Event Notification Report for October 18, 2021
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
10/17/2021 - 10/18/2021
Power Reactor
Event Number: 55521
Facility: Palo Verde
Region: 4 State: AZ
Unit: [1] [2] [3]
RX Type: [1] CE,[2] CE,[3] CE
NRC Notified By: Sean Dornseif
HQ OPS Officer: Bethany Cecere
Region: 4 State: AZ
Unit: [1] [2] [3]
RX Type: [1] CE,[2] CE,[3] CE
NRC Notified By: Sean Dornseif
HQ OPS Officer: Bethany Cecere
Notification Date: 10/14/2021
Notification Time: 14:30 [ET]
Event Date: 10/13/2021
Event Time: 14:20 [MST]
Last Update Date: 10/14/2021
Notification Time: 14:30 [ET]
Event Date: 10/13/2021
Event Time: 14:20 [MST]
Last Update Date: 10/14/2021
Emergency Class: Non Emergency
10 CFR Section:
26.719 - Fitness For Duty
10 CFR Section:
26.719 - Fitness For Duty
Person (Organization):
ALEXANDER, RYAN (R4)
FFD GROUP, (EMAIL)
ALEXANDER, RYAN (R4)
FFD GROUP, (EMAIL)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
| 2 | N | N | 0 | Refueling | 0 | Refueling |
| 3 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
EN Revision Imported Date: 10/18/2021
EN Revision Text: FITNESS FOR DUTY - NON-LICENSED SUPERVISOR VIOLATED THE FFD POLICY
"On October 13, 2021, at 1420 MST, a Non-Licensed Supervisor's test results were confirmed positive for use of a controlled substance following a random Fitness For Duty test which resulted in determination that the individual violated the station's FFD Policy. The Non-Licensed Supervisor's unescorted access has been terminated in accordance with station procedures.
"The NRC Senior Resident Inspector has been notified."
EN Revision Text: FITNESS FOR DUTY - NON-LICENSED SUPERVISOR VIOLATED THE FFD POLICY
"On October 13, 2021, at 1420 MST, a Non-Licensed Supervisor's test results were confirmed positive for use of a controlled substance following a random Fitness For Duty test which resulted in determination that the individual violated the station's FFD Policy. The Non-Licensed Supervisor's unescorted access has been terminated in accordance with station procedures.
"The NRC Senior Resident Inspector has been notified."
Power Reactor
Event Number: 55522
Facility: Fermi
Region: 3 State: MI
Unit: [2] [] []
RX Type: [2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: Nikolas Schafer
HQ OPS Officer: Bethany Cecere
Region: 3 State: MI
Unit: [2] [] []
RX Type: [2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: Nikolas Schafer
HQ OPS Officer: Bethany Cecere
Notification Date: 10/14/2021
Notification Time: 19:27 [ET]
Event Date: 10/14/2021
Event Time: 13:20 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 10/14/2021
Notification Time: 19:27 [ET]
Event Date: 10/14/2021
Event Time: 13:20 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 10/14/2021
Emergency Class: Non Emergency
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(C) - Pot Uncntrl Rad Rel
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(C) - Pot Uncntrl Rad Rel
Person (Organization):
PELKE, PATRICIA (R3)
PELKE, PATRICIA (R3)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
EN Revision Imported Date: 10/18/2021
EN Revision Text: TRAVERSING IN-CORE PROBE A BALL VALVE INOPERABLE
"At 1320 EDT, during a Traversing In-Core Probe (TIP) run for a scheduled Local Power Range Monitors (LPRM) calibration, it was reported to the Main Control Room that TIP A would not fully retract to the In-Shield position. With TIP A unable to fully retract to the In-Shield position the TIP A Ball Valve was declared Inoperable due to not being able to close and meet its safety function in that configuration.
Furthermore the TIP A Shear Valve was previously declared Inoperable due to the Firing Fuses being removed. With the two valves Inoperable the penetration could not be isolated and Primary Containment boundary isolation could not be established.
"TIP A was subsequently manually hand cranked and placed back into its In-Shield position at 1333 EDT restoring TIP A Ball Valve Operable.
"This report is being made pursuant to 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v)(C) based on control the release of radioactive material.
"The Senior NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."
EN Revision Text: TRAVERSING IN-CORE PROBE A BALL VALVE INOPERABLE
"At 1320 EDT, during a Traversing In-Core Probe (TIP) run for a scheduled Local Power Range Monitors (LPRM) calibration, it was reported to the Main Control Room that TIP A would not fully retract to the In-Shield position. With TIP A unable to fully retract to the In-Shield position the TIP A Ball Valve was declared Inoperable due to not being able to close and meet its safety function in that configuration.
Furthermore the TIP A Shear Valve was previously declared Inoperable due to the Firing Fuses being removed. With the two valves Inoperable the penetration could not be isolated and Primary Containment boundary isolation could not be established.
"TIP A was subsequently manually hand cranked and placed back into its In-Shield position at 1333 EDT restoring TIP A Ball Valve Operable.
"This report is being made pursuant to 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v)(C) based on control the release of radioactive material.
"The Senior NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."
Power Reactor
Event Number: 55523
Facility: Oconee
Region: 2 State: SC
Unit: [1] [2] [3]
RX Type: [1] B&W-L-LP,[2] B&W-L-LP,[3] B&W-L-LP
NRC Notified By: Keith Robinson
HQ OPS Officer: Brian P. Smith
Region: 2 State: SC
Unit: [1] [2] [3]
RX Type: [1] B&W-L-LP,[2] B&W-L-LP,[3] B&W-L-LP
NRC Notified By: Keith Robinson
HQ OPS Officer: Brian P. Smith
Notification Date: 10/15/2021
Notification Time: 08:52 [ET]
Event Date: 10/14/2021
Event Time: 17:27 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 10/15/2021
Notification Time: 08:52 [ET]
Event Date: 10/14/2021
Event Time: 17:27 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 10/15/2021
Emergency Class: Non Emergency
10 CFR Section:
26.719 - Fitness For Duty
10 CFR Section:
26.719 - Fitness For Duty
Person (Organization):
MILLER, MARK (R2)
FFD GROUP, (EMAIL)
MILLER, MARK (R2)
FFD GROUP, (EMAIL)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
| 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
| 3 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
EN Revision Imported Date: 10/18/2021
EN Revision Text: FITNESS FOR DUTY - FAILED TEST
"At 1727 [EDT] on October 14, 2021, it was determined that a licensed operator failed a test specified by the Fitness-For-Duty (FFD) testing program. The individual's authorization for site access has been terminated.
"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."
EN Revision Text: FITNESS FOR DUTY - FAILED TEST
"At 1727 [EDT] on October 14, 2021, it was determined that a licensed operator failed a test specified by the Fitness-For-Duty (FFD) testing program. The individual's authorization for site access has been terminated.
"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."
Power Reactor
Event Number: 55526
Facility: Diablo Canyon
Region: 4 State: CA
Unit: [2] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: Meagan Nolan
HQ OPS Officer: Kerby Scales
Region: 4 State: CA
Unit: [2] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: Meagan Nolan
HQ OPS Officer: Kerby Scales
Notification Date: 10/15/2021
Notification Time: 23:28 [ET]
Event Date: 10/15/2021
Event Time: 17:49 [PDT]
Last Update Date: 10/15/2021
Notification Time: 23:28 [ET]
Event Date: 10/15/2021
Event Time: 17:49 [PDT]
Last Update Date: 10/15/2021
Emergency Class: Non Emergency
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS Actuation - Critical 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - Valid Specif Sys Actuation
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS Actuation - Critical 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - Valid Specif Sys Actuation
Person (Organization):
ALEXANDER, RYAN (R4)
ALEXANDER, RYAN (R4)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2 | M/R | Y | 90 | Power Operation | 0 | Hot Standby |
EN Revision Imported Date: 10/18/2021
EN Revision Text: MANUAL REACTOR TRIP AND AUTOMATIC AUXILIARY FEEDWATER ACTUATION
"On October 15, 2021, at 1749 PDT with Diablo Canyon Power Plant Unit 2 operating at approximately 90 percent power, the reactor was manually tripped in accordance with plant procedures due to increasing water level in feedwater heater 2-5B. The reactor trip was uncomplicated and the Auxiliary Feedwater system started as expected. The plant is stable in Mode 3.
"This notification is being made in accordance the requirements of 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) as a manual actuation of the reactor protection system and 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) as an automatic actuation of a specified safety system.
"The cause of the increased feedwater level is under investigation. There was no impact to the health and safety of the public or plant personnel.
"The Resident Inspector has been notified."
EN Revision Text: MANUAL REACTOR TRIP AND AUTOMATIC AUXILIARY FEEDWATER ACTUATION
"On October 15, 2021, at 1749 PDT with Diablo Canyon Power Plant Unit 2 operating at approximately 90 percent power, the reactor was manually tripped in accordance with plant procedures due to increasing water level in feedwater heater 2-5B. The reactor trip was uncomplicated and the Auxiliary Feedwater system started as expected. The plant is stable in Mode 3.
"This notification is being made in accordance the requirements of 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) as a manual actuation of the reactor protection system and 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) as an automatic actuation of a specified safety system.
"The cause of the increased feedwater level is under investigation. There was no impact to the health and safety of the public or plant personnel.
"The Resident Inspector has been notified."
Power Reactor
Event Number: 55527
Facility: Dresden
Region: 3 State: IL
Unit: [3] [] []
RX Type: [2] GE-3,[3] GE-3
NRC Notified By: Jory Hansen
HQ OPS Officer: Bethany Cecere
Region: 3 State: IL
Unit: [3] [] []
RX Type: [2] GE-3,[3] GE-3
NRC Notified By: Jory Hansen
HQ OPS Officer: Bethany Cecere
Notification Date: 10/16/2021
Notification Time: 07:22 [ET]
Event Date: 10/16/2021
Event Time: 05:28 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 10/16/2021
Notification Time: 07:22 [ET]
Event Date: 10/16/2021
Event Time: 05:28 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 10/16/2021
Emergency Class: Unusual Event
10 CFR Section:
50.72(a) (1) (i) - Emergency Declared
10 CFR Section:
50.72(a) (1) (i) - Emergency Declared
Person (Organization):
PELKE, PATRICIA (R3)
Giessner, John (R3 RA)
Veil, Andrea (NRR)
KENNEDY, SILAS (IR)
PELKE, PATRICIA (R3)
Giessner, John (R3 RA)
Veil, Andrea (NRR)
KENNEDY, SILAS (IR)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 3 | A/R | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 0 | Hot Standby |
EN Revision Imported Date: 10/18/2021
EN Revision Text: UNUSUAL EVENT DECLARED DUE TO A FIRE IN THE PROTECTED AREA
"[An] Unusual Event [was declared] due to a fire in the protected area not extinguished in less than 60 minutes.
"Main power transformer 3 faulted, the unit auto scrammed, all rods are in. The fire went out at 0622 CDT. [The licensee] is monitoring for re-flash."
The unit automatically scrammed and all rods fully inserted. Decay heat removal is through the condenser. Unit 2 is unaffected and remains at 100 percent power.
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector and R3 Branch Chief (Riemer).
Notified DHS SWO, FEMA Operations Center, CISA Central, FEMA NWC (email), and DHS Nuclear SSA (email).
* * * UPDATE ON 10/16/21 AT 0848 EDT FROM DAVID KIJOWSKI TO BETHANY CECERE * * *
The Unusual Event was terminated at 0709 CDT.
Notified R3DO (Pelke), NRR EO (Felts), IR MOC (Kennedy), DHS SWO, FEMA Operations Center, CISA Central, FEMA NWC (email), and DHS Nuclear SSA (email).
EN Revision Text: UNUSUAL EVENT DECLARED DUE TO A FIRE IN THE PROTECTED AREA
"[An] Unusual Event [was declared] due to a fire in the protected area not extinguished in less than 60 minutes.
"Main power transformer 3 faulted, the unit auto scrammed, all rods are in. The fire went out at 0622 CDT. [The licensee] is monitoring for re-flash."
The unit automatically scrammed and all rods fully inserted. Decay heat removal is through the condenser. Unit 2 is unaffected and remains at 100 percent power.
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector and R3 Branch Chief (Riemer).
Notified DHS SWO, FEMA Operations Center, CISA Central, FEMA NWC (email), and DHS Nuclear SSA (email).
* * * UPDATE ON 10/16/21 AT 0848 EDT FROM DAVID KIJOWSKI TO BETHANY CECERE * * *
The Unusual Event was terminated at 0709 CDT.
Notified R3DO (Pelke), NRR EO (Felts), IR MOC (Kennedy), DHS SWO, FEMA Operations Center, CISA Central, FEMA NWC (email), and DHS Nuclear SSA (email).
Power Reactor
Event Number: 55528
Facility: Dresden
Region: 3 State: IL
Unit: [3] [] []
RX Type: [2] GE-3,[3] GE-3
NRC Notified By: David Kijowski
HQ OPS Officer: Bethany Cecere
Region: 3 State: IL
Unit: [3] [] []
RX Type: [2] GE-3,[3] GE-3
NRC Notified By: David Kijowski
HQ OPS Officer: Bethany Cecere
Notification Date: 10/16/2021
Notification Time: 09:10 [ET]
Event Date: 10/16/2021
Event Time: 04:28 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 10/16/2021
Notification Time: 09:10 [ET]
Event Date: 10/16/2021
Event Time: 04:28 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 10/16/2021
Emergency Class: Non Emergency
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS Actuation - Critical
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS Actuation - Critical
Person (Organization):
PELKE, PATRICIA (R3)
PELKE, PATRICIA (R3)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 3 | A/R | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 0 | Hot Standby |
EN Revision Imported Date: 10/18/2021
EN Revision Text: AUTOMATIC SCRAM FOLLOWING TURBINE TRIP
"On October 16, 2021 at 0428 CDT, an automatic scram was received on Unit 3 following a turbine trip. All Rods inserted to their full in position. All systems actuated and operated as expected. Unit 3 is being maintained in Mode 3, hot standby.
"This event is being reported pursuant to 10CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B), any event or condition that results in actuation of the reactor protection system (RPS) when the reactor is critical.
"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."
The event is related to Event Number 55527.
EN Revision Text: AUTOMATIC SCRAM FOLLOWING TURBINE TRIP
"On October 16, 2021 at 0428 CDT, an automatic scram was received on Unit 3 following a turbine trip. All Rods inserted to their full in position. All systems actuated and operated as expected. Unit 3 is being maintained in Mode 3, hot standby.
"This event is being reported pursuant to 10CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B), any event or condition that results in actuation of the reactor protection system (RPS) when the reactor is critical.
"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."
The event is related to Event Number 55527.
Agreement State
Event Number: 55511
Rep Org: PA BUREAU OF RADIATION PROTECTION
Licensee: Diamond Technical Services
Region: 1
City: Blairsville State: PA
County:
License #: PA-1077
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: John S. Chippo
HQ OPS Officer: Lloyd Desotell
Licensee: Diamond Technical Services
Region: 1
City: Blairsville State: PA
County:
License #: PA-1077
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: John S. Chippo
HQ OPS Officer: Lloyd Desotell
Notification Date: 10/07/2021
Notification Time: 15:16 [ET]
Event Date: 10/06/2021
Event Time: 00:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 10/18/2021
Notification Time: 15:16 [ET]
Event Date: 10/06/2021
Event Time: 00:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 10/18/2021
Emergency Class: Non Emergency
10 CFR Section:
Agreement State
10 CFR Section:
Agreement State
Person (Organization):
CARFANG, ERIN (R1)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFICATION, (EMAIL)
CARFANG, ERIN (R1)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFICATION, (EMAIL)
EN Revision Imported Date: 10/19/2021
EN Revision Text: AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - UNRETRACTABLE SOURCE
The following was received from the Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Protection (DEP) [the Department] via email:
"The Department received notification from a licensee on October 6, 2021, of a radiography source from a QSA 880 Delta Industrial Radiography device containing a 91 curie Ir-192 source that was unable to retract. The source had been exposed to check a weld and when the radiographer tried to retract the source, the slide would not lock the source in. The radiographer approached the set-up with a meter and noticed the readings were high, so he retreated. The area was roped off and put under surveillance by the Assistant Radiographer and Radiographer. The Radiographer also noticed his direct read dosimeter was off scale and so he remained outside the boundary. His dosimetry will be sent for emergency processing and he will be restricted from radiography work until his results are received.
"The licensee dispatched a Radiation Safety Officer [RSO] with source retrieval authorization to recover the source. The source was secured later the same morning of the event. The RSO received 60 millirem and his assistant received 20 millirem. The RSO's ring dosimeter will be sent out with the Radiographer badge for emergency processing. The DEP is currently in contact with the licensee and will update this event as soon as more information is provided."
Pennsylvania Event Report ID Number: PA210013
* * * UPDATE ON 10/18/2021 AT 1042 EDT FROM JOHN CHIPPO TO BRIAN LIN * * *
The following was received from the Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Protection (DEP) via email:
"Emergency processing of thermoluminescence detectors for the radiographer and assistant radiographer has been completed. The radiographer received approximately 9.3 rem and the assistant radiographer received approximately 2 rem. The licensee is continuing to monitor the radiographer's hands for erythema, as it was determined that the radiographer handled the guide tube and collimator with the 91 curie Ir-192 source in an unshielded position. Both workers have been put on mandatory leave and the licensee has committed to mandatory re-training of employees. A reactive inspection by the Department was conducted on October 12, 2021, and the licensee has gone through dose reconstruction and event re-enactments to determine how the disconnect occurred. At this time a bent pin on the control cable seems to be the cause of the event. More details will be provided when known."
Notified R1DO (BICKETT) and NMSS events Notification group (via email)
EN Revision Text: AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - UNRETRACTABLE SOURCE
The following was received from the Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Protection (DEP) [the Department] via email:
"The Department received notification from a licensee on October 6, 2021, of a radiography source from a QSA 880 Delta Industrial Radiography device containing a 91 curie Ir-192 source that was unable to retract. The source had been exposed to check a weld and when the radiographer tried to retract the source, the slide would not lock the source in. The radiographer approached the set-up with a meter and noticed the readings were high, so he retreated. The area was roped off and put under surveillance by the Assistant Radiographer and Radiographer. The Radiographer also noticed his direct read dosimeter was off scale and so he remained outside the boundary. His dosimetry will be sent for emergency processing and he will be restricted from radiography work until his results are received.
"The licensee dispatched a Radiation Safety Officer [RSO] with source retrieval authorization to recover the source. The source was secured later the same morning of the event. The RSO received 60 millirem and his assistant received 20 millirem. The RSO's ring dosimeter will be sent out with the Radiographer badge for emergency processing. The DEP is currently in contact with the licensee and will update this event as soon as more information is provided."
Pennsylvania Event Report ID Number: PA210013
* * * UPDATE ON 10/18/2021 AT 1042 EDT FROM JOHN CHIPPO TO BRIAN LIN * * *
The following was received from the Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Protection (DEP) via email:
"Emergency processing of thermoluminescence detectors for the radiographer and assistant radiographer has been completed. The radiographer received approximately 9.3 rem and the assistant radiographer received approximately 2 rem. The licensee is continuing to monitor the radiographer's hands for erythema, as it was determined that the radiographer handled the guide tube and collimator with the 91 curie Ir-192 source in an unshielded position. Both workers have been put on mandatory leave and the licensee has committed to mandatory re-training of employees. A reactive inspection by the Department was conducted on October 12, 2021, and the licensee has gone through dose reconstruction and event re-enactments to determine how the disconnect occurred. At this time a bent pin on the control cable seems to be the cause of the event. More details will be provided when known."
Notified R1DO (BICKETT) and NMSS events Notification group (via email)
Power Reactor
Event Number: 55529
Facility: Prairie Island
Region: 3 State: MN
Unit: [2] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-2-LP,[2] W-2-LP
NRC Notified By: Tim Kohrs
HQ OPS Officer: Brian Lin
Region: 3 State: MN
Unit: [2] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-2-LP,[2] W-2-LP
NRC Notified By: Tim Kohrs
HQ OPS Officer: Brian Lin
Notification Date: 10/18/2021
Notification Time: 04:05 [ET]
Event Date: 10/17/2021
Event Time: 19:30 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 10/18/2021
Notification Time: 04:05 [ET]
Event Date: 10/17/2021
Event Time: 19:30 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 10/18/2021
Emergency Class: Non Emergency
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - Accident Mitigation
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - Accident Mitigation
Person (Organization):
PELKE, PATRICIA (R3)
PELKE, PATRICIA (R3)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2 | N | N | 0 | Refueling | 0 | Refueling |
EN Revision Imported Date: 10/19/2021
EN Revision Text: EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATORS SIMULTANEOUSLY INOPERABLE
"At 1930 CDT on 10/17/2021, it was discovered both of the Unit 2 Emergency Diesel Generators were simultaneously INOPERABLE with a requirement to have one OPERABLE train; therefore, this condition is being reported as an eight-hour, non-emergency notification per 10CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v). Offsite power was OPERABLE during this event.
"There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Senior Resident Inspector has been notified."
The cause was corrected and both Emergency Diesel Generators are currently operable.
EN Revision Text: EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATORS SIMULTANEOUSLY INOPERABLE
"At 1930 CDT on 10/17/2021, it was discovered both of the Unit 2 Emergency Diesel Generators were simultaneously INOPERABLE with a requirement to have one OPERABLE train; therefore, this condition is being reported as an eight-hour, non-emergency notification per 10CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v). Offsite power was OPERABLE during this event.
"There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Senior Resident Inspector has been notified."
The cause was corrected and both Emergency Diesel Generators are currently operable.
Part 21
Event Number: 55531
Rep Org: ENGINE SYSTEMS, INC
Licensee: ENGINE SYSTEMS, INC
Region: 2
City: Rocky Mount State: NC
County:
License #:
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: Dan Roberts
HQ OPS Officer: Brian P. Smith
Licensee: ENGINE SYSTEMS, INC
Region: 2
City: Rocky Mount State: NC
County:
License #:
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: Dan Roberts
HQ OPS Officer: Brian P. Smith
Notification Date: 10/18/2021
Notification Time: 16:18 [ET]
Event Date: 08/20/2021
Event Time: 12:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 10/18/2021
Notification Time: 16:18 [ET]
Event Date: 08/20/2021
Event Time: 12:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 10/18/2021
Emergency Class: Non Emergency
10 CFR Section:
21.21(d)(3)(i) - Defects And Noncompliance
10 CFR Section:
21.21(d)(3)(i) - Defects And Noncompliance
Person (Organization):
MILLER, MARK (R2DO)
PART 21/50.55 REACTORS, - (EMAIL)
MILLER, MARK (R2DO)
PART 21/50.55 REACTORS, - (EMAIL)
PART 21 - PRESSURE REGULATOR VALVE FAILURE
The following is a summary of the report provided by Engine Systems Inc.:
The vendor supplied information to the NRC involving a defect and/or failure related to a pressure regulator valve installed on an emergency diesel generator at Brunswick Nuclear Power Plant. The valve did not properly regulate starting air pressure and allowed equalization of inlet pressure to outlet. Subsequent investigation by the vendor revealed a raised edge on the metal seating surface of the valve that caused the PTFE (Teflon) seat to tear. Equalization of starting air pressure is undesirable since it may inhibit operation of the downstream starting air solenoid valve, thus compromising the ability of the emergency diesel generator to start and support safety-related loads. The evaluation is complete. This Part 21 applies only to valves in the Brunswick Nuclear Power Plant.
Corrective Actions: Brunswick continues to monitor the outlet pressure from the regulator and verify the inlet and outlet pressures have not equalized. The vendor also recommends that existing regulators have an inspection performed on-site and at the vendor. The vendor will add inspections to the dedication package for new and refurbished pressure regulator valves to verify a smooth, rounded transition at the valve seat of the throttling sleeve.
Technical questions concerning this notification can be directed to Dan Roberts, Quality Manager, and John Kriesel, Engineering Manager.
The following is a summary of the report provided by Engine Systems Inc.:
The vendor supplied information to the NRC involving a defect and/or failure related to a pressure regulator valve installed on an emergency diesel generator at Brunswick Nuclear Power Plant. The valve did not properly regulate starting air pressure and allowed equalization of inlet pressure to outlet. Subsequent investigation by the vendor revealed a raised edge on the metal seating surface of the valve that caused the PTFE (Teflon) seat to tear. Equalization of starting air pressure is undesirable since it may inhibit operation of the downstream starting air solenoid valve, thus compromising the ability of the emergency diesel generator to start and support safety-related loads. The evaluation is complete. This Part 21 applies only to valves in the Brunswick Nuclear Power Plant.
Corrective Actions: Brunswick continues to monitor the outlet pressure from the regulator and verify the inlet and outlet pressures have not equalized. The vendor also recommends that existing regulators have an inspection performed on-site and at the vendor. The vendor will add inspections to the dedication package for new and refurbished pressure regulator valves to verify a smooth, rounded transition at the valve seat of the throttling sleeve.
Technical questions concerning this notification can be directed to Dan Roberts, Quality Manager, and John Kriesel, Engineering Manager.