Event Notification Report for May 02, 2022

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - GROUNDWATER CONTAINING URANIUM IDENTIFIED DURING EXCAVATION

The following was received from the Utah Department of Environmental Quality via email:

"On April 18, 2022, EnergySolutions personnel reported a strong fuel smell coming from a recent excavation associated with a new facility under construction. The excavations for sumps extended into the groundwater and were not included on the conditionally approved plans. The smell triggered an investigation where groundwater samples were collected for both chemical and radiological analysis. One sample indicated a concentration of 12,000 pCi/L of uranium (preliminary findings). The presence of uranium in the groundwater was unanticipated. Subsequently, the Division of Waste Management and Radiation Control has communicated to the licensee to characterize the nature and extent of the contamination. The Division is waiting for additional information from the licensee."

Event Report ID No.: UT220003

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - DAMAGED PORTABLE GAUGE

The following was received from the state of Kansas via email:

"On 4/21/22 during the course of an inspection of the facility, the State of Kansas discovered that an incident involving one of their portable gauges occurred on 7/21/2021. This incident was never reported to Kansas and was discovered through the inspection process.

"Licensee Kansas State University (# 38-C011-01) had a Campbell Pacific Nuclear model 503 portable gauge (serial number 50505) damaged while being used in a field at the Hutchinson, Kansas field research station. The gauge contained 50 mCi of AmBe. The gauge was run over when the student who was using the gauge under the oversight of the local RSO [Radiation Safety Officer] (unknown at this time if the local RSO was present at the site) backed a vehicle over it. At this time Kansas has not been able to determine if the student left the gauge unattended for a brief time or if the student did not properly secure the gauge into the vehicle and it fell out. The gauge was inspected immediately after the incident, and it was found that, though the gauge shielding appeared to be intact, the shipping case was damaged. Immediately following the incident, the student contacted their Primary Investigator (PI), who is a university instructor overseeing the student's project, to inform him of the incident, but it was reported that the PI asked if it was urgent and the student said no. The gauge was discovered damaged by the PI a week later on 7/28/2021.

"Upon discovery, the PI reported that he ordered a new shipping case and ordered leak tests. The leak tests were performed on 7/29/2021 and did not show damage to the source. The damage to the gauge housing was on the opposite side of the machine from the source and did not interfere with the source's insertion or retraction. Because of this, the licensee stated that they decided it was not reportable to Kansas. An investigation is underway to determine what steps were taken by the licensee, including possible repairs to the unit. Follow-up information will be provided as it is obtained."

EN Revision Imported Date: 5/2/2022

EN Revision Text: ULTRASONIC EXAMINATION RESULTS - REACTOR VESSEL HEAD PENETRATION

The following information was provided by the licensee via email:

"At 0854 [CDT] on April 23, 2022, while performing volumetric inspections required by ASME Code Case N-729-6, a rejectable indication on Reactor Vessel Head Penetration 75 Core Exit Thermocouple (CETC) was identified. The indication is located inboard of the J-groove weld and is OD-initiated [outer diameter - initiated]. This event is being reported as an eight-hour, non-emergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(A).

"There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."

The following additional information was obtained from the licensee in accordance with Headquarters Operations Officers Report Guidance:

The repair is scheduled during the refueling outage.

* * * UPDATE ON 04/29/22 AT 1112 EDT FROM BRYAN LYKKEBAK TO OSSY FONT * * *

The following information was provided by the licensee via telephone and email:

"The rejectable indication on Reactor Vessel Head Penetration 75 Core Exit Thermocouple (CETC) initiated on the outside diameter (OD) of the nozzle in an area that was not surface stress mitigated (peened). The indication was found to be acceptable for continued operation under CFR and ASME requirements and will not be repaired during this outage.

"The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector."

Notified R3DO (Ziolkowski).

EN Revision Imported Date: 4/27/2022

EN Revision Text: AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - RADIOPHARMACEUTICAL PACKAGE LOST IN TRANSIT

The following was received from the Illinois Emergency Management Agency (the Agency) via email:

"GE Healthcare in Arlington Heights, IL shipped a Type A package containing one (1) 10mL vial of Indium-111 liquid within a standard 6mm lead shielded container on 3/4/22 to Cardinal Health in Sioux Falls, SD. The outer package is a corrugate box, measuring (L)16.1 x (W)16.1 x (H)16.5cm. The last viable scan was 3/7/22 at the [common carrier] hub under tracking number 270485520236. At the time of shipment, the package contained 3.201 mCi, but is decayed at the time of writing this report to 0.58 mCi. The package was expected to arrive 3/7/22. After no available status updates, [common carrier] dangerous goods advised GE Healthcare to consider the package lost in transit. The licensee reported the matter timely. The licensee advised there were no available updates as of 4/11/22. There have been no available updates since this date and this package is considered lost in transit. The activity is now less than 1.0 microcurie and does not represent a significant public hazard. This matter is considered closed.

"The package has now decayed beneath the NRC reportable quantity and does not represent a significant radiation hazard. No indication of intentional theft or diversion and the contents would not be useful to illicit intent."

Illinois Event Number: IL220010


THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A 'Less than Cat 3' LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL

Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf

NOTICE OF UNUSUAL EVENT

The following is a summary of information provided by the licensee via telephone:

On 04/28/22, at 2355 EDT, with both Sequoyah Unit 1 and 2 in Mode-1, 100 percent, a Notice of Unusual Event was declared due to receiving two seismic alarms and security feeling ground movement. Additionally, security in a tower heard an explosion. Both units remain in Mode-1, 100 percent and they are investigating the validity of the seismic alarms before proceeding with the Abnormal Operating Procedure required shutdown.

The following additional information was obtained from the licensee in accordance with Headquarters Operations Officers Report Guidance:

The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector. The state of Tennessee and the Tennessee Valley Authority were notified.

Notified DHS SWO, FEMA Operations Center, CISA Central, FEMA NWC (email), DHS NRCC THD Desk(email), and DHS Nuclear SSA (email).

* * * UPDATE ON 04/29/2022 AT 0410 EDT FROM BRIAN KLEIN TO OSSY FONT * * *

The following is a summary of information provided by the licensee via telephone:

On 4/29/22, at 0406 EDT, Sequoyah Unit 1 and Unit 2 terminated the Notice of Unusual Event. The Civil Engineers determined that the alarms were due to a failed seismic indicator channel. Through interviews, only one security officer felt ground movement for a couple of seconds and heard a faint rumbling sound.

The following additional information was obtained from the licensee in accordance with Headquarters Operations Officers Report Guidance:

The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector. The state of Tennessee and the Tennessee Valley Authority were notified.

Notified R2DO (Miller), NRR EO (Miller), and IR MOC (Gott) via email.

Additionally, notified DHS SWO, FEMA Operations Center, CISA Central, FEMA NWC (email), DHS NRCC THD Desk(email), and DHS Nuclear SSA (email).

LOSS OF ASSESSMENT CAPABILITY

The following information was provided by the licensee via fax:

"On 4/28/2022, at 2338 EDT, Sequoyah received an unexpected alarm for seismological recording initiated. At 2341 EDT, unexpected alarm 1/2 Safe Shutdown Earthquake response spectra exceeded was received. The National Earthquake Information Center was contacted to confirm there was no seismic activity, and this was also confirmed on the U.S. Geological Survey website. The alarms were determined to be invalid, and they occurred due to a failure in the seismic monitoring system. This failure results in loss of ability to assess the Emergency Action Level for Initiating Condition HU2 `Seismic event greater than Operating Basis Earthquake (OBE) levels' per procedure EPIP-1, `Emergency Plan Classification Matrix.'

"If an actual seismic event had occurred, HU2 could not be assessed. However, compensatory measures have been implemented and include assessing OBE criteria based on alternative criteria contained in procedure AOP-N.05, `Earthquake,' which provides conservative guidance when seismic instruments are unavailable.

"This is an eight-hour, non-emergency notification for an event resulting in a major loss of Emergency Assessment Capability. This event is reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii). There is no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."

The following additional information was obtained from the licensee in accordance with Headquarters Operations Officers Report Guidance:

The faulty detector was removed from service, so the remaining detector provides conservative detection as the only source to make-up the logic for a seismological alarm.

MANUAL REACTOR TRIP AND AUXILIARY FEEDWATER SYSTEM ACTUATION

The following information was provided by the licensee via email:

"At 0405 Eastern Daylight Time (EDT), with Unit 1 in Mode 1 at 100 percent power, the reactor was manually tripped due to degrading condenser vacuum. The trip was not complex, with all systems responding normally post-trip. The Auxiliary Feedwater System started automatically as expected.

"Operations responded and stabilized the plant. Decay heat is being removed by the Main Steam System to the main condenser using the turbine bypass valves.

"Due to the Reactor Protection System actuation while critical, this event is being reported as a four-hour, non-emergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B). This event is also being reported per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) as an event that resulted in a valid actuation of the Auxiliary Feedwater System.

"There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.

The following additional information was obtained from the licensee in accordance with Headquarters Operations Officers Report Guidance:

No Tech Spec limits were exceeded. Offsite power is available. The suspected cause for the loss of condenser vacuum is when performing the scheduled monthly swap of condenser vacuum pumps, a suction valve failed to shut.

HIGH PRESSURE COOLANT INJECTION (HPCI) INOPERABLE

The following information was provided by the licensee via email:

"At 1251 EDT on April 29, 2022, while troubleshooting the failure of the High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) Exhaust Drain Pot High Level Alarm to clear, it was discovered that the High Pressure Coolant Injection exhaust line condensate drain system was not functioning as designed to support removal of condensate from the turbine exhaust. This resulted in some water accumulation in the turbine casing. Subsequently, the High Pressure Coolant Injection System was declared inoperable. As a result, this condition is being reported under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) as a condition that could have prevented fulfillment of the safety function at the time of discovery. "