Event Notification Report for June 21, 2021

EN Revision Imported Date: 6/21/2021

EN Revision Text: AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - MISSING RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL SHIPMENT

The following report from the state of Wisconsin was received by email:

"On June 4, 2021 the licensee reported to the Department [of Health Services] that a package containing 25 Curies of Cs-137 had been shipped from Wisconsin on April 16, 2021 and did not arrive at its destination in California. The last known location of the package was in Chicago, Illinois on April 22, 2021. The licensee is following up with the common carrier, but to date the package has not been located."

WI Event Report ID No.: WI210004


* * * UPDATE ON 06/18/2021 AT 1351 FROM DIEGO SAENZ TO LLOYD DESOTELL * * *

The following report update from the state of Wisconsin was received by email:

"The package arrived at its destination on June 7, 2021. The package was completely intact, including seal, with no signs of damage. When the licensee who offered the package for shipment contacted the common carrier, the licensee was not provided with any details of problems during shipment. However, the package was located and promptly delivered. The Department considers this event closed."

Notified R3DO (Hills), NMSS Events Notification (email), ILTAB (email) and CNSC Canada (email).

THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A 'Category 3' LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL

Category 3 sources, if not safely managed or securely protected, could cause permanent injury to a person who handled them, or were otherwise in contact with them, for some hours. It could possibly - although it is unlikely - be fatal to be close to this amount of unshielded radioactive material for a period of days to weeks. These sources are typically used in practices such as fixed industrial gauges involving high activity sources (for example: level gauges, dredger gauges, conveyor gauges and spinning pipe gauges) and well logging. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf

EN Revision Imported Date: 6/21/2021

EN Revision Text: LOSS OF CAPABILITY TO ACTIVATE EMERGENCY SIRENS AND OFFSITE NOTIFICATION OF SAME

"At 1115 EDT on June 9, 2021, during a siren activation test, a loss of the capability to activate the sirens from both Surry local activation sites was identified. The Virginia EOC was participating in the activation test and is aware of the issue and notified the local government authorities in the Surry EPZ of the situation. The NRC Resident has been notified of this issue.

"The station telecommunications department has been contacted and is aware of the issue. In the event that a radiological emergency should occur at the Surry Power Station, Primary Route Alerting procedures will be put in use by the local jurisdictions.

"This report is being made in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(xi) and 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii) due to notification of other state and local government agencies of the failure of the Alert & Notification system for Surry."

* * * PARTIAL RETRACTION ON 6/18/2021 AT 0959 FROM STEPHEN MITCHELL TO THOMAS KENDZIA * * *

"Surry Power Station Event Notification 55299 is being retracted based upon further evaluation. Surry has three localities (State SAU, James City, and Surry County) with access to the redundant activation trains (primary and backup systems). The actuation tests only one primary and one backup activation panel at two localities, only primary at the State SAU (Situational Awareness Unit) and back up at James City County were tested. Follow-up telecom and vendor investigation revealed that the primary server was functional from James City County that would have actuated all 71 sirens; Consequently, it was concluded that all of the sirens were fully functional from the James City primary system and there was no loss of all sirens as originally reported on 6/9/2021 (EN 55299). EN 55299 also contained a 4-hour Offsite Notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(xi) that is unaffected.

"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."

Notified R2DO (Miller).

EN Revision Imported Date: 6/21/2021

EN Revision Text: AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - FAILURE OF RADIOGRAPHY SOURCE TO FULLY RETRACT

The following information was received via E-mail:

"On June 10, 2021 at approximately 1030 CDT, a source hang out incident occurred while an industrial radiography crew was working at Shell Chemical, LP in Norco, St. Charles Parish, Louisiana. The radiography crew was working on the top level of a 100-foot tower located in the Geo-1 South unit.

"The crew observed after performing the exposure that the source could be cranked back almost all the way, except for approximately one half turn of the crank handle. Several more unsuccessful attempts were made by the crew to crank in the source. The source was then cranked out to the 4-HVL collimator and the crew expanded the restricted area boundary on the East side so that the entire boundary was at 2 mR/hr or below.

"The crew then contacted their site supervisor at approximately 1040 CDT, who in turn immediately contacted the Corporate Radiation Safety Officer (RSO). At approximately 1140 CDT, the source hang out incident was reported to the Department [Louisiana DEQ] Radiation Hotline by the Corporate RSO.

"A source retrieval trained radiography instructor was promptly tasked by the licensee with conducting a source retrieval. Six radiographers, including both of the crew members whose source was hung out, worked the restricted area boundary at ground level to prevent exposure to members of the public. After observing the placement of the collimator and source guide tube for approximately five seconds from five different locations at a distance of approximately 10 feet, the other source retrieval trained radiographer used a set of six-foot tongs to grab and shake the collimator and source guide tube. This loosened a bind in the source guide tube at the outlet nipple of the exposure device and permitted the source to be promptly afterwards retracted into the shielded position.

"The source was hung out for approximately three hours. The radiography instructor who conducted various observations of the guide tube in preparation for the retrieval received three mR of exposure and the other retrieval trained radiography instructor, who performed the source retrieval received one mR of exposure. An additional certified radiographer who also assisted in the retrieval operation received one mR of exposure. All other personnel on site for the licensee received less than one mR of exposure from the hung out source. No members of the public were exposed.

"The radiography exposure device was a QSA Model 880 Delta, device serial number, D13738. The source was Ir-192 with 55 Ci of activity. The source serial number was 30128M."

Louisiana Event Report ID No.: LA20210006

EN Revision Imported Date: 6/21/2021

EN Revision Text: AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - LOST PORTABLE MOISTURE / DENSITY GAUGE

The following information was received via E-mail:
"Event description: portable gauge came out of truck bed during transport.
"Event location: South Broadway and 340, Grand Junction, CO.
"Event type: Lost portable gauge, Troxler 3430 SN 26906, 333 MBq (9 mCi) of cesium-137 and 1.63 GBq (44 mCi) of americium-241:beryllium; or 2.44 MBq (66 microCi) of californium-252."
Colorado Event Report ID No.: Pending

* * * UPDATE ON JUNE 11, 2021 FROM PHILLIP PETERSON TO THOMAS HERRITY * * *

The following update was received via E-mail:
"The portable gauge reported lost by Colorado on 6/10/21 has been found. The gauge was found by an employee at the worksite where the gauge fell off the back of the truck and was secured. The licensee was notified and has recovered the gauge."

Notified R4DO (Drake) and NMSS Events Notification and ILTAB via email.

THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A 'Less than Cat 3' LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL

Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf

EN Revision Imported Date: 6/21/2021

EN Revision Text: TECHNICAL SPECIFICIATION REQUIRED SHUTDOWN

"At 1710 EDT on June 11, 2021, a Technical Specification required shutdown was initiated at Plant Hatch Unit 1. Technical Specification Condition 3.4.4.B unidentified LEAKAGE increase not within limits, was entered due to a greater than 2 gpm increase in unidentified LEAKAGE within the previous 24 hour period in MODE 1. This specification was entered on June 11, 2021, at 1615 EDT with a REQUIRED ACTION to restore leakage increase within limits within 4 hours. This REQUIRED ACTION could not be completed within the COMPLETION TIME; therefore, a Technical Specification required shutdown was initiated, and this event is being reported as a four-hour, non-emergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(i).

"There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel.

"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."

* * * RETRACTION ON 6/17/2021 AT 1309 FROM JASON BUTLER TO JEFFREY WHITED * * *

"Upon further review of the leakage rates, it was determined that at 1900 EDT on 6/11/2021 the drywell floor drain unidentified leakage increased greater than 2 gpm within the previous 24 hours while in MODE 1. Technical Specification (TS) 3.4.4.B was entered to reduce leakage increase to within limits within 4 hours. At 2000 EDT on 6/11/2021 unidentified leakage was reduced below the 2 gpm increase within the previous 24 hours due to actions taken to lower reactor power and pressure. Therefore, the TS required shutdown per TS 3.4.4.C was not applicable. Thus Event Report 55303 is being retracted.

"The NRC resident has been notified of the retraction."

Notified R2DO (Miller).

EN Revision Imported Date: 6/21/2021

EN Revision Text: ATMOSPHERIC STEAM DUMP VALVES INOPERABLE

"On June 16, 2021, at 1550 EDT, Palisades Nuclear Plant was operating in Mode 1 at 100% power. At that time, operations identified an acrid odor in the control room. Investigation revealed that the steam dump control relay had failed, rendering all four atmospheric steam dump valves inoperable.

"The loss of function of all four atmospheric steam dump valves is reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) as an event or condition that at the time of discovery could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of structures or systems that are needed to mitigate the consequences of an accident.

"Troubleshooting and replacement of the relay are in progress.

"The plant remains stable in Mode 1 at 100% power.

"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."

Unit 1 is in a 24 hour LCO for Tech Spec 3.7.4.b, atmospheric steam dump valve inoperability. The Unit is in a normal offsite power line-up.

EN Revision Imported Date: 6/21/2021

EN Revision Text: PART 21 REPORT

The following is a summary of a report received from the vendor via email:

The vendor notified the NRC that the hydraulic loss coefficient used to calculate the pressure loss and flow rate into the Side Entry Orifice (SEO) at the fuel bundle entrance in BWR/6 plants may have been underpredicted. The SEO loss coefficient was underpredicted for some fuel bundle locations, which could result in an overprediction of MCPR margin in core monitoring applications. The overprediction was a result of not originally including in the assessment flow area restrictions associated with instrument support structures in the cross beams (structural supports underneath the core plate) in BWR/6 plant designs. BWR/2-5 plants built by GE have a different core support structure that is more open so that multiple SEO losses are not applied to evaluations for those plants.

However, there are currently no US ABWR plants in operation that would potentially be affected by this evaluation. The potential error in the core monitoring system does not affect the NRC certified design of the ABWR or the GEH ABWR design certification renewal application currently under review. The unique core support structure design of the BWR6 and ABWR is not shared by earlier BWR plants or the ESBWR.

Potentially Affected Plants:
Grand Gulf, River Bend, Clinton, Perry

Point of Contact: Michelle Catts
GE Hitachi Nuclear Energy
Safety Evaluation Program Manager
3901 Castle Hayne Road, Wilmington, NC 28401