Event Notification Report for January 22, 2020

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - MISSING SELF LUMINOUS SIGNS CONTAINING TRITIUM

The following was received via phone notification from the State of Nebraska Department of Radiological Health (NDRH):

On January 22, 2020, the NDRH received notification in the mail that during the annual survey, the Gateway Mall identified that 2 self luminous signs were missing and 7 signs that were removed during construction were unaccounted for. These signs contained tritium (H3), originally in the amount of 11.5 Curies each.

NDRH is going to follow-up on this event.

* * * UPDATE ON 1/23/2020 AT 1032 EST FROM DEB WILSON TO ANDREW WAUGH * * *

It was identified that eight of the tritium signs contained 11.5 Curies each and one of the signs contained 20 Curies. The Gateway Mall will follow up with the construction company to verify whether the signs have been properly disposed of as well as double checking with the maintenance shop to see if the report of the missing signs had been made in error.

Notified R4DO (Silvia), ILTAB (email), and NMSS Events (email).

* * * RETRACTION ON 1/23/2020 AT 1434 EST FROM DEB WILSON TO THOMAS KENDZIA * * *

"Gateway Mall General Manager was able to contact the construction company. It was determined that the signs had been removed from service by the construction company and stored at Gateway Mall. Signs reported missing in the maintenance shop were located as well. All nine signs have been located and accounted for."

Notified R4DO (Silvia), ILTAB (email), and NMSS Events (email).

THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL

Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf

REQUIRED PROCEDURAL CONTROLS WERE NOT FOLLOWED

"Urenco USA is conservatively reporting a condition in that Uranic bearing material was placed into the Small Component Decontamination Train (SCDT) without meeting all conditions of IROFS54a and IROFS54b.

"IROFS54a and IROFS54b are Mass Controls that ensure the configuration of the SCDT remains sub-critical. Bookkeeping elements of the IROFS were performed correctly and the masses of the components were determined properly. However the visual inspection of the SCDT to ensure it is empty, prior to introducing components, was not performed in accordance with procedure instructions.

"The components were removed and the visual inspection was performed which confirmed the SCDT was in fact empty.

"The facility was and remains in a safe and stable configuration."

The licensee will notify NRC Region 2 tomorrow.

* * * RETRACTION ON 1/24/20 AT 1130 EST FROM BLAKE BIXENMAN TO RODNEY CLAGG * * *

"This event was determined to not be reportable.

"Consistent with NRC FCSS ISG-12, Rev 1, 10 CFR Part 70, Appendix A - Reportable Safety Events, UUSA has
concluded that EN54492 was not reportable. All situations where IROFS have failed or degraded are reportable
under Paragraphs (a)(4) or (b)(2), exceptions include the following: The capabilities of the degraded IROFS are
still sufficient to meet the performance requirements of 10 CFR 70.61.

"On 01-17-2020, UUSA completed a discharge of material to the slab tanks in the Liquid Effluent Collection
Treatment & Storage (LECTS) Room. Upon completion of decontamination activities in the SCDT, procedurally
required actions were performed to ensure all in process uranic material was removed and verification of the
uranic material hold-up value was still valid in accordance with IROFS54a&b. IROFS54a&b tags and locks were
then installed indicating the IROFS functions had been performed.

"On 01-22-2020, a new work evolution began which included bookkeeping measurements to ensure the
calculated mass of uranium was below the allowable threshold prior to introduction to the SCDT. In summary, all
requirements of the IROFS54a&b boundary were functionally complete and the capabilities of the degraded
IROFS remained sufficient to meet the performance requirements of 10 CFR 70.61."

Notified the R2DO (Coovert) and NMSS Events Notification (email)

GAUGE SHUTTER STUCK OPEN

During biannual inventory/shutter check maintenance the licensee identified a gauge shutter stuck open on the 6A pebble mill cyclone underflow. The gauge is a Kay Ray Model #7050, Serial #1397 containing 1000 milllicurie of Cs 137. The issue is not a risk to personnel. The licensee will replace the gauge.