Event Notification Report for September 10, 2022
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
09/09/2022 - 09/10/2022
Agreement State
Event Number: 56103
Rep Org: Louisiana Radiation Protection Div
Licensee: GIT Services, LLC
Region: 4
City: Baton Rouge State: LA
County:
License #: LA-12907-L01, Amendment 26, AI# 188034
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: Russell Clark
HQ OPS Officer: Ernest West
Licensee: GIT Services, LLC
Region: 4
City: Baton Rouge State: LA
County:
License #: LA-12907-L01, Amendment 26, AI# 188034
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: Russell Clark
HQ OPS Officer: Ernest West
Notification Date: 09/12/2022
Notification Time: 17:33 [ET]
Event Date: 09/10/2022
Event Time: 14:25 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 09/12/2022
Notification Time: 17:33 [ET]
Event Date: 09/10/2022
Event Time: 14:25 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 09/12/2022
Emergency Class: Non Emergency
10 CFR Section:
Agreement State
10 CFR Section:
Agreement State
Person (Organization):
Drake, James (R4DO)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFICATION (EMAIL)
Drake, James (R4DO)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFICATION (EMAIL)
AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - UNABLE TO RETRACT SOURCE
The following information was received by email from the state of Louisiana Department of Environmental Quality:
"On September 10, 2022 at approximately 1445 [CDT], a source hang out incident occurred while an industrial radiography crew was working at Cembell Industries, Inc., a steel fabrication facility located in St. Charles Parish, Louisiana.
"The radiography crew was working on ground level in the main fabrication shop of the facility. After approximately five seven-minute exposures to a 48-inch outer diameter schedule 40 steel pipe, using a 4-HVL panoramic collimator, the crew was suddenly unable to crank in the source after repeated retraction attempts. The crew took apart the pistol grip on their crank out controls and observed a broken drive cable. The crank out controls were manufactured by Industrial Radiography Maintenance and Supply (IRMS), device serial number, 22JA15867. The crew then pulled the remaining free end of the drive cable continuous with the source assembly and succeeded in pulling the source completely into the shielded position within the crew's Model 880D exposure device. Approximately three feet of the drive cable on the near end had broken off.
"The crew's exposure device automatic lock was observed to function properly upon shielding the source. Crew members read their direct-reading pocket dosimeters and noted cumulative daily exposures of 62 mR and 68 mR. After briefing their RSO on the successful source retraction, the crew utilized a backup set of crank out controls and completed the temporary job. In an abundance of caution, the RSO of the crew collected the crew's Landauer body badges and [sent] the badges to Landauer for rush processing.
"No rust, corrosion or birdcaging was observed by the manufacturer, IRMS, upon physical inspection of the crank out controls and drive cable pieces. The root cause investigation by the manufacturer is still ongoing to determine what caused extreme tension in the cable, which contributed to its breakage. The RSO stated he believed the distal end of the cable had become snared in a crimped copper fitting, which was attached to conduit on one end and to a swivel on the pistol grip at the other. The IRMS crank out controls were approximately 45 feet in length and all components were manufactured by IRMS. The crew's source guide tube was in good physical condition and was approximately six feet in length.
"Note: because the crew's pocket dosimeters did not go off scale and the crew members did not approach the high radiation area at any time during expedient retraction operations in which the source was re-shielded, the above incident is being treated as a source retraction rather than a source retrieval. The RSO stated the source was fixed during the incident approximately one to two inches in front of the exposure device outlet nipple, which provided non-negligible shielding throughout the incident.
"The radiography exposure device was a QSA Model 880 Delta, device serial number, D13936. The source, Model A-424-9, was a sealed source of Ir-192 with 97.2 Ci of activity. The source serial number was 53444M."
Louisiana Event Report ID Number: LA20220008
The following information was received by email from the state of Louisiana Department of Environmental Quality:
"On September 10, 2022 at approximately 1445 [CDT], a source hang out incident occurred while an industrial radiography crew was working at Cembell Industries, Inc., a steel fabrication facility located in St. Charles Parish, Louisiana.
"The radiography crew was working on ground level in the main fabrication shop of the facility. After approximately five seven-minute exposures to a 48-inch outer diameter schedule 40 steel pipe, using a 4-HVL panoramic collimator, the crew was suddenly unable to crank in the source after repeated retraction attempts. The crew took apart the pistol grip on their crank out controls and observed a broken drive cable. The crank out controls were manufactured by Industrial Radiography Maintenance and Supply (IRMS), device serial number, 22JA15867. The crew then pulled the remaining free end of the drive cable continuous with the source assembly and succeeded in pulling the source completely into the shielded position within the crew's Model 880D exposure device. Approximately three feet of the drive cable on the near end had broken off.
"The crew's exposure device automatic lock was observed to function properly upon shielding the source. Crew members read their direct-reading pocket dosimeters and noted cumulative daily exposures of 62 mR and 68 mR. After briefing their RSO on the successful source retraction, the crew utilized a backup set of crank out controls and completed the temporary job. In an abundance of caution, the RSO of the crew collected the crew's Landauer body badges and [sent] the badges to Landauer for rush processing.
"No rust, corrosion or birdcaging was observed by the manufacturer, IRMS, upon physical inspection of the crank out controls and drive cable pieces. The root cause investigation by the manufacturer is still ongoing to determine what caused extreme tension in the cable, which contributed to its breakage. The RSO stated he believed the distal end of the cable had become snared in a crimped copper fitting, which was attached to conduit on one end and to a swivel on the pistol grip at the other. The IRMS crank out controls were approximately 45 feet in length and all components were manufactured by IRMS. The crew's source guide tube was in good physical condition and was approximately six feet in length.
"Note: because the crew's pocket dosimeters did not go off scale and the crew members did not approach the high radiation area at any time during expedient retraction operations in which the source was re-shielded, the above incident is being treated as a source retraction rather than a source retrieval. The RSO stated the source was fixed during the incident approximately one to two inches in front of the exposure device outlet nipple, which provided non-negligible shielding throughout the incident.
"The radiography exposure device was a QSA Model 880 Delta, device serial number, D13936. The source, Model A-424-9, was a sealed source of Ir-192 with 97.2 Ci of activity. The source serial number was 53444M."
Louisiana Event Report ID Number: LA20220008
Power Reactor
Event Number: 39230
Facility: BEAVER VALLEY
Region: 1 State: PA
Unit: [] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-3-LP,[2] W-3-LP
NRC Notified By: PETE SENA
HQ OPS Officer: RICH LAURA
Region: 1 State: PA
Unit: [] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-3-LP,[2] W-3-LP
NRC Notified By: PETE SENA
HQ OPS Officer: RICH LAURA
Notification Date: 09/29/2002
Notification Time: 20:20 [ET]
Event Date: 09/10/2022
Event Time: 17:32 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 09/29/2002
Notification Time: 20:20 [ET]
Event Date: 09/10/2022
Event Time: 17:32 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 09/29/2002
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.73(a)(1) - INVALID SPECIF SYSTEM ACTUATION
10 CFR Section:
50.73(a)(1) - INVALID SPECIF SYSTEM ACTUATION
Person (Organization):
ANIELLO DELLA GRECA (R1)
ANIELLO DELLA GRECA (R1)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
INADVERTENT START OF A STANDBY SERVICE WATER PUMP DURING RESTORATION FROM A CALIBRATION ACTIVITY
"On September 10, 2002 at 1732 hrs, a pressure transmitter in the Service Water System was being returned to service after the performance of an instrument calibration procedure. The transmitter was being vented in order to return the transmitter to service. During the venting evolution, an inadvertent start of 2SWE-P21B, B Standby Service Water Pump, occurred. The pump start was due to low pressure as seen by a second transmitter, which shares a common sensing line with the transmitter that was being vented. This second transmitter provides an input to the auto start feature for the B Standby Service Water Pump. Venting the transmitter caused low pressure in the common sensing line which activated the auto start feature. Since the low pressure was only seen locally at the transmitter and not throughout the system, this was an invalid actuation. Low service water system header pressure is the parameter which would activate this feature and low service water system header pressure was not experienced during this event. A complete actuation of the B train of the Standby Service Water System occurred and the system functioned properly.
"This event is reportable pursuant to 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) since it involved an automatic actuation of an emergency service water system that does not normally run and that serves as an ultimate heat sink as per 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(B)(9). This actuation was not part of a pre-planned sequence and did not occur with this system properly removed from service.
"However, pursuant to 10 CFR 50.73(a)(1), this event is being reported via this telephone notification instead of submitting a written Licensee Event Report since the automatic actuation of the Standby Service Water pump was not generated by a valid actuation."
The NRC Resident was notified.
"On September 10, 2002 at 1732 hrs, a pressure transmitter in the Service Water System was being returned to service after the performance of an instrument calibration procedure. The transmitter was being vented in order to return the transmitter to service. During the venting evolution, an inadvertent start of 2SWE-P21B, B Standby Service Water Pump, occurred. The pump start was due to low pressure as seen by a second transmitter, which shares a common sensing line with the transmitter that was being vented. This second transmitter provides an input to the auto start feature for the B Standby Service Water Pump. Venting the transmitter caused low pressure in the common sensing line which activated the auto start feature. Since the low pressure was only seen locally at the transmitter and not throughout the system, this was an invalid actuation. Low service water system header pressure is the parameter which would activate this feature and low service water system header pressure was not experienced during this event. A complete actuation of the B train of the Standby Service Water System occurred and the system functioned properly.
"This event is reportable pursuant to 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) since it involved an automatic actuation of an emergency service water system that does not normally run and that serves as an ultimate heat sink as per 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(B)(9). This actuation was not part of a pre-planned sequence and did not occur with this system properly removed from service.
"However, pursuant to 10 CFR 50.73(a)(1), this event is being reported via this telephone notification instead of submitting a written Licensee Event Report since the automatic actuation of the Standby Service Water pump was not generated by a valid actuation."
The NRC Resident was notified.