Event Notification Report for June 01, 2021

EN Revision Imported Date: 6/3/2021

EN Revision Text: PART 21 - FAILURE OF SIZE 1 AND 2 FREEDOM SERIES FULL VOLTAGE REVERSING STARTERS

The following is a summary of information received from Paragon Energy Solutions:

On 3/29/2021, Dominion - North Anna Station has identified instances where size 1 and 2 starters have failed to function as expected in assemblies that were originally supplied by Nuclear Logistics LLC (NLI). The mechanical interlock exhibited binding that prevented the contactor from closing when energized. The identified failed starters are utilized in an application of operating Motor Operated Valves (MOV). This is an intermittent duty application.

The issue was identified on Eaton Starter Model AN56DN*, AN56GN*, CN55DN*, CN55GN* style starters and contactors with supplied date codes T4514 (week 45 of year 2014) and T4215 (week 42 of year 2015). Paragon is in the process of identifying the date codes to provide the specific information to the identified plants.

The following plants were supplied starters from September 2014 through October 2018: Beaver Valley, Columbia, Ergytech, Harris, Millstone, NEK KRSKO, North Anna, Prairie Island.

The component design that exhibited the failure was revised by the original equipment manufacturer (Eaton) in October 2018. There have been no reported failures of the interlock mechanism in vintages manufactured before September 2014 or after October 2018.

These recommendations are based on the specific application: The reversing starters and reversing contactors are typically wired in a configuration that will electrically lock out one of the contactors when the other one is being energized to prevent both contactors from being energized at the same time. Therefore, the mechanical interlock is not required to prevent both contactors from being closed at the same time when the electrical interlock configuration is being implemented. In this scenario, the mechanical interlocks are not required and can be removed.

The motor control centers that contain the mechanical interlock should be monitored to ensure that there is no binding during operation.

The evaluation being performed by Paragon is expected to be completed by May 29, 2021.

Tracy Bolt
Chief Nuclear Officer, CNO
817-284-0077
Paragon Energy Solutions, LLC
7410 Pebble Drive
Ft. Worth, TX 76118

* * * UPDATE ON 5/3/2021 AT 1559 FROM TRACY BOLT TO BRIAN LIN * * *
The following revision was received from Paragon Energy Solutions via email and corrects the identified date code and includes the size and serial number of the starter that failed:

The issue was identified on supplied Size 1, 73262-025-00028 (Date Code: T4515 - 45th week of 2015) and Size 2, 73262-028-00001 (Date Code: T4215 - 42nd week of 2015).

Notified R1DO (Young), R2DO (Miller), R3DO (Orlikowski), R4DO (Deese), NMSS Events Notification, and Part 21 Group via email.

* * * UPDATE ON 5/28/2021 AT 1558 FROM TRACY BOLT TO KERBY SCALES * * *
The following update (Interim Report) was received from Paragon Energy Solutions via email:

"Paragon is submitting this Interim Report since this condition is currently under evaluation but will not be completed within 60 days.

"Paragon is in communication with EATON, the OEM for the starters/contactors to determine the extent of condition. The evaluation is expected to be completed by June 30, 2021.

"It was determined that Dominion - Millstone should not be included in the list of affected plants. Millstone will be removed from the list in the final revision of P21-03302021."

Notified R1DO (Bower), R2DO (Miller), R3DO (Feliz-Adorno), R4DO (Gepford), NMSS Events Notification, and Part 21 Group via email.

EN Revision Imported Date: 6/3/2021

EN Revision Text: LOST, THEN FOUND, PACKAGE OF IODINE-131

The following is a summary of a phone conversation with the Licensee's Radiation Safety Officer (RSO):

RLS (USA) Inc was informed that a package, which was shipped via a common carrier, was delivered to the wrong address. The package, which contained a sealed source of 297 millicuries of I-131, was dropped off at approximately 0930 (EDT) to Valassis Anderson Printing Plant. The package was labeled with the correct address, however the common carrier delivered it to the wrong location. Valassis Anderson Printing Plant informed the Licensee (RLS) at 1330 that they were in possession of the mis-delivered package at which time the Licensee immediately picked up the package and brought it to their facility. The package was missing for approximately 4.5 hours. Upon inspection, the package was not damaged. Wipes taken were at background levels. A surface survey reading indicated 17 mrem/hr and the transportation index was .5.

The contents of the package are 1000 times the limit specified in appendix C to part 20.

The RSO performed a worst case scenario: If a member of the public held on to the package for 4.5 hours that would yield a dose of approximately 76.5 millirem. The more likely scenario is that a member of the public was at 3 meters from the package for 4.5 hours which would yield a dose of 2.25 millirem. It is estimated that a member of the public could have received a dose greater then 2 millirem in 1 hours. However, there is no way to confirm this.

The package originated from Jubilant Draximage, Canada.




THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A 'Less than Cat 3' LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL

Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf

EN Revision Imported Date: 6/3/2021

EN Revision Text: AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - HEAT AND SMOKE DETECTOR FAILED TO FUNCTION

The following is a summary of a phone conversation with the State of Nebraska Radioactive Materials Program:

On May 21, 2021, at 1600 (CDT), while performing a start up of the irradiator, the licensee noticed a fault on the control panel of the smoke detector. Troubleshooting revealed there was an issue with a circuit board in the fire system which was causing the fault. Replacement of the circuit board is in progress and is expected to be completed on May 25, 2021. The redundant heat and smoke detector in the vault does not provide an automatic shutdown of the irradiator in case of an emergency. Compensatory measures are in place which include stationing a fire watch.

EN Revision Imported Date: 6/3/2021

EN Revision Text: AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - TROXLER GAUGE RUN OVER

The following was received from the Tennessee Division of Radiological Health via e-mail:

"During construction of a commercial business, a Troxler gauge was run over on May 21, 2021. The gauge is still in a shielded configuration and is being securely stored according to plans and procedures until the local field office can respond. The device information is listed below:

Manufacturer: Troxler
Model: 3440
Serial Number: 33760
Isotopes:
Am-241 8 mCi
Cs-137 40 mCi
Activity Source Serial Number:
Am-241 47-29413
Cs-137 750-8896

"State Event Report ID Number: TN-21-058"

EN Revision Imported Date: 6/3/2021

EN Revision Text: AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - DAMAGED GAUGE

The following was received from the California Department of Public Health via e-mail:

"On May 24, 2021, [the licensee], contacted Los Angeles County Radiation Management regarding a CPN International MC3 (serial number not reported, containing nominally 10 millicuries Cs-137 and 50 millicuries Am:Be-241) moisture density gauge that had been stored in a gauge operators home that was involved in a house fire on May 23, 2021. The gauge was stored in the transport case. The gauge was found to have been melted and was unrecognizable. An inspector from the Los Angeles County was sent to the scene to perform radiation surveys and to evaluate the damage to the gauge and determine if the sealed sources were intact. The disposal of the source will be determined once the evaluation of the damage to the gauge has been completed. The California Department of Public Health will continue to investigate the incident.

"CA 5010 Number: 052421"

* * * UPDATE ON 5/26/2021 AT 2053 EDT FROM ROBERT GREGER TO JEFFREY WHITED * * *

The following was received from the California Department of Public Health via e-mail:

"The Cs-137 and Am:Be-241 sources were recovered the evening of May 24 by a member of the California radiation control program. The sources were taken to a licensed gauge service provider the next day, where wipes were taken of the sources for leak testing. The leak test results were received from the gauge manufacturer on May 26 showing that neither source was leaking. The serial number of the gauge was reported as M34125843."

Notified R4DO (Gepford) and NMSS Event Notifications (email)

EN Revision Imported Date: 6/3/2021

EN Revision Text: AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - LOST DEVICE

The following was received from the South Carolina Department of Health and Environmental Control (the Department) via email:

"The South Carolina Department of Health and Environmental Control was notified on 05/25/21, that a strontium-90 medical eye applicator was lost or missing. The eye applicator is an Atlantic Research Corporation Model B-1 eye applicator, serial number 300, with a maximum activity of 50 millicuries. The licensee is reporting that the last inventory listed the source activity at 15.25 millicuries. During a recent inspection conducted by the Department, the licensee was unable to provide disposal records of the medical eye applicator. The licensee is now reporting the loss of the strontium-90 medical eye applicator. This event is still under investigation by the South Carolina Department of Health and Environmental Control."

THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A 'Less than Cat 3' LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL

Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf

EN Revision Imported Date: 6/3/2021

EN Revision Text: 60-DAY TELEPHONIC NOTIFICATION OF INVALID PLANT PROTECTION SYSTEM ACTUATION SIGNAL

"This 60-day telephone notification is being made in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73(a)(1) and 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) to provide information pertaining to an invalid Engineered Safety Feature actuation signal.

"On April 1, 2021, at Waterford 3, while performing a replacement of power supplies on the Plant Protection System, a spurious signal caused a partial actuation of the Emergency Feedwater Actuation Signal. A partial Emergency Feedwater (EFW) logic trip path was met causing the opening of valves EFW-228A (EFW to SG 1 Primary Isolation), EFW-229A (EFW to SG 1 backup isolation), EFW-228B (EFW to SG 2 Primary Isolation), and EFW-229B (EFW to SG2 Backup Isolation).

"This inadvertent actuation was spurious and was not a valid signal resulting from parameter inputs. The 1992 Statements of Consideration (57 FR 41378) define an invalid signal to include spurious signals. Therefore, this actuation is considered invalid.

"This event was entered into the Waterford 3 corrective action program for resolution. This event did not result in any adverse impact to the health and safety of the public. The plant responded as expected.

"In accordance with 10 CFR 50.73(a)(1) a telephone notification is being made in lieu of submitting a written Licensee Event Report.

"The NRC Senior Resident Inspector has been notified."

EN Revision Imported Date: 6/3/2021

EN Revision Text: PART 21 REPORT - VACUUM BREAKERS FAILURE TO CLOSE

The following is a summary of the report provided by Framatome Inc.:

Identification of Component: Siemens 5kV 1200A Vacuum Breakers - 5-DPU-350-1200-78

Nature of Defect:
Framtome reported during dedication testing / inspection that a batch of 5-DPU-350-1200-78 MV vacuum breakers exhibited sporadic failure to close upon both electrical and mechanical closure signals. This was entered in their Corrective Action Program and troubleshooting / testing was completed at the Siemens manufacturing facility. Using a high speed camera to troubleshoot, they determined the close latch does not have sufficient torsional force to consistently maintain the breaker close latch in the closed position during the closing cycle. In some instances the breaker will receive a close signal and the close latch will not maintain the breaker in a closed position and the breaker will fail to close. It has been observed in testing that this condition is sporadic and that subsequent attempts to close the breaker will result in a closed breaker. The issue has no impact on the breakers staying closed once they have successfully closed. The issue has no impact on the ability for the breakers to open.

Number and Location of Basic Components:
The reportable defect is similar to design on the 22 breakers delivered and 19 installed at St. Lucie Unit 1, during refueling cycle 30. St. Lucie was notified on May 28, 2021 by Framatome Inc. via telephone and email.

Corrective Actions to Date:
Preliminary evaluation determined a modification of the breakers is required to increase the torsion spring force acting on the close latch. Framatome is working with Siemens to develop a long-term solution to increase the torsional spring force acting on the close latch. An interim solution utilizing a revised spring retaining bracket could be deployed near-term.

Gayle Elliott
Deputy Director, Licensing & Regulatory Affairs
Framatome Inc.
3315 Old Forest Road
Lynchburg, Va. 24501
Office (434-832-3347)
Mobile (434-841-0306)

EN Revision Imported Date: 6/3/2021

EN Revision Text: FITNESS FOR DUTY REPORT

A licensed operator had a confirmed positive during a random fitness-for-duty test. The employee's access to the plant has been terminated.

The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.