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Event Notification Report for December 06, 2018

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center

Event Reports For
12/5/2018 - 12/6/2018

** EVENT NUMBERS **


53714 53758 53776 53777 53778 53779

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Agreement State Event Number: 53714
Rep Org: WA OFFICE OF RADIATION PROTECTION
Licensee: GEOENGINEERS, INCORPORATED
Region: 4
City: REDMOND   State: WA
County:
License #: WN-I0204-1
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: ANDREW HALLORAN
HQ OPS Officer: JEFF HERRERA
Notification Date: 11/04/2018
Notification Time: 21:35 [ET]
Event Date: 11/03/2018
Event Time: 00:00 [PST]
Last Update Date: 12/06/2018
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
Person (Organization):
CALE YOUNG (R4DO)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFICATION (EMAIL)

Event Text

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - DAMAGED DENSITY GAUGE

The following report was received from the Washington State Department of Health via email:

"On 11/3/2018, a gauge user was working at a jobsite located in Kirkland, Washington. He sat the gauge down and moved approximately 30 feet away to speak to a contractor. While the gauge was out of his direct control, it was hit by a piece of heavy equipment and damaged. The contractor took the gauge back to the Redmond office, secured it in the gauge storage room, and notified the office ARSO [Assistant Radiation Safety Officer] and corporate RSO [Radiation Safety Officer]. The ARSO, notified DOH [Washington State Department of Health] that evening. [The Washington State Department of Health Laboratory Program Manager] spoke with [the ARSO] to get an overview of the incident.

"[The DOH Laboratory Program Manager] met with the ARSO and the corporate RSO, at the Redmond office at 0930 PST on 11/4/2018 to examine the gauge (CPN MC1DRP S/N MD00805859) to determine whether the Cs-137 and Am-241 sources had been compromised. After performing swab tests of the interior and exterior of the gauge and measuring the exposure rates around the gauge, [The DOH Laboratory Program Manager] made the assumption that the sealed sources were not compromised (the licensee couldn't do this because they don't have a survey instrument). [The DOH Laboratory Program Manager] also surveyed the vehicle used to transport the damaged gauge to verify that there was no detectable contamination in the vehicle.

"DOH will conduct an investigation into the incident, and the licensee is submitting an incident report. More information to follow."

Event Report ID: WA-18-027

* * * UPDATE AT 1229 EST ON 12/5/2018 FROM ANDREW HALLORAN TO MARK ABRAMOVITZ * * *

The following update was received via e-mail:

"DOH [Washington State Department of Health] conducted an investigation and a review of the licensee's internal incident report and root cause analysis. The gauge user did not maintain direct control of the gauge, resulting in the gauge being left unattended when it was damaged by an excavator. Additionally, the licensee failed to follow both the emergency procedures and radiation safety program guidance included in their radioactive materials license application renewal, further compounding the health and safety issues. Instead of securing the area and remaining onsite and alerting DOH as required by procedure, the gauge user and project manager decided to remove the damaged gauge and return it to the Redmond storage location. Both the failure to maintain control of the gauge and the failure to follow the emergency procedures were cited as violations in a compliance letter sent to GeoEngineers. In addition to the corrective actions required by the compliance letter, DOH will also perform a follow-up inspection of the Redmond office and field site."

This event was closed on 12/5/2018.

Notified the R4DO (Gaddy) and NMSS (via e-mail).

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Agreement State Event Number: 53758
Rep Org: TEXAS DEPT OF STATE HEALTH SERVICES
Licensee: INEOS USA LLC
Region: 4
City: FREEPORT   State: TX
County:
License #: Licen-RAM-L01422
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: ART TUCKER
HQ OPS Officer: KARL DIEDERICH
Notification Date: 11/28/2018
Notification Time: 17:10 [ET]
Event Date: 11/28/2018
Event Time: 00:00 [CST]
Last Update Date: 11/28/2018
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
Person (Organization):
JASON KOZAL (R4DO)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFICATION (EMAIL)

Event Text

AGREEMENT STATE - FIXED GAUGE STUCK SHUTTER

The following information was received from the State of Texas via email:

"On November 28, 2018, the Agency [Texas Department of State Health Services] was notified by the licensee that while performing a shutter test on an Ohmart-Vega Model SH-F1 gauge containing a 20 milliCurie (original activity) Cs-137 source, the shutter would not close. Open is the normal operating position for the gauge. The gauge is in a location that does not present an exposure risk to any individual. The licensee has contacted a service provider to repair the gauge. Additional information will be provided as it is received in accordance with SA-300."

Texas Incident #: I-9640.

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Power Reactor Event Number: 53776
Facility: COOPER
Region: 4     State: NE
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4
NRC Notified By: DAVID VAN DER KAMP
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH
Notification Date: 12/05/2018
Notification Time: 11:24 [ET]
Event Date: 10/13/2018
Event Time: 00:00 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 12/05/2018
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.73(a)(1) - INVALID SPECIF SYSTEM ACTUATION
Person (Organization):
VINCENT GADDY (R4DO)
Unit SCRAM Code RX Crit Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
1 N N 0 Refueling 0 Refueling

Event Text

60-DAY OPTIONAL TELEPHONIC NOTIFICATION OF INVALID SPECIFIED SYSTEM ACTUATION

"This 60-day telephone notification is being made per the reporting requirements specified by 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) and 10 CFR 50.73(a)(1) to describe an invalid actuation of a Primary Containment Isolation System (PCIS) Group 1 for Main Steam Isolation Valves (MSIVs), Group 3 for Reactor Water Cleanup (RWCU), Group 6 for Secondary Containment isolation, Group 7 for Reactor Water Sampling, Diesel Generator, Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) System logic, and Residual Heat Removal (RHR) logic.

"Group 1, Group 6, Diesel Generator actuation, RCIC actuation and RHR actuation are within scope of 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv). Group 3 and Group 7 are not within scope as they affect only one system.

"Cooper Nuclear Station [CNS] was shut down in Mode 5 at the time of the event with the reactor cavity flooded. On October 13, 2018, at 0028 Central Daylight Time, CNS received full PCIS Groups 1, 3, and 6, and a half Group 7 on the Division 1 side. The MSIVs and RWCU isolation valves were already closed for maintenance. The Secondary Containment isolated. Control Room Emergency Filter and the Standby Gas Treatment Systems initiated. The inboard Reactor Water Sample valve isolated. Diesel Generator #1 started but was not required to connect to the critical bus. Reactor Core Isolation Cooling System logic actuated with no expected response due to being isolated for shutdown conditions.

"Division 1 RHR pump logic actuated. Division 1 RHR system was operating in shutdown cooling mode. The actuation caused the Division 1 RHR outboard injection and heat exchanger bypass valves to open. Shutdown cooling was unaffected and remained in service throughout the event.

"The plant systems responded as expected with no Emergency Core Cooling System injection.

"At the time of the event, an in-service inspection of welds inside the reactor vessel was taking place using a robot scanner that uses two vortex thrusters to hold the robot to the vessel wall. The robot inadvertently passed over an instrument penetration, drawing suction on the process leg, resulting in low reactor water level indications and the subsequent invalid Level 1 and 2 system actuations. Actual reactor vessel water level remained steady at cavity flooded conditions.

"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified of this event."

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Power Reactor Event Number: 53777
Facility: ARKANSAS NUCLEAR
Region: 4     State: AR
Unit: [] [2] []
RX Type: [1] B&W-L-LP,[2] CE
NRC Notified By: BENJAMIN EGNEW
HQ OPS Officer: JEFFREY WHITED
Notification Date: 12/05/2018
Notification Time: 14:54 [ET]
Event Date: 10/09/2018
Event Time: 00:00 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 12/05/2018
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.73(a)(1) - INVALID SPECIF SYSTEM ACTUATION
Person (Organization):
VINCENT GADDY (R4DO)
Unit SCRAM Code RX Crit Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
2 N N 0 Refueling 0 Refueling

Event Text

60-DAY OPTIONAL TELEPHONIC NOTIFICATION OF INVALID SPECIFIED SYSTEM ACTUATION

"This 60-day telephone notification is being made in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73(a)(1) and 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) to provide information pertaining to an invalid Engineered Safety Feature actuation signal.

"On October 9, 2018, Arkansas Nuclear One, Unit 2 was in refueling Mode 6, when a vital inverter failed while aligned from its alternate power source causing a loss of one of four vital instrument buses. The loss of the instrument bus resulted in one of the four engineered safety feature protection channels to enter a tripped state. Because one of the other four channels was already in a tripped state in support of a channel power supply replacement activity, two out of four protection channels were now in the tripped state resulting in a Safety Injection Actuation Signal, Containment Spray Actuation Signal, Containment Cooling Actuation Signal, Recirculation Actuation Signal, Emergency Feed Actuation Signal, and Containment Isolation Actuation Signal.

"In general, only one train of equipment is protected and assumed to be available during Mode 6 operations. Due to the defense-in-depth plant configuration in Mode 6, which is intended to avoid inadvertent start of emergency systems, the resulting actuations caused no adverse impact to Shutdown Cooling or Spent Fuel Pool cooling operations. At least one train of the following systems was aligned for automatic actuation:

"Service Water
Emergency Diesel Generator
Containment Penetration Room Exhaust Fan
Other non-essential components which are shed or realigned upon safeguards actuation

"The few systems and components that were aligned for automatic operation responded as designed, including containment isolation valves and valves associated with the above systems (if aligned for automatic operation). The Service Water system was already in operation and, therefore, no Service Water pumps actuated. All systems and components which were capable of automatic operation performed as designed.

"The Emergency Diesel Generator started but did not synchronize to the bus. No safety injection occurred to the core.

"This actuation was caused by equipment failure and was not an actual signal resulting from parameter inputs. The affected actuation signals do not perform a safety function in Mode 6 and are not required to be available or operable. Therefore, this actuation is considered invalid.

"This event was entered into ANO's corrective action program for resolution. This event did not result in any adverse impact to the health and safety of the public.

"In accordance with 10 CFR 50.73(a)(i) a telephone notification is being made in lieu of submitting a written Licensee Event Report. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector."

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Power Reactor Event Number: 53778
Facility: FITZPATRICK
Region: 1     State: NY
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4
NRC Notified By: MARK HAWES
HQ OPS Officer: MARK ABRAMOVITZ
Notification Date: 12/05/2018
Notification Time: 17:06 [ET]
Event Date: 12/05/2018
Event Time: 00:00 [EST]
Last Update Date: 12/05/2018
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(C) - POT UNCNTRL RAD REL
Person (Organization):
CHRISTOPHER LALLY (R1DO)
Unit SCRAM Code RX Crit Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
1 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation

Event Text

THREE MINUTE LOSS OF SECONDARY CONTAINMENT VACUUM

"At 1010 [EST] on December 5, 2018, Secondary Containment differential pressure exceeded the Technical Specification Surveillance Requirement of greater than or equal to 0.25 inches of vacuum water gauge. This condition existed for approximately 3 minutes before the differential pressure was restored to normal when the Standby Gas Treatment system was manually initiated.

"This event was caused by a trip of the service air compressor 39AC-2A. The loss of instrument air pressure caused Reactor Building ventilation to isolate and raise Secondary Containment differential pressure. The instrument air pressure was restored when 39AC-2A was isolated and the two backup air compressors started.

"This condition did not impact the leak tightness of Secondary Containment or the ability of the Standby Gas Treatment system to establish and maintain the required differential pressure. When Secondary Containment did not meet the Technical Specification Surveillance Requirement 3.6.4.1.1 for differential pressure, the Limiting Condition of Operation (LCO) was not met. Therefore, Secondary Containment was inoperable. This event is being reported under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(C)."

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

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Power Reactor Event Number: 53779
Facility: POINT BEACH
Region: 3     State: WI
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-2-LP,[2] W-2-LP
NRC Notified By: KILE HESS
HQ OPS Officer: MARK ABRAMOVITZ
Notification Date: 12/05/2018
Notification Time: 20:07 [ET]
Event Date: 12/05/2018
Event Time: 00:00 [CST]
Last Update Date: 12/05/2018
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL
50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION
Person (Organization):
PATRICIA PELKE (R3DO)
Unit SCRAM Code RX Crit Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
1 M/R Y 100 Power Operation 0 Hot Standby

Event Text

MANUAL REACTOR TRIP ON LOSS OF MAIN CONDENSER VACUUM

"At 1539 [CST] December 5, 2018, with Unit 1 at 100 percent power, the reactor was manually tripped due to degrading condenser vacuum. The trip was uncomplicated with all systems responding normally, post-trip. An actuation of the auxiliary feedwater system occurred during the manual trip. The auxiliary feedwater system automatically started as designed when the valid actuation signal was received. Operations stabilized the plant in mode 3 [hot standby]. Decay heat is being removed by atmospheric dump valves.

"Unit 2 is not affected.

"This event is being reported pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) and 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A)."

The loss of condenser vacuum resulted because one of two circulating water pumps was running and its discharge valve shut. The cause for the valve shutting is under investigation. There is no primary to secondary leakage.

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector


Page Last Reviewed/Updated Thursday, December 06, 2018
Thursday, December 06, 2018