Event Notification Report for July 18, 2022

EN Revision Imported Date: 7/18/2022

EN Revision Text: HIGH PRESSURE COOLANT INJECTION (HPCI) INOPERABLE

The following information was provided by the licensee via email:

"At 1251 EDT on April 29, 2022, while troubleshooting the failure of the High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) Exhaust Drain Pot High Level Alarm to clear, it was discovered that the High Pressure Coolant Injection exhaust line condensate drain system was not functioning as designed to support removal of condensate from the turbine exhaust. This resulted in some water accumulation in the turbine casing. Subsequently, the High Pressure Coolant Injection System was declared inoperable. As a result, this condition is being reported under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) as a condition that could have prevented fulfillment of the safety function at the time of discovery. "

* * * RETRACTION ON 07/15/22 AT 1943 EDT FROM EVAN THOMPSON TO LLOYD DESOTELL * * *

"A technical evaluation of this event was performed and concluded that the HPCI system would have been operable with this condition. If HPCI turbine actuated with the estimated amount of condensate accumulated in the casing and connecting piping, it would have performed its safety function; the HPCI Turbine Exhaust Rupture Disc would not have been challenged by calculated peak pressures; and calculated water hammer loads were within specified load capacities of the turbine flange, downstream piping, struts, snubber, and spring hanger. Based on this, the condition reported in EN 55871 is being retracted."

Notified R1DO (Bickett)

EN Revision Imported Date: 7/11/2022

EN Revision Text: AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - STUCK OPEN SHUTTER

The following information was received from the Wisconsin Department of Health Services via email:

"On July 8, 2022, the State was contacted by a representative of the licensee to report a radiation event that had been identified on July 7. The licensee was performing routine checks on a fixed gauge device, and the individual servicing the gauge identified that the shutter was unable to be closed. All indicators are functioning as required to alert that the gauge is open. The device is believed to have been stuck open for approximately 13 hours. Staff who work in the area have been instructed that the device is unable to be closed, and to avoid working around the gauge even when it is not being utilized. The device is a Mahlo Model 11-200933, [serial number] SN: 11-011988. It contains an Eckert and Ziegler Pm-147 [Model] PHC.C1 source, SN:AH-4968. It has an assay date of April 15, 2016, 1000 mCi. It currently contains approximately 193 mCi. The licensee performed a dose reconstruction of any individual who would have been at the 8 foot boundary of the gauge, which indicates minimal exposure. The manufacturer was notified and is currently coordinating with the licensee to get a service engineer on site. The department will continue to follow-up with the licensee."

WI incident no.: WI220014

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - LOST TRITIUM EXIT SIGNS

The following information was received from the Colorado Department of Public Health and Environment (the department) via email:

The department was notified on June 6, 2022, that two SLX-60 Exit signs containing 7.62 Ci each of H-3 were lost in 2021. No additional information was provided.

CO incident no.: CO220021

THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A 'Less than Cat 3' LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL

Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - STUCK OPEN SHUTTER

The following information was received from the Iowa Department of Public Health (IDPH) via email:

"At 1515 CDT, July 7, 2022, an NDC Technologies, Model 302 fixed gauge with [approximately] 80 mCi of Kr-85 had a shutter stick open when the line was turned off. The shutter was first identified as stuck open around 1600 when the Radiation Safety Officer was conducting their entrance radiation survey. Radiation safety perimeter was established. The service provider was called and arrived the morning of July 8, 2022. They were able to close the shutter but unable to conduct cause analysis. The gauge will be shipped back to vendor to safely analyze for cause. The IDPH will decide on a reactive inspection based on the cause of stuck shutter identified by the vendor.
Licensee aware of 30 day written notification requirement."

IA incident no.: IA220004

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - LOST TRITIUM EXIT SIGN

The following summary was received from the Colorado Department of Public Health and Environment via email:

On June 6, 2022, the Colorado Department of Public Health and Environment reported one model 2040 exit sign containing an unknown amount of tritium lost by the licensee. The incident occurred between 2009-2010.

CO incident no.: CO220022

THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A 'Less than Cat 3' LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL

Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf

EN Revision Imported Date: 7/11/2022

EN Revision Text: AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - DOSE MISADMINISTRATION

The following information was received from the Alabama Department of Public Health Office of Radiation Control (the Agency) via email:

"Issue discovered 6/30/2022, during inspection. The licensee did not report to the Agency at the time of occurrence. The dose to patient was evaluated as a result of a wrong dose on 7/8/2022. [On 3/11/2020,] the patient was prescribed 15 mCi of Tc-99m sestamibi/Cardiolite; the patient received 24.28 mCi of Tc-99m MDP [methyl diphosphonate]. The licensee reported that the nuclear medicine technician did not adequately verify dose labeling, and has been retrained in procedures. [This] appears to result in an effective dose of 512.068 mrem, and dose to bone surfaces of 5659.668 mrem."

AL incident no.: 22-10

A Medical Event may indicate potential problems in a medical facility's use of radioactive materials. It does not necessarily result in harm to the patient.

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - RADIOPHARMACEUTICAL MISADMINISTRATION

The following information was received from the Alabama Department of Public Health Office of Radiation Control (the Agency) via email:

"Licensee emailed 9/3/2021 that a patient received the wrong radiopharmaceutical. The patient was prescribed PYP [pyrophosphate] with 15 millicuries Tc-99m; the patient received 15 mCi of Tc-99m sodium pertechnetate. The licensee reported that the nuclear medicine technologist thought the dose was mislabeled, and administered 15 mCi of the sodium pertechnetate dose. The dose to the patient appeared to be 721.5 mrem effective dose. The writer did not report this matter to the NRC Headquarters Operations Officer at the time of occurrence. The matter has been reviewed during inspection on 3/7 and 3/9/2022, and the licensee appears to have implemented corrective actions."

AL incident no.: 21-29

A Medical Event may indicate potential problems in a medical facility's use of radioactive materials. It does not necessarily result in harm to the patient.

FITNESS-FOR-DUTY REPORT

The following information was provided by the licensee via email:

"At 1035 CDT on 7/15/2022, it was determined that a non-licensed supervisor tested positive in accordance with the fitness-for-duty testing program. The individual's authorization for site access has been terminated.

"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."

HIGH PRESSURE COOLANT INJECTION (HPCI) INOPERABLE

The following information was provided by the licensee via email:

"At 2020 Eastern Daylight Time (EDT) on July 15, 2022, the HPCI System was declared inoperable. Therefore, this condition is being reported as an eight-hour, non-emergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D). The Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) System and Automatic Depressurization System (ADS) were operable during this time.

"HPCI availability was restored at 2023. Additional investigation is in-progress.

"There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel.

"Unit 2 is not affected by this event.

"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."

The following additional information was obtained from the licensee in accordance with Headquarters Operations Officers Report Guidance:

HPCI is considered inoperable but available at this time, resulting in a 14-day Shutdown LCO [Limiting Condition for Operation], due to the HPCI inoperability.

EN Revision Imported Date: 7/13/2022

EN Revision Text: AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - STOLEN MOISTURE DENSITY GAUGE

The following was received from the California, Department of Health, Radiologic Health Branch (RHB Brea) via email:

"On July 11, 2022, at approximately 1100 PDT, [redacted], the radiation safety officer (RSO) of Premier Testing & Inspection, Inc., Radioactive Materials License #7988-33, contacted RHB Brea to report the theft of a moisture/density gauge: CPN, MC-1, serial #MD40507409 (Cs-137, 0.370 Giga-Becquerels, Am-241, 1.85 Giga-Becquerels). The gauge had been in the back of a sport-utility-vehicle (SUV) (Subaru Crosstrek) parked in the front of an apartment building in Woodland Hills, CA, in the early morning hours prior to leaving for the temporary work site. The vehicle had been broken into by breaking the left rear window and removing the radioactive gauge from the vehicle. The Authorized User who discovered the missing radioactive gauge at approximately 0730 PDT on July 11, 2022, [redacted], notified the RSO and then notified the Los Angeles Police Department, who completed a police theft report. A copy of the theft report has been forwarded to the RHB Brea office to be included as part of this report. The RSO will contact local newspapers in an attempt to retrieve the stolen radioactive gauge, as well as notifying local servicing vendors of radioactive gauges to be alert for the serial number of the stolen gauge in case it turns up for service. The investigation will continue to determine if the radioactive gauge can be recovered."

CA 5010 Number 071122

THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A 'Less than Cat 3' LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL

Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - STOLEN MOISTURE DENSITY GAUGE

The following information was provided via email:

"On July 12, 2022, the licensee notified the Agency that around 1230 pm, a Humboldt 5001EZ Moisture Density Gauge containing a 40 milliCurie Americium-241 source and a 10 milliCurie Cesium-137 source was stolen out of the back of a company truck. The licensee reported that the technician returned to the site office, he unlocked the moisture density gauge transit case. He then got distracted and went into the office. When he went back outside the case was still chained to the truck but when he opened the case the gauge was missing. The gauge was unlocked. LLE [Local Law Enforcement] was notified. Additional information will be provided as it is received in accordance with SA-300."

Texas Incident number: 9939


THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A 'Less than Cat 3' LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL

Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf

PART 21 REPORT - POTENTIAL PREMATURE FAILURES OF VALCOR COIL SHELL ASSEMBLIES

The following is a synopsis of information received via facsimile:

Valcor Engineering Corporation (VEC) was notified via a letter dated 5/19/2022 that Catawba Nuclear Station (CNS) discovered two failed Coil Shell Assemblies, part number V52653-6040-7, which were removed from V70900-39-3-1 Solenoid Valves and returned to VEC for evaluation. VEC has not concluded this is a reportable condition in accordance with 10 CFR 21.22(d) and requires additional time to complete testing and evaluation.

VEC is submitting this 60-day Interim Report Notification per 10 CFR 21.21(a)(2).

VEC will complete the evaluation and provide a determination of reportability in accordance with Part 21 no later than 09/12/2022.

Currently, Catawba Nuclear Station is the only affected facility.

For additional information, please contact Mike Swirad, Valcor Engineering Quality Assurance Director (973-467-8400 x 7223)

AUTOMATIC REACTOR TRIP DUE TO STEAM GENERATOR LOW LEVEL

The following information was provided by the licensee via email:

"While operating at 100 percent reactor power, the Control Room received indications of a feedwater transient, and indications of decreasing level on Steam Generator `B.' Reactor Trip occurred approximately 30 seconds after initial indications of transient at 1803 CDT on 7/18/22. All Safety Related Equipment responded as expected, including actuation of Auxiliary Feedwater. Control Room responded properly and progressed through Emergency Operating Procedures. The Unit is Stable in Mode 3. The NRC Senior Resident Inspector has been notified."

The following additional information was obtained from the licensee in accordance with Headquarters Operations Officers Report Guidance:

The plant is in a normal post-trip electrical line-up. Wolf Creek intends to make a press release.