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Event Notification Report for December 03, 2018

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center

Event Reports For
11/30/2018 - 12/3/2018

** EVENT NUMBERS **


53756 53762 53763 53764 53765 53767 53771

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!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED.THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
Power Reactor Event Number: 53756
Facility: RIVER BEND
Region: 4     State: LA
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-6
NRC Notified By: T. W. GATES
HQ OPS Officer: THOMAS KENDZIA
Notification Date: 11/28/2018
Notification Time: 05:40 [ET]
Event Date: 11/27/2018
Event Time: 00:00 [CST]
Last Update Date: 12/03/2018
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(C) - POT UNCNTRL RAD REL
Person (Organization):
JASON KOZAL (R4DO)
Unit SCRAM Code RX Crit Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
1 N Y 99 Power Operation 99 Power Operation

Event Text

INOPERABILITY OF EQUIPMENT FOR CONTROL OF RADIOLOGICAL RELEASE

"At 2130 CST on 11/27/2018, Division 1 Main Steam Positive Leakage Control System (MS-PLCS) was declared inoperable because of a leaking check valve that caused excessive cycling of the associated air compressor.

"Division 2 MS-PLCS had been declared inoperable on 11/27/2018 at 1400 CST when a pressure control valve in the system exceeded the maximum allowable stroke time.

"Because MS-PLCS supplements the isolation function of the main steam isolation valves (MSIVs) by processing fission products that could leak through the closed MSIVs, both divisions of MS-PLCS inoperable at the same time represents a condition that could prevent the fulfillment of a safety function of an SSC [Structures, Systems and Components] that is needed to control the release of radioactive material.

"The station diesel air compressor is available to supply backup air to the safety relief valves as required by the Technical Requirements Manual." [This is associated with operability of the safety relief valves, due to the inoperable MS-PLCS air compressor.]

The unit is in a 7 day shutdown Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO), 1-TS1-18-Div 1 & 2 MSPLCS-685, for the two divisions of MS-PLCS being inoperable.

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

* * * RETRACTION ON 12/03/18 AT 1551 EST FROM TIM GATES TO BETHANY CECERE * * *

"This event was initially reported under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(C) as a condition that could have prevented the Main Steam Positive Leakage Control System (MS-PLCS) from fulfilling its safety function to control the release of radioactive material. Division I was declared inoperable due to a failed component. Division II was declared inoperable due to a pressure control valve in the system exceeding the maximum allowable time to close by 0.50 seconds. An engineering evaluation has since been performed and concluded that the 2 second maximum allowable time to close was based on the pressure control valve being classified as a rapid closure valve and was established from the original baseline data of 0.50 seconds. This baseline data is an administrative target value per the In-Service Testing Program. There are no technical specification requirements associated with the 2 second closure time.

"The engineering evaluation also determined that the volume of air supplied through the pressure control valve during the extra 0.50 seconds of valve closure would have an inconsequential effect on the pressure within the volume of leakage barrier between the Main Steam Isolation Valves associated with the MS-PLCS pressure control valve or have any effect on containment over-pressurization.

"Based on the information provided by the engineering evaluation, the Division II MS-PLCS has been declared operable-degraded non-conforming since time of initial discovery. Consequently, this event is not reportable as a condition that could have prevented the Main Steam Positive Leakage Control System (MS-PLCS) from fulfilling its safety function.

"The [NRC] Resident Inspector has been notified via e-mail."

Notified the R4DO (Gaddy).

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Power Reactor Event Number: 53762
Facility: CATAWBA
Region: 2     State: SC
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: STEVEN ANDREWS
HQ OPS Officer: THOMAS KENDZIA
Notification Date: 11/30/2018
Notification Time: 04:22 [ET]
Event Date: 11/30/2018
Event Time: 00:00 [EST]
Last Update Date: 11/30/2018
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(xi) - OFFSITE NOTIFICATION
Person (Organization):
SCOTT SHAEFFER (R2DO)
CHRIS MILLER (NRR EO)
WILLIAM GOTT (IRD)
Unit SCRAM Code RX Crit Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
1 N N 0 Defueled 0 Defueled
2 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation

Event Text

OFFSITE NOTIFICATION DUE TO CONTRACTOR FATALITY

"At 2300 EST on November 29, 2018 Catawba Nuclear Station (CNS) requested offsite transport for treatment of a contractor to an offsite medical facility. Upon arrival of the offsite medical personnel, the individual was declared deceased at 2354 EST on November 29, 2018.

"The fatality was not work-related and the individual was outside of the Radiological Controlled Area.

"No news release by CNS is planned. Notifications are planned to the South Carolina Division of Occupational Safety and Health.

"This is a four hour notification, non-emergency for a notification of other government agency. This event is reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(xi). The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."

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Part 21 Event Number: 53763
Rep Org: ENGINE SYSTEMS, INC
Licensee: ENGINE SYSTEMS, INC
Region: 1
City: ROCKY MOUNT   State: NC
County:
License #:
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: DAN ROBERTS
HQ OPS Officer: MARK ABRAMOVITZ
Notification Date: 11/30/2018
Notification Time: 16:08 [ET]
Event Date: 11/30/2018
Event Time: 00:00 [EST]
Last Update Date: 12/21/2018
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
21.21(d)(3)(i) - DEFECTS AND NONCOMPLIANCE
Person (Organization):
ART BURRITT (R1DO)
SCOTT SHAEFFER (R2DO)
ERIC DUNCAN (R3DO)
JASON KOZAL (R4DO)
- PART 21/50.55 REACTORS (EMAIL)

Event Text

PART-21 - EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR EMD FUEL AND SOAKBACK PUMPS LOOSE BOLTS

The following report was received via fax:

"ESI [Engine Systems, Inc.] was notified by a nuclear customer of two instances where a bolt was found loose or backed out of the cover of an EMD [Electro-Motive Diesel] engine driven fuel pump P/N 8410219. Following notification, ESI inspected remaining pumps in inventory and found instances where one or more of the pump cover bolts were loose or lightly torqued.

"EMD fuel pump, P/N 8410219, is commonly used on all 12, 16, and 20-cylinder EMD model 645E4 and E4B engines. The pump is either mechanically driven from the engine (via the scavenging tube oil pump) or motor driven (as in the case of a backup/redundant fuel pump). The pump transfers fuel oil from the day tank to the fuel injectors to support fuel combustion. Without the supply of fuel oil, the diesel engine is unable to produce power which adversely affects the safety-related operation of the emergency diesel generator set.

"ESI recommends inspecting the bolts of all pumps for proper bolt tightness. Use a torque wrench and ensure all bolts are tightened to 108 to 120 in-lbs (12 to 13 Nm).

"This activity should be performed at the earliest opportunity; however, it is more important for the inspection to be performed on newly installed pumps. It is expected that for pumps supplied with low bolt torque, if a problem were to develop it would be in the form of a fuel leak soon after installation. For pumps that have been successfully installed for several months or years with no detectable leakage, it is less likely that bolt(s) are loose and therefore the urgency of this inspection is reduced."

Points of Contact: (252) 977-2720
Dan Roberts, Quality Manager
John Kriesel, Engineering Manager

Affected Plants:
Region 1: Nine Mile Point, Fitzpatrick
Region 2: Brown's Ferry, Savannah River, Oconee, St Lucie, Surry Power Station, Turkey Point, Watts Bar
Region 3: La Salle, Point Beach, Dresden, Clinton
Region 4: Grand Gulf, River Bend, Energy Northwest,, Entergy Operations Inc - Arkansas, Omaha Public Power - Fort Calhoun

* * * UPDATE FROM DAN ROBERTS TO JEFFREY WHITED AT 1202 EST ON 12/21/18 * * *

The following was received via fax:

Revision 1 involves updates on page 2 of the 10 CFR Part 21 Report which include:

"In item (iv), added reference to F4B engine application.

Revised Item (vii):

"For all affected customers:
"ESI recommends inspecting the bolt tightness for all pumps. The recommended bolt torque is 108 to 120 in-lbs (12 to 13 Nm). After verifying bolt torque, a shaft freeness check is recommended. The pump shaft should be capable of being rotated by hand in either direction. Due to the small shaft size, this check is commonly performed with a small crescent wrench or with the coupling half installed on the shaft. Inability to rotate by hand indicates loss of end clearance and the pump should be returned to ESI for rework or replacement.

"Note: For installed pumps where it is not possible to check shaft freeness, ESI recommends using a reduced bolt torque of 60 to 70 in-lbs (7 to 8 Nm). This is sufficient to ensure the bolts are snug while safeguarding against loss of end clearance that would otherwise go undetected.

"This activity should be performed at the earliest opportunity; however, it is more important for the inspection to be performed on newly installed pumps. It is expected that for pumps supplied with low bolt torque, if a problem were to develop it would be in the form of a fuel leak soon after installation. For pumps that have been successfully installed for several months or years with no detectable leakage, it is less likely that bolt(s) are loose and therefore the urgency of this inspection is reduced.

"For ESI: The dedication procedures for these pumps have been revised or are being revised to add a step to verify proper bolt torque. This will be completed prior to any future shipments. In addition, ESI is in correspondence with the pump manufacturer to implement corrective actions to prevent reoccurrence."

Notified R1DO (Jackson), R2DO (Bonser), R3DO (Stone), R4DO (Alexander), and Part 21/50.55 Reactors (e-mail).

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Power Reactor Event Number: 53764
Facility: DIABLO CANYON
Region: 4     State: CA
Unit: [] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: WES FIANT
HQ OPS Officer: ANDREW WAUGH
Notification Date: 12/01/2018
Notification Time: 16:56 [ET]
Event Date: 12/01/2018
Event Time: 00:00 [PST]
Last Update Date: 12/01/2018
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL
50.72(b)(2)(xi) - OFFSITE NOTIFICATION
50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION
Person (Organization):
JASON KOZAL (R4DO)
WILLIAM GOTT (IRD)
Unit SCRAM Code RX Crit Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
2 A/R Y 100 Power Operation 0 Hot Standby

Event Text

AUTOMATIC REACTOR TRIP OF UNIT 2 DUE TO A LOAD REJECTION

"At 1006 [PST], on December 1, 2018, with Unit 2 at 100 percent power, the reactor automatically tripped due to a load rejection from the 500 kV offsite electrical system.

"Operations responded and stabilized the plant. Decay heat is being removed by the Main Steam system to the main condenser using the steam dump valves. The cause of the load rejection is currently under investigation.

"Due to the Reactor Protection System actuation while critical, this event is being reported as a four-hour, non-emergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B). Additionally, due to the actuation of the Auxiliary Feedwater System, as expected, this event is being reported per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A).

"There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Senior Resident Inspector was notified. A press release is planned for this event."

All control rods fully inserted and the trip was uncomplicated. There was no effect on Unit 1.

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Power Reactor Event Number: 53765
Facility: NINE MILE POINT
Region: 1     State: NY
Unit: [] [2] []
RX Type: [1] GE-2,[2] GE-5
NRC Notified By: RYAN LOOMIS
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH
Notification Date: 12/02/2018
Notification Time: 06:17 [ET]
Event Date: 12/02/2018
Event Time: 00:00 [EST]
Last Update Date: 12/02/2018
Emergency Class: ALERT
10 CFR Section:
50.72(a) (1) (i) - EMERGENCY DECLARED
Person (Organization):
ART BURRITT (R1DO)
WILLIAM GOTT (IRD)
CHRIS MILLER (NRR EO)
HO NIEH (NRR ET)
DAVID LEW (R1RA)
Unit SCRAM Code RX Crit Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
2 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation

Event Text

ALERT DECLARED DUE TO EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR DAMAGE

"During the post-maintenance testing run of the Division III Emergency Diesel Generator [EDG], [a field operator] reported smoke coming from the diesel and an emergency shutdown was required. After the EDG was shutdown, significant damage [thrown rod] to the EDG was observed.

"Emergency Action Level HA 2.1 [an Alert] was declared at 0530 [EST]."

Currently, the plant is stable and operating at 100 percent power. All safety systems are available. The damage occurred approximately 20 minutes into the required 1 hour run. The licensee's emergency response organization has been activated. No offsite assistance was required or requested. There is a 14-day shutdown limiting condition for operation (LCO) in effect under technical specification 3.5.1 for the high pressure core spray system.

Notified DHS Senior Watch Officer, FEMA Operations Center, DHS NICC Watch Officer, HHS Operations Center, DOE Operations Center, EPA Emergency Operations Center, FDA EOC (email), FEMA NWC (email) and DHS Nuclear SSA (email).

The licensee has notified state and local authorities and the NRC Resident Inspector.

* * * UPDATE ON 12/2/18 AT 0737 EST FROM TODD DAVIS TO HOWIE CROUCH * * *

The licensee terminated the Alert at 0731 EST on 12/2/18. The basis for termination was that the licensee has met all procedural requirements to terminate the emergency and on-shift personnel can operate the unit without further assistance.

Notified R1DO (Burritt), NRR EO (Miller), IRD MOC (Gott), HQPAO (Couret), ERDS Activation Group, DHS Senior Watch Officer, FEMA Operations Center, DHS NICC Watch Officer, HHS Operations Center, DOE Operations Center, EPA Emergency Operations Center, FDA EOC (email), FEMA NWC (email) and DHS Nuclear SSA (email).

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Power Reactor Event Number: 53767
Facility: COMANCHE PEAK
Region: 4     State: TX
Unit: [] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: BRIAN MITCHELL
HQ OPS Officer: KAREN COTTON
Notification Date: 12/03/2018
Notification Time: 11:15 [ET]
Event Date: 12/03/2018
Event Time: 00:00 [CST]
Last Update Date: 12/03/2018
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION
Person (Organization):
JASON KOZAL (R4DO)
Unit SCRAM Code RX Crit Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
2 N Y 100 Power Operation 95 Power Operation

Event Text

ACTUATION OF BLACKOUT SEQUENCERS DUE TO LOSS OF ONE OFFSITE POWER SOURCE

"At 0315 [CST] on 12/3/18, the Comanche Peak Nuclear Power Plant experienced a loss of 138 KV transformer XST1. Unit 1 is currently at 100% power. Unit 2 was subjected to actuation of both blackout sequencers causing an automatic start of both motor driven Auxiliary Feedwater (AFW) pumps as well as the turbine driven AFW pump.

"No emergency diesel generators started as per design. Train A and B motor driven and the turbine driven AFW pumps have been returned to automatic. All other safety systems functioned per design.

"The loss of power to 138 KV transformer XST1 resulted in loss of power to both safeguards busses on Unit 2. The busses performed a load-shed and slow transfer to power supplied from 345 KV transformer XST2A as designed and were re-energized and loads sequenced back onto the busses. The emergency diesel generators are not required to start unless the busses are not re-energized by the alternate offsite transformer. All electrical power related actuations functioned as designed. There was no impact on Unit 1.

"The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector."

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Non-Power Reactor Event Number: 53771
Facility: REED COLLEGE
RX Type: 250 KW TRIGA MARK I
Comments:
Region: 0
City: PORTLAND   State: OR
County: MULTNOMAH
License #: R-112
Agreement: Y
Docket: 05000288
NRC Notified By: MELINDA KRAHENBUHL
HQ OPS Officer: BETHANY CECERE
Notification Date: 12/03/2018
Notification Time: 19:56 [ET]
Event Date: 12/01/2018
Event Time: 00:00 [PST]
Last Update Date: 12/03/2018
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
NON-POWER REACTOR EVENT
Person (Organization):
GEOFF WERTZ (NRR PM)
WILLIAM SCHUSTER (NPR)

Event Text

TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION VIOLATION

Violation of Technical Specification 6.1.3, which requires the minimum staffing when the reactor is not secured to be a licensed reactor operator, and another individual.

The key was inserted at 1316 PST and removed at 1325 PST and reinserted at 1327 PST and removed at 1331 PST on December 1, 2018. The reactor operator was trying to complete the reactor startup checklist, but was alone. No rods were withdrawn during this period.


Page Last Reviewed/Updated Friday, May 03, 2019
Friday, May 03, 2019