Event Notification Report for April 08, 2021

This material event contains a "Category 2" level of radioactive material.

EN Revision Imported Date: 4/8/2021

EN Revision Text: AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - SEALED SOURCE MISSING IN TRANSIT

The following information was received from the Massachusetts Radiation Control Program via email:

"The licensee reported at 1143 EDT on March 31, 2021 that it discovered on the same day (March 31, 2021) at 1044 EDT that a package (Yellow-II, T.I. 0.5, Type B, UN 2916) containing one sealed source (Iridium-192;105.2 Curies) in a model 880 radiography exposure device [was missing in transit].

"The package was shipped by QSA Global, Inc. on March 26, 2021 for shipment to their customer, Acuren Inspections, Inc. in Corpus Christi, TX. The package was last tracked by [the common carrier] in Memphis, TN on March 30, 2021, but there has been no [package] movement since March 27, 2021. [The common carrier] initiated a trace on the package on March 31, 2021. On March 31, 2021 at 1143 EDT, QSA Global, Inc. reported the event to the Massachusetts Radiation Control Program.

"The reporting requirement is immediate and is 105 CMR 120.281(A)(1), missing licensed radioactive materials in aggregate quantity equal to or greater than 1,000 times the quantity specified in 105 CMR 120.297, Appendix C. The four-hour reporting requirement of 105 CMR 120.077(B), missing shipment of Category 2 quantity of radioactive material, also applies.

"The Agency [Massachusetts Radiation Control Program] considers this event to be open."

Notified: DHS SWO, DOE Operations Center, FEMA Operations Center, HHS Operations Center, CISA Central, USDA Operations Center, EPA Emergency Operations Center, FDA Emergency Operations Center (email), FEMA NWC (email), DHS Nuclear SSA (email), and FEMA NRCC SASC (email), CWMD Watch Desk (email).

* * * UPDATE ON 4/7/2021 AT 0905 EDT FROM BOB LOCKE TO BRIAN LIN * * *

"Licensee reports that it was notified at 1601 EDT on April 6, 2021 that the package had been delivered to its intended destination undamaged."

Notified R1DO (WERKHEISER), NMSS (RIVERA-CAPELLA), IR MOC (KENNEDY), and ILTAB (RICHARDSON) and via email NMSS EVENTS NOTIFICATION and INES NATIONAL OFFICER (MILLIGAN). Also notified DHS-SWO, FEMA-OC, USDA-OC, HHS-OC, DOE-OC, DHS CISA Central, and EPA-EOC and via email FDA-EOC, Nuclear SSA, FEMA-NWC, and CWMD-Watch Desk.

THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "CATEGORY 2" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL

Category 2 sources, if not safely managed or securely protected, could cause permanent injury to a person who handled them, or were otherwise in contact with them, for a short time (minutes to hours). It could possibly be fatal to be close to this amount of unshielded radioactive material for a period of hours to days. These sources are typically used in practices such as industrial gamma radiography, high dose rate brachytherapy and medium dose rate brachytherapy. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf

EN Revision Imported Date: 4/8/2021

EN Revision Text: AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - MISSING ION MOBILITY SPECTROMETERS

The following is a summary of information received from the Colorado Department of Public Health & Environment by email:

The General License coordinator requested past due inventory registrations. After the licensee conducted a thorough search, two ion mobility spectrometers (Ni-63; 0.01 Ci each) could not be found.

THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A 'Less than Cat 3' LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL

Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf

EN Revision Imported Date: 4/8/2021

EN Revision Text: PART 21 INTERIM REPORT - FAILURE OF AMETEK 300V, 250A CLAMP DIODES

The following is a synopsis of a Part 21 interim report received by email:

"COMPONENT DESCRIPTION - 300V, 250 A clamp diodes with Vishay/International Rectifier part numbers IN3737 and IN3737R and Ametek part numbers 07-600250-00 and 07-600251-00, respectively. Diode failures occurred in 20kVA Inverters, Ametek part number 85-VC0200-41 with serial numbers C84733-0211 and C84733-0511. Two failed diodes returned for evaluation were manufactured in India in 2004.

"PROBLEM EXPERIENCED - TVA has experienced 5 diode failures since November of 2017. The diode failures experienced at TVA resulted in alarms for abnormal conditions and equipment alarms for fan failure, inverter fuse blown, and inverter failure. The equipment will transfer to bypass when a diode fails.

"POTENTIAL CAUSE - Diodes installed in the TVA equipment were shorted in most cases and degraded in one instance. Only two of the shorted diodes were sent to AMETEK SCI for evaluation.

"While the precise cause of this failure is unknown, diode failures are generally attributed to transient voltage spikes and overheating. TVA did indicate there have not been any transient events on the DC bus that could have caused this failure.

"The inverters at TVA are loaded below 50%. This could contribute to increased heat and stress on the diodes due to increased current draw. However, test data from the original testing of the equipment at no load did not show elevated temperatures on the diodes.

"EFFECT ON SYSTEM PERFORMANCE - Failures described above could result in loss of output voltage and transfer of the static switch to the bypass source which could result in potential loss of load.

"EVALUATION OF THE POTENTIAL DEFECT - AMETEK is sending the parts to the original manufacturer for further evaluation with the intent to obtain more insight on the interior condition of the diodes. The targeted completion date for this evaluation of the two diodes returned is June 1, 2021."


* * * UPDATE FROM ETHAN SALSBURY TO DONALD NORWOOD AT 0648 EDT ON 4/6/2021 VIA E-MAIL* * *

What is being classified as a 'minor adjustment' is being made to the notification originally submitted on 4/1/2021.

"All diodes TVA identified as failed were shorted. None were degraded."

Notified R2DO (Miller) and the Part 21/50.55 Reactors E-mail group.

EN Revision Imported Date: 4/8/2021

EN Revision Text: MANUAL REACTOR PROTECTION SYSTEM (RPS) ACTUATION AT ZERO PERCENT POWER

"At 2149 EDT on April 5, 2021, with the power plant in Mode 2 at zero percent power, an actuation of the RPS system occurred following the decision to abort plant start-up. The reason for the RPS actuation was to align the plant to Mode 3, from Mode 2, following manually inserting all control rods using the Rod Control System. The RPS system initiated as designed when the mode switch was taken from 'Start-up' to 'Shutdown' to align the plant to Mode 3 from Mode 2.

"This event is being reported in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) as an event that results in a valid actuation of the RPS system.

"There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.

PART 21 INTERIM REPORT OF DEVIATION

"Meggitt Safety Systems, Inc. (Meggitt) has recently identified situations where the appropriate amount of testing was not performed to verify the acceptability of critical characteristics for commercially procured materials for use in safety related products in the Nuclear Cable Product Line. On February 5, 2021 during an internal audit, it was discovered that material verification for critical characteristics for several components had not been performed in accordance with Meggitt Engineering Document (ER94113 Rev T). These components are used on Meggitt nuclear safety related cables for in-containment instrumentation and control cables. These are also used on fire-resistant (Appendix R) power and control cables. The safety function of the in-containment and Appendix R cables is to reliably interconnect the detection/sensing device to the plant instrumentation during normal and [Loss of Coolant Accident] LOCA conditions and to interconnect the remote control location to critical devices during normal and abnormal/fire conditions respectively. Without the material verification there is a potential that the cables would not perform their Safety function properly.

"Meggitt is revalidating materials and engaging suppliers to satisfy critical characteristics verification requirements. Meggitt's preliminary assessment is that there is no impact to the safety function, however the COVID-19 pandemic has impacted our ability to complete our investigation. As a result, Meggitt is unable to meet the 60 day requirement and requests an additional 60 days to complete the Part 21 Safety Evaluation. The expected completion date is June 4, 2021."

Contact Information:
Jim Healy
Senior Vice-President and General Manager
Meggitt Safety Systems, Inc.
1785 Voyager Ave Simi Valley, CA 93063
(805) 581-8608