Event Notification Report for December 05, 2018
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
12/04/2018 - 12/05/2018
Power Reactor
Event Number: 53778
Facility: FITZPATRICK
Region: 1 State: NY
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4
NRC Notified By: MARK HAWES
HQ OPS Officer: MARK ABRAMOVITZ
Region: 1 State: NY
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4
NRC Notified By: MARK HAWES
HQ OPS Officer: MARK ABRAMOVITZ
Notification Date: 12/05/2018
Notification Time: 17:06 [ET]
Event Date: 12/05/2018
Event Time: 00:00 [EST]
Last Update Date: 12/05/2018
Notification Time: 17:06 [ET]
Event Date: 12/05/2018
Event Time: 00:00 [EST]
Last Update Date: 12/05/2018
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(C) - POT UNCNTRL RAD REL
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(C) - POT UNCNTRL RAD REL
Person (Organization):
CHRISTOPHER LALLY (R1DO)
CHRISTOPHER LALLY (R1DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
THREE MINUTE LOSS OF SECONDARY CONTAINMENT VACUUM
"At 1010 [EST] on December 5, 2018, Secondary Containment differential pressure exceeded the Technical Specification Surveillance Requirement of greater than or equal to 0.25 inches of vacuum water gauge. This condition existed for approximately 3 minutes before the differential pressure was restored to normal when the Standby Gas Treatment system was manually initiated.
"This event was caused by a trip of the service air compressor 39AC-2A. The loss of instrument air pressure caused Reactor Building ventilation to isolate and raise Secondary Containment differential pressure. The instrument air pressure was restored when 39AC-2A was isolated and the two backup air compressors started.
"This condition did not impact the leak tightness of Secondary Containment or the ability of the Standby Gas Treatment system to establish and maintain the required differential pressure. When Secondary Containment did not meet the Technical Specification Surveillance Requirement 3.6.4.1.1 for differential pressure, the Limiting Condition of Operation (LCO) was not met. Therefore, Secondary Containment was inoperable. This event is being reported under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(C)."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
"At 1010 [EST] on December 5, 2018, Secondary Containment differential pressure exceeded the Technical Specification Surveillance Requirement of greater than or equal to 0.25 inches of vacuum water gauge. This condition existed for approximately 3 minutes before the differential pressure was restored to normal when the Standby Gas Treatment system was manually initiated.
"This event was caused by a trip of the service air compressor 39AC-2A. The loss of instrument air pressure caused Reactor Building ventilation to isolate and raise Secondary Containment differential pressure. The instrument air pressure was restored when 39AC-2A was isolated and the two backup air compressors started.
"This condition did not impact the leak tightness of Secondary Containment or the ability of the Standby Gas Treatment system to establish and maintain the required differential pressure. When Secondary Containment did not meet the Technical Specification Surveillance Requirement 3.6.4.1.1 for differential pressure, the Limiting Condition of Operation (LCO) was not met. Therefore, Secondary Containment was inoperable. This event is being reported under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(C)."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 53779
Facility: POINT BEACH
Region: 3 State: WI
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-2-LP,[2] W-2-LP
NRC Notified By: KILE HESS
HQ OPS Officer: MARK ABRAMOVITZ
Region: 3 State: WI
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-2-LP,[2] W-2-LP
NRC Notified By: KILE HESS
HQ OPS Officer: MARK ABRAMOVITZ
Notification Date: 12/05/2018
Notification Time: 20:07 [ET]
Event Date: 12/05/2018
Event Time: 00:00 [CST]
Last Update Date: 12/05/2018
Notification Time: 20:07 [ET]
Event Date: 12/05/2018
Event Time: 00:00 [CST]
Last Update Date: 12/05/2018
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION
Person (Organization):
PATRICIA PELKE (R3DO)
PATRICIA PELKE (R3DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | M/R | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 0 | Hot Standby |
MANUAL REACTOR TRIP ON LOSS OF MAIN CONDENSER VACUUM
"At 1539 [CST] December 5, 2018, with Unit 1 at 100 percent power, the reactor was manually tripped due to degrading condenser vacuum. The trip was uncomplicated with all systems responding normally, post-trip. An actuation of the auxiliary feedwater system occurred during the manual trip. The auxiliary feedwater system automatically started as designed when the valid actuation signal was received. Operations stabilized the plant in mode 3 [hot standby]. Decay heat is being removed by atmospheric dump valves.
"Unit 2 is not affected.
"This event is being reported pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) and 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A)."
The loss of condenser vacuum resulted because one of two circulating water pumps was running and its discharge valve shut. The cause for the valve shutting is under investigation. There is no primary to secondary leakage.
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector
"At 1539 [CST] December 5, 2018, with Unit 1 at 100 percent power, the reactor was manually tripped due to degrading condenser vacuum. The trip was uncomplicated with all systems responding normally, post-trip. An actuation of the auxiliary feedwater system occurred during the manual trip. The auxiliary feedwater system automatically started as designed when the valid actuation signal was received. Operations stabilized the plant in mode 3 [hot standby]. Decay heat is being removed by atmospheric dump valves.
"Unit 2 is not affected.
"This event is being reported pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) and 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A)."
The loss of condenser vacuum resulted because one of two circulating water pumps was running and its discharge valve shut. The cause for the valve shutting is under investigation. There is no primary to secondary leakage.
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector