| U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center Event Reports For
12/21/2018 - 12/24/2018 ** EVENT NUMBERS ** |
| Part 21 | Event Number: 53763 | Rep Org: ENGINE SYSTEMS, INC
Licensee: ENGINE SYSTEMS, INC
Region: 1
City: ROCKY MOUNT State: NC
County:
License #:
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: DAN ROBERTS
HQ OPS Officer: MARK ABRAMOVITZ | Notification Date: 11/30/2018
Notification Time: 16:08 [ET]
Event Date: 11/30/2018
Event Time: 00:00 [EST]
Last Update Date: 12/21/2018 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
21.21(d)(3)(i) - DEFECTS AND NONCOMPLIANCE
| Person (Organization):
ART BURRITT (R1DO)
SCOTT SHAEFFER (R2DO)
ERIC DUNCAN (R3DO)
JASON KOZAL (R4DO)
- PART 21/50.55 REACTORS (EMAIL) | Event Text PART-21 - EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR EMD FUEL AND SOAKBACK PUMPS LOOSE BOLTS
The following report was received via fax:
"ESI [Engine Systems, Inc.] was notified by a nuclear customer of two instances where a bolt was found loose or backed out of the cover of an EMD [Electro-Motive Diesel] engine driven fuel pump P/N 8410219. Following notification, ESI inspected remaining pumps in inventory and found instances where one or more of the pump cover bolts were loose or lightly torqued.
"EMD fuel pump, P/N 8410219, is commonly used on all 12, 16, and 20-cylinder EMD model 645E4 and E4B engines. The pump is either mechanically driven from the engine (via the scavenging tube oil pump) or motor driven (as in the case of a backup/redundant fuel pump). The pump transfers fuel oil from the day tank to the fuel injectors to support fuel combustion. Without the supply of fuel oil, the diesel engine is unable to produce power which adversely affects the safety-related operation of the emergency diesel generator set.
"ESI recommends inspecting the bolts of all pumps for proper bolt tightness. Use a torque wrench and ensure all bolts are tightened to 108 to 120 in-lbs (12 to 13 Nm).
"This activity should be performed at the earliest opportunity; however, it is more important for the inspection to be performed on newly installed pumps. It is expected that for pumps supplied with low bolt torque, if a problem were to develop it would be in the form of a fuel leak soon after installation. For pumps that have been successfully installed for several months or years with no detectable leakage, it is less likely that bolt(s) are loose and therefore the urgency of this inspection is reduced."
Points of Contact: (252) 977-2720
Dan Roberts, Quality Manager
John Kriesel, Engineering Manager
Affected Plants:
Region 1: Nine Mile Point, Fitzpatrick
Region 2: Brown's Ferry, Savannah River, Oconee, St Lucie, Surry Power Station, Turkey Point, Watts Bar
Region 3: La Salle, Point Beach, Dresden, Clinton
Region 4: Grand Gulf, River Bend, Energy Northwest,, Entergy Operations Inc - Arkansas, Omaha Public Power - Fort Calhoun
* * * UPDATE FROM DAN ROBERTS TO JEFFREY WHITED AT 1202 EST ON 12/21/18 * * *
The following was received via fax:
Revision 1 involves updates on page 2 of the 10 CFR Part 21 Report which include:
"In item (iv), added reference to F4B engine application.
Revised Item (vii):
"For all affected customers:
"ESI recommends inspecting the bolt tightness for all pumps. The recommended bolt torque is 108 to 120 in-lbs (12 to 13 Nm). After verifying bolt torque, a shaft freeness check is recommended. The pump shaft should be capable of being rotated by hand in either direction. Due to the small shaft size, this check is commonly performed with a small crescent wrench or with the coupling half installed on the shaft. Inability to rotate by hand indicates loss of end clearance and the pump should be returned to ESI for rework or replacement.
"Note: For installed pumps where it is not possible to check shaft freeness, ESI recommends using a reduced bolt torque of 60 to 70 in-lbs (7 to 8 Nm). This is sufficient to ensure the bolts are snug while safeguarding against loss of end clearance that would otherwise go undetected.
"This activity should be performed at the earliest opportunity; however, it is more important for the inspection to be performed on newly installed pumps. It is expected that for pumps supplied with low bolt torque, if a problem were to develop it would be in the form of a fuel leak soon after installation. For pumps that have been successfully installed for several months or years with no detectable leakage, it is less likely that bolt(s) are loose and therefore the urgency of this inspection is reduced.
"For ESI: The dedication procedures for these pumps have been revised or are being revised to add a step to verify proper bolt torque. This will be completed prior to any future shipments. In addition, ESI is in correspondence with the pump manufacturer to implement corrective actions to prevent reoccurrence."
Notified R1DO (Jackson), R2DO (Bonser), R3DO (Stone), R4DO (Alexander), and Part 21/50.55 Reactors (e-mail). |
| Agreement State | Event Number: 53790 | Rep Org: FLORIDA BUREAU OF RADIATION CONTROL
Licensee: VERSA INTEGRITY GROUP
Region: 1
City: SANFORD State: FL
County:
License #: 4500-1
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: TIM DUNN
HQ OPS Officer: MARK ABRAMOVITZ | Notification Date: 12/13/2018
Notification Time: 15:03 [ET]
Event Date: 12/13/2018
Event Time: 00:00 [EST]
Last Update Date: 12/22/2018 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
| Person (Organization):
RAY MCKINLEY (R1DO)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFICATION (EMAIL) | | This material event contains a "Category 3" level of radioactive material. | Event Text AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - RADIOGRAPHY CAMERA LOST BY COMMERCIAL CARRIER
The following report was received from the state of Florida via e-mail:
"Received a call from Versa Integrity Group to report a missing Ir-192 radiography camera. The device was shipped from Sanford, Florida via [commercial carrier] on 11-29-18 in route to Corpus Christi, Texas, but never arrived. The last location that [the commercial carrier] can confirm the location of the package was Memphis, Tennessee. (Source information - model: A424-9, S/N: 62109G)."
The camera had a 330 GBq Ir-192 source.
The licensee contacted the commercial carrier on 12-10-18, to inquiry about the shipment and was told it was delayed. The licensee recontacted the commercial carrier on 12-13-18 and was told the package could not be located.
Florida Incident: FL18-153
* * * UPDATE FROM ART TUCKER TO HOWIE CROUCH AT 1556 EST ON 12/13/18 * * *
The state of Texas also reported the same event since their licensee was the intended recipient. The Texas Department of State Health Services will be contacting the state of Florida about this event.
Texas Incident: 9645
Notified R4DO (Taylor) and NMSS Events Notification group (email).
* * * UPDATE AT 1345 EST ON 12/21/2018 FROM ART TUCKER TO MARK ABRAMOVITZ * * *
The following information was received via fax:
"At 12:39 PM [CST] on December 21, 2018, the licensee contacted the Agency [Texas Department of State Health Services] and stated they had received an email from [the commercial carrier] stating the exposure device would be delivered to the facility in Corpus Christi by 1645 [CST] hours today."
Texas Incident: I-9645
Notified the R1DO (Jackson), R4DO (Alexander) and NMSS (via e-mail).
* * * UPDATE AT 1703 EST ON 12/21/2018 FROM ART TUCKER TO TOM KENDZIA * * *
The following information was received via fax:
"The licensee contacted the Agency [Texas Department of State Health Services] at 1550 hours and reported they had received the exposure device. The licensee stated they would provide additional information after they completed their investigation. Additional information will be provided as it is received in accordance with SA-300."
Texas Incident: I-9645
Notified the R1DO (Jackson), R4DO (Alexander) and NMSS (via e-mail).
THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "CATEGORY 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL
Category 3 sources, if not safely managed or securely protected, could cause permanent injury to a person who handled them, or were otherwise in contact with them, for some hours. It could possibly - although it is unlikely - be fatal to be close to this amount of unshielded radioactive material for a period of days to weeks. These sources are typically used in practices such as fixed industrial gauges involving high activity sources (for example: level gauges, dredger gauges, conveyor gauges and spinning pipe gauges) and well logging. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf
Note: This device is assigned an IAEA Category 3 value based on the actual radioactivity of the source, not on the device type. (Reference IAEA RG-G-1.9) |
| Agreement State | Event Number: 53791 | Rep Org: NORTH DAKOTA DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH
Licensee: BRAUN INTERTEC CORPORATION
Region: 4
City: BELFIELD State: ND
County:
License #: 33-48303-01
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: DAVE STRADINGER
HQ OPS Officer: MARK ABRAMOVITZ | Notification Date: 12/13/2018
Notification Time: 16:12 [ET]
Event Date: 12/12/2018
Event Time: 00:00 [CST]
Last Update Date: 12/13/2018 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
| Person (Organization):
NICK TAYLOR (R4DO)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFICATION (EMAIL) | Event Text AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - RADIOGRAPHY GUIDE TUBE KINKED WITH SOURCE EXPOSED
"Braun Intertec Corporation reported an event of the inability to retract a 1.44 TBq (39 Ci) Ir-192 sealed source (QSA Global, Inc. Model A424-9, SN 67476) which occurred at a temporary job site near Belfield, ND at approximately 4:02 pm CST on December 12, 2018. While performing radiography using a QSA Global, Inc. Model 880 Delta (SN D9541) exposure device on a pipe section resting on a stand, the pipe fell from the stand and kinked the guide tube. The radiography crew was unable to retract the source and immediately expanded the public dose boundary to an actual 2 mR/hr distance and maintained continuous surveillance and contacted their RSO for guidance. The RSO arrived on site the same day at approximately 8:45 pm CST and completed the source retrieval at approximately 9:45 pm CST. The sealed source was successfully retrieved into the exposure device. The maximum exposure readings from the direct reading exposure devices of the radiography crew and retrieval personnel was 3 mR. The crank assembly and guide tube were taken out of service. Visual inspection noted no defects to the pigtail assembly."
North Dakota Event: 180003 |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 53801 | Facility: WATTS BAR
Region: 2 State: TN
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: CHARLES BROESCHE
HQ OPS Officer: ANDREW WAUGH | Notification Date: 12/21/2018
Notification Time: 00:02 [ET]
Event Date: 12/20/2018
Event Time: 00:00 [EST]
Last Update Date: 12/21/2018 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) - UNANALYZED CONDITION
| Person (Organization):
BRIAN BONSER (R2DO) | | Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | Event Text CONTAINMENT AIR RETURN FAN SYSTEM INOPERABLE
"At 1642 Eastern Standard Time (EST) on December 20, 2018, it was determined that both trains of Containment Air Return Fan (CARF) were simultaneously INOPERABLE from 0817 (EST) to 1129 (EST) on November 20, 2018. This condition is not bounded by existing design and licensing documents; however, it poses no impact to the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. Therefore, this event is being reported as an eight-hour, non-emergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B).
"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified." |
| Non-Power Reactor | Event Number: 53805 | Facility: KANSAS STATE UNIVERSITY
RX Type: 250 KW TRIGA MARK II
Comments:
Region: 0
City: MANHATTAN State: KS
County: RILEY
License #: R-88
Agreement: Y
Docket: 05000188
NRC Notified By: ALAN CEBULA
HQ OPS Officer: OSSY FONT
| Notification Date: 12/23/2018
Notification Time: 20:22 [ET]
Event Date: 12/22/2018
Event Time: 00:00 [CST]
Last Update Date: 12/23/2018 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
NON-POWER REACTOR EVENT
| Person (Organization):
SPYROS TRAIFOROS (PM)
ELIZABETH REED (ENC) | Event Text SURVEILLANCE NOT DONE DUE TO INADEQUATE PROCEDURE
The following was received via email:
"[The licensee notified] the NRC of a reportable occurrence identified on December 22, 2018 due to violation of an LCO [limiting condition for operation]. While performing testing and surveillance following control rod maintenance, the Reactor Supervisor identified an interlock check was not being completed due to an inadequate procedure. The inadequacy was identified as part of additional documentation checks that are being implemented at the facility.
"Per Technical Specification 3.4.3 - Table 2, the CONTROL ROD (STANDARD) position interlock must be operable in PULSE MODE. The interlock prevents withdrawal of the standard control rods while in PULSE MODE. The surveillance to ensure the interlock is operable is required on a SEMIANNUAL frequency as specified in Technical Specifications 4.4.2. As currently written, the procedure used to satisfy this surveillance does not direct the operator to enter PULSE MODE to check the interlock. Instead, the procedure activated a similarly named interlock (Pulse Power) that indirectly prevents withdrawal of the standard control rods by engaging the source interlock; however it is not specified to enter PULSE MODE in the procedure steps. The CONTROL ROD (STANDARD) position interlock was subsequently tested to be operable in that it functioned properly during the test and no operational history would suggest it was non-functioning otherwise.
"Based on the surveillance not being performed in PULSE MODE, the interlock was technically not operable during pulsing operations. The reactor is and will remain shutdown until a review by the Reactor Safeguards Committee of corrective actions in accordance with Technical Specifications.
"A written report will be submitted within ten days summarizing the reportable occurrence." | |