Event Notification Report for August 12, 2019

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - DAMAGED MOISTURE DENSITY GAUGE

The following report was received via e-mail:

"On August 12, 2019, the licensee's radiation safety officer (RSO) reported to the Agency [Texas Department of State Health Services] that while one of its technician's was using a Troxler Model 3440 moisture/density gauge [device #21053] to perform density testing at a temporary job site in Greenville, Texas, the tip of the insertion rod, which holds an 8 millicurie cesium-137 source, came off in the test hole. The RSO and a representative from a licensed gauge service company met at the site and recovered the source. The RSO stated the source holder, which is screwed onto the end of the insertion rod then welded, was intact with the source, spring, and spacer in place. However, it had broken off approximately 1/4 inch below the weld (below the threads). A survey of the test hole and surrounding area found no readings above background. A wipe test was taken which will be analyzed at the service company's facility, where the source and gauge are being taken for evaluation/repair, before the source is removed from the recovery pig. No overexposures are expected from this event. An investigation into this event is ongoing. Information will be provided as it is obtained in accordance with SA-300."

Texas Incident: 9700

THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL

Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - RADIOGRPAHY CAMERA SOURCE WOULD NOT RETRACT

The following report was received from Louisiana Department of Environmental Quality (LDEQ) via facsimile:

"On August 12, 2019, at 1619 CDT, the licensee called LDEQ to report that a source would not retract back into the shielded position. The event happened approximately at 1330 at a temporary jobsite within the Shell Refinery, Airline Highway, Norco, LA. in St. Charles Parish.

"The camera was being used at this temporary jobsite. The exposure was made and the source would not retract into the shielded position. The problem was detected during the post exposure survey. The exposure levels indicated the source was still in the collimator. The reportable event was the 'drive cable' broke in the associated equipment being used with this QSA Global, Model 880 Delta exposure device. The serial number for the 880 Delta is D-7906. The source was a 91.0 Ci of Ir-192, model number A424-9, and serial number 86571G.

"The [industrial radiography] crew followed the [Versa Integrity Group] VIG Safety Procedures securing and shielding the radiography source and then contacted the [Radiation Safety Officer] RSO. The three-man site crew performed the preliminary source retrieval procedures. QSA Global was contacted by the RSO to assist with the source retrieval. QSA Global arrived approximately at 1811 CDT and the source recovery ended at 1930 CDT. The drive cable and source assembly were taken to QSA Global for an equipment evaluation.

"VIG personnel involved in this retrieval received a maximum exposure of 40 mrem and the other individual's exposures were less. There were no excessive exposures associated with this event. At no time did the general public receive an exposure to the source of radiation."

Louisiana Event Report ID No: LA 190011

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - TRANSPORTATION ACCIDENT INVOLVING A DENSITY GAUGE

The following was received from the Maryland Department of the Environment Radiological Health Program (MDE RHP) via phone:

"On August 12, 2019, at approximately 1330 [EDT] hours, the Maryland Department of the Environment (MDE) Hazardous Waste Enforcement Division contacted the MDE Radiological Health Program (RHP) concerning a vehicular accident that involved a nuclear density gauge.

"The initial transportation accident, as logged in at 1300 hours, indicated the accident location near the 70-mile marker on west-bound I-70, near Lisbon, MD. The vehicle, identified as a box truck, was carrying a density gauge that was ejected during the accident. The gauge was observed not in its transportation case at time of arrival of Fire/EMS and Maryland State police. The company Radiation Safety Officer from Francis O. Day, Inc. responded to the scene and verified that the source was in the shielded position. The gauge was taken to Northeast Technical Services for evaluation.

"The gauge was identified as a Troxler model 4640 surface thin-layer gauge, S/N 2399. This gauge has a Cs-137 sealed source with a nominal activity of 8 mCi and was last leak tested on July 14, 2019. The State trooper on scene stated that the vehicle was actually a pickup truck. The transportation case was ejected from the pickup truck along with the truck cap and the driver. The gauge left the confines of the transportation case and came to rest approximately 10 feet from the case. The chain that held the case to the truck bed broke. The driver did not survive the accident.

"MDE/RHP will further investigate this event. "

PART 21 - NON-DESTRUCTIVE EXAMINATION PERFORMANCE OF COMPONENTS BY AN UNQUALIFIED EMPLOYEE

The following is a summary of the information received from Flowserve via facsimile:

Contrary to the requirements of ASME Section III & ASME NQA-1 Requirement 2, an employee of Flowserve was found to have performed Non-Destructive Examinations (Liquid Penetrant Testing - PTs) without the required certificate in accordance with ASNT SNT-TC-1A, and Flowserve's written practice. The employee was trained and tested in accordance with the written practice and ASNT requirements. Although the individual section scores were found to pass the (70 percent) minimum, the composite test requirements failed to meet the minimum 80 percent requirement. Actual composite score achieved was 79.176 percent.

The extent of exposure to this condition was on examinations completed between 10/22/18 and 11/21/18. There were ten examinations, totaling 22 pieces that were completed by the employee without oversight/signature by another certified individual.

The scope of impacted valves/components encompasses body, stem, cover, yoke, pin wedge, and disk. Licensees affected include Exelon Company, Pinnacle West Capital Corp, Bruce Power, Xcel Energy, Alabama Power, Entergy Nuclear Operations Inc., and FirstEnergy.

Flowserve issues a corrective action, and is currently in the process of determining the root cause and prevention action measures. This will include identifying the affected valves via communications with affected customers.

* * * UPDATE ON 09/06/2019 AT 1345 EDT FROM KEVIN WORTH TO JEFFREY WHITED * * *

The following is a synopsis of a letter received from Flowserve:

On 09/06/19, Flowserve issued its Final Report for the Part 21, noting the scope of the valves/components affected by the issue described above. Flowserve also noted the corrective actions that were taken to address the issue and detailed the specific actions taken for the individual components.

Notified R1DO (Carfang), R2DO (Shaeffer), R3DO(Edwards), R4DO(O'Keefe), and Part 21/50.55 Reactors Group (e-mail).