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Event Notification Report for January 07, 2019

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center

Event Reports For
1/4/2019 - 1/7/2019

** EVENT NUMBERS **


53813 53815 53816

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Power Reactor Event Number: 53813
Facility: PALISADES
Region: 3     State: MI
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] CE
NRC Notified By: JACOB MILLIKEN
HQ OPS Officer: JEFFREY WHITED
Notification Date: 01/03/2019
Notification Time: 23:57 [ET]
Event Date: 01/03/2019
Event Time: 20:28 [EST]
Last Update Date: 01/04/2019
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL
50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION
Person (Organization):
ERIC DUNCAN (R3DO)
Unit SCRAM Code RX Crit Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
1 M/R Y 85 Power Operation 0 Hot Standby

Event Text

REACTOR TRIP DUE TO CYCLING OF TURBINE GOVERNOR VALVE

"At 2028 [EST] on January 3, 2019, with the reactor at 85% power, the reactor was manually tripped due to cycling of Turbine Governor Valve #4. The trip was uncomplicated with all systems responding normally following the trip. Investigation of the cause of the valve cycling is ongoing.

"All full-length control rods inserted fully. Auxiliary Feedwater System actuated as designed in response to low steam generator water levels. Operations stabilized the plant in Mode 3 (hot standby). Decay heat is being removed by atmospheric dump valves.

"This condition has no impact to the health and safety of the public.

"The licensee notified the NRC Senior Resident Inspector.

"This event is being reported pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) and 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A)."

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!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED.THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
Power Reactor Event Number: 53815
Facility: PILGRIM
Region: 1     State: MA
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-3
NRC Notified By: PAUL GALLANT
HQ OPS Officer: DONALD NORWOOD
Notification Date: 01/05/2019
Notification Time: 17:30 [ET]
Event Date: 01/05/2019
Event Time: 10:40 [EST]
Last Update Date: 02/11/2019
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(A) - POT UNABLE TO SAFE SD
Person (Organization):
ANTHONY DIMITRIADIS (R1DO)
Unit SCRAM Code RX Crit Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
1 N Y 31 Power Operation 31 Power Operation

Event Text

POTENTIAL LOSS OF MSIV SCRAM FUNCTION DURING MAIN STEAM LINE ISOLATION VALVE TESTING

"At approximately 1040 EST on January 5, 2019, during evaluation of test results for the 'C' Main Steam Isolation Valve (MSIV), it was determined that closure of three of four Main Steam Lines would not necessarily have resulted in a full scram during testing due to failure of a limit switch (LS-6) associated with MSIV-1C while in the test configuration. This condition is being reported as an eight-hour, non-emergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v), 'Any event or condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of structures or systems that are needed to: (A) Shut down the reactor and maintain it in a safe shutdown condition.'

"The system was restored from the testing configuration at 1057 EST and the failed trip channel was placed in the tripped condition at 1326 EST thus restoring the design function. There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."

* * * RETRACTION AT 1529 EST ON 02/11/19 FROM JOSEPH FRATTASIO TO JEFF HERRERA * * *

"The purpose of the notification is to retract ENS Notification 53815 made on 01/05/19 for Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station. The previous notification reported that there was a potential loss of Main Steam Isolation Valve (MSIV) scram function during main steam line isolation valve testing, at the time of discovery, due to failure of a limit switch (LS-6) associated with MSIV-1C while in the test configuration. Subsequent evaluation has demonstrated that the scram function credited in the design basis was not lost.
"Specifically, after an Engineering Evaluation, it has been determined that the MSIV position RPS logic was not lost for those functions within the design basis and, as such, was capable of performing its intended safety function."

The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.

Notified the R1DO (Cahill).

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Part 21 Event Number: 53816
Rep Org: AMETEK SOLIDSTATE CONTROLS
Licensee: AMETEK SOLIDSTATE CONTROLS
Region: 3
City: COLUMBUS   State: OH
County:
License #:
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: ETHAN SALSBURY
HQ OPS Officer: DONALD NORWOOD
Notification Date: 01/07/2019
Notification Time: 12:48 [ET]
Event Date: 01/07/2019
Event Time: 00:00 [EST]
Last Update Date: 01/31/2019
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
21.21(d)(3)(i) - DEFECTS AND NONCOMPLIANCE
Person (Organization):
FRANK EHRHARDT (R2DO)
DAVID HILLS (R3DO)
- PART 21/50.55 REACTORS (EMAIL)

Event Text

PART 21 - COMPONENTS PROVIDED AS SAFETY-RELATED SPARE PARTS WITHOUT BEING DEDICATED

"AMETEK Solidstate Controls (SCI) is providing this report in accordance with 10CFR Part 21 as notice of a process defect that resulted in components being provided as safety-related spare parts without being dedicated.

"PROBLEM DESCRIPTION: Lack of evidence of dedication testing for AMETEK Solidstate Controls Safety-Related Operational Spare Parts Kits provided with SCI equipment

"CAUSE: In October 2018, NextEra Seabrook notified SCI of a part number discrepancy with a safety-related fuse that was provided with an operational spare parts kit with an equipment order. After further investigation, it was determined that dedication testing was not performed on the operational spare parts kits provided with the equipment on various jobs in recent years.

"Generally, spare parts are ordered separately from equipment and a process is in place to direct the parts to quality for commercial grade dedication testing. In this instance, the parts were ordered as a line item on the sale and the parts in question were selected from inventory without being routed through quality for commercial grade dedication.

"PROBLEM YOU COULD SEE: Evidence of dedication testing is not available for operational spare parts kits which were provided with equipment orders, however, there are no functional concerns with the components provided on these orders. The parts would have been selected at the same time as the parts that were installed in the systems. Additionally, for the commercial grade items provided, there is no history of failure during
dedication testing performed by AMETEK either in equipment or during bench testing.

"ACTION REQUIRED: Aside from printed circuit boards, the parts supplied as operational spare parts will need to be dedicated. AMETEK SCI recommends returning the untested items and will work with [the customer] to arrange returns and retesting. Please contact Mr. Mark Shreve of AMETEK SCI's Client Services group at 1-800-222-9079, 1-614-846-7500 ext. 6332, or mark.shreve@ametek.com."

The non-dedicated parts were supplied to Brunswick Steam Electric Plant, Seabrook Station, and North Anna Power Station. In addition, non-dedicated parts were also supplied to the Krsko Nuclear Power Plant in Slovenia and the Maanshan Nuclear Power Plant in Taiwan.

* * * UPDATE ON 1/31/19 AT 1304 EST FROM ETHAN SALSBURY TO OSSY FONT * * *

The following was received via email from Ametek:

"After further evaluation, [Ametek] has determined that additional kits are impacted by this issue, but the same customer list and POs apply. No additional customers are impacted and a corrected notification will be provided to customers that have been previously identified."

R1DO (Bickett) and R2DO (Lopez) were notified. Part 21 Reactors Group was notified via email.


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Friday, May 03, 2019