Event Notification Report for February 16, 2022
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
02/15/2022 - 02/16/2022
Power Reactor
Event Number: 55741
Facility: Watts Bar
Region: 2 State: TN
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: Ryan B. Nessell
HQ OPS Officer: Karen Cotton-Gross
Region: 2 State: TN
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: Ryan B. Nessell
HQ OPS Officer: Karen Cotton-Gross
Notification Date: 02/16/2022
Notification Time: 16:42 [ET]
Event Date: 02/16/2022
Event Time: 11:59 [EST]
Last Update Date: 02/16/2022
Notification Time: 16:42 [ET]
Event Date: 02/16/2022
Event Time: 11:59 [EST]
Last Update Date: 02/16/2022
Emergency Class: Non Emergency
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - Loss Comm/Asmt/Response
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - Loss Comm/Asmt/Response
Person (Organization):
Miller, Mark (R2)
Miller, Mark (R2)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
| 2 | N | Y | 95 | Power Operation | 95 | Power Operation |
EN Revision Imported Date: 3/16/2022
EN Revision Text: LOSS OF OFFSITE COMMUNICATION CAPABILITY
The following information was provided by the licensee via fax or email:
"At 1159 EST, on 2/16/2022, the Watts Bar Nuclear, Shift Manager was notified that Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) attempted to notify Tennessee Emergency Management Agency (TEMA) regarding routine siren testing at 0750 EST. TVA was unable to reach TEMA via telephone land line or the Emergency Communication and Notification System (ECNS). TEMA Watch Point staff were located at their back-up facility. TVA subsequently notified TEMA via cell phone that there were communication issues with the primary and backup notification methods. It was determined that the TEMA back-up facility was not able to receive incoming calls. At 0820 EST, TEMA positioned personnel at their primary facility in order to respond to notifications. This restored primary and backup means of notifying the state because the primary facility was not affected by the communication issues.
"This event is reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii) as a Major Loss of Offsite Communications Capability because it affected TVA's ability to notify the State of TN.
"The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector."
EN Revision Text: LOSS OF OFFSITE COMMUNICATION CAPABILITY
The following information was provided by the licensee via fax or email:
"At 1159 EST, on 2/16/2022, the Watts Bar Nuclear, Shift Manager was notified that Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) attempted to notify Tennessee Emergency Management Agency (TEMA) regarding routine siren testing at 0750 EST. TVA was unable to reach TEMA via telephone land line or the Emergency Communication and Notification System (ECNS). TEMA Watch Point staff were located at their back-up facility. TVA subsequently notified TEMA via cell phone that there were communication issues with the primary and backup notification methods. It was determined that the TEMA back-up facility was not able to receive incoming calls. At 0820 EST, TEMA positioned personnel at their primary facility in order to respond to notifications. This restored primary and backup means of notifying the state because the primary facility was not affected by the communication issues.
"This event is reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii) as a Major Loss of Offsite Communications Capability because it affected TVA's ability to notify the State of TN.
"The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector."
Power Reactor
Event Number: 55742
Facility: Sequoyah
Region: 2 State: TN
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: Tony Langford
HQ OPS Officer: Kerby Scales
Region: 2 State: TN
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: Tony Langford
HQ OPS Officer: Kerby Scales
Notification Date: 02/16/2022
Notification Time: 17:01 [ET]
Event Date: 02/16/2022
Event Time: 11:28 [EST]
Last Update Date: 02/16/2022
Notification Time: 17:01 [ET]
Event Date: 02/16/2022
Event Time: 11:28 [EST]
Last Update Date: 02/16/2022
Emergency Class: Non Emergency
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - Loss Comm/Asmt/Response
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - Loss Comm/Asmt/Response
Person (Organization):
Miller, Mark (R2)
Miller, Mark (R2)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
| 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
EN Revision Imported Date: 3/16/2022
EN Revision Text: LOSS OF OFFSITE COMMUNICATION CAPABILITY
The following information was provided by the licensee via fax or email:
"At 1128 EST on 2/16/2022, the SQN [Sequoyah Nuclear] Shift Manager was notified that TVA [Tennessee Valley Authority] attempted to notify Tennessee Emergency Management Agency (TEMA) regarding routine siren testing at 0750. TVA was unable to reach TEMA via telephone land line or the Emergency Communication and Notification System (ECNS). TEMA Watch Point staff were located at their back-up facility. TVA subsequently notified TEMA via cell phone that there were communication issues with the primary and backup notification methods. It was determined that the TEMA back-up facility was not able to receive incoming calls. At 0820, TEMA positioned personnel at their primary facility in order to respond to notifications. This restored primary and backup means of notifying the state because the primary facility was not affected by the communication issues.
"This event is reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii) as a Major Loss of Offsite Communications Capability because it affected TVA's ability to notify the State of TN.
"The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector."
EN Revision Text: LOSS OF OFFSITE COMMUNICATION CAPABILITY
The following information was provided by the licensee via fax or email:
"At 1128 EST on 2/16/2022, the SQN [Sequoyah Nuclear] Shift Manager was notified that TVA [Tennessee Valley Authority] attempted to notify Tennessee Emergency Management Agency (TEMA) regarding routine siren testing at 0750. TVA was unable to reach TEMA via telephone land line or the Emergency Communication and Notification System (ECNS). TEMA Watch Point staff were located at their back-up facility. TVA subsequently notified TEMA via cell phone that there were communication issues with the primary and backup notification methods. It was determined that the TEMA back-up facility was not able to receive incoming calls. At 0820, TEMA positioned personnel at their primary facility in order to respond to notifications. This restored primary and backup means of notifying the state because the primary facility was not affected by the communication issues.
"This event is reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii) as a Major Loss of Offsite Communications Capability because it affected TVA's ability to notify the State of TN.
"The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector."
Agreement State
Event Number: 55743
Rep Org: Texas Dept of State Health Services
Licensee: Mistras Group INC
Region: 4
City: LaPorte State: TX
County:
License #: L 06369
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: Art Tucker
HQ OPS Officer: Bethany Cecere
Licensee: Mistras Group INC
Region: 4
City: LaPorte State: TX
County:
License #: L 06369
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: Art Tucker
HQ OPS Officer: Bethany Cecere
Notification Date: 02/16/2022
Notification Time: 20:26 [ET]
Event Date: 02/16/2022
Event Time: 00:00 [CST]
Last Update Date: 02/16/2022
Notification Time: 20:26 [ET]
Event Date: 02/16/2022
Event Time: 00:00 [CST]
Last Update Date: 02/16/2022
Emergency Class: Non Emergency
10 CFR Section:
Agreement State
10 CFR Section:
Agreement State
Person (Organization):
Azua, Ray (R4)
NMSS_Events_Notification, (EMAIL)
Azua, Ray (R4)
NMSS_Events_Notification, (EMAIL)
EN Revision Imported Date: 3/16/2022
EN Revision Text: AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - SAFETY EQUIPMENT FAILURE
The following information was provided by the Texas Department of State Health Services (the Agency) by email:
"On February 16, 2022, the Agency was notified by the licensee's radiation safety officer (RSO) that one of his crews [at a temporary job site in Baytown, TX] were unable to retract an 89 Curie iridium - 192 source back into a QSA 880D exposure device. The radiographers were performing radiography when a pipe fell on the guide tube crimping it to the point that the source assemble could not pass through it. The radiographers isolated the area and contacted the company's RSO. A retrieval team went to the location and was able to recover the source within the hour of the start of the event. No member of the public received an exposure from the event. The radiographers did not exceed any exposure limits. The radiographer's dosimetry will be sent for processing."
Texas Incident #: 9914
EN Revision Text: AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - SAFETY EQUIPMENT FAILURE
The following information was provided by the Texas Department of State Health Services (the Agency) by email:
"On February 16, 2022, the Agency was notified by the licensee's radiation safety officer (RSO) that one of his crews [at a temporary job site in Baytown, TX] were unable to retract an 89 Curie iridium - 192 source back into a QSA 880D exposure device. The radiographers were performing radiography when a pipe fell on the guide tube crimping it to the point that the source assemble could not pass through it. The radiographers isolated the area and contacted the company's RSO. A retrieval team went to the location and was able to recover the source within the hour of the start of the event. No member of the public received an exposure from the event. The radiographers did not exceed any exposure limits. The radiographer's dosimetry will be sent for processing."
Texas Incident #: 9914
Part 21
Event Number: 55749
Rep Org: Emerson Process Management
Licensee: Emerson Process Management
Region: 2
City: Louisville State: KY
County:
License #:
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: Steven Stoops
HQ OPS Officer: Thomas Kendzia
Licensee: Emerson Process Management
Region: 2
City: Louisville State: KY
County:
License #:
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: Steven Stoops
HQ OPS Officer: Thomas Kendzia
Notification Date: 02/18/2022
Notification Time: 08:46 [ET]
Event Date: 02/16/2022
Event Time: 00:00 [CST]
Last Update Date: 02/18/2022
Notification Time: 08:46 [ET]
Event Date: 02/16/2022
Event Time: 00:00 [CST]
Last Update Date: 02/18/2022
Emergency Class: Non Emergency
10 CFR Section:
21.21(a)(2) - Interim Eval Of Deviation
10 CFR Section:
21.21(a)(2) - Interim Eval Of Deviation
Person (Organization):
Schroeder, Dan (R1)
Miller, Mark (R2DO)
Riemer, Kenneth (R3DO)
Azua, Ray (R4DO)
Part 21/50.55 Reactors, - (EMAIL)
Schroeder, Dan (R1)
Miller, Mark (R2DO)
Riemer, Kenneth (R3DO)
Azua, Ray (R4DO)
Part 21/50.55 Reactors, - (EMAIL)
EN Revision Imported Date: 3/18/2022
EN Revision Text: PART 21 INTERIM REPORT OF DEVIATION
The following is a summary of a report provided by Emerson Process Management:
On December 13, 2021, Framatome discovered a non-conformance with TopWorx limit switch part number C7-13521-E0 and initiated a return to TopWorx. Emerson Process Management (TopWorx) discovered that, at certain orientations, the limit switch would indicate dual continuity (both open and closed). The anomaly appears to be due to an internal component (brass washer) rotated out of position during assembly. This potentially affects 129 limits switches. TopWorx notified Framatome of the issue.
Contact Information:
Steven Stoops, Quality Manager, TopWorx
Emerson Automation Solutions, 3300 Fern Valley Road, Louisville, KY 40213
502 873 4606 Steven.Stoops@Emerson.com
EN Revision Text: PART 21 INTERIM REPORT OF DEVIATION
The following is a summary of a report provided by Emerson Process Management:
On December 13, 2021, Framatome discovered a non-conformance with TopWorx limit switch part number C7-13521-E0 and initiated a return to TopWorx. Emerson Process Management (TopWorx) discovered that, at certain orientations, the limit switch would indicate dual continuity (both open and closed). The anomaly appears to be due to an internal component (brass washer) rotated out of position during assembly. This potentially affects 129 limits switches. TopWorx notified Framatome of the issue.
Contact Information:
Steven Stoops, Quality Manager, TopWorx
Emerson Automation Solutions, 3300 Fern Valley Road, Louisville, KY 40213
502 873 4606 Steven.Stoops@Emerson.com
Agreement State
Event Number: 55745
Rep Org: SC Dept of Health & Env Control
Licensee: New-Indy Catawba LLC
Region: 1
City: Catawba State: SC
County:
License #: 030
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: Adam Gause
HQ OPS Officer: Karen Cotton-Gross
Licensee: New-Indy Catawba LLC
Region: 1
City: Catawba State: SC
County:
License #: 030
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: Adam Gause
HQ OPS Officer: Karen Cotton-Gross
Notification Date: 02/17/2022
Notification Time: 15:13 [ET]
Event Date: 02/16/2022
Event Time: 00:00 [EST]
Last Update Date: 02/17/2022
Notification Time: 15:13 [ET]
Event Date: 02/16/2022
Event Time: 00:00 [EST]
Last Update Date: 02/17/2022
Emergency Class: Non Emergency
10 CFR Section:
Agreement State
10 CFR Section:
Agreement State
Person (Organization):
Schroeder, Dan (R1)
NMSS_Events_Notification, (EMAIL)
Schroeder, Dan (R1)
NMSS_Events_Notification, (EMAIL)
EN Revision Imported Date: 3/17/2022
EN Revision Text: AGREEMENT STATE REPORT- STUCK SHUTTERS ON TWO FIXED GAUGES
The following information was provided by the state of South Carolina Department of Health and Environmental Control (the Department) via email:
"The South Carolina Department of Health and Environmental Control was notified via phone at 1626 [EST] on 02/16/2022, that shutters were stuck in the open position on two different fixed gauges. The licensee is reporting that one of the fixed gauges is a Cs-137 Berthold Model LB 7440D gauging device, serial number 1678-6-88, with an activity of 150 mCi. The licensee is reporting that the second fixed gauge is a Cs-137 Berthold Model LB 7440D gauging device, serial number 1003-4-96, with an activity of 50 mCi. The licensee is reporting that the locking mechanisms for both shutters is disabled and won't allow for the shutters to close. The licensee is reporting that the gauging devices are still mounted to vessels. A Department inspector was dispatched to the facility on 02/17/22, and found the gauging devices as the licensee described. Dose rate readings using a NDS ND-2000A (calibrated 9/14/21) indicated readings as high as 1.8 mR/hr on the surface of the Cs-137 Berthold Model LB 7440D gauging device, serial number 1003-4-96, with an activity of 50 mCi. Dose rate readings using a NDS ND-2000A (calibrated 9/14/21) indicated readings as high as 2.2 mR/hr on the surface of the Cs-137 Berthold Model LB 7440D gauging device, serial number 1678-6-88, with an activity of 150 mCi. The gauges are located in a controlled area within the licensee's facility. A licensed consultant was scheduled to arrive at the licensee's facility on 02/17/22, to remove the gauges, attach a replacement shutter, and place the gauging devices in storage at the licensee's facility. This event is still under investigation by the South Carolina Department of Health and Environmental Control."
EN Revision Text: AGREEMENT STATE REPORT- STUCK SHUTTERS ON TWO FIXED GAUGES
The following information was provided by the state of South Carolina Department of Health and Environmental Control (the Department) via email:
"The South Carolina Department of Health and Environmental Control was notified via phone at 1626 [EST] on 02/16/2022, that shutters were stuck in the open position on two different fixed gauges. The licensee is reporting that one of the fixed gauges is a Cs-137 Berthold Model LB 7440D gauging device, serial number 1678-6-88, with an activity of 150 mCi. The licensee is reporting that the second fixed gauge is a Cs-137 Berthold Model LB 7440D gauging device, serial number 1003-4-96, with an activity of 50 mCi. The licensee is reporting that the locking mechanisms for both shutters is disabled and won't allow for the shutters to close. The licensee is reporting that the gauging devices are still mounted to vessels. A Department inspector was dispatched to the facility on 02/17/22, and found the gauging devices as the licensee described. Dose rate readings using a NDS ND-2000A (calibrated 9/14/21) indicated readings as high as 1.8 mR/hr on the surface of the Cs-137 Berthold Model LB 7440D gauging device, serial number 1003-4-96, with an activity of 50 mCi. Dose rate readings using a NDS ND-2000A (calibrated 9/14/21) indicated readings as high as 2.2 mR/hr on the surface of the Cs-137 Berthold Model LB 7440D gauging device, serial number 1678-6-88, with an activity of 150 mCi. The gauges are located in a controlled area within the licensee's facility. A licensed consultant was scheduled to arrive at the licensee's facility on 02/17/22, to remove the gauges, attach a replacement shutter, and place the gauging devices in storage at the licensee's facility. This event is still under investigation by the South Carolina Department of Health and Environmental Control."