Event Notification Report for May 23, 2022

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - SOURCE HOLDER AFFECTED BY MOLTEN METAL

The following was received from Tennessee Division of Radiological Health via email:

"On May 22, 2022 at 1048 [CDT], molten metal came into contact with the source holder. Damage occurred to the lifting ears of the gauge. The source was not affected by the event. The source and holder are locked away with other gauges with the shutter in the closed position. No elevated readings were detected after the event. NuCor Steel is going to contract with Radiometrix in Ohio to transfer the source to a new gauge. The following is the technical information on the gauge:

"Manufacturer: Berthold; Model: LB 300 MLT; Gauge SN: 45132-004-10003; Isotope: Co-60, 3.405 mCi; Source SN: 1344-08-09; Source Model: Berthold P 2608-100

"Any corrective actions will be updated with a report within 30 days."

State Event Report ID Number: TN-22-037

EN Revision Imported Date: 5/25/2022

EN Revision Text: PROCEDURAL NONCOMPLIANCE WITH ADMINISTRATIVE ITEMS RELIED ON FOR SAFETY (IROFS)

The following additional information was obtained from the licensee by phone and email:

"Administrative IROFS WT-165 and WT-166 require independent operators to sample and verify the V-1170 uranium concentration is below an administrative limit prior to discharge to the V-1160 tank. These IROFS were correctly performed on May 18, 2022, for both the V-1170A and V-1170B tanks. In between the 18th and the 23rd, the warm caustic filter was water washed with the process solution sent to the V-1170 tanks.

"At 0422 EDT on May 23, 2022, the contents of V-1170A and V-1170B tanks were pumped to the T-1160B tank without the tank uranium concentration being updated following the warm caustic filter wash.

"At 0925 EDT on May 23, 2022, an evaluation into the reportability of the event was initiated when a Uranium Recovery and Recycling Services (URRS) team manager contacted Criticality Engineering to report the transfer without the test results required by procedure. After reviewing updated tank test results, performing calculations to determine risk, and discussing actions taken by the operators, IROFS WT-165 and WT-166 were considered failed and IROFS WT-171, WT-172, WT-175 and WT-176 were considered degraded.

"Per CSE-15C-S1-G3, the remaining safety margin was 1.000E-2, which was below the required 1.000E-4.

"The result is reportable per 10 CFR Part 70 Appendix A (b)(2), 'Loss or degradation of items relied on for safety that results in failure to meet the performance requirements of 10 CFR 70.61.'

"Following the event, the contents of V-1170A and T-1160B were tested and historical tank level indication data was reviewed with results well within the IROFS limits. There was no safety impact as a result of the failed IROFS."

EN Revision Imported Date: 5/24/2022

EN Revision Text: SECONDARY CONTAINMENT PRESSURE EXCEEDED TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION REQUIREMENT

The following information was provided by the licensee via email:

"On May 23, 2022, at 0455 CST, Cooper Nuclear Station experienced a spike in Secondary Containment differential pressure which exceeded the Technical Specifications Surveillance Requirements 3.6.4.1.1 limit of -0.25 inches of water gauge. Secondary Containment differential pressure restored to Technical Specification limits within two minutes and further investigation is ongoing. This unplanned Secondary Containment inoperability constitutes a condition reportable under 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v)(C) and (D).

"The NRC Senior Resident Inspector has been informed."

BOTH TRAINS OF CONTROL ROOM AREA VENTILATION AIR CONDITIONING SYSTEM INOPERABLE

The following information was provided by the licensee via fax:

"At 1256 CST on 05/23/2022, it was discovered both trains of Control Room Area Ventilation Air Conditioning Systems were simultaneously INOPERABLE. Due to this INOPERABILITY, the system was in a condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of a safety function; therefore, this condition is being reported as an eight-hour, non-emergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v).

"There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel.

"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."

AUTOMATIC REACTOR SCRAM
The following information was provided by the licensee via email:

"At 1716 hours EDT on May 23, 2022, Susquehanna Steam Electric Station Unit 1 reactor automatically scrammed.

"Unit 1 reactor was being operated at approximately 100 percent [Rated Thermal Power] RTP. The Control Room received indication that both divisions of [Reactor Protection System] RPS actuated from [Reactor Pressure Vessel] RPV high pressure signals and all control rods fully inserted. The Main Turbine bypass valves opened automatically to control reactor pressure. Reactor water level lowered to -42 inches causing Level 3 and Level 2 isolations. [High Pressure Coolant Injection] HPCI [Emergency Core Cooling System] ECCS actuation occurred as designed at -38 inches and injected to the Reactor Vessel. No other ECCS system actuations occurred. [Reactor Core Isolation Cooling] RCIC automatically initiated as designed at -30 inches. The Operations crew subsequently maintained reactor water level at the normal operating band using Feedwater pumps.

"The reactor is currently stable in Mode 3. An investigation is in progress into the cause of the Automatic SCRAM.

"The NRC Senior Resident Inspector was notified. A voluntary notification to [Pennsylvania Emergency Management Agency] PEMA will be made.

"This event requires a 4 hour ENS notification in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(A) & 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) and an 8 hour ENS notification in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A)."

PART 21 INTERIM REPORT OF DEVIATION

The following is a summary of a report provided by Southern Nuclear:

On May 23, 2022, Framatome notified Farley Nuclear Power Plant, among other plants, by letter of a potential nonconformance in certain Siemens medium voltage circuit breakers that could create a substantial safety hazard in certain applications. Southern Nuclear has determined that additional time beyond the 60-day evaluation period is needed to perform the necessary walkdowns of the installed equipment and complete the substantial safety hazard evaluation for reportability in accordance with 10 CFR 21. At the time, Framatome did not have enough information to determine where licensees intended to or had installed the supplied breakers, or how many breakers within the population supplied were actually nonconforming. The interim report does not describe details of the nonconformance and the original May 23, 2022 letter was not sent to the Headquarters Operations Center.

Contact Information:
Ryan Joyce, Fleet Licensing Manager, (205) 992-6468

Known affected plant: Farley among others

EN Revision Imported Date: 1/27/2023

EN Revision Text: PART 21 - MEDIUM VOLTAGE CIRCUIT BREAKERS

The following information is a synopsis of information provided by the licensee via fax and phone:

On May 23, 2022, Framatome informed Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) of a deviation of breakers purchased under contract. On January 23, 2023, TVA determined that a defect of the basic component could create a substantial safety hazard.

Framatome Inc. identified a deviation in the Siemens medium voltage vacuum circuit breaker where a failure to electrically charge or electrically close could occur. Framatome Inc. identified this as a departure from the technical requirements included in the procurement document. It is noted that the ability to electrically trip the circuit breaker would not be affected by the condition. TVA was notified by Framatome under 10 CFR 21.21(b) to evaluate the application of the breaker for a substantial safety hazard.

The TVA evaluation identified these breakers as intended for use in safety related Class 1E applications where a loss of the closure function would impact mitigation of design basis accidents and transients. During the Framatome dedication testing/inspection of Siemens medium voltage vacuum breakers, a hi-pot test failure on one circuit breaker was encountered. Troubleshooting and inspection found damage to charging motor wiring. It was determined that the cause of the damage was due to the manner in which control wiring was routed and connected to the internal bracket in close proximity to a bracket edge. This edge caused damage to wiring after significant number of cycles were applied to the breaker prior to dedication testing.

TVA received nine medium voltage vacuum circuit breakers at an offsite warehouse facility. While located at that facility, TVA, with assistance from Framatome, examined the affected breakers for the wire routing condition. The wiring harnesses of certain breakers were corrected. Framatome is to examine medium voltage vacuum circuit breakers that may be purchased under this contract for the wiring condition and correct as necessary before delivery.

The NRC Senior Resident Inspector has been notified.

This is a non-emergency notification required by 10 CFR 21.21(d)(3)(i).

* * * UPDATE ON 1/26/23 AT 0916 EST FROM RICARDO MEDINA TO BRIAN P. SMITH * * *

The following information is a synopsis of information provided by the licensee via phone:

The Sequoyah site licensing manager requested via phone call to the HOO that the model number for the basic component with the defect be listed in the Part 21 event narrative in addition to the official Part 21 report. The component discussed is a Siemens 6.9kV, 1200A, 125VDC Vacuum Circuit Breaker, Model No.: 7-HKR-50-1200-130.

Notified R2DO (Miller) and the Part 21 Reactors Group (Email).