Event Notification Report for March 16, 2020
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
03/15/2020 - 03/16/2020
Agreement State
Event Number: 54586
Rep Org: TEXAS DEPT OF STATE HEALTH SERVICES
Licensee: XCEL NDT LLC
Region: 4
City: VAN HORN State: TX
County:
License #: RAM - L07039
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: KAREN BLANCHARD
HQ OPS Officer: THOMAS KENDZIA
Licensee: XCEL NDT LLC
Region: 4
City: VAN HORN State: TX
County:
License #: RAM - L07039
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: KAREN BLANCHARD
HQ OPS Officer: THOMAS KENDZIA
Notification Date: 03/17/2020
Notification Time: 10:39 [ET]
Event Date: 03/16/2020
Event Time: 00:00 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 03/17/2020
Notification Time: 10:39 [ET]
Event Date: 03/16/2020
Event Time: 00:00 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 03/17/2020
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
Person (Organization):
NEIL O'KEEFE (R4DO)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFICATION (EMAIL)
NEIL O'KEEFE (R4DO)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFICATION (EMAIL)
AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - RADIOGRAPHY SOURCE GUIDE TUBE DAMAGED
The following was received from the State of Texas via email:
"On March 17, 2020, the Texas of Department of State Health (Agency) was notified that on March 16, 2020, one of the licensee's radiography crews was performing work at a temporary job site near Van Horn, Texas, when a piece of pipe fell onto the guide tube and they were unable to retract the source. A person authorized for source retrieval was dispatched and was able to retrieve the source and secure it inside the exposure device. The source retriever's pocket dosimeter had a reading of 155 millirem at the conclusion of the retrieval. The licensee will send the retriever's and the crew's dosimetry badges for processing. There were no other exposures as a result of this event. An investigation into this event is ongoing. More information will be provided as it is obtained in accordance with SA-300.
"Device Info: QSA Delta 880, SN: D5797, Source Info: 59.4 curies, Iridium-192, SN: 93949G"
Texas Incident Number: 9752
The following was received from the State of Texas via email:
"On March 17, 2020, the Texas of Department of State Health (Agency) was notified that on March 16, 2020, one of the licensee's radiography crews was performing work at a temporary job site near Van Horn, Texas, when a piece of pipe fell onto the guide tube and they were unable to retract the source. A person authorized for source retrieval was dispatched and was able to retrieve the source and secure it inside the exposure device. The source retriever's pocket dosimeter had a reading of 155 millirem at the conclusion of the retrieval. The licensee will send the retriever's and the crew's dosimetry badges for processing. There were no other exposures as a result of this event. An investigation into this event is ongoing. More information will be provided as it is obtained in accordance with SA-300.
"Device Info: QSA Delta 880, SN: D5797, Source Info: 59.4 curies, Iridium-192, SN: 93949G"
Texas Incident Number: 9752
Power Reactor
Event Number: 54709
Facility: Browns Ferry
Region: 2 State: AL
Unit: [] [] [3]
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4,[3] GE-4
NRC Notified By: Wesley Conkle
HQ OPS Officer: Kerby Scales
Region: 2 State: AL
Unit: [] [] [3]
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4,[3] GE-4
NRC Notified By: Wesley Conkle
HQ OPS Officer: Kerby Scales
Notification Date: 05/13/2020
Notification Time: 13:10 [ET]
Event Date: 03/16/2020
Event Time: 01:02 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 05/13/2020
Notification Time: 13:10 [ET]
Event Date: 03/16/2020
Event Time: 01:02 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 05/13/2020
Emergency Class: Non Emergency
10 CFR Section:
50.73(a)(1) - Invalid Specif System Actuation
10 CFR Section:
50.73(a)(1) - Invalid Specif System Actuation
Person (Organization):
MARK MILLER (R2DO)
MARK MILLER (R2DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 3 | N | N | 0 | Refueling | 0 | Refueling |
INVALID SPECIFIED SYSTEM ACTUATION
"This 60-day telephone notification is being made per the reporting requirements specified by 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) and 10 CFR 50.73(a)(1) to describe an invalid actuation of a general containment isolation signal affecting more than one system.
"On March 16, 2020, at approximately 0102 CDT, Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant (BFN), Unit 3 received motor trip-out alarms and diagnosed Group 2 and 3 Primary Containment Isolation System (PCIS) Isolations, 3C Residual Heat Removal (RHR) Pump tripping and Reactor Water Cleanup (RWCU) system isolating. All affected safety systems responded as expected. BFN, Unit 3, was nearing the end of the U3R19 refueling outage at the time of the event, and was still dependent on the Shutdown Cooling (SDC) system. Plant conditions which initiate PCIS Group 2 actuations are Reactor Vessel Low Water Level (Level 3) or High Drywell Pressure. The PCIS Group 3 actuations are initiated by Reactor Vessel Low Water Level (Level 3) or Reactor Water Cleanup Area High Temperature. At the time of the event, these conditions did not exist: therefore, the PCIS actuation was invalid.
"The event was determined to have been caused by clearance restoration activities in an unprotected control panel. A fuse re-installation inadvertently created a fault condition between two different plant 120 VAC power sources when the fuse holder's lower spring clip contacted a different fuse. This was a result of age-related degradation of the fuse holder, its close proximity to other fuses, and the lack of insulating isolation barriers between fuses.
"There were no safety consequences or impact to the health and safety of the public as a result of this event.
"This event was entered into the Corrective Action Program as Condition Report 1594925.
"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified of this event."
"This 60-day telephone notification is being made per the reporting requirements specified by 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) and 10 CFR 50.73(a)(1) to describe an invalid actuation of a general containment isolation signal affecting more than one system.
"On March 16, 2020, at approximately 0102 CDT, Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant (BFN), Unit 3 received motor trip-out alarms and diagnosed Group 2 and 3 Primary Containment Isolation System (PCIS) Isolations, 3C Residual Heat Removal (RHR) Pump tripping and Reactor Water Cleanup (RWCU) system isolating. All affected safety systems responded as expected. BFN, Unit 3, was nearing the end of the U3R19 refueling outage at the time of the event, and was still dependent on the Shutdown Cooling (SDC) system. Plant conditions which initiate PCIS Group 2 actuations are Reactor Vessel Low Water Level (Level 3) or High Drywell Pressure. The PCIS Group 3 actuations are initiated by Reactor Vessel Low Water Level (Level 3) or Reactor Water Cleanup Area High Temperature. At the time of the event, these conditions did not exist: therefore, the PCIS actuation was invalid.
"The event was determined to have been caused by clearance restoration activities in an unprotected control panel. A fuse re-installation inadvertently created a fault condition between two different plant 120 VAC power sources when the fuse holder's lower spring clip contacted a different fuse. This was a result of age-related degradation of the fuse holder, its close proximity to other fuses, and the lack of insulating isolation barriers between fuses.
"There were no safety consequences or impact to the health and safety of the public as a result of this event.
"This event was entered into the Corrective Action Program as Condition Report 1594925.
"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified of this event."