Event Notification Report for October 12, 2021

EN Revision Imported Date: 10/12/2021

EN Revision Text: AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - DAMAGE TO PORTABLE MOISTURE DENSITY GAUGE

The following was received from the Virginia Radioactive Materials Program (VRMP) via email:

"On September 30, 2021 at 1530 EDT, the Virginia Radioactive Materials Program (VRMP) received a report via telephone from the licensee that a portable nuclear moisture/density gauge (Troxler Model 3430, serial number 25698, containing 8 millicuries of Cesium-137 and 40 millicuries of Americium-241/Beryllium) was damaged. It was hit by a compaction vehicle/machine at a temporary jobsite at approx. 1455 on 9/30/2021. The source rod was not out. The gauge housing was damaged but the source appeared to remain intact within the safe position. The licensee's survey of the gauge yielded readings of approx. 2.0 mR/hr at about 6 inches from the gauge. The readings were at or below background (0.02 mR/hr) along a 4 foot radius around the gauge. The gauge was transported to the licensee's office in its transport container. A survey was also performed on the ground and the reading was reported as background. The gauge will be tested for leakage and will be sent to the Troxler Electronics Laboratories for evaluation. The RSO indicated the gauge is not functional. The VRMP is working with the licensee to obtain additional information. This report will be updated once the licensee's investigation is complete."

Event Report ID No.: VA210006

EN Revision Imported Date: 10/12/2021

EN Revision Text: AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - UNRETRACTABLE SOURCE

The following was received from the Mississippi Division of Radiological Health via email:

"On 30 September 2021, a Radiography crew was conducting radiography testing of a 12 inch pipe located at Plant Dudley, 308 Moselle Seminary Road, Moselle, Mississippi. During their test, the crew realized the 118 Ci, Ir-192 source (QSA Global, Sentinel, Serial#: 33736M) was not in the camera (QSA Global, Sentinel 880D, Serial#: D6695). The crew notified the Radiation Safety Officer (RSO) at approximately 1300 EDT and he instructed them to cover the collimator with lead shot bags and additional shielding. Upon arrival into the restricted area and [after] four [retrieval] attempts, the RSO discovered the cable behind the connector had separated (130 mR total on [RSO] pocket dosimeter). The collimator was facing down and the source was 90 percent shielded, according to the RSO. The RSO was approximately six inches from the source as he cut away the tube, which lasted for three and half to four minutes (saturated pocket dosimeter and electronic dosimeter read 6 R). During the entirety of the incident, the location was secure and under constant surveillance. Weather in the area was rainy. Upon completion of the source retrieval, the RSO brought the crank/cable to the Applied Technical Services (ATS) Metallurgy Lab to perform a chemistry and forensics investigation. Once the ATS, Inc. investigation is complete, the crank/cable will be sent to QSA Global. Currently, the camera is being stored at the Alabama storage location."

Mississippi Event Number: MS-210002

* * * UPDATE ON 10/09/2021 AT 0132 EDT FROM THE STATE OF MISSISSIPPI (MCROBERTS) TO HOWIE CROUCH* * *

"The RSO sent his dosimetry results to Landauer for immediate processing, and he received the results, Tuesday, October 5, 2021. Please see below:

7/1/2021-9/30/2021:
Collar:
DDE: 1456 mrem
LDE: 1460 mrem
SDE: 1461 mrem

Rt Finger: 10255 mrem
Lt Finger: 35538 mrem
Rt Ankle: 721 mrem
Lt Ankle: 336 mrem

9/1/2021-9/30/2021
Chest:
DDE: 2581 mrem
LDE: 2581 mrem
SDE: 2530 mrem

Quarter 3
Collar and Chest:
DDE: 4040 mrem
LDE: 4045 mrem
SDE: 3995 mrem

Rt Finger: 10255 mrem
Lt Finger: 35538 mrem
Rt Ankle: 721 mrem
Lt Ankle: 336 mrem

Total Year to Date:
Collar and Chest:
DDE: 4045 mrem
LDE: 4052 mrem
SDE: 4015 mrem

Rt Finger: 10255 mrem
Lt Finger: 35538 mrem
Rt Ankle: 721 mrem
Lt Ankle: 336 mrem

"The investigation into this event is ongoing. Information will continue to be provided as it is received according to SA-300."

Notified R1DO (Carfang), R4DO (Dixon) and NMSS Events Resource (email).

EN Revision Imported Date: 10/12/2021

EN Revision Text: AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - MISSING SHIPMENT

The following information was received via email:

"The licensee contracted a common carrier to transport a Sr-82/Rb-82 generator to their RWM [radioactive waste management] site in Utah from the Warner Robins Facility (temporary job site). The package was picked up from the licensee's office on August 23, 2021 to be delivered in Utah on August 24, 2021. The package never arrived. The licensee contacted the common carrier, but was told they had to file a claim online. The package has not been found. The package was 84.63 mCi (3.13 GBq) with a Transport Index of 0.4. Results of a surface wipe test done before shipping were 203 dpm and surface reading was 6 mr/hr. "

GA Incident No.: 48

THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A 'Less than Cat 3' LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL

Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf

AUXILIARY FEEDWATER SYSTEM AUTO-STARTED ON FEEDWATER ISOLATION SIGNAL

"At 0300 EDT, with Unit 3 in Mode 3 at 0 percent power, an actuation of the Auxiliary Feedwater System occurred when steam generator water level rose to 80 percent causing a Feedwater Isolation signal, which tripped the last remaining Steam Generator Feed Pump during plant cooldown. The Auxiliary Feedwater System automatically started as designed when the feedwater isolation signal was received.

"This event is being reported pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A).

"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."

The cause of the high steam generator level is under investigation.

AUTOMATIC REACTOR SCRAM AFTER MAIN TURBINE TRIP

"At 1321 EDT on October 11, 2021, Susquehanna Steam Electric Station Unit 2 reactor automatically scrammed due to a trip of the Main Turbine.

"Unit 2 reactor was being operated at approximately 95 percent RTP [rated thermal power] with no evolutions in progress. The Control Room received indication of a Main Turbine trip with both divisions of RPS [Reactor Protection System] actuated and all control rods inserted. Turbine bypass valves opened automatically to control reactor pressure and subsequently failed open causing the reactor to depressurize. When reactor pressure reached approximately 560 psig, the operations crew manually closed the Main Steam Isolation Valves (MISVs) to stop the depressurization. Reactor water level lowered to -31 inches causing Level 3 (+13 inches) isolations. No [automatic] ECCS [Emergency Core Cooling System] actuations occurred. HPCI [High Pressure Coolant Injection] and RCIC [Reactor Core Isolation Cooling] were manually initiated to control reactor water level. The Operations crew subsequently maintained reactor water level at the normal operating band using RCIC and reactor pressure was controlled with HPCI in pressure control mode and main steam line drains. The Reactor Recirculation Pumps tripped as designed on EOC-RPT [end of cycle recirculation pump trip].

"The reactor is currently stable in Mode 3. An investigation into the cause of the turbine trip is underway.

"The NRC Resident Inspector was notified. A voluntary notification to PEMA will be made.

"This event requires a 4 hour ENS notification in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(A), 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) and an 8 hour ENS notification in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A)."