting will be investigated as well."
* * * UPDATE ON 02/06/2023 AT 1248 EST FROM GARY FORSEE TO LLOYD DESOTELL * * *
The following information was provided by the Illinois Emergency Management Agency (the Agency) via email:
"Agency staff attempted to perform a reactionary inspection the morning of February 6, 2023, to inspect the condition of the five radioactive gauges identified above. This effort confirmed that the registrant did in fact lose accountability of the gauges as it appears they were stolen at some point in the last four months. The last known location was in Sauget, IL in September 2022 when that storage location was involved in a fire. Since that time, the building has reportedly been accessible to looters. Local scrap yards and public safety partners will be notified."
Illinois Incident Number: IL230002
Notified: R3DO (Szwarc); NMSS Events Notification and ILTAB via email.
* * * UPDATE ON 04/04/2023 AT 1120 EDT FROM GARY FORSEE TO BRIAN LIN * * *
The following information was provided by the Illinois Emergency Management Agency (the Agency) via email:
"On 3/7/23 the property owner (39N properties) was contacted to coordinate a site visit. The Agency was advised that on 2/23/2023, all assets were transferred to JET Resources by matter of court decision. The Agency staff coordinated with the new property owners and performed a site visit on 3/30/2023. The Agency staff performed surveys for nearly 2.5 hours to attempt to locate the gauges. While it is possible the gauges may still be buried beneath debris, surveys on the accessible surface did not show evidence of the gauges. Sodium iodide surveys performed throughout the site yielded count rates that were indistinguishable from background. The area is secured and looting does not appear to be an issue as initially reported. Site cleanup is ongoing and the new owners will coordinate with the Agency if anything suspect is located. The contractor has radiation detection equipment. Enforcement regarding this matter is ongoing. While this report will be updated with any developments, all available evidence indicates these gauges are no longer on the site and were either stolen or improperly transferred by the previous owners. This matter is considered closed by the Agency unless additional information becomes available."
Notified: R3DO (Orlikowski); NMSS Events Notification, NMSS Regional Coordinator (Rivera-Capel), and ILTAB via email.
* * * UPDATE ON 12/11/23 AT 1240 FROM WHITNEY COX TO KAREN COTTON * * *
The following information was provided by the Illinois Emergency Management Agency (the Agency) via email:
"ONS-RAM [Office of Nuclear Safety - Radioactive Materials] was contacted by Illinois Environmental Protection Agency on 12/6/23, to advise that they had discovered what appeared to be generally licensed gauges, reported as lost/abandoned in February of this year at Jive Resources in Sauget, IL. IEMA-OHS [Illinois Emergency Management Agency - Office of Homeland Security] staff responded and recovered three generally licensed gauges containing 20-30 mCi of Cs-137 each. The gauges were found corroded, partially submerged, and had been involved in a fire. Field surveys/wipes did not show evidence of leakage, but ash samples and wipes will be submitted to the lab for confirmation. Two gauges remain unaccounted for, but were not located after additional searches/surveys of the site.
"The following gauges were recovered: Vega Americas Model SR-A gauges with S/Ns 2174GK, 2878GK, and 63008."
Notified: R3DO (McCraw); NMSS Events Notification, NMSS Regional Coordinator (Brenneman), and ILTAB via email.
THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A 'Less than Cat 3' LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL
Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf
EN Revision Text: AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - SEALED SOURCE GAUGES INVOLVED IN A FIRE
The following information was provided by the Illinois Emergency Management Agency (the Agency) via email:
"The Agency was contacted on February 3, 2023, by Jiva Resources in Sauget, IL to advise that five Cs-137 gauges had been impacted by a fire in September 2022. A Jiva Resources representative called and initially reported the five radioactive gauges as stolen 'in the last week.' When Agency staff returned his call that same morning, the devices had been located but were identified as having been involved in a fire back in September 2022. While the container (sealed drum) holding the gauges was impacted by the fire, it is unclear if there was any impact to the gauges. The devices include two Ohmart model SH-F1 gauges (serial numbers 2879GK and 1652GK) and three Vega model SR-A gauges (serial numbers 2174GK, 2878GK, and 63008). All contain 20 millicuries of Cs-137 except for serial number 63008 which contains 30 millicuries of Cs-137. It should be noted the SH-F1 housings are identified in the Sealed Source and Device Registry as being fireproof (rated above 800 degrees Celsius for 30 minutes) while the SR-A housings are lead-filled cylindrical steel shells, which are noted for retaining the source should the lead shielding melt out. Exposure rates should be less than 5 mR/hr at one foot - which will be confirmed by Agency staff. Leak tests will be conducted and source security assessed. Additional regulatory requirements regarding proper disposal, storage, leak testing and reporting will be investigated as well."
* * * UPDATE ON 02/06/2023 AT 1248 EST FROM GARY FORSEE TO LLOYD DESOTELL * * *
The following information was provided by the Illinois Emergency Management Agency (the Agency) via email:
"Agency staff attempted to perform a reactionary inspection the morning of February 6, 2023, to inspect the condition of the five radioactive gauges identified above. This effort confirmed that the registrant did in fact lose accountability of the gauges as it appears they were stolen at some point in the last four months. The last known location was in Sauget, IL in September 2022 when that storage location was involved in a fire. Since that time, the building has reportedly been accessible to looters. Local scrap yards and public safety partners will be notified."
Illinois Incident Number: IL230002
Notified: R3DO (Szwarc); NMSS Events Notification and ILTAB via email.
* * * UPDATE ON 04/04/2023 AT 1120 EDT FROM GARY FORSEE TO BRIAN LIN * * *
The following information was provided by the Illinois Emergency Management Agency (the Agency) via email:
"On 3/7/23 the property owner (39N properties) was contacted to coordinate a site visit. The Agency was advised that on 2/23/2023, all assets were transferred to JET Resources by matter of court decision. The Agency staff coordinated with the new property owners and performed a site visit on 3/30/2023. The Agency staff performed surveys for nearly 2.5 hours to attempt to locate the gauges. While it is possible the gauges may still be buried beneath debris, surveys on the accessible surface did not show evidence of the gauges. Sodium iodide surveys performed throughout the site yielded count rates that were indistinguishable from background. The area is secured and looting does not appear to be an issue as initially reported. Site cleanup is ongoing and the new owners will coordinate with the Agency if anything suspect is located. The contractor has radiation detection equipment. Enforcement regarding this matter is ongoing. While this report will be updated with any developments, all available evidence indicates these gauges are no longer on the site and were either stolen or improperly transferred by the previous owners. This matter is considered closed by the Agency unless additional information becomes available."
Notified: R3DO (Orlikowski); NMSS Events Notification, NMSS Regional Coordinator (Rivera-Capel), and ILTAB via email.
* * * UPDATE ON 12/11/23 AT 1240 FROM WHITNEY COX TO KAREN COTTON * * *
The following information was provided by the Illinois Emergency Management Agency (the Agency) via email:
"ONS-RAM [Office of Nuclear Safety - Radioactive Materials] was contacted by Illinois Environmental Protection Agency on 12/6/23, to advise that they had discovered what appeared to be generally licensed gauges, reported as lost/abandoned in February of this year at Jive Resources in Sauget, IL. IEMA-OHS [Illinois Emergency Management Agency - Office of Homeland Security] staff responded and recovered three generally licensed gauges containing 20-30 mCi of Cs-137 each. The gauges were found corroded, partially submerged, and had been involved in a fire. Field surveys/wipes did not show evidence of leakage, but ash samples and wipes will be submitted to the lab for confirmation. Two gauges remain unaccounted for, but were not located after additional searches/surveys of the site.
"The following gauges were recovered: Vega Americas Model SR-A gauges with S/Ns 2174GK, 2878GK, and 63008."
Notified: R3DO (McCraw); NMSS Events Notification, NMSS Regional Coordinator (Brenneman), and ILTAB via email.
THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A 'Less than Cat 3' LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL
Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf