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Event Notification Report for October 25, 2018

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center

Event Reports For
10/24/2018 - 10/25/2018

** EVENT NUMBERS **


53646 53669 53670 53671 53693

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!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED.THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
Power Reactor Event Number: 53646
Facility: COOPER
Region: 4     State: NE
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4
NRC Notified By: TERRELL HIGGINS
HQ OPS Officer: VINCE KLCO
Notification Date: 10/05/2018
Notification Time: 09:52 [ET]
Event Date: 10/05/2018
Event Time: 00:00 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 10/24/2018
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(A) - DEGRADED CONDITION
Person (Organization):
THOMAS FARNHOLTZ (R4DO)
Unit SCRAM Code RX Crit Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
1 N N 0 Refueling 0 Refueling

Event Text

MAIN STEAM ISOLATION VALVES EXCEEDED PRIMARY CONTAINMENT LOCAL LEAK RATE ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA

"At 0520 (CDT), on October 05, 2018, it was discovered that a Primary Containment local leak rate test performed on Main Steam Isolation Valves (MSIV) exceeded its acceptance criteria.

"During Mode 1, 2, and 3, Surveillance Requirement 3.6.1.3.10 requires MSIV leakage for a single MSIV line to be less than or equal to 106 standard cubic feet per hour (scfh) when tested at 29 psig and Surveillance Requirement 3.6.1.3.12 requires the combined leakage rate for all MSIV leakage paths to be less than or equal to 212 scfh when tested at 29 psig.

"As-found for the 'C' MSIV line leakage results were unquantifiable and gave a [minimum] path value greeter than 160 scfh. This leakage rate lead to Surveillance Requirement 3.6.1.3.10 and 3.6.1.3.12 limits to be exceeded. This event is being reported as a condition of the nuclear power plant, including its principal safety barriers, being seriously degraded per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(A) since the Primary Containment Isolation Valves leakage limits for MSIVs were exceeded.

"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."

* * * RETRACTION AT 2320 EDT ON 10/24/2018 FROM THOMAS FORLAND TO MARK ABRAMOVITZ * * *

"CNS [Cooper Nuclear Station] is retracting the 8-hour non-emergency notification made on October 5, 2018 at 0520 CDT (EN# 53646). Subsequent evaluation concluded that overall as-found 'C' MSIV leakage rate was not at a level that exceeded the surveillance requirement 3.6.1.3.10 and 3.6.1.3.12 limits and thus the Primary Containment Isolation Valve leakage rate limits for the MSIVs were not exceeded.

"The NRC Senior Resident Inspector has been notified."

Notified the R4DO (Drake).

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Non-Agreement State Event Number: 53669
Rep Org: CLOROX
Licensee: CLOROX
Region: 1
City: SAN JUAN   State: PR
County:
License #: GL
Agreement: N
Docket:
NRC Notified By: TRACY GLOVER
HQ OPS Officer: VINCE KLCO
Notification Date: 10/16/2018
Notification Time: 10:12 [ET]
Event Date: 09/19/2018
Event Time: 00:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 10/16/2018
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
20.2201(a)(1)(i) - LOST/STOLEN LNM>1000X
Person (Organization):
MATT YOUNG (R1DO)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFICATION (EMAIL)
ILTAB (EMAIL)
This material event contains a "Less than Cat 3" level of radioactive material.

Event Text

MISSING FIXED GAUGE

The Clorox Company discovered a missing fixed gauge containing radioactive material. The gauge was a Filtec, model FT-2 containing 100 microCuries of Americium-241. Gauge S/N: 105382; Source S/N: 1786.

THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL

Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf

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Non-Agreement State Event Number: 53670
Rep Org: EXXON MOBIL REFINING & SUPPLY CO.
Licensee: EXXON MOBIL REFINING & SUPPLY CO.
Region: 4
City: BILLINGS   State: MT
County:
License #: 25-03375-01
Agreement: N
Docket:
NRC Notified By: BRENT HADDOW
HQ OPS Officer: PHIL NATIVIDAD
Notification Date: 10/16/2018
Notification Time: 18:41 [ET]
Event Date: 10/16/2018
Event Time: 00:00 [MDT]
Last Update Date: 10/16/2018
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
30.50(b)(2) - SAFETY EQUIPMENT FAILURE
Person (Organization):
GREG PICK (R4DO)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFICATION (EMAIL)

Event Text

INABILITY TO RETRACT A SOURCE TO ITS SHIELDED POSITION

The following information was received via email:

"On October 16th 2018, The ExxonMobil RSO at the Billings Montana Refinery (License # 25-03375-01) notified USNRC of one (1) device (insertion type nuclear gauge) that failed to function as designed (10 CFR 30.50.Section B.2).

"Device Information: Ohmart device, model MT-93-439-001 with 10 mCi. of Cs-137; S/N: 0692GK; Source capsule model: A-2102 (X38/2); Manufacture date: Nov 7th, 1994

"Upon locking out the nuclear gauge at approximately 11:00am, the nuclear gauge user identified that the cable connecting the source capsule housing (torpedo) to the source holder retrieval mechanism had become detached. The source capsule housing appears to be in its normal operating location at the bottom of the equipment guide tube in the boot of the vessel, however, due to the disconnected cable it cannot be retrieved. The following precautionary measures were taken to ensure minimal potential for exposure (1) no vessel entry permits will be issued for the vessel (2) the area around the boot was barricaded to restrict entry.

"There is no additional risk of radiation exposure to members of the general public or radiation workers due to the failure of the equipment function.

"The source capsule housing is scheduled to be retrieved, shielded, and shipped for transfer to QSA Global by VEGA Americas, Inc. on 10/18/18."

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!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED. THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
Agreement State Event Number: 53671
Rep Org: NE DIV OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIALS
Licensee: BECTON DICKINSON & CO.
Region: 4
City: COLUMBUS   State: NE
County:
License #: NE-10-08-01
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: LARRY HARISIS
HQ OPS Officer: DONG HWA PARK
Notification Date: 10/17/2018
Notification Time: 18:34 [ET]
Event Date: 10/16/2018
Event Time: 00:00 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 10/18/2018
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
Person (Organization):
GREG PICK (R4DO)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFICATION (EMAIL)

Event Text

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - EQUIPMENT FAILURE

The following was received from the State of Nebraska:

"Event type: Equipment Failure as reportable under 10 CFR 30.50, item b.2. and Inoperability of Access Control System under 10 CFR 36.83, item 5.

"Event description: Nebraska Department of Health and Human Services, Office of Radiological Health was conducting a performance-based inspection of the Becton Dickinson and Company licensee (10-08-01) during the late afternoon (between 2:30 and 3:30 pm) on October 16, 2018. During the inspection, an inspector was able to open an outer door leading from the production floor area to the control room, which is a part of the licensee's controlled access area. The control room also contains an access door which leads to a panoramic, wet source storage irradiator licensed for millions of curies of Co-60. The access door in the control room did not fail and was functioning as intended. The outer door leading to the control room was able to be opened by the inspector only after a routine entry was made. During the initial inspection by the licensee, it was determined that the locking mechanism was loose and did not latch as intended. The licensee was able to repair the locking mechanism within 2 hours and could not open the outer door after a routine entry was made.

"The State inquired with the Region IV Regional State Agreement Officer (RSAO) in the early afternoon (between 1:30 and 2:30pm) of October 17, 2018 to ask if this incident was a reportable event under 10 CFR 37. The RSAO indicated and agreed that this incident was not a report event under the reporting requirements of 10 CFR 37. Later that afternoon (between 3:30 and 4:00 pm), the RSAO stated that this incident may be a reportable event under 10 CFR 30.50, item b.2. and 10 CFR 36.83, item 5.

"The State and Region IV staff are scheduled to discuss this further on October 18, 2018, and this incident may need to be retracted.

"State Event Report ID No.: NE-18-0008"

* * * RETRACTION ON 10/18/2018 AT 1129 EDT FROM LARRY HARISIS TO ANDREW WAUGH * * *

The following retraction was received from the State of Nebraska via email:

"Please retract this event. This does not meet the reporting requirements of either 10 CFR 30.50 or 10 CFR 36.83 since this outer door is not a part of the access control system. This was reviewed and discussed by State staff and NRC Region IV staff this morning."

Notified R4DO (Pick) and NMSS Events Notification (email).

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Power Reactor Event Number: 53693
Facility: QUAD CITIES
Region: 3     State: IL
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-3,[2] GE-3
NRC Notified By: JEFF KOSCIK
HQ OPS Officer: BETHANY CECERE
Notification Date: 10/24/2018
Notification Time: 17:45 [ET]
Event Date: 10/24/2018
Event Time: 00:00 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 10/24/2018
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION
50.72(b)(3)(v)(B) - POT RHR INOP
Person (Organization):
MICHAEL KUNOWSKI (R3DO)
Unit SCRAM Code RX Crit Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
1 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation

Event Text

1/2 EDG AUTO STARTED AND LPCI/CORE SPRAY INOPERABLE DUE TO LOSS OF SAFETY BUS

"On October 24, 2018 at 0901 CDT, during performance of the 'Functional Test of Unit 1 Second Level Undervoltage,' a loss of Bus 13-1 and Bus 18 occurred. The 1/2 Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) automatically started due to a valid actuation on loss of power to Bus 13-1, but did not load due to required testing alignment.

"The loss of Bus 13-1 caused the loss of the 1A loop of Core Spray, both loops of Low Pressure Coolant Injection (LPCI), and Bus 18. All equipment responded as expected.

"Bus 13-1 and Bus 18 were restored at 0911[CDT] on 10/24/18. Other affected systems are in the process of being restored. An investigation as to the cause of the event has been initiated.

"This notification is being made in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv), 'Event or Condition that results in valid actuation of any of the systems listed in paragraph (b)(3)(iv)(B),' because the 1/2 EDG auto started due to the loss of power condition.

"This notification is also being made in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(B), 'Event or Condition that Could Have Prevented Fulfillment of a Safety Function,' because both loops of LPCI were inoperable for a short time period."

During the ten minutes where LPCI was unavailable, Unit 1 was in Technical Specification LCO 3.0.3. Unit 1 is currently in LCO 3.8.1(b) until the EDG is restored. Unit 2 was not affected by this event.

The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector.


Page Last Reviewed/Updated Friday, May 03, 2019
Friday, May 03, 2019