Event Notification Report for October 17, 2021
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
10/16/2021 - 10/17/2021
!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
Power Reactor
Event Number: 55529
Facility: Prairie Island
Region: 3 State: MN
Unit: [2] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-2-LP,[2] W-2-LP
NRC Notified By: Tim Kohrs
HQ OPS Officer: Brian Lin
Region: 3 State: MN
Unit: [2] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-2-LP,[2] W-2-LP
NRC Notified By: Tim Kohrs
HQ OPS Officer: Brian Lin
Notification Date: 10/18/2021
Notification Time: 04:05 [ET]
Event Date: 10/17/2021
Event Time: 19:30 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 12/13/2021
Notification Time: 04:05 [ET]
Event Date: 10/17/2021
Event Time: 19:30 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 12/13/2021
Emergency Class: Non Emergency
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - Accident Mitigation
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - Accident Mitigation
Person (Organization):
PELKE, PATRICIA (R3)
PELKE, PATRICIA (R3)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2 | N | N | 0 | Refueling | 0 | Refueling |
EN Revision Imported Date: 1/13/2022
EN Revision Text: EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATORS SIMULTANEOUSLY INOPERABLE
"At 1930 CDT on 10/17/2021, it was discovered both of the Unit 2 Emergency Diesel Generators were simultaneously INOPERABLE with a requirement to have one OPERABLE train; therefore, this condition is being reported as an eight-hour, non-emergency notification per 10CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v). Offsite power was OPERABLE during this event.
"There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Senior Resident Inspector has been notified."
The cause was corrected and both Emergency Diesel Generators are currently operable.
* * * RETRACTION ON 12/13/2021 AT 1607 EST FROM CARLOS PARADA TO LLOYD DESOTELL * * *
* The following information was provided by the licensee via email:
"This is a retraction of Event Notification EN55529 in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) made by the Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant on October 18, 2021. The original notification stemmed from a loss of power to the non-safety related Unit 2 Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) starting air compressors. The resulting pressure decay in the EDG starting air receivers led to a decision to declare both EDGs inoperable. A subsequent engineering evaluation has provided reasonable assurance that the Unit 2 EDGs were operable and capable of performing their safety function during the time power was lost.
"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."
The HOO notified R3DO (Skokowski).
EN Revision Text: EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATORS SIMULTANEOUSLY INOPERABLE
"At 1930 CDT on 10/17/2021, it was discovered both of the Unit 2 Emergency Diesel Generators were simultaneously INOPERABLE with a requirement to have one OPERABLE train; therefore, this condition is being reported as an eight-hour, non-emergency notification per 10CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v). Offsite power was OPERABLE during this event.
"There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Senior Resident Inspector has been notified."
The cause was corrected and both Emergency Diesel Generators are currently operable.
* * * RETRACTION ON 12/13/2021 AT 1607 EST FROM CARLOS PARADA TO LLOYD DESOTELL * * *
* The following information was provided by the licensee via email:
"This is a retraction of Event Notification EN55529 in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) made by the Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant on October 18, 2021. The original notification stemmed from a loss of power to the non-safety related Unit 2 Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) starting air compressors. The resulting pressure decay in the EDG starting air receivers led to a decision to declare both EDGs inoperable. A subsequent engineering evaluation has provided reasonable assurance that the Unit 2 EDGs were operable and capable of performing their safety function during the time power was lost.
"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."
The HOO notified R3DO (Skokowski).
Power Reactor
Event Number: 55609
Facility: Ginna
Region: 1 State: NY
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-2-LP
NRC Notified By: Wade Weber
HQ OPS Officer: Brian P. Smith
Region: 1 State: NY
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-2-LP
NRC Notified By: Wade Weber
HQ OPS Officer: Brian P. Smith
Notification Date: 11/24/2021
Notification Time: 20:24 [ET]
Event Date: 10/17/2021
Event Time: 13:58 [EST]
Last Update Date: 11/24/2021
Notification Time: 20:24 [ET]
Event Date: 10/17/2021
Event Time: 13:58 [EST]
Last Update Date: 11/24/2021
Emergency Class: Non Emergency
10 CFR Section:
50.73(a)(1) - Invalid Specif System Actuation
10 CFR Section:
50.73(a)(1) - Invalid Specif System Actuation
Person (Organization):
Defrancisco, Anne (R1)
Defrancisco, Anne (R1)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | N | 0 | Cold Shutdown | 100 | Power Operation |
EN Revision Imported Date: 12/23/2021
EN Revision Text: 60 DAY OPTIONAL TELEPHONIC NOTIFICATION FOR INVALID SPECIFIED ACTUATION OF CONTAINMENT ISOLATION TRAIN
"This 60-day telephone notification is provided in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73(a)(1) to report one invalid actuation of the Unit 1 Containment Isolation System Train "A" in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A).
"On October 17, 2021 at approximately 1358 [EDT], a DC breaker was opened to perform an inspection of a Containment Isolation (CI) rack. A CI signal was produced and resulted in a loss of Letdown during filling and venting the Reactor Coolant System (RCS) with the RCS at 344 psig. RCS pressure began to rise, and prompt actions were taken by the Control Room to secure a Charging Pump within 20 seconds. The RCS pressure rise continued and both Pressure Operated Relief Valves cycled at 409.9 psig as designed, lowering RCS pressure. The CI Train "A" was not part of a pre-planned sequence and the event resulted in the invalid actuation of Train "A" Containment Isolation valves in more than one system. All valves functioned successfully. The DC breaker was closed, CI signal reset, and associated CI valves re-opened. All systems functioned as required and returned to normal service.
"The NRC Senior Resident Inspector has been notified."
EN Revision Text: 60 DAY OPTIONAL TELEPHONIC NOTIFICATION FOR INVALID SPECIFIED ACTUATION OF CONTAINMENT ISOLATION TRAIN
"This 60-day telephone notification is provided in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73(a)(1) to report one invalid actuation of the Unit 1 Containment Isolation System Train "A" in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A).
"On October 17, 2021 at approximately 1358 [EDT], a DC breaker was opened to perform an inspection of a Containment Isolation (CI) rack. A CI signal was produced and resulted in a loss of Letdown during filling and venting the Reactor Coolant System (RCS) with the RCS at 344 psig. RCS pressure began to rise, and prompt actions were taken by the Control Room to secure a Charging Pump within 20 seconds. The RCS pressure rise continued and both Pressure Operated Relief Valves cycled at 409.9 psig as designed, lowering RCS pressure. The CI Train "A" was not part of a pre-planned sequence and the event resulted in the invalid actuation of Train "A" Containment Isolation valves in more than one system. All valves functioned successfully. The DC breaker was closed, CI signal reset, and associated CI valves re-opened. All systems functioned as required and returned to normal service.
"The NRC Senior Resident Inspector has been notified."