Event Notification Report for January 08, 2019
|
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Event Reports For ** EVENT NUMBERS ** |
| 53552 | 53816 | 53817 | 53818 |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 53552 |
| Facility: THREE MILE ISLAND Region: 1 State: PA Unit: [1] [] [] RX Type: [1] B&W-L-LP,[2] B&W-L-LP NRC Notified By: ERIC MASCHUCK HQ OPS Officer: ANDREW WAUGH |
Notification Date: 08/17/2018 Notification Time: 08:17 [ET] Event Date: 08/16/2018 Event Time: 15:19 [EDT] Last Update Date: 01/08/2019 |
| Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY 10 CFR Section: 26.719 - FITNESS FOR DUTY |
Person (Organization): MATT YOUNG (R1DO) FFD GROUP (EMAIL) |
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | |||||||
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
Event Text
| FITNESS-FOR-DUTY TEST POSITIVE FOR NON-LICENSED EMPLOYEE At 1519 EDT on August 16, 2018, Exelon determined a non-licensed employee had a confirmed positive for a controlled substance during a random Fitness-for-Duty test. The employee's unescorted access to the plant has been terminated. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. * * * UPDATE FROM MICHAEL FITZWATER TO DONALD NORWOOD AT 1310 EST ON 1/8/2019 * * * The following is a correction to the reason for the Fitness-for-Duty test: At 1519 EDT on August 16, 2018, Exelon determined a non-licensed employee had a confirmed positive for a controlled substance during a follow-up Fitness-for-Duty test. The employee's unescorted access to the plant has been terminated. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified of this correction. Notified R1DO (Bower) and FFD E-mail group. |
| Part 21 | Event Number: 53816 |
| Rep Org: AMETEK SOLIDSTATE CONTROLS Licensee: AMETEK SOLIDSTATE CONTROLS Region: 3 City: COLUMBUS State: OH County: License #: Agreement: Y Docket: NRC Notified By: ETHAN SALSBURY HQ OPS Officer: DONALD NORWOOD |
Notification Date: 01/07/2019 Notification Time: 12:48 [ET] Event Date: 01/07/2019 Event Time: 00:00 [EST] Last Update Date: 01/31/2019 |
| Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY 10 CFR Section: 21.21(d)(3)(i) - DEFECTS AND NONCOMPLIANCE |
Person (Organization): FRANK EHRHARDT (R2DO) DAVID HILLS (R3DO) - PART 21/50.55 REACTORS (EMAIL) |
Event Text
| PART 21 - COMPONENTS PROVIDED AS SAFETY-RELATED SPARE PARTS WITHOUT BEING DEDICATED "AMETEK Solidstate Controls (SCI) is providing this report in accordance with 10CFR Part 21 as notice of a process defect that resulted in components being provided as safety-related spare parts without being dedicated. "PROBLEM DESCRIPTION: Lack of evidence of dedication testing for AMETEK Solidstate Controls Safety-Related Operational Spare Parts Kits provided with SCI equipment "CAUSE: In October 2018, NextEra Seabrook notified SCI of a part number discrepancy with a safety-related fuse that was provided with an operational spare parts kit with an equipment order. After further investigation, it was determined that dedication testing was not performed on the operational spare parts kits provided with the equipment on various jobs in recent years. "Generally, spare parts are ordered separately from equipment and a process is in place to direct the parts to quality for commercial grade dedication testing. In this instance, the parts were ordered as a line item on the sale and the parts in question were selected from inventory without being routed through quality for commercial grade dedication. "PROBLEM YOU COULD SEE: Evidence of dedication testing is not available for operational spare parts kits which were provided with equipment orders, however, there are no functional concerns with the components provided on these orders. The parts would have been selected at the same time as the parts that were installed in the systems. Additionally, for the commercial grade items provided, there is no history of failure during dedication testing performed by AMETEK either in equipment or during bench testing. "ACTION REQUIRED: Aside from printed circuit boards, the parts supplied as operational spare parts will need to be dedicated. AMETEK SCI recommends returning the untested items and will work with [the customer] to arrange returns and retesting. Please contact Mr. Mark Shreve of AMETEK SCI's Client Services group at 1-800-222-9079, 1-614-846-7500 ext. 6332, or mark.shreve@ametek.com." The non-dedicated parts were supplied to Brunswick Steam Electric Plant, Seabrook Station, and North Anna Power Station. In addition, non-dedicated parts were also supplied to the Krsko Nuclear Power Plant in Slovenia and the Maanshan Nuclear Power Plant in Taiwan. * * * UPDATE ON 1/31/19 AT 1304 EST FROM ETHAN SALSBURY TO OSSY FONT * * * The following was received via email from Ametek: "After further evaluation, [Ametek] has determined that additional kits are impacted by this issue, but the same customer list and POs apply. No additional customers are impacted and a corrected notification will be provided to customers that have been previously identified." R1DO (Bickett) and R2DO (Lopez) were notified. Part 21 Reactors Group was notified via email. |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 53817 |
| Facility: HATCH Region: 2 State: GA Unit: [1] [2] [] RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4 NRC Notified By: NICHOLAS HIGHTOWER HQ OPS Officer: JEFFREY WHITED |
Notification Date: 01/08/2019 Notification Time: 08:12 [ET] Event Date: 11/12/2018 Event Time: 13:31 [EST] Last Update Date: 01/08/2019 |
| Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY 10 CFR Section: 50.73(a)(1) - INVALID SPECIF SYSTEM ACTUATION |
Person (Organization): FRANK EHRHARDT (R2DO) |
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | |||||||
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | |||||||
| 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
Event Text
| INVALID SPECIFIED SYSTEM ACTUATION "On November 12, 2018, at 1331 EST, Unit 1 secondary containment isolated and Standby Gas Treatment (SBGT) systems started on Unit 1 and Unit 2 due to a blown fuse. The blown fuse was caused by a degraded refuel floor radiation monitoring relay, causing the radiation monitor to trip and resulted in an invalid actuation of the Unit 1 Group 10 and Group 11 primary containment isolation valves, all Unit 1 secondary containment isolation valves, and auto start of the Unit 1 and Unit 2 SBGT system. The Unit 1 Fission Product Monitor isolated and tripped and both Unit 1 H202 Analyzers isolated. "This event is reportable per 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) since the containment isolation and auto-start of SBGT on both units was not part of a pre-planned sequence and the event resulted in the invalid actuation of general containment isolation valves in more than one system. "All primary and secondary containment isolation valves, with the exception of the 2T41F003A, Refueling Floor Inboard Vent Supply Isolation valve, functioned successfully. The refuel floor inboard vent supply isolation valve failed to travel fully closed on the secondary containment isolation signal and was therefore declared inoperable. The 2T41F003B refuel floor outboard vent supply isolation valve was verified to go fully closed and therefore isolation of that associated penetration line was successful. After assistance from maintenance, the valve was verified to be fully closed. "All SBGT systems functioned successfully. The associated fuse and relay were replaced, and secondary containment was returned to normal service. "The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector." |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 53818 |
| Facility: PILGRIM Region: 1 State: MA Unit: [1] [] [] RX Type: [1] GE-3 NRC Notified By: J. WEBERS HQ OPS Officer: DONALD NORWOOD |
Notification Date: 01/08/2019 Notification Time: 15:45 [ET] Event Date: 01/08/2019 Event Time: 09:45 [EST] Last Update Date: 01/08/2019 |
| Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY 10 CFR Section: 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION |
Person (Organization): FRED BOWER (R1DO) |
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | |||||||
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
Event Text
| REACTOR CORE ISOLATION COOLING DECLARED INOPERABLE "On January 8, 2019, at 0945 EST Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station discovered that the Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) system failed to meet its surveillance test requirements and was declared inoperable; therefore, this condition is being reported as an eight-hour, non-emergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v), 'event or condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of a safety function: (D), mitigate the consequences of an accident.' "There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified." |
Page Last Reviewed/Updated Thursday, March 25, 2021
Page Last Reviewed/Updated Thursday, March 25, 2021