| U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center Event Reports For
12/4/2018 - 12/5/2018 ** EVENT NUMBERS ** |
| Agreement State | Event Number: 53755 | Rep Org: CALIFORNIA RADIATION CONTROL PRGM
Licensee: RMA GROUP
Region: 4
City: SAN DIEGO State: CA
County:
License #: 8054-37
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: ALAN ROOK
HQ OPS Officer: KARL DIEDERICH | Notification Date: 11/26/2018
Notification Time: 15:51 [ET]
Event Date: 11/26/2018
Event Time: 00:00 [PST]
Last Update Date: 11/26/2018 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
| Person (Organization):
JASON KOZAL (R4DO)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFICATION (EMAIL)
ILTAB (EMAIL)
CNSNS (MEXICO) (EMAIL) | | This material event contains a "Less than Cat 3" level of radioactive material. | Event Text AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - LOSS OR THEFT OF MOISTURE DENSITY GAUGE
The following report was received from the State of California via email:
"On November 26, 2018, at approximately 1015 [PST] .., [the] RSO [Radiation Safety Officer] of RMA Group, Radioactive Materials License #8054-37, contacted RHB [Radiologic Health Branch] Brea concerning the moisture/density gauge, Troxler 3430, Cs-137 serial #750-4104, Am-241 serial #47-26740 (Cs-137, 0.333 GBq, Am-241, 1.6 GBq) that had been found missing during a semi-annual inventory of the radioactive gauges possessed at the permanent storage facility at 6976 Convoy Court, San Diego, CA 92111. [The RSO] will contact local law enforcement in San Diego and will fill out a police report with them. A copy of the theft report will be forwarded to the RHB Brea office to be included as part of this report. [The RSO] will contact local newspapers to attempt to retrieve the stolen radioactive gauge as well as notifying local servicing vendors of radioactive gauges to be alert for the serial number of the stolen gauge in case it turns up for service. The investigation will continue to determine if the radioactive gauge can be found and determination can be made on how it was lost at the permanent storage location. This is being reported to the NRC Operations Center as a 24-hour report under 10 CFR 30.50(b)(2) since the radioactive gauge has been lost and it can not be determined what condition the sources are currently in."
THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL
Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf |
| !!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED.THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!! | | Power Reactor | Event Number: 53772 | Facility: FERMI
Region: 3 State: MI
Unit: [2] [] []
RX Type: [2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: PAUL ANGOVE
HQ OPS Officer: BETHANY CECERE | Notification Date: 12/04/2018
Notification Time: 13:35 [ET]
Event Date: 12/04/2018
Event Time: 09:35 [EST]
Last Update Date: 01/30/2019 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
| Person (Organization):
PATRICIA PELKE (R3DO) | | Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 2 | N | Y | 82 | Power Operation | 82 | Power Operation | Event Text HPCI INOPERABLE DUE TO MECHANICAL DRAFT COOLING TOWER FAN BRAKE INVERTER FAILURE
"At 0935 EST on December 4, 2018, the Division 2 Mechanical Draft Cooling Tower (MDCT) fans were declared inoperable due to failure of the over speed fan brake inverter. The brakes prevent fan over speed from a design basis tornado. The MDCT fans are required to support operability of the Ultimate Heat Sink (UHS). The UHS is required to support operability of the Division 2 Emergency Equipment Cooling Water (EECW) system. The EECW system cools various safety related components, including the High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) system room cooler. An unplanned HPCI inoperability occurred based on a loss of the HPCI Room Cooler. Investigation into why the Division 2 MDCT fan over speed brake inverter failed is in progress. This report is being made pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) based on an unplanned HPCI inoperability.
"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."
Fermi 2 is in a 14-day LCO for inoperability of HPCI and a 72-hour LCO for UHS inoperability.
* * * RETRACTION ON 1/30/19 AT 1605 EST FROM CHRIS ROBINSON TO BETHANY CECERE * * *
"The purpose of this notification is to retract EN 53772 made on December 4, 2018. Subsequent to the initial notification, the event and site Technical Specifications (TS) were reviewed further. An evaluation determined that TS Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) 3.0.9 for barriers could be applied to the MDCT fan brakes. As a result of applying TS LCO 3.0.9 to the MDCT fan brakes, it was not necessary to declare the UHS inoperable. With the Division 2 UHS operable on December 4, 2018, the HPCI system was also operable. With HPCI operable, there was no event or condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of a safety function needed to mitigate the consequences of an accident under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D). Therefore, EN 53772 is retracted and no Licensee Event Report (LER) under 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(D) is required to be submitted.
"The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector."
Notified R3DO (Cameron). |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 53775 | Facility: COLUMBIA GENERATING STATION
Region: 4 State: WA
Unit: [2] [] []
RX Type: [2] GE-5
NRC Notified By: DAVID PORTER
HQ OPS Officer: BETHANY CECERE | Notification Date: 12/04/2018
Notification Time: 17:12 [ET]
Event Date: 12/04/2018
Event Time: 00:00 [PST]
Last Update Date: 12/04/2018 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
| Person (Organization):
VINCENT GADDY (R4DO) | | Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | Event Text LOSS OF EMERGENCY ASSESSMENT CAPABILITY
"On 12/4/2018 at 1340 [PST], Columbia entered a planned evolution to replace the seismic monitoring system. Use of the Modified Mercalli Intensity Scale has been implemented as a compensatory measure per station procedures. The expected duration of the replacement activity will exceed 72 hours, therefore, this is being reported as a major loss of emergency assessment capability in accordance with regulation 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii).
"Compensatory measures will remain in place until the seismic system replacement has been completed.
"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified." |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 53776 | Facility: COOPER
Region: 4 State: NE
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4
NRC Notified By: DAVID VAN DER KAMP
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH | Notification Date: 12/05/2018
Notification Time: 11:24 [ET]
Event Date: 10/13/2018
Event Time: 00:00 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 12/05/2018 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.73(a)(1) - INVALID SPECIF SYSTEM ACTUATION
| Person (Organization):
VINCENT GADDY (R4DO) | | Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | N | N | 0 | Refueling | 0 | Refueling | Event Text 60-DAY OPTIONAL TELEPHONIC NOTIFICATION OF INVALID SPECIFIED SYSTEM ACTUATION
"This 60-day telephone notification is being made per the reporting requirements specified by 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) and 10 CFR 50.73(a)(1) to describe an invalid actuation of a Primary Containment Isolation System (PCIS) Group 1 for Main Steam Isolation Valves (MSIVs), Group 3 for Reactor Water Cleanup (RWCU), Group 6 for Secondary Containment isolation, Group 7 for Reactor Water Sampling, Diesel Generator, Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) System logic, and Residual Heat Removal (RHR) logic.
"Group 1, Group 6, Diesel Generator actuation, RCIC actuation and RHR actuation are within scope of 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv). Group 3 and Group 7 are not within scope as they affect only one system.
"Cooper Nuclear Station [CNS] was shut down in Mode 5 at the time of the event with the reactor cavity flooded. On October 13, 2018, at 0028 Central Daylight Time, CNS received full PCIS Groups 1, 3, and 6, and a half Group 7 on the Division 1 side. The MSIVs and RWCU isolation valves were already closed for maintenance. The Secondary Containment isolated. Control Room Emergency Filter and the Standby Gas Treatment Systems initiated. The inboard Reactor Water Sample valve isolated. Diesel Generator #1 started but was not required to connect to the critical bus. Reactor Core Isolation Cooling System logic actuated with no expected response due to being isolated for shutdown conditions.
"Division 1 RHR pump logic actuated. Division 1 RHR system was operating in shutdown cooling mode. The actuation caused the Division 1 RHR outboard injection and heat exchanger bypass valves to open. Shutdown cooling was unaffected and remained in service throughout the event.
"The plant systems responded as expected with no Emergency Core Cooling System injection.
"At the time of the event, an in-service inspection of welds inside the reactor vessel was taking place using a robot scanner that uses two vortex thrusters to hold the robot to the vessel wall. The robot inadvertently passed over an instrument penetration, drawing suction on the process leg, resulting in low reactor water level indications and the subsequent invalid Level 1 and 2 system actuations. Actual reactor vessel water level remained steady at cavity flooded conditions.
"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified of this event." |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 53777 | Facility: ARKANSAS NUCLEAR
Region: 4 State: AR
Unit: [] [2] []
RX Type: [1] B&W-L-LP,[2] CE
NRC Notified By: BENJAMIN EGNEW
HQ OPS Officer: JEFFREY WHITED | Notification Date: 12/05/2018
Notification Time: 14:54 [ET]
Event Date: 10/09/2018
Event Time: 00:00 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 12/05/2018 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.73(a)(1) - INVALID SPECIF SYSTEM ACTUATION
| Person (Organization):
VINCENT GADDY (R4DO) | | Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 2 | N | N | 0 | Refueling | 0 | Refueling | Event Text 60-DAY OPTIONAL TELEPHONIC NOTIFICATION OF INVALID SPECIFIED SYSTEM ACTUATION
"This 60-day telephone notification is being made in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73(a)(1) and 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) to provide information pertaining to an invalid Engineered Safety Feature actuation signal.
"On October 9, 2018, Arkansas Nuclear One, Unit 2 was in refueling Mode 6, when a vital inverter failed while aligned from its alternate power source causing a loss of one of four vital instrument buses. The loss of the instrument bus resulted in one of the four engineered safety feature protection channels to enter a tripped state. Because one of the other four channels was already in a tripped state in support of a channel power supply replacement activity, two out of four protection channels were now in the tripped state resulting in a Safety Injection Actuation Signal, Containment Spray Actuation Signal, Containment Cooling Actuation Signal, Recirculation Actuation Signal, Emergency Feed Actuation Signal, and Containment Isolation Actuation Signal.
"In general, only one train of equipment is protected and assumed to be available during Mode 6 operations. Due to the defense-in-depth plant configuration in Mode 6, which is intended to avoid inadvertent start of emergency systems, the resulting actuations caused no adverse impact to Shutdown Cooling or Spent Fuel Pool cooling operations. At least one train of the following systems was aligned for automatic actuation:
"Service Water
Emergency Diesel Generator
Containment Penetration Room Exhaust Fan
Other non-essential components which are shed or realigned upon safeguards actuation
"The few systems and components that were aligned for automatic operation responded as designed, including containment isolation valves and valves associated with the above systems (if aligned for automatic operation). The Service Water system was already in operation and, therefore, no Service Water pumps actuated. All systems and components which were capable of automatic operation performed as designed.
"The Emergency Diesel Generator started but did not synchronize to the bus. No safety injection occurred to the core.
"This actuation was caused by equipment failure and was not an actual signal resulting from parameter inputs. The affected actuation signals do not perform a safety function in Mode 6 and are not required to be available or operable. Therefore, this actuation is considered invalid.
"This event was entered into ANO's corrective action program for resolution. This event did not result in any adverse impact to the health and safety of the public.
"In accordance with 10 CFR 50.73(a)(i) a telephone notification is being made in lieu of submitting a written Licensee Event Report. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector." |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 53778 | Facility: FITZPATRICK
Region: 1 State: NY
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4
NRC Notified By: MARK HAWES
HQ OPS Officer: MARK ABRAMOVITZ | Notification Date: 12/05/2018
Notification Time: 17:06 [ET]
Event Date: 12/05/2018
Event Time: 00:00 [EST]
Last Update Date: 12/05/2018 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(C) - POT UNCNTRL RAD REL
| Person (Organization):
CHRISTOPHER LALLY (R1DO) | | Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | Event Text THREE MINUTE LOSS OF SECONDARY CONTAINMENT VACUUM
"At 1010 [EST] on December 5, 2018, Secondary Containment differential pressure exceeded the Technical Specification Surveillance Requirement of greater than or equal to 0.25 inches of vacuum water gauge. This condition existed for approximately 3 minutes before the differential pressure was restored to normal when the Standby Gas Treatment system was manually initiated.
"This event was caused by a trip of the service air compressor 39AC-2A. The loss of instrument air pressure caused Reactor Building ventilation to isolate and raise Secondary Containment differential pressure. The instrument air pressure was restored when 39AC-2A was isolated and the two backup air compressors started.
"This condition did not impact the leak tightness of Secondary Containment or the ability of the Standby Gas Treatment system to establish and maintain the required differential pressure. When Secondary Containment did not meet the Technical Specification Surveillance Requirement 3.6.4.1.1 for differential pressure, the Limiting Condition of Operation (LCO) was not met. Therefore, Secondary Containment was inoperable. This event is being reported under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(C)."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 53779 | Facility: POINT BEACH
Region: 3 State: WI
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-2-LP,[2] W-2-LP
NRC Notified By: KILE HESS
HQ OPS Officer: MARK ABRAMOVITZ | Notification Date: 12/05/2018
Notification Time: 20:07 [ET]
Event Date: 12/05/2018
Event Time: 00:00 [CST]
Last Update Date: 12/05/2018 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL
50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION
| Person (Organization):
PATRICIA PELKE (R3DO) | | Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | M/R | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 0 | Hot Standby | Event Text MANUAL REACTOR TRIP ON LOSS OF MAIN CONDENSER VACUUM
"At 1539 [CST] December 5, 2018, with Unit 1 at 100 percent power, the reactor was manually tripped due to degrading condenser vacuum. The trip was uncomplicated with all systems responding normally, post-trip. An actuation of the auxiliary feedwater system occurred during the manual trip. The auxiliary feedwater system automatically started as designed when the valid actuation signal was received. Operations stabilized the plant in mode 3 [hot standby]. Decay heat is being removed by atmospheric dump valves.
"Unit 2 is not affected.
"This event is being reported pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) and 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A)."
The loss of condenser vacuum resulted because one of two circulating water pumps was running and its discharge valve shut. The cause for the valve shutting is under investigation. There is no primary to secondary leakage.
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector | |