Event Notification Report for December 01, 2020
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
11/30/2020 - 12/01/2020
Power Reactor
Event Number: 55017
Facility: Harris
Region: 2 State: NC
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-3-LP
NRC Notified By: Lonnie Hickerson
HQ OPS Officer: Donald Norwood
Region: 2 State: NC
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-3-LP
NRC Notified By: Lonnie Hickerson
HQ OPS Officer: Donald Norwood
Notification Date: 12/01/2020
Notification Time: 17:00 [ET]
Event Date: 12/01/2020
Event Time: 11:16 [EST]
Last Update Date: 12/01/2020
Notification Time: 17:00 [ET]
Event Date: 12/01/2020
Event Time: 11:16 [EST]
Last Update Date: 12/01/2020
Emergency Class: Non Emergency
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - Loss Comm/Asmt/Response
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - Loss Comm/Asmt/Response
Person (Organization):
MARK MILLER (R2DO)
MARK MILLER (R2DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
LOSS OF TECHNICAL SUPPORT CENTER FUNCTIONALITY
"On December 1, 2020 at 1116 EST, a condition impacting functionality of the Technical Support Center (TSC) Ventilation System was discovered during surveillance testing. The issue resulted in a loss of TSC functionality due to a high flow rate measured on outside air intake fans. The cause of the high flow rate is under investigation.
"This is an eight-hour, non-emergency notification for a loss of Emergency Assessment Capability. This event is reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii) because the condition affects the functionality of an emergency response facility.
"If an emergency is declared requiring TSC activation during the non-functional period, the TSC will be staffed and activated using existing emergency planning procedures unless the TSC becomes uninhabitable due to ambient temperature, radiological, or other conditions. If relocation of the TSC becomes necessary, the Emergency Coordinator will relocate the TSC staff to an alternate location in accordance with site procedures. This condition does not affect the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."
"On December 1, 2020 at 1116 EST, a condition impacting functionality of the Technical Support Center (TSC) Ventilation System was discovered during surveillance testing. The issue resulted in a loss of TSC functionality due to a high flow rate measured on outside air intake fans. The cause of the high flow rate is under investigation.
"This is an eight-hour, non-emergency notification for a loss of Emergency Assessment Capability. This event is reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii) because the condition affects the functionality of an emergency response facility.
"If an emergency is declared requiring TSC activation during the non-functional period, the TSC will be staffed and activated using existing emergency planning procedures unless the TSC becomes uninhabitable due to ambient temperature, radiological, or other conditions. If relocation of the TSC becomes necessary, the Emergency Coordinator will relocate the TSC staff to an alternate location in accordance with site procedures. This condition does not affect the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."
Agreement State
Event Number: 55023
Rep Org: ARIZONA DEPT OF HEALTH SERVICES
Licensee: Northwest Medical Center, L.L.C.
Region: 4
City: Tucson State: AZ
County:
License #: 10-097
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: Brian Goretzki
HQ OPS Officer: Solomon Sahle
Licensee: Northwest Medical Center, L.L.C.
Region: 4
City: Tucson State: AZ
County:
License #: 10-097
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: Brian Goretzki
HQ OPS Officer: Solomon Sahle
Notification Date: 12/04/2020
Notification Time: 16:21 [ET]
Event Date: 12/01/2020
Event Time: 00:00 [MST]
Last Update Date: 12/04/2020
Notification Time: 16:21 [ET]
Event Date: 12/01/2020
Event Time: 00:00 [MST]
Last Update Date: 12/04/2020
Emergency Class: Non Emergency
10 CFR Section:
Agreement State
10 CFR Section:
Agreement State
Person (Organization):
HEATHER GEPFORD (R4DO)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFICATION (EMAIL)
ILTAB (EMAIL)
- CNSNS (MEXICO) (EMAIL)
HEATHER GEPFORD (R4DO)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFICATION (EMAIL)
ILTAB (EMAIL)
- CNSNS (MEXICO) (EMAIL)
AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - LOST IODINE-125 SEEDS
The following was received from the state of Arizona Department of Health Services (the Department) via email:
"The Department received notification from the licensee that seven approximately 0.4 milliCurie Iodine-125 seeds used for breast localization were discovered missing [during inventory on 12/1/2020]. The Department has requested additional information and continues to investigate the event."
Arizona Incident Number: 20-024.
THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL
Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf
The following was received from the state of Arizona Department of Health Services (the Department) via email:
"The Department received notification from the licensee that seven approximately 0.4 milliCurie Iodine-125 seeds used for breast localization were discovered missing [during inventory on 12/1/2020]. The Department has requested additional information and continues to investigate the event."
Arizona Incident Number: 20-024.
THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL
Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf
Power Reactor
Event Number: 55079
Facility: Robinson
Region: 2 State: SC
Unit: [2] [] []
RX Type: [2] W-3-LP
NRC Notified By: Arence Gower
HQ OPS Officer: Donald Norwood
Region: 2 State: SC
Unit: [2] [] []
RX Type: [2] W-3-LP
NRC Notified By: Arence Gower
HQ OPS Officer: Donald Norwood
Notification Date: 01/21/2021
Notification Time: 17:10 [ET]
Event Date: 12/01/2020
Event Time: 09:46 [EST]
Last Update Date: 01/21/2021
Notification Time: 17:10 [ET]
Event Date: 12/01/2020
Event Time: 09:46 [EST]
Last Update Date: 01/21/2021
Emergency Class: Non Emergency
10 CFR Section:
50.73(a)(1) - Invalid Specif System Actuation
10 CFR Section:
50.73(a)(1) - Invalid Specif System Actuation
Person (Organization):
MILLER, MARK (R2)
MILLER, MARK (R2)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2 | N | N | 0 | Power Operation | 0 | Power Operation |
EN Revision Imported Date: 2/7/2021
EN Revision Text: 60-DAY OPTIONAL TELEPHONIC NOTIFICATION OF AN INVALID SPECIFIED SYSTEM ACTUATION
"This 60-day optional telephone notification is being made in lieu of an LER submittal, as allowed by 10 CFR 50.73(a)(1). This notification is made pursuant to the reporting requirements specified in 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) for an invalid actuation of one of the systems listed in 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(B).
"At 0946 hrs on December 1, 2020, with unit 2 in Mode 5 at 0% power, an invalid actuation of the Emergency Diesel Generators (EDG) 'A' and 'B', 'A' Residual Heat Removal (RHR) Pump, 'A' Service Water Booster Pump (SWBP), and Auxiliary Feed Water (AFW) Pumps 'A' and 'B' occurred. The actuation was caused by a Safety Injection (SI) signal while installing simulations to support Reactor Safeguards testing. The SI signal occurred when two out of three logic was met for Low Pressurizer Pressure, which was caused by a high resistance connection to a test point from a loose test lead.
"All aligned equipment, 'A' and 'B' EDGs, 'A' RHR Pump, 'A' SWBP and 'A' and 'B' AFW Pumps, responded properly to the auto-start signal and the actuation was complete. The actuation was not initiated in response to actual plant conditions, it was not an intentional manual initiation, and there were no parameters satisfying the requirements for initiation of the system. Therefore, this event has been determined to be an invalid actuation.
"There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector was notified."
EN Revision Text: 60-DAY OPTIONAL TELEPHONIC NOTIFICATION OF AN INVALID SPECIFIED SYSTEM ACTUATION
"This 60-day optional telephone notification is being made in lieu of an LER submittal, as allowed by 10 CFR 50.73(a)(1). This notification is made pursuant to the reporting requirements specified in 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) for an invalid actuation of one of the systems listed in 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(B).
"At 0946 hrs on December 1, 2020, with unit 2 in Mode 5 at 0% power, an invalid actuation of the Emergency Diesel Generators (EDG) 'A' and 'B', 'A' Residual Heat Removal (RHR) Pump, 'A' Service Water Booster Pump (SWBP), and Auxiliary Feed Water (AFW) Pumps 'A' and 'B' occurred. The actuation was caused by a Safety Injection (SI) signal while installing simulations to support Reactor Safeguards testing. The SI signal occurred when two out of three logic was met for Low Pressurizer Pressure, which was caused by a high resistance connection to a test point from a loose test lead.
"All aligned equipment, 'A' and 'B' EDGs, 'A' RHR Pump, 'A' SWBP and 'A' and 'B' AFW Pumps, responded properly to the auto-start signal and the actuation was complete. The actuation was not initiated in response to actual plant conditions, it was not an intentional manual initiation, and there were no parameters satisfying the requirements for initiation of the system. Therefore, this event has been determined to be an invalid actuation.
"There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector was notified."