Event Notification Report for February 28, 2022
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
02/27/2022 - 02/28/2022
Power Reactor
Event Number: 55756
Facility: Brunswick
Region: 2 State: NC
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: Richard Barrett
HQ OPS Officer: Karen Cotton-Gross
Region: 2 State: NC
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: Richard Barrett
HQ OPS Officer: Karen Cotton-Gross
Notification Date: 02/24/2022
Notification Time: 14:35 [ET]
Event Date: 01/04/2022
Event Time: 13:16 [EST]
Last Update Date: 02/24/2022
Notification Time: 14:35 [ET]
Event Date: 01/04/2022
Event Time: 13:16 [EST]
Last Update Date: 02/24/2022
Emergency Class: Non Emergency
10 CFR Section:
50.73(a)(1) - Invalid Specif System Actuation
10 CFR Section:
50.73(a)(1) - Invalid Specif System Actuation
Person (Organization):
Miller, Mark (R2)
Miller, Mark (R2)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
EN Revision Imported Date: 2/28/2022
EN Revision Text: 60-DAY OPTIONAL TELEPHONIC NOTIFICATION FOR INVALID ACTUATION OF CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVES
The following information was provided by the licensee via email:
"This 60-day optional telephone notification is being made in lieu of an LER [Licensee Event Report] submittal as allowed by 10 CFR 50.73(a)(1). This notification is made pursuant to the reporting requirements specified in 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) for an invalid actuation of one of the systems listed in 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(B).
"At approximately 1316 Eastern Standard Time [EST] on January 4, 2022, during performance of isolation logic periodic testing associated with Primary Containment Isolation System Groups 2 and 6, an invalid actuation of Group 6 Primary Containment Isolation Valves (PCIVs) (i.e., Containment Atmospheric Control/Monitoring (CAC/CAM) and Post Accident Sampling (PASS) isolation valves) occurred. This resulted in a Division I CAC isolation signal, a full CAM isolation, and a full PASS isolation. Reactor Building Ventilation isolated and Standby Gas Treatment started per design. No manipulations associated with the isolation or reset logic were ongoing at the time.
"Troubleshooting determined that the Group 6 isolation signal resulted from a high resistance contact on a relay associated with the main stack radiation high-high isolation logic. This condition interrupted electrical continuity and prevented the Group 6 logic from resetting. Following cleaning of the relay contacts, the isolation logic remained in the reset state.
"The main stack radiation monitor is a shared component that sends isolation signals to Unit 1 and Unit 2. It was verified that the radiation monitor was not in trip electrically and there were no Unit 2 actuations. Therefore, the actuation was not initiated in response to actual plant conditions, it was not an intentional manual initiation, and there were no parameters satisfying the requirements for initiation of the system. As a result, this event has been determined to be an invalid actuation.
"This event did not result in any adverse impact to the health and safety of the public."
The NRC Resident Inspector was notified.
EN Revision Text: 60-DAY OPTIONAL TELEPHONIC NOTIFICATION FOR INVALID ACTUATION OF CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVES
The following information was provided by the licensee via email:
"This 60-day optional telephone notification is being made in lieu of an LER [Licensee Event Report] submittal as allowed by 10 CFR 50.73(a)(1). This notification is made pursuant to the reporting requirements specified in 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) for an invalid actuation of one of the systems listed in 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(B).
"At approximately 1316 Eastern Standard Time [EST] on January 4, 2022, during performance of isolation logic periodic testing associated with Primary Containment Isolation System Groups 2 and 6, an invalid actuation of Group 6 Primary Containment Isolation Valves (PCIVs) (i.e., Containment Atmospheric Control/Monitoring (CAC/CAM) and Post Accident Sampling (PASS) isolation valves) occurred. This resulted in a Division I CAC isolation signal, a full CAM isolation, and a full PASS isolation. Reactor Building Ventilation isolated and Standby Gas Treatment started per design. No manipulations associated with the isolation or reset logic were ongoing at the time.
"Troubleshooting determined that the Group 6 isolation signal resulted from a high resistance contact on a relay associated with the main stack radiation high-high isolation logic. This condition interrupted electrical continuity and prevented the Group 6 logic from resetting. Following cleaning of the relay contacts, the isolation logic remained in the reset state.
"The main stack radiation monitor is a shared component that sends isolation signals to Unit 1 and Unit 2. It was verified that the radiation monitor was not in trip electrically and there were no Unit 2 actuations. Therefore, the actuation was not initiated in response to actual plant conditions, it was not an intentional manual initiation, and there were no parameters satisfying the requirements for initiation of the system. As a result, this event has been determined to be an invalid actuation.
"This event did not result in any adverse impact to the health and safety of the public."
The NRC Resident Inspector was notified.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 55757
Facility: Turkey Point
Region: 2 State: FL
Unit: [3] [] []
RX Type: [3] W-3-LP,[4] W-3-LP
NRC Notified By: Humberto Benitez
HQ OPS Officer: Ossy Font
Region: 2 State: FL
Unit: [3] [] []
RX Type: [3] W-3-LP,[4] W-3-LP
NRC Notified By: Humberto Benitez
HQ OPS Officer: Ossy Font
Notification Date: 02/25/2022
Notification Time: 14:53 [ET]
Event Date: 02/24/2022
Event Time: 16:50 [EST]
Last Update Date: 02/25/2022
Notification Time: 14:53 [ET]
Event Date: 02/24/2022
Event Time: 16:50 [EST]
Last Update Date: 02/25/2022
Emergency Class: Non Emergency
10 CFR Section:
26.719 - Fitness For Duty
10 CFR Section:
26.719 - Fitness For Duty
Person (Organization):
Miller, Mark (R2)
FFD Group, (EMAIL)
Miller, Mark (R2)
FFD Group, (EMAIL)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 3 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
FITNESS FOR DUTY
The following information was provided by the licensee via telephone:
A non-licensee contractor supervisor had a confirmed positive for a controlled substance during a fitness for duty test. The employee's access to the plant has been terminated.
The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
The following information was provided by the licensee via telephone:
A non-licensee contractor supervisor had a confirmed positive for a controlled substance during a fitness for duty test. The employee's access to the plant has been terminated.
The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 55758
Facility: McGuire
Region: 2 State: NC
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: Justin Black
HQ OPS Officer: Ossy Font
Region: 2 State: NC
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: Justin Black
HQ OPS Officer: Ossy Font
Notification Date: 02/25/2022
Notification Time: 16:10 [ET]
Event Date: 02/25/2022
Event Time: 11:33 [EST]
Last Update Date: 02/25/2022
Notification Time: 16:10 [ET]
Event Date: 02/25/2022
Event Time: 11:33 [EST]
Last Update Date: 02/25/2022
Emergency Class: Non Emergency
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - Loss Comm/Asmt/Response
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - Loss Comm/Asmt/Response
Person (Organization):
Miller, Mark (R2)
Miller, Mark (R2)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
| 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
LOSS OF TECHNICAL SUPPORT CENTER (TSC)
The following information was provided by the licensee:
"On 2/25/22, at 1133 EDT, the Technical Support Center (TSC) high temperature alarm annunciated in the Control Room due to an equipment malfunction that resulted in an unplanned loss of the TSC for greater than seventy-five minutes.
"If an emergency had been declared requiring TSC activation during this period, the TSC would have been staffed and activated using existing emergency planning procedures. If relocation of the TSC had been necessary, the Emergency Coordinator would have relocated the TSC staff to an alternate location in accordance with applicable site procedures.
"This is an eight-hour, non-emergency notification for a loss of Emergency Assessment Capability. This event is reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii) because the equipment malfunction affected the functionality of an emergency response facility.
"There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."
The following information was provided by the licensee:
"On 2/25/22, at 1133 EDT, the Technical Support Center (TSC) high temperature alarm annunciated in the Control Room due to an equipment malfunction that resulted in an unplanned loss of the TSC for greater than seventy-five minutes.
"If an emergency had been declared requiring TSC activation during this period, the TSC would have been staffed and activated using existing emergency planning procedures. If relocation of the TSC had been necessary, the Emergency Coordinator would have relocated the TSC staff to an alternate location in accordance with applicable site procedures.
"This is an eight-hour, non-emergency notification for a loss of Emergency Assessment Capability. This event is reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii) because the equipment malfunction affected the functionality of an emergency response facility.
"There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."
Agreement State
Event Number: 55751
Rep Org: Illinois Emergency Mgmt. Agency
Licensee: The Carle Foundation
Region: 3
City: Urbana State: IL
County:
License #: IL-01156-01
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: Zach Mengel
HQ OPS Officer: Karen Cotton-Gross
Licensee: The Carle Foundation
Region: 3
City: Urbana State: IL
County:
License #: IL-01156-01
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: Zach Mengel
HQ OPS Officer: Karen Cotton-Gross
Notification Date: 02/22/2022
Notification Time: 13:00 [ET]
Event Date: 12/28/2016
Event Time: 00:00 [CST]
Last Update Date: 02/22/2022
Notification Time: 13:00 [ET]
Event Date: 12/28/2016
Event Time: 00:00 [CST]
Last Update Date: 02/22/2022
Emergency Class: Non Emergency
10 CFR Section:
Agreement State
10 CFR Section:
Agreement State
Person (Organization):
Dickson, Billy (R3)
NMSS_Events_Notification, (EMAIL)
Dickson, Billy (R3)
NMSS_Events_Notification, (EMAIL)
EN Revision Imported Date: 3/1/2022
EN Revision Text: AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - UNDERDOSE TO PATIENT
The following information was provided by the Illinois Emergency Management Agency (Agency) via email:
"At 1400 CST on February 21, 2022, The Carle Foundation notified the Agency to advise of an unreported medical event that occurred on December 28, 2016. No adverse patient impact reported. This will be reported to the NRC this morning.
"Following a comprehensive review of Y-90 Therasphere procedures performed over the last several years, The Carle Foundation d/b/a The Carle Foundation Hospital identified an additional medical event in addition to the one identified during a recent Agency inspection on 2/16/22, that was not reported as required. On 12/28/2016, a written directive to deliver 0.51 GBq Y-90 Theraspheres to the Superior Branch of Segment 3 (liver) was prepared; however, only 0.16 GBq (31.4%) was delivered. The licensee was under the impression that this was not a reportable medical event since they revised the treatment plan and written directive after the procedure. Although still under investigation, the root cause appears to be the use of a smaller microcatheter than recommended. No further treatment to the patient is planned. The authorized user advised that the dose delivered to the critical mass of the segment treated was medically satisfactory for this case."
Illinois Report # IL220006
A Medical Event may indicate potential problems in a medical facility's use of radioactive materials. It does not necessarily result in harm to the patient.
EN Revision Text: AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - UNDERDOSE TO PATIENT
The following information was provided by the Illinois Emergency Management Agency (Agency) via email:
"At 1400 CST on February 21, 2022, The Carle Foundation notified the Agency to advise of an unreported medical event that occurred on December 28, 2016. No adverse patient impact reported. This will be reported to the NRC this morning.
"Following a comprehensive review of Y-90 Therasphere procedures performed over the last several years, The Carle Foundation d/b/a The Carle Foundation Hospital identified an additional medical event in addition to the one identified during a recent Agency inspection on 2/16/22, that was not reported as required. On 12/28/2016, a written directive to deliver 0.51 GBq Y-90 Theraspheres to the Superior Branch of Segment 3 (liver) was prepared; however, only 0.16 GBq (31.4%) was delivered. The licensee was under the impression that this was not a reportable medical event since they revised the treatment plan and written directive after the procedure. Although still under investigation, the root cause appears to be the use of a smaller microcatheter than recommended. No further treatment to the patient is planned. The authorized user advised that the dose delivered to the critical mass of the segment treated was medically satisfactory for this case."
Illinois Report # IL220006
A Medical Event may indicate potential problems in a medical facility's use of radioactive materials. It does not necessarily result in harm to the patient.
Agreement State
Event Number: 55752
Rep Org: California Radiation Control Prgm
Licensee: G3 Quality, Inc
Region: 4
City: Cerritos State: CA
County:
License #: 7986-19
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: Don Oesterle
HQ OPS Officer: Lloyd Desotell
Licensee: G3 Quality, Inc
Region: 4
City: Cerritos State: CA
County:
License #: 7986-19
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: Don Oesterle
HQ OPS Officer: Lloyd Desotell
Notification Date: 02/22/2022
Notification Time: 19:03 [ET]
Event Date: 02/21/2022
Event Time: 00:00 [PST]
Last Update Date: 02/22/2022
Notification Time: 19:03 [ET]
Event Date: 02/21/2022
Event Time: 00:00 [PST]
Last Update Date: 02/22/2022
Emergency Class: Non Emergency
10 CFR Section:
Agreement State
10 CFR Section:
Agreement State
Person (Organization):
O'Keefe, Neil (R4)
NMSS_Events_Notification, (EMAIL)
ILTAB, (EMAIL)
CNSNS (Mexico), (EMAIL)
O'Keefe, Neil (R4)
NMSS_Events_Notification, (EMAIL)
ILTAB, (EMAIL)
CNSNS (Mexico), (EMAIL)
EN Revision Imported Date: 3/1/2022
EN Revision Text: AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - STOLEN MOISTURE DENSITY GAUGE
The following report was received from the California Department of Public Health via email:
"On February 21, 2022, the alternate Radiation Safety Officer of G3 Quality, Inc. contacted the California Office of Emergency Services to report a stolen moisture density gauge. The gauge was a CPN model MC-3 S/N M370108596 (10 mCi Cs-137, 50 mCi Am:Be-241). The gauge was discovered stolen, along with other equipment, from a locked temporary storage container in a fenced (also locked) area of a construction site at the northwest corner of Interstate 10 and Interstate 15. The theft likely occurred sometime between Friday, February 19 and Monday, February 21. The storage container and fence locks were cut. A police report was given to the Ontario Police Department. The licensee's investigation into this event is ongoing and will be reviewed further by the California Department of Public Health."
California Event Number: 022122
THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A 'Less than Cat 3' LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL
Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf
EN Revision Text: AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - STOLEN MOISTURE DENSITY GAUGE
The following report was received from the California Department of Public Health via email:
"On February 21, 2022, the alternate Radiation Safety Officer of G3 Quality, Inc. contacted the California Office of Emergency Services to report a stolen moisture density gauge. The gauge was a CPN model MC-3 S/N M370108596 (10 mCi Cs-137, 50 mCi Am:Be-241). The gauge was discovered stolen, along with other equipment, from a locked temporary storage container in a fenced (also locked) area of a construction site at the northwest corner of Interstate 10 and Interstate 15. The theft likely occurred sometime between Friday, February 19 and Monday, February 21. The storage container and fence locks were cut. A police report was given to the Ontario Police Department. The licensee's investigation into this event is ongoing and will be reviewed further by the California Department of Public Health."
California Event Number: 022122
THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A 'Less than Cat 3' LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL
Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf