Event Notification Report for June 13, 2022
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
06/12/2022 - 06/13/2022
Agreement State
Event Number: 55937
Rep Org: Texas Dept of State Health Services
Licensee: Beyond Engineering and Testing LLC
Region: 4
City: Round Rock State: TX
County:
License #: L06924
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: Art Tucker
HQ OPS Officer: Thomas Herrity
Licensee: Beyond Engineering and Testing LLC
Region: 4
City: Round Rock State: TX
County:
License #: L06924
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: Art Tucker
HQ OPS Officer: Thomas Herrity
Notification Date: 06/13/2022
Notification Time: 17:48 [ET]
Event Date: 06/13/2022
Event Time: 00:00 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 02/22/2023
Notification Time: 17:48 [ET]
Event Date: 06/13/2022
Event Time: 00:00 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 02/22/2023
Emergency Class: Non Emergency
10 CFR Section:
Agreement State
10 CFR Section:
Agreement State
Person (Organization):
Azua, Ray (R4DO)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFICATION (EMAIL)
ILTAB, (EMAIL)
Azua, Ray (R4DO)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFICATION (EMAIL)
ILTAB, (EMAIL)
EN Revision Imported Date: 2/23/2023
EN Revision Text: AGREEMENT STATE REPRT - STOLEN TRUCK CONTAINING A MOISTURE DENSITY GAUGE
The following was reported by the Texas Department of State Health Services (the Agency) via email:
"On June 13, 2022, the licensee notified the Agency that on Friday, June 10, 2022, a truck containing a Insto Tek 3500 moisture density gauge was stolen. The gauge contained a 44 millicurie americium-241 source, and an 11 millicurie cesium-137 source. The licensee reported that the technician had stopped at a convenience store to buy some items and when they came back out the truck was missing. The licensee stated the gauge was locked in the back of the truck but was unsure if the keys to the locks were also taken. The licensee stated the gauge has an old [Global Positioning System] (GPS) tracking device that was inactive. The licensee stated they had contacted the GPS service company to see if the tracking device was still active and the gauge tracked that way. The licensee stated it would take up to 24 hours to determine if the tracking device could be used. The licensee stated the local police was notified of the theft. The individual who contacted the Agency stated they had not interviewed the technician about the event so some of the information requested by the Agency was unknown. Additional information will be provided as it is received in accordance with SA-300."
Texas Incident Number: 9934
* * * UPDATE ON 2/22/2023 AT 1048 EST FROM CHRIS MOORE TO ERNEST WEST * * *
"On June 13, 2022, the licensee notified the Agency that a pickup truck with a Instro Tek 3500 moisture/density gauge had been stolen on June 10, 2022, when the technician left the truck running with the doors locked. The secured gauge in the back of the truck contained a 10 millicurie cesium-137 source and a 40 millicurie americium-241/beryllium source. The truck was recovered and was partially stripped for parts. The gauge was missing. The source was locked, however, the keys to the gauge were in the pickup truck. The licensee conducted training on security of the gauge and not leaving trucks running even if the gauge is properly secured. The company is purchasing GPS tracking units to install on the gauges. On Feb 21, 2023, the licensee reported to the Agency that the gauge was found on February 20, 2023, in the back of a stolen U-Haul truck. The licensee has the gauge in their possession and the gauge is in good condition."
Notified R4DO (Roldan-Otero), NMSS Events Notification, and ILTAB via email.
THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A 'Less than Cat 3' LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL
Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf
EN Revision Text: AGREEMENT STATE REPRT - STOLEN TRUCK CONTAINING A MOISTURE DENSITY GAUGE
The following was reported by the Texas Department of State Health Services (the Agency) via email:
"On June 13, 2022, the licensee notified the Agency that on Friday, June 10, 2022, a truck containing a Insto Tek 3500 moisture density gauge was stolen. The gauge contained a 44 millicurie americium-241 source, and an 11 millicurie cesium-137 source. The licensee reported that the technician had stopped at a convenience store to buy some items and when they came back out the truck was missing. The licensee stated the gauge was locked in the back of the truck but was unsure if the keys to the locks were also taken. The licensee stated the gauge has an old [Global Positioning System] (GPS) tracking device that was inactive. The licensee stated they had contacted the GPS service company to see if the tracking device was still active and the gauge tracked that way. The licensee stated it would take up to 24 hours to determine if the tracking device could be used. The licensee stated the local police was notified of the theft. The individual who contacted the Agency stated they had not interviewed the technician about the event so some of the information requested by the Agency was unknown. Additional information will be provided as it is received in accordance with SA-300."
Texas Incident Number: 9934
* * * UPDATE ON 2/22/2023 AT 1048 EST FROM CHRIS MOORE TO ERNEST WEST * * *
"On June 13, 2022, the licensee notified the Agency that a pickup truck with a Instro Tek 3500 moisture/density gauge had been stolen on June 10, 2022, when the technician left the truck running with the doors locked. The secured gauge in the back of the truck contained a 10 millicurie cesium-137 source and a 40 millicurie americium-241/beryllium source. The truck was recovered and was partially stripped for parts. The gauge was missing. The source was locked, however, the keys to the gauge were in the pickup truck. The licensee conducted training on security of the gauge and not leaving trucks running even if the gauge is properly secured. The company is purchasing GPS tracking units to install on the gauges. On Feb 21, 2023, the licensee reported to the Agency that the gauge was found on February 20, 2023, in the back of a stolen U-Haul truck. The licensee has the gauge in their possession and the gauge is in good condition."
Notified R4DO (Roldan-Otero), NMSS Events Notification, and ILTAB via email.
THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A 'Less than Cat 3' LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL
Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf
Power Reactor
Event Number: 55938
Facility: Columbia Generating Station
Region: 4 State: WA
Unit: [2] [] []
RX Type: [2] GE-5
NRC Notified By: Michael Garcia
HQ OPS Officer: Thomas Herrity
Region: 4 State: WA
Unit: [2] [] []
RX Type: [2] GE-5
NRC Notified By: Michael Garcia
HQ OPS Officer: Thomas Herrity
Notification Date: 06/13/2022
Notification Time: 18:21 [ET]
Event Date: 06/13/2022
Event Time: 09:23 [PDT]
Last Update Date: 08/10/2022
Notification Time: 18:21 [ET]
Event Date: 06/13/2022
Event Time: 09:23 [PDT]
Last Update Date: 08/10/2022
Emergency Class: Non Emergency
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - Valid Specif Sys Actuation
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - Valid Specif Sys Actuation
Person (Organization):
Azua, Ray (R4DO)
Azua, Ray (R4DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2 | N | Y | 40 | Power Operation | 40 | Power Operation |
EN Revision Imported Date: 8/11/2022
EN Revision Text: PARTIAL LOSS OF POWER TO RPS DURING MAINTENANCE
The following information was provided by the licensee via email:
"During thermography of a reactor protection system (RPS) distribution panel, a circuit breaker (RPS-CB-7B) was inadvertently opened. This resulted in a partial loss of power to RPS Division B, which caused containment isolations to occur in multiple systems (Reactor Water Clean Up, Equipment Drains Radioactive, Floor Drains Radioactive, Reactor Recirculation, and Traversing lncore Probe). Specifically, RWCU-V-1, FDR-V-3, EDR-V-19, RRC-V-19, and TIP-V-15 all closed. All actuations occurred as designed upon the partial loss of RPS power.
"This event is being reported pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) due to an unplanned valid actuation of a system pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(B)(2). Additionally, this is being reported pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72 (b)(3)(xiii) for a major loss of emergency assessment capability due to the inability to assess primary containment identified and unidentified leakage rates.
"Emergency assessment capability was restored at 1008 PDT upon system restoration."
The NRC resident was notified by the licensee.
* * * UPDATE FROM SIMEON MORALES TO DONALD NORWOOD AT 1547 EDT ON 6/16/2022 * * *
The following information was received via email:
"This event is being reported pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72 (b)(3)(xiii) only for a major loss of emergency assessment capability due to the inability to assess primary containment identified and unidentified leakage rates.
"The containment isolation was not due to actual plant conditions or parameters meeting design criteria for containment isolation. Therefore, this is considered an invalid actuation.
"Updated ENS Text:
"During thermography of a reactor protection system (RPS) distribution panel, a circuit breaker (RPS-CB-7B) was inadvertently opened. This resulted in a partial loss of power to RPS Division B, which caused containment isolations to occur in multiple systems (Reactor Water Clean Up, Equipment Drains Radioactive, Floor Drains Radioactive, Reactor Recirculation, and Traversing Incore Probe). Specifically, RWCU-V-1, FDR-V-3, EDR-V-19, RRC-V-19, and TIP-V-15 all closed. All actuations occurred as designed upon the partial loss of RPS power.
"This is being reported pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72 (b)(3)(xiii) for a major loss of emergency assessment capability due to the inability to assess primary containment identified and unidentified leakage rates.
"Emergency assessment capability was restored at 1008 PDT upon system restoration.
"The plant is stable, and all effected systems have been restored.
"There was no impact to the health and safety of the public or plant personnel.
"The NRC resident has been notified."
Notified R4DO (Azua).
* * * UPDATE FROM TRACY HOWARD TO ERNEST WEST AT 1853 EDT ON 8/10/2022 * * *
The following information was received via email:
"At 0923 [PDT] on June 13, 2022, a partial loss of power to the Reactor Protection System (RPS) 'B' occurred due to the inadvertent opening of circuit breaker RPS-CB-7B during thermography of RPS-PP-C72/P001. The partial loss of RPS 'B' resulted in closure of primary containment isolation valves (PCIVs) in multiple systems. No plant parameters existed which would cause the opening of RPS-CB-7B or actuation of the primary containment isolation; therefore, this is considered to be an invalid actuation of a system listed in 10 CFR 50.73(a)(iv)(B).
"The closure of PCIVs were expected responses to the partial loss of RPS 'B'.
"Circuit breaker RPS-CB-7B was closed lo restore energy lo RPS 'B' at 1008 [PDT], containment isolation valves were opened, and the affected systems were returned to normal operating conditions for the current configuration per plant procedures.
"As indicated in 10 CFR 50.73(a)(1), in the case of an invalid actuation reported under 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), the licensee may, at its option, provide a telephonic notification lo the NRC Operations Center within 60 days of discovery of the event instead of submitting a written Licensee Event Report. This 60-day telephone notification is being made in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73(a)(1) for invalid actuations reported under 10 CFR 50.73 (a)(2)(iv)(A). This actuation was invalid since it was caused by maintenance activities and not the result of actual plant conditions warranting containment isolation.
"The following additional information is provided as specified in NUREG-1022:
"The following inboard containment isolation valves were actuated when personnel inadvertently bumped into RPS-CB-7B during the removal of a panel
RWCU-V-1 Reactor Water Cleanup Suction Inboard Isolation Valve
EDR-V-19 Drywell Equipment Drain Inboard Isolation Valve
FDR-V-3 Drywell Floor Drain Inboard Isolation Valve
RRC-V-19 Reactor Water Sample Inboard Isolation Valve
TIP-V-15 Traversing In-Core Probe Purge Isolation Valve
"All actuations occurred as designed upon the partial loss of RPS power.
"There were no actual safety consequences associated with this event since all affected equipment responded as designed.
"The NRG Residents have been notified."
Notified R4DO (O'Keefe).
EN Revision Text: PARTIAL LOSS OF POWER TO RPS DURING MAINTENANCE
The following information was provided by the licensee via email:
"During thermography of a reactor protection system (RPS) distribution panel, a circuit breaker (RPS-CB-7B) was inadvertently opened. This resulted in a partial loss of power to RPS Division B, which caused containment isolations to occur in multiple systems (Reactor Water Clean Up, Equipment Drains Radioactive, Floor Drains Radioactive, Reactor Recirculation, and Traversing lncore Probe). Specifically, RWCU-V-1, FDR-V-3, EDR-V-19, RRC-V-19, and TIP-V-15 all closed. All actuations occurred as designed upon the partial loss of RPS power.
"This event is being reported pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) due to an unplanned valid actuation of a system pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(B)(2). Additionally, this is being reported pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72 (b)(3)(xiii) for a major loss of emergency assessment capability due to the inability to assess primary containment identified and unidentified leakage rates.
"Emergency assessment capability was restored at 1008 PDT upon system restoration."
The NRC resident was notified by the licensee.
* * * UPDATE FROM SIMEON MORALES TO DONALD NORWOOD AT 1547 EDT ON 6/16/2022 * * *
The following information was received via email:
"This event is being reported pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72 (b)(3)(xiii) only for a major loss of emergency assessment capability due to the inability to assess primary containment identified and unidentified leakage rates.
"The containment isolation was not due to actual plant conditions or parameters meeting design criteria for containment isolation. Therefore, this is considered an invalid actuation.
"Updated ENS Text:
"During thermography of a reactor protection system (RPS) distribution panel, a circuit breaker (RPS-CB-7B) was inadvertently opened. This resulted in a partial loss of power to RPS Division B, which caused containment isolations to occur in multiple systems (Reactor Water Clean Up, Equipment Drains Radioactive, Floor Drains Radioactive, Reactor Recirculation, and Traversing Incore Probe). Specifically, RWCU-V-1, FDR-V-3, EDR-V-19, RRC-V-19, and TIP-V-15 all closed. All actuations occurred as designed upon the partial loss of RPS power.
"This is being reported pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72 (b)(3)(xiii) for a major loss of emergency assessment capability due to the inability to assess primary containment identified and unidentified leakage rates.
"Emergency assessment capability was restored at 1008 PDT upon system restoration.
"The plant is stable, and all effected systems have been restored.
"There was no impact to the health and safety of the public or plant personnel.
"The NRC resident has been notified."
Notified R4DO (Azua).
* * * UPDATE FROM TRACY HOWARD TO ERNEST WEST AT 1853 EDT ON 8/10/2022 * * *
The following information was received via email:
"At 0923 [PDT] on June 13, 2022, a partial loss of power to the Reactor Protection System (RPS) 'B' occurred due to the inadvertent opening of circuit breaker RPS-CB-7B during thermography of RPS-PP-C72/P001. The partial loss of RPS 'B' resulted in closure of primary containment isolation valves (PCIVs) in multiple systems. No plant parameters existed which would cause the opening of RPS-CB-7B or actuation of the primary containment isolation; therefore, this is considered to be an invalid actuation of a system listed in 10 CFR 50.73(a)(iv)(B).
"The closure of PCIVs were expected responses to the partial loss of RPS 'B'.
"Circuit breaker RPS-CB-7B was closed lo restore energy lo RPS 'B' at 1008 [PDT], containment isolation valves were opened, and the affected systems were returned to normal operating conditions for the current configuration per plant procedures.
"As indicated in 10 CFR 50.73(a)(1), in the case of an invalid actuation reported under 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), the licensee may, at its option, provide a telephonic notification lo the NRC Operations Center within 60 days of discovery of the event instead of submitting a written Licensee Event Report. This 60-day telephone notification is being made in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73(a)(1) for invalid actuations reported under 10 CFR 50.73 (a)(2)(iv)(A). This actuation was invalid since it was caused by maintenance activities and not the result of actual plant conditions warranting containment isolation.
"The following additional information is provided as specified in NUREG-1022:
"The following inboard containment isolation valves were actuated when personnel inadvertently bumped into RPS-CB-7B during the removal of a panel
RWCU-V-1 Reactor Water Cleanup Suction Inboard Isolation Valve
EDR-V-19 Drywell Equipment Drain Inboard Isolation Valve
FDR-V-3 Drywell Floor Drain Inboard Isolation Valve
RRC-V-19 Reactor Water Sample Inboard Isolation Valve
TIP-V-15 Traversing In-Core Probe Purge Isolation Valve
"All actuations occurred as designed upon the partial loss of RPS power.
"There were no actual safety consequences associated with this event since all affected equipment responded as designed.
"The NRG Residents have been notified."
Notified R4DO (O'Keefe).
Agreement State
Event Number: 55939
Rep Org: Kansas Dept of Health & Environment
Licensee: PROtect, LLC
Region: 4
City: Lenexa State: KS
County:
License #: 21-B805
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: Kimberly Steves
HQ OPS Officer: Bill Gott
Licensee: PROtect, LLC
Region: 4
City: Lenexa State: KS
County:
License #: 21-B805
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: Kimberly Steves
HQ OPS Officer: Bill Gott
Notification Date: 06/14/2022
Notification Time: 11:29 [ET]
Event Date: 06/13/2022
Event Time: 14:15 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 06/14/2022
Notification Time: 11:29 [ET]
Event Date: 06/13/2022
Event Time: 14:15 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 06/14/2022
Emergency Class: Non Emergency
10 CFR Section:
Agreement State
10 CFR Section:
Agreement State
Person (Organization):
Azua, Ray (R4DO)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFICATION (EMAIL)
Azua, Ray (R4DO)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFICATION (EMAIL)
AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - DAMAGED RADIOGRAPHY GUIDE TUBE
The following information was provided by the Kansas Department of Health and Environment via email:
"On June 13, 2022, at approximately 1415 CDT the licensee experienced an incident with the 9 Ci Ir-192 source in their 880 Delta radiography camera at their Lenexa, Kansas office location. They reported that during routine maintenance, the source became restricted in the source tube while cranking the source back into the shielded position. When the source was being retracted back into the camera, the cart on which it was sitting shifted. This put the guide tube into a bind which restricted the source from easily being returned into the camera. The Radiation Safety Officer (RSO) was immediately notified and arrived shortly thereafter to evaluate the situation. The licensee reported that once they realized it was just the position of the source tube putting the source in a bind, they were able to move the cart back to the position that then allowed them to retract the source back into the shielded position of the camera. The licensee reports that the source was exposed for no more than three minutes.
"The Kansas Radiation Control Program is currently performing a reactive inspection on June 14, 2022, and additional information will be provided at a later date."
The following information was provided by the Kansas Department of Health and Environment via email:
"On June 13, 2022, at approximately 1415 CDT the licensee experienced an incident with the 9 Ci Ir-192 source in their 880 Delta radiography camera at their Lenexa, Kansas office location. They reported that during routine maintenance, the source became restricted in the source tube while cranking the source back into the shielded position. When the source was being retracted back into the camera, the cart on which it was sitting shifted. This put the guide tube into a bind which restricted the source from easily being returned into the camera. The Radiation Safety Officer (RSO) was immediately notified and arrived shortly thereafter to evaluate the situation. The licensee reported that once they realized it was just the position of the source tube putting the source in a bind, they were able to move the cart back to the position that then allowed them to retract the source back into the shielded position of the camera. The licensee reports that the source was exposed for no more than three minutes.
"The Kansas Radiation Control Program is currently performing a reactive inspection on June 14, 2022, and additional information will be provided at a later date."