Event Notification Report for March 07, 2022
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
03/06/2022 - 03/07/2022
!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
Fuel Cycle Facility
Event Number: 55770
Facility: Louisiana Energy Services
Region: 2 State: NM
Unit: [] [] []
RX Type:
Comments: Uranium Enrichment Facility
Gas Centrifuge Facility
NRC Notified By: Barry Love
HQ OPS Officer: Kerby Scales
Region: 2 State: NM
Unit: [] [] []
RX Type:
Comments: Uranium Enrichment Facility
Gas Centrifuge Facility
NRC Notified By: Barry Love
HQ OPS Officer: Kerby Scales
Notification Date: 03/07/2022
Notification Time: 13:44 [ET]
Event Date: 03/07/2022
Event Time: 10:45 [MST]
Last Update Date: 04/25/2022
Notification Time: 13:44 [ET]
Event Date: 03/07/2022
Event Time: 10:45 [MST]
Last Update Date: 04/25/2022
Emergency Class: Non Emergency
10 CFR Section:
PART 70 APP A (a)(4) - All Safety Items Unavailable
10 CFR Section:
PART 70 APP A (a)(4) - All Safety Items Unavailable
Person (Organization):
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFICATION (EMAIL)
Miller, Mark (R2DO)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFICATION (EMAIL)
Miller, Mark (R2DO)
EN Revision Imported Date: 4/26/2022
EN Revision Text: ITEM RELIED ON FOR SAFETY (IROFS) INOPERABLE
The following information was provided by the licensee via email:
"The plant is in a safe configuration. Three construction vehicles, a front end loader, road grader and roller, were allowed within the Controlled Access Area [CAA] boundary without IROFS50b and IROFS50c being declared Operable.
"The Administrative Control IROFS require physical barriers to be placed around the building of concern. Barriers had been placed but the IROFS had not been declared Operable by a Shift Manager.
"The construction vehicles were removed from the CAA and UUSA [Urenco USA] is conservatively reporting this event as a 1-hour Report. This event has been entered in UUSA's corrective action program as EV 149740 and a causal investigation will be performed."
The licensee will notify NRC Region 2.
* * * RETRACTION ON 04/25/2022 AT 1206 EDT FROM BARRY LOVE TO OSSY FONT * * *
The following retraction was received from Urenco USA (UUSA) via telephone and email:
"The accident sequence was originally evaluated for UUSA being in a construction phase and the applicable IROFS were applied based on these construction conditions. The accident scenario has been re-evaluated based on probabilities with current site conditions and assessed that the initiating events would be `highly unlikely' or less than 1E-06 per year, and therefore `not credible.' IROFS50b/c would not be required to meet the performance criteria of 10 CFR 70.61 for the construction vehicles on this project.
"Based on the reassessment of the accident scenarios, UUSA is retracting event notification EN 55770.
"UUSA will be notifying Region 2.
"EN 55802 is not being retracted."
Notified R2DO (Miller) and NMSS Events Notification via email.
EN Revision Text: ITEM RELIED ON FOR SAFETY (IROFS) INOPERABLE
The following information was provided by the licensee via email:
"The plant is in a safe configuration. Three construction vehicles, a front end loader, road grader and roller, were allowed within the Controlled Access Area [CAA] boundary without IROFS50b and IROFS50c being declared Operable.
"The Administrative Control IROFS require physical barriers to be placed around the building of concern. Barriers had been placed but the IROFS had not been declared Operable by a Shift Manager.
"The construction vehicles were removed from the CAA and UUSA [Urenco USA] is conservatively reporting this event as a 1-hour Report. This event has been entered in UUSA's corrective action program as EV 149740 and a causal investigation will be performed."
The licensee will notify NRC Region 2.
* * * RETRACTION ON 04/25/2022 AT 1206 EDT FROM BARRY LOVE TO OSSY FONT * * *
The following retraction was received from Urenco USA (UUSA) via telephone and email:
"The accident sequence was originally evaluated for UUSA being in a construction phase and the applicable IROFS were applied based on these construction conditions. The accident scenario has been re-evaluated based on probabilities with current site conditions and assessed that the initiating events would be `highly unlikely' or less than 1E-06 per year, and therefore `not credible.' IROFS50b/c would not be required to meet the performance criteria of 10 CFR 70.61 for the construction vehicles on this project.
"Based on the reassessment of the accident scenarios, UUSA is retracting event notification EN 55770.
"UUSA will be notifying Region 2.
"EN 55802 is not being retracted."
Notified R2DO (Miller) and NMSS Events Notification via email.
Agreement State
Event Number: 55772
Rep Org: Arizona Dept of Health Services
Licensee:
Region: 4
City: Chandler State: AZ
County:
License #:
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: Brian Goretzki
HQ OPS Officer: Kerby Scales
Licensee:
Region: 4
City: Chandler State: AZ
County:
License #:
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: Brian Goretzki
HQ OPS Officer: Kerby Scales
Notification Date: 03/07/2022
Notification Time: 19:14 [ET]
Event Date: 03/07/2022
Event Time: 00:00 [MST]
Last Update Date: 03/07/2022
Notification Time: 19:14 [ET]
Event Date: 03/07/2022
Event Time: 00:00 [MST]
Last Update Date: 03/07/2022
Emergency Class: Non Emergency
10 CFR Section:
Agreement State
10 CFR Section:
Agreement State
Person (Organization):
Groom, Jeremy (R4)
NMSS_Events_Notification, (EMAIL)
Groom, Jeremy (R4)
NMSS_Events_Notification, (EMAIL)
EN Revision Imported Date: 4/7/2022
EN Revision Text: AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - POTENTIALLY RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL DISCOVERED
The following information was received from the Arizona Department of Health Services (the Department) via email:
"The Department received a call from a concerned citizen over 3 potentially radioactive pieces of metal that he found in a toolbox that his father-in-law previously owned. When Department inspectors went onsite, the pieces of metal read between 2-8 mR/hr on contact. The metal pieces were removed by Department staff and are currently in secure storage. Exposures to individuals are unknown at this time and the origin of the metal is unknown. The Department will continue to investigate."
Arizona Incident Number: 22-005
EN Revision Text: AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - POTENTIALLY RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL DISCOVERED
The following information was received from the Arizona Department of Health Services (the Department) via email:
"The Department received a call from a concerned citizen over 3 potentially radioactive pieces of metal that he found in a toolbox that his father-in-law previously owned. When Department inspectors went onsite, the pieces of metal read between 2-8 mR/hr on contact. The metal pieces were removed by Department staff and are currently in secure storage. Exposures to individuals are unknown at this time and the origin of the metal is unknown. The Department will continue to investigate."
Arizona Incident Number: 22-005
Agreement State
Event Number: 55773
Rep Org: Arizona Dept of Health Services
Licensee: Western Technologies Inc.
Region: 4
City: Tucson State: AZ
County:
License #: 07-080
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: Brian Goretzki
HQ OPS Officer: Kerby Scales
Licensee: Western Technologies Inc.
Region: 4
City: Tucson State: AZ
County:
License #: 07-080
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: Brian Goretzki
HQ OPS Officer: Kerby Scales
Notification Date: 03/07/2022
Notification Time: 20:01 [ET]
Event Date: 03/07/2022
Event Time: 07:30 [MST]
Last Update Date: 03/07/2022
Notification Time: 20:01 [ET]
Event Date: 03/07/2022
Event Time: 07:30 [MST]
Last Update Date: 03/07/2022
Emergency Class: Non Emergency
10 CFR Section:
Agreement State
10 CFR Section:
Agreement State
Person (Organization):
Groom, Jeremy (R4)
NMSS_Events_Notification, (EMAIL)
ILTAB, (EMAIL)
CNSNS (Mexico), - (EMAIL)
Groom, Jeremy (R4)
NMSS_Events_Notification, (EMAIL)
ILTAB, (EMAIL)
CNSNS (Mexico), - (EMAIL)
EN Revision Imported Date: 4/7/2022
EN Revision Text: AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - STOLEN TROXLER GAUGE
The following information was received from the Arizona Department of Health Services (the Department) via email:
"The Department received notification from the licensee that a portable gauge was lost/stolen. A technician last saw the gauge on 03/04/2022 at a jobsite in Phoenix at 1320 [MST]. The technician then realized that the gauge was no longer in his possession on 03/07/2022 when he arrived at his first jobsite at 0730 [MST] in Tucson. The gauge is a Troxler 3430P, Serial Number 72511, containing approximately 8 millicuries of Cesium-137 and 40 millicuries of Americium-241:Beryllium. The Department has requested additional information and continues to investigate the event. The licensee has reported the gauge stolen to the cities of Tucson and Phoenix. The report numbers are as follows:
"City of Phoenix - #2022-00000355178, City of Tucson - #2203078513"
Arizona Incident Number: 22-006
THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A 'Less than Cat 3' LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL
Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf
EN Revision Text: AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - STOLEN TROXLER GAUGE
The following information was received from the Arizona Department of Health Services (the Department) via email:
"The Department received notification from the licensee that a portable gauge was lost/stolen. A technician last saw the gauge on 03/04/2022 at a jobsite in Phoenix at 1320 [MST]. The technician then realized that the gauge was no longer in his possession on 03/07/2022 when he arrived at his first jobsite at 0730 [MST] in Tucson. The gauge is a Troxler 3430P, Serial Number 72511, containing approximately 8 millicuries of Cesium-137 and 40 millicuries of Americium-241:Beryllium. The Department has requested additional information and continues to investigate the event. The licensee has reported the gauge stolen to the cities of Tucson and Phoenix. The report numbers are as follows:
"City of Phoenix - #2022-00000355178, City of Tucson - #2203078513"
Arizona Incident Number: 22-006
THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A 'Less than Cat 3' LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL
Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf
Power Reactor
Event Number: 55859
Facility: Brunswick
Region: 2 State: NC
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: Christopher Denton
HQ OPS Officer: Brian P. Smith
Region: 2 State: NC
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: Christopher Denton
HQ OPS Officer: Brian P. Smith
Notification Date: 04/26/2022
Notification Time: 13:13 [ET]
Event Date: 03/07/2022
Event Time: 00:40 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 04/26/2022
Notification Time: 13:13 [ET]
Event Date: 03/07/2022
Event Time: 00:40 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 04/26/2022
Emergency Class: Non Emergency
10 CFR Section:
50.73(a)(1) - Invalid Specif System Actuation
10 CFR Section:
50.73(a)(1) - Invalid Specif System Actuation
Person (Organization):
Miller, Mark (R2DO)
Miller, Mark (R2DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | N | 0 | Cold Shutdown | 100 | Power Operation |
INVALID ACTUATION 60-DAY TELEPHONE NOTIFICATION
The following information was provided by the licensee via fax or email:
"This 60-day telephone notification is being made in lieu of an LER submittal per 10 CFR 50.73(a)(1). This notification is made pursuant to the reporting requirements specified in 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) for invalid actuations of systems listed in 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(B).
"At approximately 0040 Eastern Standard Time (EST) on March 7, 2022, Unit 1 received inadvertent High-Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) and Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) initiation signals. Subsequently, at approximately 0148 EST on March 7, 2022, Unit 1 received inadvertent Low-Pressure Coolant Injection (LPCI) and Core Spray initiation signals. In addition, all four Emergency Diesel Generators auto started, Group 10 (Instrument Air) Primary Containment Isolation System actuations occurred, and the Residual Heat Removal (RHR) Service Water Booster pumps tripped resulting in a brief interruption (approximately 9 minutes) to the Shutdown Cooling (SDC) heatsink. Jumpers, installed per planned refueling outage activities, prevented discharge of Emergency Core Cooling Systems into the reactor. HPCI, RCIC, and RHR Loop `A' were removed from service and under clearance. RHR SDC remained operable via RHR Loop `B' and forced circulation was maintained in the reactor.
"At the time of these events, Unit 1 was shutdown for refueling and the `A' and `C' reactor water level transmitters had been isolated in preparation for planned replacement. Leak-by of the instrument isolation valves occurred on both transmitters. Leak-by on the `C' instrument occurred at a faster rate with the `A' instrument providing the confirmatory signals resulting in Low Level 2 (LL2) and Low Level 3 (LL3) indication at approximately 0040 EST and 0148 EST, respectively. All actuations occurred as designed for LL2 and LL3 signals. During these events, reactor water level remained stable at the Reactor Vessel Head Flange and the `B' and `D' reactor water level transmitters remained off-scale-high, as expected under these conditions. Therefore, the actuations were not initiated in response to actual plant conditions, it was not an intentional manual initiation, and there were no parameters satisfying the requirements for initiation of the system (i.e., there was no low reactor water level condition). Considering the above, these actuations were invalid."
"There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel."
The following information was provided by the licensee via fax or email:
"This 60-day telephone notification is being made in lieu of an LER submittal per 10 CFR 50.73(a)(1). This notification is made pursuant to the reporting requirements specified in 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) for invalid actuations of systems listed in 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(B).
"At approximately 0040 Eastern Standard Time (EST) on March 7, 2022, Unit 1 received inadvertent High-Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) and Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) initiation signals. Subsequently, at approximately 0148 EST on March 7, 2022, Unit 1 received inadvertent Low-Pressure Coolant Injection (LPCI) and Core Spray initiation signals. In addition, all four Emergency Diesel Generators auto started, Group 10 (Instrument Air) Primary Containment Isolation System actuations occurred, and the Residual Heat Removal (RHR) Service Water Booster pumps tripped resulting in a brief interruption (approximately 9 minutes) to the Shutdown Cooling (SDC) heatsink. Jumpers, installed per planned refueling outage activities, prevented discharge of Emergency Core Cooling Systems into the reactor. HPCI, RCIC, and RHR Loop `A' were removed from service and under clearance. RHR SDC remained operable via RHR Loop `B' and forced circulation was maintained in the reactor.
"At the time of these events, Unit 1 was shutdown for refueling and the `A' and `C' reactor water level transmitters had been isolated in preparation for planned replacement. Leak-by of the instrument isolation valves occurred on both transmitters. Leak-by on the `C' instrument occurred at a faster rate with the `A' instrument providing the confirmatory signals resulting in Low Level 2 (LL2) and Low Level 3 (LL3) indication at approximately 0040 EST and 0148 EST, respectively. All actuations occurred as designed for LL2 and LL3 signals. During these events, reactor water level remained stable at the Reactor Vessel Head Flange and the `B' and `D' reactor water level transmitters remained off-scale-high, as expected under these conditions. Therefore, the actuations were not initiated in response to actual plant conditions, it was not an intentional manual initiation, and there were no parameters satisfying the requirements for initiation of the system (i.e., there was no low reactor water level condition). Considering the above, these actuations were invalid."
"There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel."