Event Notification Report for September 23, 2021

EN Revision Imported Date: 9/23/2021

EN Revision Text: DESIGN CHANGE ALTERED BASIS FOR ITAAC

"In accordance with 10 CFR 52.99(c)(2), as described in NEI 08-01, 'Industry Guideline for the ITAAC Closure Process Under 10 CFR Part 52,' Vogtle Units 3 and 4 Construction is making this notification to the NRC for determining that Inspections, Tests, Analyses and Acceptance Criteria (ITAAC) 2.5.02.07a (Index No. 534) and ITAAC 2.5.02.07e (Index No. 538) for both units require additional actions to restore their completed status. The ITAAC Closure Notifications for ITAAC 534 were submitted on March 31, 2017 (Unit 3 ML17093A286, Unit 4 ML17093A535). The ITAAC Closure Notifications for ITAAC 538 were submitted on November 30, 2016 (Unit 3 ML16351A350, Unit 4 ML16351A334).

"On August 26, 2020, it was determined that a design change, issued for several Protection and Safety Monitoring System (PMS) isolation barrier assemblies (ISBs), materially altered the basis for determining that the ITAAC 534 and ITAAC 538 Acceptance Criteria were met. The modified ISBs will require testing per IEEE 384-1981, Standard Criteria for Independence of Class 1E Equipment and Circuits, to demonstrate that the Acceptance Criteria is met. System function is not required while the plant is under construction.

"ITAAC Post Closure Notifications in accordance with 10 CFR 52.99(c)(2) will be submitted following completion of corrective actions.

"The 10 CFR 52.99(c)(4) All ITAAC Complete Notification has not been submitted for VEGP [(Vogtle Electric Generating Plant)] 3 and 4.

"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."

* * * UPDATE ON 9/22/21 AT 1534 EDT FROM NICK KELLENBERGER TO HOWIE CROUCH * * *

"Upon successful completion of the work to correct the identified impact to ITAAC 534, it has been determined there was no material impact to ITAAC 538. Confirmation was made that the credible fault only affected PMS to PLS analog ISBs and not PMS to PLS relay isolation ISBs. It was also confirmed that the relay isolation ISB testing and qualification summary information was unaffected by the modifications made to the analog ISBs to correct the credible fault scenario condition. Resolution of the credible fault scenario did not result in modifications to the relay isolation ISBs which are the subject of ITAAC 538. Therefore, the ITAAC Closure Notifications submitted for ITAAC 538 on November 30, 2016 (Unit 3 ML16351A350, Unit 4 ML16351A334) continue to be valid and ITAAC Post Closure Notifications are not required."

The licensee has notified NRC Region 2. Notified R2DO (Miller) and NRR Vogtle Project Office (via email).

EN Revision Imported Date: 9/23/2021

EN Revision Text: AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - MISSING RADIOACTIVE SOURCES

The following is summary of information received from the state of Washington via email:

On August 13, 2021, the University of Washington Radiation Safety concluded that it was unable to locate two Gd-148 sources with activity totaling 0.0882 microCi and one Am-241 source with activity 0.982 microCi. Internal radiation exposure to these sources is highly unlikely, and any external exposure to the sources would not be considered a public health and safety concern. It is probable that the sources are still in the facility, but since they cannot be located they are considered missing. The root cause of the problem is a lack of documentation of source use and storage locations. Corrective actions were taken by Radiation Safety to prevent future loss of material.

WA incident no.: WA-21-021

THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A 'Less than Cat 3' LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL

Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf

EN Revision Imported Date: 9/23/2021

EN Revision Text: AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - MISSING RADIOACTIVE SHIPMENT

The following information was received from the state of Arkansas (the Department) via email:

"The Department received notification on June 16, 2021, from licensee 3D Imaging Drug Design and Development, 3DI, that a package containing 87 milliCi of Zr-89 did not reach its shipping destination.

"Upon review of the event, the Licensee transferred the package via [common carrier] pick-up from its Little Rock, Arkansas campus on Saturday June 12, 2021, with a scheduled delivery date of June 14, 2021. The package destination was:

"Memorial Sloan Kettering
1275 York Avenue
New York City, New York

"On June 16, 2021, the package was reported missing to the Department and the activity of the package was estimated to be approximately 30 milliCi based on the 3.2 day half-life of Zr-89.

"The licensee had contacted the [common carrier] and the [common carrier] stated that they were unable to locate the package. Department inspectors visited the 3DI campus on June 18, 2021 and questioned the Licensee about the lost package. At that time, and currently, the [common carrier] has been unable to locate the package. The Department has spoken with multiple individuals associated with the [common carrier], both at the Little Rock location and with the companies Dangerous Goods Administration Department, about the lost package. The Department has also followed up with 3DI.

"The associates at the [common carrier] were able to confirm that the package was received and scanned. After acceptance, and the initial scan of the package, there are no other scans available to determine what has happened to the package. 3DI stated that the company has experienced additional shipping problems since the lost package. 3DI has had additional packages that have been scanned and shipped to Licensees other than the intended recipient. All additional packages have been able to be located and recovered or reach their final destination successfully.

"The initial package of Zr-89 remains missing. The Department has requested and is awaiting the 30 Day report from 3DI as required. The Department considers this incident open pending location of the missing package and will update this report as information is received. "

AR incident no.: AR-2021-007

THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A 'Less than Cat 3' LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL

Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf"

EN Revision Imported Date: 9/23/2021

EN Revision Text: AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - DAMAGED TROXLER MOISTURE DENSITY GAUGE

The following information was received from the state of Oklahoma via email:

"We [Oklahoma Department of Environmental Quality] have been informed that earlier today a Troxler Model 3440 gauge was struck by a truck in Oklahoma City. The gauge belonged to CEC Corp. (OK-31047-01). Surveys of the gauge indicated that the shielding was intact. [The State] will provide more information as it becomes available."

Troxler Model 3440 gauges contain 40 mCi Am241:Be and 8 mCi Cs-137 sources.

EN Revision Imported Date: 9/23/2021

EN Revision Text: AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - RADIOGRAPHY DEVICE MALFUNCTION

The following information was received from the state of California via email:

"On 9/14/2021, the licensee contacted the Radiation Health Branch (RHB) to report an incident that occurred on 9/13/2021 in which a radiography exposure device failed to retract to the fully shielded position. The licensee reported that after completing their second exposure shot, the radiography crew cranked the source to the fully shielded position which actuated the fully shielded source position indicator. The crew reverse cranked the source to confirm that the source was locked into the fully shielded position and discovered that the source was still exposed. The radiographers were able to lock the source into the final position after manipulating the locking mechanism manually. The licensee reported an exposure maximum of 33 millirem to one of the radiographers due to this incident. At this time, the licensee does not expect an overexposure to either radiographers nor members of the public. RHB will be investigating this incident further."

EN Revision Imported Date: 9/23/2021

EN Revision Text: AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - MISSING RADIOACTIVE SOURCE

The following information was received from the Commonwealth of Massachusetts via email:

"On September 16, 2021, at 1020 [EDT], the licensee notified the Massachusetts Radiation Control Program (RCP) via telephone of a missing 5 millicurie Cs-137 sealed source. The source has been missing since the last inventory performed by the licensee on August 16, 2021. Upon discovery, the licensee subsequently searched for the source with survey meters on their licensed premises and could not locate it. Personnel involved with the use of the source were immediately interviewed and later all employees were interviewed. To the date of this report the licensee has not found the source.

"The only item related to the source that was discovered was the top cover to the lead shielding container. The shielding cylinder and the sealed Cs-137 source are still missing.

"The licensee written report and RCP on-site inspection are pending. The Agency considers this matter still OPEN."

THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A 'Less than Cat 3' LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL

Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf