Event Notification Report for December 02, 2021

EN Revision Imported Date: 12/2/2021

EN Revision Text: AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - STUCK SHUTTER

The following was received via email from the Mississippi State Department of Health (the agency) via email:

"On 22 November 2021, the licensee notified the Agency by email regarding an incident that took place on 19 November 2021. The [Berthold Technologies] reciprocity crew, working under reciprocal recognition, was conducting turn around, replacing three gauge systems at the Licensee plant's Operating Processes. Two of the three sources retracted while one source was discovered to be stuck in the dip tube (Source Information: Co-60, 7.43 mCi, Manufacturer/Model: EG&G Berthold Model P-2608-100, Serial #: 1540-08-05, Device Information: Manufacturer EG&G Berthold, Device Model#: LB 7671, Serial Number: TBD). Reciprocity personnel attempted to dislodge the source to get it to retract but all attempts failed. The technician attached a blind plate (surveys below background) to prevent access and he documented surveys which the reciprocity personnel stated will be provided at a later time. According to the reciprocity licensee personnel, surveys were approximately 0.2 to 0.3 mR/hr at the detector side. Licensee personnel stated that the source is secured and remains shielded. Reciprocity licensee stated that they will continue to consider options to dislodge the source. The investigation into this event is ongoing and information will be provided as it is received in accordance with SA-300."

Mississippi Item Number: MS-210003

EN Revision Imported Date: 12/2/2021

EN Revision Text: AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL MISSING IN TRANSIT THEN RECOVERED

The following was received from the Massachusetts Radiation Control Program [the Agency] via email:

"On 11/17/2021, 1113 EST, the licensee reported 3 packages containing radioactive material were not received at PerkinElmer facility in Groningen, Netherlands. Extensive searches were conducted in Boston, Amsterdam and Zurich. The packages were destined to arrive in Zurich on November 13, 2021. The 3 packages, each with a Transport Index 0.1, were shipped, along with 20 other excepted packages, from Logan International Airport in Boston, MA on 11/12/2021. The transfer of the packages was planned in the following sequence: Logan International Airport, Boston - Zurich - Amsterdam - Groningen, The Netherlands. All 23 packages were received in Zurich on November 13. Only 20 of the 23 packages were recorded as received in Amsterdam. The 3 missing packages were positively identified as the packages labeled as Yellow II with a TI of 0.1 each. The 3 packages contained the following radioactive material: Package 1 had 3 vials of P-32 with total activity of 1.5 mCi, Package 2 had 1 vial of I-125 at 0.160 mCi, and Package 3 had 1 vial of P-32 at 0.800 mCi. Each package was 25 cm x 15 cm x 13 cm in dimension and constructed of white cardboard with Styrofoam packing in shielded vials. A shipping manager at PerkinElmer, Inc., Boston, was first notified via email at 0719 EST on November 17 that the package was not received by the PerkinElmer facility in Groningen, Netherlands. The Radiation Safety Officer was first notified around 0900 EST. On November 19, the licensee notified the Agency that the 3 packages were found in Zurich.

"The Agency considers this matter closed. "

Massachusetts Event Number: 23-4724

THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A 'Less than Cat 3' LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL

Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf

EN Revision Imported Date: 12/2/2021

EN Revision Text: AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - GAMMA KNIFE SHUTTER DOORS FAIL TO CLOSE

The following report was received via email from the New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection:

"While conducting the routine spot check prior to patient treatment with an Elekta Leksell Gamma Knife ICON unit, serial number 6114, the unit's shutter doors failed to close during the "Emergency Off" button test. The licensee's authorized medical physicist (AMP) followed emergency procedures and entered the room to manually close the doors. The doors closed, but the AMP decided to try again with the same result. The AMP carried a handheld survey meter with them each trip. Their calculated total exposure for their trips based on the exposure rate was 0.575 mR. There was no patient involvement. The unit is secured and Elekta is in the process repairing the unit. The licensee will follow-up with a full report."

EN Revision Imported Date: 12/2/2021

EN Revision Text: AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - UNDERDOSE OF PATIENT MEDICAL EVENT

The following was received from the state of Texas (the Agency) via email:

"On November 24, 2021, the licensee notified the Agency that a medical event had occurred at its facility on November 23, 2021. A patient was being treated with SIRTEX SIR-spheres yttrium-90 microspheres. The order for the treatment was 8.1 millicuries.
Following the procedure, it was determined the patient had only received 6.3 millicuries. The licensee reported this was not the result of stasis and is investigating to determine the cause. The licensee has contacted the manufacturer. The Authorized User stated the dose delivered should be high enough for an effective treatment. An investigation into this event is ongoing. More information will be provided as it is obtained in accordance with SA-300."

Texas Incident Number: 9896

A Medical Event may indicate potential problems in a medical facility's use of radioactive materials. It does not necessarily result in harm to the patient.

EN Revision Imported Date: 12/3/2021

EN Revision Text: NON-AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - STUCK SOURCE
The following event synopsis was received by the licensee via phone call and email:

The Headquarters Operations Officer was notified by the licensee that during radiography operations, a source was stuck in the guide tube. The radiography operations were conducted by a contractor (Northwest Inspection).
The contractor established a 2 mrem/hr perimeter prior to conducting the radiography work. When the source became stuck in the guide tube, the contractor Radiation Safety Officer deployed to the site was able to successfully retrieve the source without incident.

Gauge : QSA Model 880 containing a 17.4 Ci Ir-192 source.

EN Revision Imported Date: 12/2/2021

EN Revision Text: UNIT 1 AUTOMATIC SCRAM

"At 1254 EST on November 30, 2021, Susquehanna Steam Electric Station Unit 1 reactor automatically scrammed during Turbine Valve Cycling surveillance activities.

"Unit 1 reactor was being operated at approximately 80 percent rated thermal power with turbine valve cycling surveillance activities in progress. The Control Room received indication that both divisions of RPS [reactor protection system] actuated from turbine valve closure signals and all control rods fully inserted. The Main Turbine was manually tripped, and turbine bypass valves opened automatically to control reactor pressure. Reactor water level lowered to -35 inches causing Level 3 and Level 2 isolations. No ECCS [emergency core cooling systems] actuations occurred. RCIC [reactor core isolation cooling] automatically initiated as designed at -30 inches. The Operations crew subsequently maintained reactor water level at the normal operating band using Feedwater pumps and RCIC was placed in a standby lineup.

"The reactor is currently stable in Mode 3. An investigation is in progress into the cause of the turbine valve closure signals.

"The NRC Senior Resident Inspector was notified. A voluntary notification to PEMA [Pennsylvania Emergency Management Agency] will be made.

"This event requires a 4-hour ENS notification in accordance with 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) and an 8-hour ENS notification in accordance with 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A)."

Unit 2 was not affected and remains at 100 percent power, Mode 1.

EN Revision Imported Date: 12/3/2021

EN Revision Text: UNIT 1 HPCI INOPERABLE

"At 1847 CST on December 1, 2021, it was discovered that the HPCI [high pressure coolant injection] system was inoperable. Due to this inoperability, the system was in a condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of a safety function; therefore, this condition is being reported as an eight-hour, non-emergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D). The Unit 1 RCIC [reactor core isolation cooling] system was Operable during this time period. There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident has been notified."

Unit 1 HPCI operability was restored at 2110 CST.

PART 21 - 15V AND 48 V POWER SUPPLY DEFECT

"This is a non-emergency notification required by 10 CFR 21.21(d)(3)(i). A written notification in accordance with 10 CFR 21.21(d)(3)(ii) will be provided in 30 days.

"On November 10, 2021, Callaway Plant received written notification from Paragon Energy Solutions, LLC, pursuant to 10 CFR 21.21(b), which identified a deviation associated with the DC/DC converter in two power supplies, NLI-STM15-15M20 (15 VDC) and NLI-STM48-14M20 (48 VDC) that had been sent to Paragon for evaluation and failure analysis following failures of individual components within the power supplies at Callaway Plant. The notification identified the following failed components:

"For the NLI-STM15-15M20 [15 VDC] power supply, the failed components were the Vicor Module, P/N: V150A28C500BL, and the DC/DC Converter, Murata P/N: NKE1212SC, Date code: G1511

"For the NLI-STM48-14M20 [48 VDC] power supply, the failed component was the DC/DC Converter, Murata P/N: NKE1212SC, Date code: G1511

"Fourteen of these power supplies (in total) are used in three Balance of Plant Engineered Safety Feature Actuation System (BOP-ESFAS) cabinets and two Load Shed and Emergency Load Sequencer (LSELS) cabinets.

"Based upon the 10 CFR 21.21(b) transfer from Paragon Energy Solutions, Callaway Plant has determined that a Substantial Safety Hazard could be created by the failure of the power supplies. The responsible officer was notified on December 1, 2021.

"The NRC Resident Inspector at Callaway Plant has been notified."