Event Notification Report for May 14, 2021

EN Revision Imported Date: 5/14/2021

EN Revision Text: MANUAL REACTOR PROTECTION SYSTEM (RPS) ACTUATION AT ZERO PERCENT POWER

"At 2149 EDT on April 5, 2021, with the power plant in Mode 2 at zero percent power, an actuation of the RPS system occurred following the decision to abort plant start-up. The reason for the RPS actuation was to align the plant to Mode 3, from Mode 2, following manually inserting all control rods using the Rod Control System. The RPS system initiated as designed when the mode switch was taken from 'Start-up' to 'Shutdown' to align the plant to Mode 3 from Mode 2.

"This event is being reported in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) as an event that results in a valid actuation of the RPS system.

"There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.

* * * RETRACTION ON 5/12/21 AT 1345 EDT FROM JOHN NAKEL TO KERBY SCALES * * *

"This is a retraction of an event notification made on 4/6/2021 at 0432 EST (EN#55172). This event was initially reported in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) as an event that results in a valid actuation of the RPS System. This event was later determined to be pre-planned, in accordance with Technical Specifications, and not the result of a significant event, therefore not meeting the reporting criteria of 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A).

"On the evening of April 4, 2021, while commencing reactor start up, it was determined that control rod withdrawal to add positive reactivity for the start-up would not overcome the negative reactivity of plant heat up. The control room team determined that the proper course of action would be to insert all control rods . The control room briefed and notified the Outage Control Center about its decision, then proceeded to insert all control rods. The control room manually inserted all control rods using the control rod hydraulic system.

"Following insertion of all control rods, the mode switch was taken to the shutdown position to meet the prerequisites of the procedure for maintaining hot shutdown. This action establishes Mode 3 in accordance with Technical Specifications and aligns the plant to perform the necessary work prior to a plant restart. By placing the mode switch in the shutdown position, a scram signal is generated for 10 seconds.

"NUREG-1022 offers guidance that states 'Actuations that need not be reported are those initiated for reasons other than to mitigate the consequences of an event.' The actions the operating crew took that night are accurately described by this statement in NUREG-1022 'shifting alignment of makeup pumps or closing a containment isolation valve for normal operational purposes would not be reportable.' In this situation, the Mode switch was taken to shutdown to align the plant to mode 3 for normal operational purposes, and not to mitigate a significant event.

"When the mode switch was taken to shut-down, RPS initiated as designed, there was no mis-operation or unnecessary actuation.

"This actuation was determined to be pre-planned, in accordance with Tech Specs, and not the result of a significant event, therefore not meeting the reporting criteria of 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A)."

The NRC Resident has been notified.

Notified R3DO (McGraw).

EN Revision Imported Date: 5/14/2021

EN Revision Text: AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - STOLEN TROXLER GAUGE

The following notice was received from the State of North Carolina Radioactive Materials Branch (RMB), via email:

"A portable nuclear density gauge was reported stolen out of a licensee's flatbed truck, sometime during the evening of May 5th. The gauge was reported as secured from unauthorized removal by two independent means and padlocked in its transportation case. The truck was parked in front of the personal residence of one of the licensee's authorized users overnight. The morning of May 6th, the authorized user noticed the gauge case missing with locks and chains broken. The authorized user immediately called 911 and notified the licensee's Radiation Safety Officer immediately, who in turn, notified the RMB who responded to the scene of the theft the morning of [May] 6th. RMB is preparing a press release in an effort to recover the gauge and its investigation is ongoing."

Durham Police Department was notified.

Gauge Information:
Manufacturer: Troxler; Model: 3430P; S/N: 71890

Sources Information:
CS-137 0.300 GBq, 8.0 mCi; Am-241 BE, 40.0 mCi

North Carolina Tracking Number: 210006

THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A 'Less than Cat 3' LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL

Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf

EN Revision Imported Date: 5/14/2021

EN Revision Text: AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - FIRE DAMAGE PREVENTS LEVEL GAUGE RETRACTION

The following was reported by the State of Florida via email:

"On 5/5/21 a fire occurred on the same floor as the nylon finishing line using a nuclear gauge (level switch). Fire extinguished by in-house [personnel] on-site as well as Escambia County fire depts. After a structural review was completed and entrance safety assured, continued property examination on 5/6 revealed the nuclear gauge could not be shuttered. No injuries were reported. No exposures were reported. Exclusion zones have been marked on the finishing line floor as well as adjacent floor. At the time of this report, Ascend [Performance Material] is evaluating contractor availability for gauge assessment concerning repair and/or removal. Plant contact person reported the 1500 milliCurie source was purchased in 1962."

Florida Incident Number: FL21-060.

EN Revision Imported Date: 5/14/2021

EN Revision Text: AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - LOST TRITIUM EXIT SIGN

The following information was received from the State of Colorado via email:

The licensee reported one tritium exit sign lost. The activity was 7.09 Curies of H-3. The sign has been missing since June 2019 and was declared lost on May 6, 2021.

THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A 'Less than Cat 3' LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL

Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf

EN Revision Imported Date: 5/14/2021

EN Revision Text: AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - LOST TRITIUM EXIT SIGNS

The following information was received from the State of Colorado via email:

The licensee reported three tritium exit signs lost with an activity of 21.6 Curies each. The signs were reported missing and lost on March 4, 2020.

THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A 'Less than Cat 3' LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL

Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf

EN Revision Imported Date: 5/14/2021

EN Revision Text: AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - LOST SMOKE MEASURING EQUIPMENT

The following report was received from the Illinois Emergency Management Agency (the Agency) via email:

"The Agency was contacted after business hours on 5/6/21 to report the possible loss of three 5 microCurie Am-241 sources. The sources were reported missing in transit on 5/6/2021 by Intertek Testing Services NA, Inc. The last known location was the common carrier hub in Memphis TN. The common carrier is still actively searching and has not yet declared the package as lost. While a reportable quantity under NRC, this does not represent a serious public safety hazard. There is no indication of intentional theft or diversion at this time. This quantity of material would not be immediately useful for elicit purposes.

"The three sources were contained in EC-912 MIC heads (smoke measuring equipment) which had been packaged for shipment to the manufacturer for calibration on 4/15/2021. The common carrier, is still actively trying to locate the three packages. As these were labeled as excepted packages, they only bear UN2911 and do not have radioactive labels on the exterior. This is not an immediate hazard to workers or members of the public that locate the package. Each of the three packages is approximately 24"x24"x48" in a framed wood box with metal reinforcements.

"This report will be updated as additional information becomes available."

Illinois Incident No.: IL210014

THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A 'Less than Cat 3' LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL

Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf

EN Revision Imported Date: 5/14/2021

EN Revision Text: AUTOMATIC REACTOR TRIP, MAIN FEED ISOLATION, AND AUXILLIARY FEEDWATER SYSTEM ACTUATION

"With Reactor power at approximately 8 percent following a refueling outage, Steam Generator levels began to oscillate while in automatic control. Manual control of Main Feedwater Regulating Valves was unable to stabilize steam generator levels prior to reaching the "C" Steam Generator Low Level Reactor Trip setpoint. Reactor Trip, Main Feedwater Isolation and Auxiliary Feedwater Actuation automatically actuated.

"The plant is stable in Mode 3 at Hot Standby. All equipment has responded as expected.

"The Resident has been contacted."

FITNESS FOR DUTY REPORT

A non-licensed temporary supervisor had a confirmed positive during a random fitness-for-duty test. The employee's access to the plant has been terminated.

The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.