EN Revision Imported Date : 8/7/2019
EN Revision Text: AUTOMATIC REACTOR SCRAM ON LOW REACTOR WATER LEVEL
"At 0226 [CDT], an automatic scram on low reactor water level occurred due to a trip of the 'B' Reactor Feed pump. All control rods fully inserted. Reactor water level 2 was reached and the High Pressure Core Spray system, Reactor Core Isolation Cooling system, Division 3 diesel generator, Standby Gas Treatment Systems 'A' and 'B' and all shutdown safety related service water pumps started as expected. Reactor Core Isolation Cooling and High Pressure Core Spray injected as expected. All level 2 containment isolation signals occurred as expected and all level 2 containment valves closed as expected. Reactor water level is currently being controlled in band by condensate. Reactor pressure is being maintained by main turbine Bypass Valves.
"This event is being reported under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(A), for ECCS discharge to RCS; 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B), for RPS actuation, and 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A), for specified system actuation.
"The NRC Senior Resident Inspector has been notified."
No safety relief valves lifted during the transient. The plant is in a normal shutdown electrical lineup with all safety equipment available. The licensee notified the Illinois Emergency Management Agency per their communications protocol.
* * * UPDATE FROM DAVID LIVINGSTON TO HOWIE CROUCH AT 0321 EDT ON 8/4/19 * * *
"Following automatic initiation of the High Pressure Core Spray (HPCS) System as described above, the HPCS System was manually secured following station procedures after verification that additional RPV [reactor pressure vessel] injection was no longer required. Securing HPCS injection in this manner prevents automatic restart of the system in the event of a subsequent low RPV level condition, rendering it inoperable. As the HPCS system is considered a single train safety system, this meets the reportability requirements of 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D). This reportable condition was identified following review of post-scram actions. The HPCS system has been restored to a Standby lineup."
The licensee will be notifying the NRC Resident Inspector.
Notified R3DO (Pelke).
* * * UPDATE FROM JAMES FORMAN TO KERBY SCALES AT 1545 EDT ON 8/6/19 * * *
"Following the scram, the Primary Containment to Secondary Containment and the Drywell to Primary Containment differential pressure limits were exceeded. Technical Specification (TS) Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) 3.6.1.4, Primary Containment Pressure, and 3.6.5.4, Drywell Pressure, Actions A.1, B.1, and B.2 were entered. Primary Containment to Secondary Containment differential pressure and Drywell to Primary Containment differential pressure were restored to within the LCO limits at 1505 on 8/3/19 and the associated TS Actions were exited. This event is reportable under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) as an unanalyzed condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of the primary containment function due to being outside the initial conditions to ensure that drywell and containment pressures remain within design values during a loss of coolant accident. This event is also reportable under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(C) as an event or condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of the drywell and primary containment functions to control the release of radioactive material for the same reason."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
Notified R3DO (Pelke). |