Event Notification Report for July 06, 2021

EN Revision Imported Date: 7/6/2021

EN Revision Text: AUTOMATIC REACTOR TRIP DUE TO HIGH PRESSURIZER PRESSURE

"At 0315 MST on May 19, 2021, Unit 2 reactor automatically tripped during testing of the Plant Protection System. The Reactor Protection System actuated to trip the reactor on High Pressurizer Pressure, although no plant protection setpoints were exceeded. Main Steam Isolation Signal (MSIS), Safety Injection Actuation Signal (SIAS), and Containment Isolation Actuation Signal (CIAS) were received. No injection of water into the Reactor Coolant System occurred. Auxiliary Feedwater Actuation Signals (AFAS) 1 and 2 actuated on low Steam Generator water level post trip as designed. This event is being reported as a reactor protection system and a specified system actuation in accordance with the reporting criteria of 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) and 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A).

"Following the reactor trip, all [Control Element Assemblies] CEAs inserted fully into the core. All systems operated as expected. No emergency plan classification was required per the Emergency Plan. Safety related busses remained powered during the event from offsite power and the offsite power grid is stable. Unit 2 is stable and in Mode 3. Steam Generator heat removal is via the class 1 E powered motor driven auxiliary feedwater pump and Atmospheric Dump Valves.

"The NRC Senior Resident Inspector has been informed."

* * * UPDATE ON 5/19/21 AT 1351 EDT FROM JASON HILL TO BRIAN P. SMITH * * *

"The Unit 2 reactor tripped because of actual High Pressurizer Pressure that occurred as a result of a Main Steam Isolation Signal actuation.

"At 0337 MST, both trains of Low Pressure and High Pressure Safety Injection (LPSI and HPSI) were made inoperable when the injection valves were overridden and closed in accordance with station procedures. At 0346 MST, in accordance with station procedures, both trains of Containment Spray, LPSI, and HPSI pumps were overridden and stopped, rendering Containment Spray inoperable as well. This represents a condition that would have prevented the fulfillment of a safety function required to mitigate the consequences of an accident per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D). Additionally, at the time of the Safety Injection Actuation Signal (0315 MST), both trains of Emergency Diesel Generators actuated as required and both 4160 VAC busses remained energized from off-site power.

"The NRC Senior Resident Inspector has been informed."

Notified R4DO (Young)

* * * UPDATE ON 7/02/21 AT 1943 EDT FROM YOLANDA GOOD TO JEFFREY WHITED * * *

"The inoperability of both trains of Low Pressure and High Pressure Safety Injection (LPSI and HPSI) and both trains of Containment Spray (CS) following the Unit 2 reactor trip has been determined to be an unanalyzed condition per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B). Additionally, inoperability of both trains of HPSI resulted in a reportable condition that could prevent fulfillment of its credited safety function to maintain the reactor in a safe shutdown condition per 10 CFR 50. 72(b)(3)(v)(A). The additional reporting criteria were discovered during review of the event and corresponding safety analyses.

"The NRC Senior Resident Inspector has been informed."

Notified R4DO (Werner)

EN Revision Imported Date: 7/6/2021

EN Revision Text: AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - LEAKING SOURCE

The following was received from the Massachusetts Radiation Control Program via email:

"At 1551 EDT on May 27, 2021, the Massachusetts Radiation Control Program received a phone call from the Radiation Safety Officer (RSO) of Thermo Scientific Portable Analytical Instruments, License Number 55-0238. The RSO stated that a source was removed from the licensee's manufactured device that was sent to them for servicing. During this receipt procedure, a wipe sample taken on the device resulted in positive contamination. The Nickel-63 source was found to be leaking and the wipe test indicated a removable contamination level of 0.0728 microcurie. The limit for reporting the activity is 0.005 microcurie.

"Further information will be forthcoming as the event is under investigation."

* * * UPDATE ON MAY 28, 2021 AT 1603 EDT FROM ANTHONY CARPENITO TO BRIAN P. SMITH * * *

The following update was received from the Massachusetts Radiation Control Program [MRCP] via email:

"The licensee notified the MRCP at 1202 [EDT] on May 28, 2021 to correct and update its earlier report. The sealed source isotope of interest is Iron-55 (Fe-55), not Nickel-63 as reported earlier, and the source activity is 20 millicuries. [The] Source was contained within an X-ray fluorescence device Model XLi 969, SN 5249. The customer had shipped the device to the licensee for decommissioning rather than service/repair. The accompanying leak test result prior to shipment was negative for contamination. Wipe survey results for areas within the licensee's facility where the device had been were negative for contamination. End of update."

Notified R1DO (Bower) and NMSS Events Notification

* * * UPDATE ON JULY 2, 2021 AT 1603 EDT FROM SZYMON MUDREWICZ TO JEFFREY WHITED * * *

The following update was received from the MRCP via email:

"The only update to this event is the MA docket number as referenced in the subject above [MA Event Docket 17-4568]. There are currently no other updates to this event at the moment."

MA Event Docket: 17-4568

Notified R1DO (Lilliendahl) and NMSS Events Notification

EN Revision Imported Date: 7/6/2021

EN Revision Text: AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - RADIOGRAPHY SOURCE DISCONNECT

The following information was received via E-mail:

"On June 25, 2021, the Agency [Texas Department of State Health Services] was notified by the licensee's Radiation Safety Officer (RSO) that while conducting radiography in their shooting bay, they experienced a source disconnect. The disconnect involved a QSA 880D exposure device containing a 60 curie iridium-192 source.

"The RSO stated the radiographer had completed an exposure and was entering the bay to exchange the film. As they passed the entrance beam the radiation alarm went off. The radiographer exited the area. The licensee was unable to retract the source. They contacted a service company who came to the licensee's location.

"It was determined that the ball on the drive cable had broken free of the drive cable. The service company was able to retract the source into the exposure device. No overexposures occurred due to this event. Additional information will be provided as it is received in accordance with SA-300."

Texas Incident Number: I-9860.

EN Revision Imported Date: 7/6/2021

EN Revision Text: AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - UNDERDOSE TO PATIENT

The following report was received from the Wisconsin Radiation Protection Section [the State]:

"On June 25, 2021, the licensee reported to the State a misadministration of Y-90 Theraspheres on the morning of the same day. The prescribed dose was 126 Gy to the right lobe of the liver, corresponding to 2.31 GBq. After the administration was complete, the licensee surveyed the residual material and noticed that an unusually high amount of material was still present in the administration setup. Initial calculations indicate that approximately 1.572 GBq of material was delivered to the patient. This corresponds to 68.8 percent of the prescribed dose resulting in a dose to the right lobe of the liver that differed from the prescribed dose by 39.2 Gy. The technologist notified the Authorized User immediately and the Authorized User then notified the patient. No unusual circumstances or events were noted during the administration, and there are no suspected spills or outside exposures resulting from this event. The State will continue to follow up on the event."

Wisconsin Event Report: WI210005

A Medical Event may indicate potential problems in a medical facility's use of radioactive materials. It does not necessarily result in harm to the patient.

EN Revision Imported Date: 7/6/2021

EN Revision Text: CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE DISCOVERED WITHIN THE PROTECTED AREA

"On July 03, 2021, at approximately 1011 CDT, a Security Force Supervisor at South Texas Project Electric Generating Station (STPEGS) was informed by a security officer that they had located what appeared to be drug paraphernalia inside the Protected Area. At 1033 CDT Local Law Enforcement was contacted and responded to STPEGS. At 1130 CDT the Matagorda County Sheriff's office took the item into evidence for testing to determine if there was any presence of a controlled substance. At 1311 CDT, the Matagorda County Sheriff's office notified STP Nuclear Operating Company (STPNOC) that the item tested positive for the presence of a controlled substance. At 1330 CDT the Unit 1 Shift Manager was notified. This event is being reported in accordance with 10 CFR 26.719(b)(1) for discovery or presence of illegal drugs within the protected area. STPNOC is continuing to investigate this incident.

"The Resident Inspector has been notified."

EN Revision Imported Date: 7/6/2021

EN Revision Text: LOSS OF SEISMIC MONITORING FOR EMERGENCY PLAN ASSESSMENT

"At 0911 EDT on July 4, 2021, a failure occurred on 2 out of 3 of the required seismic monitoring instruments that feed the Operational Basis Earthquake (OBE) annunciator. The failure would prevent an OBE EXCEEDED alarm on the Seismic Monitoring Panel in the Control Room. This results in a major loss of emergency assessment capability. Corrective actions are being pursued to restore the seismic monitoring instruments. Compensatory measures are in place to assure adequate monitoring capability.

"This is an eight-hour, non-emergency notification for a loss of Emergency Assessment Capability. This event is reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii) because the unplanned failure of the required seismic instruments affects the ability to assess a seismic event greater than the OBE. There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel.

"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."