Event Notification Report for August 19, 2022

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - GAMMA KNIFE MALFUNCTION

The following information was provided by South Carolina Department of Health & Environmental Control via email:
"The South Carolina Department of Health and Environmental Control was notified on 08/10/2022, during a follow-up of a routine inspection, that a Leksell Gamma Knife Perfexion gamma stereotactic radiosurgery unit had failed to function as designed. The licensee [Prisma Health Richland Hospital] is reporting that during routine maintenance that was conducted by the manufacturer on 11/01/2021, it was discovered that a sector was dragging and not transferring smoothly. The licensee is reporting that one of the sealed sources had slipped less than 1/8 inch within one of the source cavities of the Leksell Gamma Knife Perfexion unit. The sealed source is a Co-60 Elekta Model 43685 medical teletherapy source, with an estimated activity between 20-22 curies. The licensee is reporting the unit was repaired and source reseeded on 11/05/2021. The licensee is reporting no overexposures to workers, patients, or members of the public. All sealed sources were leak tested on 11/05/2021 and results indicated that no sources were leaking. This event is under investigation by the South Carolina Department of Health and Environmental Control."

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - STUCK SHUTTER

The following was reported by the State of Tennessee via email:

"During weekly checks on the device located on a kiln scrubber sump tank, it was discovered by a Vega [device manufacturer] technician that the shutter would not close on the device. The shutter is in the 'open' position, which is the normal operating position. The technician deemed it to be unrepairable in the field. The licensee is in contact with the manufacturer to have the device removed. Licensee estimates 2-3 weeks before a replacement can be ordered. The device information is as follows:

Manufacturer: Ohmart/Vega
Model: SH-F1
Isotope: Cs-137, 50 mCi
Source Model: A-2102 (originally CDC 700)
Source SN: 6648GK

"Corrective actions or reports will be updated with a report within 30 days."

Tennessee State Event Report ID NO.: TN-22-059

PART 21 INTERIM REPORT OF DEVIATION

The following is a summary of a report provided by Southern Nuclear:

On May 23, 2022, Framatome notified Farley Nuclear Power Plant, among other plants, by letter of a potential nonconformance in certain Siemens medium voltage circuit breakers that could create a substantial safety hazard in certain applications. Southern Nuclear has determined that additional time beyond the 60-day evaluation period is needed to perform the necessary walkdowns of the installed equipment and complete the substantial safety hazard evaluation for reportability in accordance with 10 CFR 21. At the time, Framatome did not have enough information to determine where licensees intended to or had installed the supplied breakers, or how many breakers within the population supplied were actually nonconforming. The interim report does not describe details of the nonconformance and the original May 23, 2022 letter was not sent to the Headquarters Operations Center.

Contact Information:
Ryan Joyce, Fleet Licensing Manager, (205) 992-6468

Known affected plant: Farley among others

SAFETY SYSTEM INOPERABILITY

The following information was provided by the licensee via email:

"At 2108 EDT on August 17, 2022 the Division 2 Mechanical Draft Cooling Tower (MDCT) fans were declared inoperable due to failure of the over speed fan brake inverter. The brakes prevent fan over speed from a design basis tornado. The MDCT fans are required to support operability of the Ultimate Heat Sink (UHS). The UHS is required to support operability of the Division 2 Emergency Equipment Cooling Water (EECW) system. The Division 2 EECW system cools various safety related components, including the High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) room cooler and Division 2 Control Center HVAC (CCHVAC) chiller. An unplanned HPCI inoperability occurred based on a loss of the HPCI Room Cooler. At the time of the event, Division I CCHVAC was inoperable for maintenance (but was running for a maintenance run) and the event caused an inoperability of Division 2 CCHVAC. This resulted in an inoperability of both divisions of CCHVAC. Failure of the Division 2 MDCT Fan brake inverter occurred due to a trip of the DC input breaker. The breaker was reset at 2128 EDT restoring Division 2 UHS Operability. This report is being made pursuant to 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) as a condition that at the time of discovery could have prevented the fulfilment of the safety function of structures or systems that are needed to mitigate the consequences of an accident based on a loss of a single train safety system and loss of both divisions of a safety system.

"The Senior NRC Resident Inspector has been notified"

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - UNABLE TO RETRACT SOURCE INTO RADIOGRAPHY EXPOSURE DEVICE

The following information was provided by the Texas Department of State Health Services via email:

"On August 13, 2022, licensee reported that they were unable to retract a radiography source on the evening of August 12 at around 2030 CDT. The incident occurred north of the city of Stanton, TX. The two radiographers reported the issue to the site Radiation Safety Officer (RSO) who was at their work site. A barrier was set up and a case of water was placed over the source. The site RSO got another licensee employee to assist and they uncrimped the guideline and successfully retracted the source. The site RSO and second source retrieval employee are both authorized for source retrievals on the Texas license. The two radiographers did not receive significant dose from this event. The site RSO and second source retrieval employee received 1.1 mR and 0.6 mR, respectively. The two took turns going up to the source and uncrimping the guideline. The camera was a QSA Delta 880 and the source was 40 Ci Ir-192. Further information will be provided per SA-300."

Texas Incident #: 9947

EN Revision Imported Date: 8/22/2022

EN Revision Text: AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - CONTAMINATION SPREAD TO UNRESTRICTED AREAS
The following information was received via email from the Arkansas Department of State Health, Radiation Control Program (the Agency):

"PETNET Solutions, Arkansas, reported to the Agency on August 18, 2022, that there had been a contamination event of materials with long-lived activation products, specifically Co-56, Mn-52, and Mn-54. This contamination event occurred in the cyclotron room where a target window exploded. Contamination spread to the unrestricted areas outside the Little Rock PETNET facility, i.e. in the hallways of the St. Vincent Hospital. A radiation safety team from the corporate office in Tennessee has been onsite since late Wednesday, August 17, 2022, working to decontaminate the St. Vincent areas. They have been successful in that decontamination effort and have alerted the St. Vincent RSO to make them aware of the situation. The Agency will be performing an onsite investigation on Friday morning, August 19, 2022."

Arkansas Event Report ID number: AR-2022-04

FOUR AUTOMATIC DEPRESSURIZATION SYSTEM VALVES INOPERABLE

The following information was provided by the licensee via email:

"At 1215 CDT on 8/19/2022, with Grand Gulf Nuclear Station in Mode 1 and at 100 percent power, four Automatic Depressurization System (ADS) valves were rendered inoperable due to a loss of system pressure. The station entered Technical Specification 3.5.1 Condition G.

"This event is being reported under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) as an event or condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of a safety function.

"There were no other systems affected as a result of this condition.

"The NRC Senior Resident Inspector was notified."


The following additional information was obtained from the licensee in accordance with Headquarters Operations Officers Report Guidance: Plans are to remain in Mode 1 until corrected or until driven by the Technical Specifications to shut down (12-hour LCO from 1215 CDT on 8/19/2022).

TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION REQUIRED SHUTDOWN

The following information was provided by the licensee via fax or email:

"At 2342 CDT on August 19, 2022, with Grand Gulf Nuclear Station in Mode 1 and at 40 percent power, the station initiated a normal shutdown to comply with its Technical Specifications (TS). The station entered Mode 3 at 0000 CDT August 20, 2022 to comply with (LCO) 3.5.1 Condition G Action G.1 due to the condition reported to NRC previously (EN 56058).

"This event is being reported under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(i) as a shutdown required by the plant's technical specifications.

"The NRC Senior Resident Inspector was notified."

The following additional information was obtained from the licensee in accordance with Headquarters Operations Officers Report Guidance:

The plant is now in a 36-hour LCO to be in Mode 4 due to Low Low Set Valves inoperability per TS 3.6.1.6.

ALCOHOL DISCOVERED WITHIN THE PROTECTED AREA

A non-licensed, non-supervisory employee had a confirmed positive for alcohol during a for-cause fitness-for-duty test. Subsequent investigation revealed the presence of alcohol within the Protected Area. The employee's access to the plant has been terminated.