Event Notification Report for April 05, 2021

This material event contains a "Less than Cat 3" level of radioactive material.

EN Revision Imported Date: 4/5/2021

EN Revision Text: AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - STOLEN RADIOLOGICAL DEVICE

The following information was received via E-mail from the Kentucky Department for Public Health & Safety, Radiation Health Branch (KY RHB):

"The Radiation Safety Officer [RSO] for Kentucky Radioactive Materials Licensee Environmental Concerns Inc., reported the theft of a single Viken Pb200i [TM] XRF device (Serial No: 2374 with sealed source model IPL 3901 Series, serial number SI-705, with 5 milliCuries of cobalt-57) from the RSO's vehicle while parked overnight at the user's residence located in Louisville, KY. The device case was secured by a cable to the rear seat support within the cab of the locked vehicle, and was stolen from within the vehicle. The cable and lock combination were recovered in the vehicle. A report was made to the Louisville Metro Police Department which is investigating the theft (Report No. 8021016661). The Kentucky Radiation Health Branch, will follow up with an interview with the RSO."


Kentucky Event Report ID Number: KY210001

THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL

Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf

EN Revision Imported Date: 4/5/2021

EN Revision Text: AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - LOSS OF POWER TO IRRADIATOR

The following was received from the State of Texas (The Agency) via email:

"On March 27, 2021 at approximately 1021 [CDT], the licensee reported that on March 26, 2021, at approximately 1800 [MDT], their facility in El Paso, Texas, experienced the loss of an electrical breaker which resulted in loss of power to their irradiator, irradiator control system, and equipment room. The source racks immediately descended to the fully shielded position verified by the licensee. There was no exposure to any employee during this event.

"The access control radiation monitor was not operable due to power loss. The irradiator entry door, as designed, remained locked and unable to be opened. The building security system and security access alarm remained in full operation and the facility was manned. Product entry and exit portals were secured. The pool water circulation stopped due to the power loss and the radiation monitor that monitors the pool water for contamination from leaking sources also stopped working. The deionization monitor had been working properly until the time of the power loss and no levels above background had been detected. An authorized employee was scheduled to collect a water sample from the pool to be analyzed.

"The electrical breaker was replaced, all systems tested, and the irradiator resumed full operation by 1700 [MDT] on March 27, 2021. The irradiator is a Nordion Model 8900."

Texas Incident Number has not yet been assigned.

EN Revision Imported Date: 4/5/2021

EN Revision Text: AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - RADIOGRAPHY SOURCE FAILED TO RETRACT

The following was received by email from the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania:

"The licensee reported that on February 12, 2021 while using a QSA Global Model 880, Serial # D15520, containing a 128 Curie source of iridium-192, the source failed to fully retract and lock. The technicians secured the area by adjusting their 2 mR/hr boundaries to an unshielded source distance and immediately contacted their company designee. Once on scene, the designee surveyed the scene and device and found elevated readings. Working the crank handle back and forth several times he was able to return the source to the secured and locked position. The device was taken back to the licensee's storage vault in Williamsport, PA for inspection. The cause of the incident is believed to be cold temperature and freezing of the lock mechanism. The Radiation Safety Officer (RSO) subsequently investigated the incident and found that neither the radiographer nor the assistant radiographer had been performing proper radiation surveys during the workday which would have identified the lock failure sooner. As a result, the radiographer received a dose of 876 mR. We are still awaiting a dose on the assistant radiographer. Corrective actions include retraining all radiography employees to follow proper procedure. Also, both the radiographer and assistant radiographer are no longer employed by the licensee."

PA Event Report ID No: PA210003

EN Revision Imported Date: 4/5/2021

EN Revision Text: PART 21 REPORT - FAILURE OF AMETEK 300V, 250A CLAMP DIODES

The following is a synopsis of a Part 21 interim report received by email:

"COMPONENT DESCRIPTION - 300V, 250 A clamp diodes with Vishay/International Rectifier part numbers IN3737 and IN3737R and Ametek part numbers 07-600250-00 and 07-600251-00, respectively.
Diode failures occurred in 20kVA Inverters, Ametek part number 85-VC0200-41 with serial numbers C84733-0211 and C84733-0511. Two failed diodes returned for evaluation were manufactured in India in 2004.

"PROBLEM EXPERIENCED - TVA has experienced 5 diode failures since November of 2017. The diode failures experienced at TVA resulted in alarms for abnormal conditions and equipment alarms for fan failure, inverter fuse blown, and inverter failure. The equipment will transfer to bypass when a diode fails.

"POTENTIAL CAUSE - Diodes installed in the TVA equipment were shorted in most cases and degraded in one instance. Only two of the shorted diodes were sent to AMETEK SCI for evaluation.

"While the precise cause of this failure is unknown, diode failures are generally attributed to transient voltage spikes and overheating. TVA did indicate there have not been any transient events on the DC bus that could have caused this failure.

"The inverters at TVA are loaded below 50%. This could contribute to increased heat and stress on the diodes due to increased current draw. However, test data from the original testing of the equipment at no load did not show elevated temperatures on the diodes.

"EFFECT ON SYSTEM PERFORMANCE - Failures described above could result in loss of output voltage and transfer of the static switch to the bypass source which could result in potential loss of load.

"EVALUATION OF THE POTENTIAL DEFECT - AMETEK is sending the parts to the original manufacturer for further evaluation with the intent to obtain more insight on the interior condition of the diodes. The targeted completion date for this evaluation of the two diodes returned is June 1, 2021."

EN Revision Imported Date: 4/5/2021

EN Revision Text: AUTOMATIC REACTOR SCRAM DUE TO TURBINE TRIP

"At 1017 CDT on April 2, 2021, while operating at 85 percent power, River Bend Station experienced an automatic reactor scram caused by a turbine trip signal. The cause of the turbine trip signal is not known at this time and is being investigated. Reactor water level is being maintained by feedwater pumps and reactor pressure is being maintained by turbine bypass valves. The scram was uncomplicated and all plant systems responded as designed.

"This event is being reported under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B), as any event or condition that results in actuation of the Reactor Protection System (RPS) when the reactor is critical and 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) Specified System Actuation as result of expected post scram level 3 isolations.

"No radiological releases have occurred due to this event from the unit.

"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified of this event."