Event Notification Report for October 15, 2021

EN Revision Imported Date: 10/15/2021

EN Revision Text: AUXILIARY BUILDING GAS TREATMENT SYSTEMS INOPERABLE

"At 0905 EDT, it was discovered both trains of Auxiliary Building Gas Treatment System (ABGTS) were simultaneously INOPERABLE due to the auxiliary building secondary containment enclosure (ABSCE) being inoperable; therefore, this condition is being reported as an eight-hour, non-emergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v).

"There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."

ABSCE and ABGTS were returned to operable.

* * * RETRACTION ON 10/14/2021 AT 0756 EDT FROM TRACY SUDOKO TO THOMAS HERRITY * * *

"This is a retraction of the 8-hour Immediate notification (EN55421) made to the NRC by Sequoyah Nuclear Plant on August 20, 2021.

"Sequoyah is retracting this event notification based on the following: Regulatory Guidance in NUREG-1022, Revision 3, 'Event Reporting Guidelines 10 CFR 50.72 and 50.73', Sections 2.8 'Retraction and Cancellation of Event Reporting', and 4.2.3 'ENS Notification Retraction'.

"On August 20, 2021 personnel found door A-118 open. This door is part of the ABSCE. During the initial investigation, it was found that other personnel had the door open using Precaution A of 0-TI-SXX-000-016.0 which allows material access through ABSCE doors if the door is closed within three minutes. It was found that A-118 door had been open for greater than three minutes. With this door open the ABSCE was beyond its capability for ABGTS fan to maintain the required pressure during an Aux. Building Isolation. Thus, the site declared the ABSCE and both Trains of ABGTS inoperable per LCO 3.7.12 Conditions A, B and E. With the ABSCE being a single train system, this caused a condition that "could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function" which requires an Immediate Notification to the NRC within eight hours under 10 CFR 50.72 (b)(3)(v)(C) and 10 CFR 50.72 (b)(3)(v)(D). This Immediate Notification was reported on August 20, 2021 at 1600 EDT.

"It was later determined that at 'Time of Discovery', although Door A-118 was open, it was not obstructed, the door was open by normal means, was capable of being closed and was now attended. The time requirement per 0-TI-SXX-000-016.0 for closure of an open ABSCE door is within three minutes of notification. Although the individual found holding the door was unaware of the requirement of 0-TI-SXX-000-016.0 to close the door, communications were established and the Main Control Room (MCR), upon discovery of the 'Open Door', could have directed closure starting at the Time of Discovery if required. Since the MCR was aware the door was open, had communications established with personnel at the door, the door was capable of closure and not restricted, the three minute closure requirement of 0-TI-SXX-000-016.0 was met. Subsequently, the door was closed within approximately two minutes of notification to close. The closure of the door with these procedural measures met confirmed the integrity of the ABSCE and therefore Operability of ABGTS.

"Based on the above critical thinking, entry into LCO 3.7.12 Condition A, B, and E was retracted on August 22, 2021 at 2044 EDT. With the LCO conditions retracted and the above determination that at the Time of Discovery safety function was maintained, the Immediate Notification per 10 CFR 50.72 (b)(3)(v)(C) and 10 CFR 50.72 (b)(3)(v)(D) was not required. The issue of Past Operability remains for instances in time that the door did not have appropriate compensatory measures in place. Any further notification required for this event will be submitted as a Licensee Event Report."

Notified R2DO (Miller)

EN Revision Imported Date: 10/15/2021

EN Revision Text: AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - UNRETRACTABLE SOURCE

The following was received via an email from the Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Protection (DEP) [the Department] via email:

"The Department received notification from a licensee on October 6, 2021, of a radiography source from a QSA 880 Delta Industrial Radiography device containing a 91 curie Ir-192 that was unable to retract. The source had been exposed to check a weld and when the radiographer tried to retract the source, the slide would not lock the source in. The radiographer approached the set-up with a meter and noticed the readings were high, so he retreated. The area was roped off and put under surveillance by the Assistant Radiographer and Radiographer. The Radiographer also noticed his direct read dosimeter was off scale and so he remained outside the boundary. His dosimetry will be sent for emergency processing and he will be restricted from radiography work until his results are received.

"The licensee dispatched a Radiation Safety Officer [RSO] with source retrieval authorization to recover the source. The source was secured later the same morning of the event. The RSO received 60 millirem and his assistant received 20 millirem. The RSO's ring dosimeter will be sent out with the Radiographer badge for emergency processing. The DEP is currently in contact with the licensee and will update this event as soon as more information is provided."

Pennsylvania Event Report ID Number: PA210013

EN Revision Imported Date: 10/15/2021

EN Revision Text: AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - GAUGE STRUCK BY VEHICLE

The following was received via an email from the Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Protection (DEP) [the Department] via email:

"The Department received notification from a licensee on October 6, 2021, that on September 21, 2021 a Model Humboldt 5001-EZ nuclear gauge (serial number 5434) was run over by a dump truck while on a temporary job site. This type of gauge typically contains 11 millicuries of Cs-137 and 44 millicuries of Am-241 for the Am-Be neutron source. The area was secured, and the licensee Radiation Safety Officer determined that the sources were secure, and gauge was not leaking. The gauge was transported to Pennoni's King of Prussia office and the sources were leak tested. The leak test samples showed no evidence of radiological material. The unit is out of service and will be sent to the manufacturer or other licensed facility for further review. There was no exposure to workers or the public. The DEP is currently in contact with the licensee and will update this event as soon as more information is provided."

Pennsylvania Event Report ID Number: PA210014

FITNESS FOR DUTY - NON-LICENSED SUPERVISOR VIOLATED THE FFD POLICY

"On October 13, 2021, at 1420 MST, a Non-Licensed Supervisor's test results were confirmed positive for use of a controlled substance following a random Fitness For Duty test which resulted in determination that the individual violated the station's FFD Policy. The Non-Licensed Supervisor's unescorted access has been terminated in accordance with station procedures.

"The NRC Senior Resident Inspector has been notified."

TRAVERSING IN-CORE PROBE A BALL VALVE INOPERABLE

"At 1320 EDT, during a Traversing In-Core Probe (TIP) run for a scheduled Local Power Range Monitors (LPRM) calibration, it was reported to the Main Control Room that TIP A would not fully retract to the In-Shield position. With TIP A unable to fully retract to the In-Shield position the TIP A Ball Valve was declared Inoperable due to not being able to close and meet its safety function in that configuration.
Furthermore the TIP A Shear Valve was previously declared Inoperable due to the Firing Fuses being removed. With the two valves Inoperable the penetration could not be isolated and Primary Containment boundary isolation could not be established.

"TIP A was subsequently manually hand cranked and placed back into its In-Shield position at 1333 EDT restoring TIP A Ball Valve Operable.

"This report is being made pursuant to 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v)(C) based on control the release of radioactive material.

"The Senior NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."