Event Notification Report for August 17, 2022
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
08/16/2022 - 08/17/2022
Agreement State
Event Number: 56057
Rep Org: Arkansas Department of Health
Licensee: PETNET Solutions
Region: 4
City: Little Rock State: AR
County:
License #: ARK-0953-02500
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: Susan Elliott
HQ OPS Officer: Solomon Sahle
Licensee: PETNET Solutions
Region: 4
City: Little Rock State: AR
County:
License #: ARK-0953-02500
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: Susan Elliott
HQ OPS Officer: Solomon Sahle
Notification Date: 08/19/2022
Notification Time: 11:13 [ET]
Event Date: 08/17/2022
Event Time: 00:00 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 08/22/2022
Notification Time: 11:13 [ET]
Event Date: 08/17/2022
Event Time: 00:00 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 08/22/2022
Emergency Class: Non Emergency
10 CFR Section:
Agreement State
10 CFR Section:
Agreement State
Person (Organization):
Werner, Greg (R4DO)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFICATION (EMAIL)
Werner, Greg (R4DO)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFICATION (EMAIL)
EN Revision Imported Date: 8/22/2022
EN Revision Text: AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - CONTAMINATION SPREAD TO UNRESTRICTED AREAS
The following information was received via email from the Arkansas Department of State Health, Radiation Control Program (the Agency):
"PETNET Solutions, Arkansas, reported to the Agency on August 18, 2022, that there had been a contamination event of materials with long-lived activation products, specifically Co-56, Mn-52, and Mn-54. This contamination event occurred in the cyclotron room where a target window exploded. Contamination spread to the unrestricted areas outside the Little Rock PETNET facility, i.e. in the hallways of the St. Vincent Hospital. A radiation safety team from the corporate office in Tennessee has been onsite since late Wednesday, August 17, 2022, working to decontaminate the St. Vincent areas. They have been successful in that decontamination effort and have alerted the St. Vincent RSO to make them aware of the situation. The Agency will be performing an onsite investigation on Friday morning, August 19, 2022."
Arkansas Event Report ID number: AR-2022-04
EN Revision Text: AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - CONTAMINATION SPREAD TO UNRESTRICTED AREAS
The following information was received via email from the Arkansas Department of State Health, Radiation Control Program (the Agency):
"PETNET Solutions, Arkansas, reported to the Agency on August 18, 2022, that there had been a contamination event of materials with long-lived activation products, specifically Co-56, Mn-52, and Mn-54. This contamination event occurred in the cyclotron room where a target window exploded. Contamination spread to the unrestricted areas outside the Little Rock PETNET facility, i.e. in the hallways of the St. Vincent Hospital. A radiation safety team from the corporate office in Tennessee has been onsite since late Wednesday, August 17, 2022, working to decontaminate the St. Vincent areas. They have been successful in that decontamination effort and have alerted the St. Vincent RSO to make them aware of the situation. The Agency will be performing an onsite investigation on Friday morning, August 19, 2022."
Arkansas Event Report ID number: AR-2022-04
!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
Power Reactor
Event Number: 56054
Facility: Fermi
Region: 3 State: MI
Unit: [2] [] []
RX Type: [2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: Greg Miller
HQ OPS Officer: Brian Lin
Region: 3 State: MI
Unit: [2] [] []
RX Type: [2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: Greg Miller
HQ OPS Officer: Brian Lin
Notification Date: 08/18/2022
Notification Time: 01:20 [ET]
Event Date: 08/17/2022
Event Time: 21:08 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 09/08/2022
Notification Time: 01:20 [ET]
Event Date: 08/17/2022
Event Time: 21:08 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 09/08/2022
Emergency Class: Non Emergency
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - Accident Mitigation
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - Accident Mitigation
Person (Organization):
Orth, Steve (R3DO)
Orth, Steve (R3DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
EN Revision Imported Date: 9/8/2022
EN Revision Text: SAFETY SYSTEM INOPERABILITY
The following information was provided by the licensee via email:
"At 2108 EDT on August 17, 2022 the Division 2 Mechanical Draft Cooling Tower (MDCT) fans were declared inoperable due to failure of the over speed fan brake inverter. The brakes prevent fan over speed from a design basis tornado. The MDCT fans are required to support operability of the Ultimate Heat Sink (UHS). The UHS is required to support operability of the Division 2 Emergency Equipment Cooling Water (EECW) system. The Division 2 EECW system cools various safety related components, including the High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) room cooler and Division 2 Control Center HVAC (CCHVAC) chiller. An unplanned HPCI inoperability occurred based on a loss of the HPCI Room Cooler. At the time of the event, Division I CCHVAC was inoperable for maintenance (but was running for a maintenance run) and the event caused an inoperability of Division 2 CCHVAC. This resulted in an inoperability of both divisions of CCHVAC. Failure of the Division 2 MDCT Fan brake inverter occurred due to a trip of the DC input breaker. The breaker was reset at 2128 EDT restoring Division 2 UHS Operability. This report is being made pursuant to 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) as a condition that at the time of discovery could have prevented the fulfilment of the safety function of structures or systems that are needed to mitigate the consequences of an accident based on a loss of a single train safety system and loss of both divisions of a safety system.
"The Senior NRC Resident Inspector has been notified"
* * * RETRACTION ON 09/08/2022 AT 0856 EDT FROM JEFF MYERS TO MIKE STAFFORD * * *
The following information was provided by the licensee via email:
"On 8/17/22 at 2108 EDT the Division 2 (Div. 2) mechanical draft cooling tower (MDCT) brake inverter input breaker tripped for an unknown cause. The result of the loss of power was the inoperability of the MDCT fan brakes which impacts the ultimate heat sink (UHS) (TS 3.7.2). The UHS cascades to the EECW (emergency equipment cooling water) (TS 3.7.2) which is a support system for Div. 2 CCHVAC (Control Cell) Chiller A/C system (TS 3.7.4). This resulted in the inoperability of the Div. 2 CCHVAC Chiller.
"The cause for the breaker to trip is an intermittent electrical transient. Immediate corrective action was to reset the breaker, and the long-term action is to implement a modification to mitigate susceptibility to voltage variations. Div. 1 has implemented this long-term mod and no unexpected trips have occurred to date.
"Div. 1 CCHVAC Chiller was previously inoperable from equipment issues which was repaired, and the unit was in service for a 24-hour confidence run. Although licensed personnel had not completed the administrative actions for documenting operability during the 24-hour confidence run to monitor parameters, the (post maintenance test) PMT related to the maintenance was already completed, which included a 4-hour run in accordance with surveillance 24.413.01, Div. 1 and Div. 2 Chilled Water Pump and Valve, to verify normal operation and motor current. These PMT's were completed prior to the identified inoperability of the Div. 2 UHS due to the tripped breaker on the brake power supply.
"At the time of the MDCT brake inverter trip, the Operations' Senior License and the Night Shift Manager were aligned that, although still operating as part of the 24-hour confidence run, the unit was in service and capable of performing its safety function, but the administrative tasks were not completed, the Limited Condition of Operation (LCO) sheet had not been cleared, and no log entries were made. Since the Div. 1 Chiller was, in fact, operable at the time of the trip of the breaker on the inverter, this would allow the use of Technical Specification (TS) 3.0.9 'Barriers'. Per Operations Department Expectation (ODE)-12 `LCOs' (standard guidance and expectations for preparing and implementing an LCO), Operations determined that the MDCT brakes are barriers to a tornado event and TS 3.0.9 could be utilized. By invoking TS 3.0.9, as long as all other supported systems in the other division are operable, Div. 2 supported systems relying upon the UHS can remain operable and the Automatic Depressurization System (ADS) and Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) system can be used as backup to the High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) system. Based on this information, there was no loss of safety function with CCHVAC A/C system or HPCI. Therefore, the NRC non-emergency 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) report was not required and the NRC report 56054 can be retracted."
The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
Notified R3DO (Orlikowski)
EN Revision Text: SAFETY SYSTEM INOPERABILITY
The following information was provided by the licensee via email:
"At 2108 EDT on August 17, 2022 the Division 2 Mechanical Draft Cooling Tower (MDCT) fans were declared inoperable due to failure of the over speed fan brake inverter. The brakes prevent fan over speed from a design basis tornado. The MDCT fans are required to support operability of the Ultimate Heat Sink (UHS). The UHS is required to support operability of the Division 2 Emergency Equipment Cooling Water (EECW) system. The Division 2 EECW system cools various safety related components, including the High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) room cooler and Division 2 Control Center HVAC (CCHVAC) chiller. An unplanned HPCI inoperability occurred based on a loss of the HPCI Room Cooler. At the time of the event, Division I CCHVAC was inoperable for maintenance (but was running for a maintenance run) and the event caused an inoperability of Division 2 CCHVAC. This resulted in an inoperability of both divisions of CCHVAC. Failure of the Division 2 MDCT Fan brake inverter occurred due to a trip of the DC input breaker. The breaker was reset at 2128 EDT restoring Division 2 UHS Operability. This report is being made pursuant to 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) as a condition that at the time of discovery could have prevented the fulfilment of the safety function of structures or systems that are needed to mitigate the consequences of an accident based on a loss of a single train safety system and loss of both divisions of a safety system.
"The Senior NRC Resident Inspector has been notified"
* * * RETRACTION ON 09/08/2022 AT 0856 EDT FROM JEFF MYERS TO MIKE STAFFORD * * *
The following information was provided by the licensee via email:
"On 8/17/22 at 2108 EDT the Division 2 (Div. 2) mechanical draft cooling tower (MDCT) brake inverter input breaker tripped for an unknown cause. The result of the loss of power was the inoperability of the MDCT fan brakes which impacts the ultimate heat sink (UHS) (TS 3.7.2). The UHS cascades to the EECW (emergency equipment cooling water) (TS 3.7.2) which is a support system for Div. 2 CCHVAC (Control Cell) Chiller A/C system (TS 3.7.4). This resulted in the inoperability of the Div. 2 CCHVAC Chiller.
"The cause for the breaker to trip is an intermittent electrical transient. Immediate corrective action was to reset the breaker, and the long-term action is to implement a modification to mitigate susceptibility to voltage variations. Div. 1 has implemented this long-term mod and no unexpected trips have occurred to date.
"Div. 1 CCHVAC Chiller was previously inoperable from equipment issues which was repaired, and the unit was in service for a 24-hour confidence run. Although licensed personnel had not completed the administrative actions for documenting operability during the 24-hour confidence run to monitor parameters, the (post maintenance test) PMT related to the maintenance was already completed, which included a 4-hour run in accordance with surveillance 24.413.01, Div. 1 and Div. 2 Chilled Water Pump and Valve, to verify normal operation and motor current. These PMT's were completed prior to the identified inoperability of the Div. 2 UHS due to the tripped breaker on the brake power supply.
"At the time of the MDCT brake inverter trip, the Operations' Senior License and the Night Shift Manager were aligned that, although still operating as part of the 24-hour confidence run, the unit was in service and capable of performing its safety function, but the administrative tasks were not completed, the Limited Condition of Operation (LCO) sheet had not been cleared, and no log entries were made. Since the Div. 1 Chiller was, in fact, operable at the time of the trip of the breaker on the inverter, this would allow the use of Technical Specification (TS) 3.0.9 'Barriers'. Per Operations Department Expectation (ODE)-12 `LCOs' (standard guidance and expectations for preparing and implementing an LCO), Operations determined that the MDCT brakes are barriers to a tornado event and TS 3.0.9 could be utilized. By invoking TS 3.0.9, as long as all other supported systems in the other division are operable, Div. 2 supported systems relying upon the UHS can remain operable and the Automatic Depressurization System (ADS) and Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) system can be used as backup to the High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) system. Based on this information, there was no loss of safety function with CCHVAC A/C system or HPCI. Therefore, the NRC non-emergency 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) report was not required and the NRC report 56054 can be retracted."
The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
Notified R3DO (Orlikowski)
Agreement State
Event Number: 56055
Rep Org: Texas Dept of State Health Services
Licensee: Precision NDT LLC
Region: 4
City: Pampa State: TX
County:
License #: L07054
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: Art Tucker
HQ OPS Officer: Brian P. Smith
Licensee: Precision NDT LLC
Region: 4
City: Pampa State: TX
County:
License #: L07054
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: Art Tucker
HQ OPS Officer: Brian P. Smith
Notification Date: 08/18/2022
Notification Time: 22:02 [ET]
Event Date: 08/17/2022
Event Time: 12:45 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 08/18/2022
Notification Time: 22:02 [ET]
Event Date: 08/17/2022
Event Time: 12:45 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 08/18/2022
Emergency Class: Non Emergency
10 CFR Section:
Agreement State
10 CFR Section:
Agreement State
Person (Organization):
Werner, Greg (R4DO)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFICATION (EMAIL)
Werner, Greg (R4DO)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFICATION (EMAIL)
AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - UNABLE TO RETRACT SOURCE
The following report was received via email from the Texas Department of State Health Services [the Agency]:
"On August 18, 2022, at 0922 [CDT] hours, the Agency was notified of a source retrieval that occurred August 17th, 2022. The licensee stated the event occurred at a field location at 1245 [CDT] on August 17th, 2022. The licensee stated the location was at a facility located in Pampa, Texas. The licensee stated the event occurred when a piece of pipe fell onto the guide tube of a SPEC [Source Production and Equipment Company] - 150 exposure device and crimped the tube, preventing them from retracting the 60 Curie iridium [Ir-192] source. The licensee's retrieval individual was able to reshape the guide tube and the source was successfully retrieved by 1330 [CDT] that day. The exposure to the individual retrieving the source was 80 millirem. The associated equipment was removed from service and is undergoing inspection to ensure no other damage was done to the equipment. Additional information will be provided as it is received in accordance with SA-300."
Texas Incident Number: 9949
The following report was received via email from the Texas Department of State Health Services [the Agency]:
"On August 18, 2022, at 0922 [CDT] hours, the Agency was notified of a source retrieval that occurred August 17th, 2022. The licensee stated the event occurred at a field location at 1245 [CDT] on August 17th, 2022. The licensee stated the location was at a facility located in Pampa, Texas. The licensee stated the event occurred when a piece of pipe fell onto the guide tube of a SPEC [Source Production and Equipment Company] - 150 exposure device and crimped the tube, preventing them from retracting the 60 Curie iridium [Ir-192] source. The licensee's retrieval individual was able to reshape the guide tube and the source was successfully retrieved by 1330 [CDT] that day. The exposure to the individual retrieving the source was 80 millirem. The associated equipment was removed from service and is undergoing inspection to ensure no other damage was done to the equipment. Additional information will be provided as it is received in accordance with SA-300."
Texas Incident Number: 9949