Event Notification Report for June 06, 2022

EN Revision Imported Date: 6/6/2022

EN Revision Text: AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - LOST SEALED SOURCES IN TRANSIT

The following report was received via e-mail from the Massachusetts Radiation Control Program [the Agency]:

"The licensee (QSA Global, Inc., License No. 12-8361) reported at 0851 [EDT] on May 27, 2022 that it discovered on the same day (May 27, 2022) at 0750 [CDT] that a package (Yellow-III, T.I. 2.6, Type A) containing 9 sealed sources (Cs-137; 13.89 Ci total) was reported missing by the shipper. The package was shipped in a 924CO Type A with P496 lead shield pot.

"The package was shipped on April 15, 2022. The destination for the shipment is Schlumberger Technology Corp (c/o: NSSI), Houston, TX, 77087, TX License: L02991. QSA Global received email update on May 27, 2022 that the [common carrier] couldn't physically locate the package. The last known location according to the [common carrier] is their facility in Memphis, TN. Schlumberger Technology Corp confirmed that they have not received the package on May 27, 2022.

"The reporting requirement is immediate and is of 105 CMR 120.281(A)(1), missing licensed radioactive materials in aggregate quantity equal to or greater than 1,000 times quantity specified in 105 CMR 120.297, Appendix C.

"The Agency considers this event to be open."

* * * UPDATE ON 06/03/2022 AT 1433 EDT FROM BOB LOCKE TO OSSY FONT * * *

The following information was provided by the Agency via email:

"The licensee reported at 1014 EDT on June 2, 2022, that the package had been found at the Houston, TX [common carrier] facility. It was delivered to its intended destination undamaged at 1500 EDT on June 2, 2022."

Notified R1DO (Jackson) and NMSS Events Notification and ILTAB via email.

THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A 'Category 3' LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL

Category 3 sources, if not safely managed or securely protected, could cause permanent injury to a person who handled them, or were otherwise in contact with them, for some hours. It could possibly - although it is unlikely - be fatal to be close to this amount of unshielded radioactive material for a period of days to weeks. These sources are typically used in practices such as fixed industrial gauges involving high activity sources (for example: level gauges, dredger gauges, conveyor gauges and spinning pipe gauges) and well logging. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - LOST EXIT SIGN

The following report was received via e-mail from the New Jersey Radiation Department and Release Prevention Program [the Department]:

"The Radiation Safety Officer of Rutgers University informed the Department that one H-3 (Tritium) exit sign cannot be found and is considered lost. The exit sign was last inventoried in October 2021 and was noticed to be missing in April 2022. After extensive investigation/searching, the licensee considers the sign lost. The Exit sign in question is an Isolite H-3 Exit sign, model 880-126R10BA, S/N H138883, originally containing 7.59 Ci of H-3. Rutgers will forward a written report within 30 days concerning the loss and their investigation."

THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A 'Less than Cat 3' LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL

Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf

INVALID SYSTEM ACTUATION

The following information was provided by the licensee via email:

"The following event description is based on information currently available. If, through subsequent reviews of this event, additional information is identified that is pertinent to this event or alters the information being provided at this time, a follow-up notification will be made via the ENS or under the reporting requirements of 10 CFR 50.73.

"This telephone notification is being made pursuant to the reporting requirements of 10 CFR 50.73(a)(1) and 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) to describe invalid actuations of the Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station (PVNGS) Unit 1 B Train Auxiliary Feedwater (AF) system and Essential Spray Pond (ESP) system that occurred while in a refueling outage.

"On April 11, 2022, at approximately 2045 Mountain Standard Time, an automatic start of the Unit 1 B Train AF and ESP systems occurred during restoration from a surveillance test. The station was conducting a surveillance test during a Unit 1 refueling outage to verify the proper responses of the Engineered Safety Features Actuation Systems to simulated design basis events. The test portion was completed satisfactorily; however, during the restoration portion, the load sequencer inadvertently cycled between Mode 0 and Mode 1 three times in immediate succession.

"At the time of the system actuations, one of the actuation signals associated with this portion of the test had been reset per procedure. Another actuation signal was still in while restoration steps were ongoing, but the sequencer was not expected to cycle between Modes. The system actuations did not occur as a result of actual plant conditions or parameters and are therefore invalid.

"The Unit 1 B Train AF and ESP system actuations were complete and the systems started and functioned successfully. For the systems that did not actuate, the reasons are clearly understood as those systems were in an overridden condition due to test configuration.

"The spurious actuation was not able to be replicated and a direct cause was not identified. There were no adverse impacts to public health and safety nor to plant employees.

"The NRC Resident Inspectors have been informed."