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Event Notification Report for August 29, 2018

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center

Event Reports For
8/28/2018 - 8/29/2018

** EVENT NUMBERS **


53555 53565 53570

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Agreement State Event Number: 53555
Rep Org: ILLINOIS EMERGENCY MGMT. AGENCY
Licensee: QUAD CITY TESTING LABORATORY
Region: 3
City: DAVENPORT   State: IL
County:
License #: IL-01089-01
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: GARY FORSEE
HQ OPS Officer: OSSY FONT
Notification Date: 08/21/2018
Notification Time: 14:24 [ET]
Event Date: 08/16/2018
Event Time: 19:00 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 08/21/2018
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
Person (Organization):
HIRONORI PETERSON (R3DO)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFICATION (EMAIL)

Event Text

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - SOURCE GUIDE TUBE DAMAGED

The following was received via email from the State of Illinois:

"On 8/16/18 at approximately 1900 [CDT], the licensee was conducting radiography operations at O'Hare Airport in Chicago, IL. At or around this time, a pipe being analyzed fell off the pipe stand onto the source guide tube, denting it and prohibiting source retraction. Chicago Fire Dept. personnel were contacted at approximately 2030 [CDT] and arrived at the facility. The licensee had established a control boundary at 2 mR/hr and maintained line of sight control over the source. The licensee's recovery team was concurrently deployed and was approximately one hour away. Chicago Fire Dept. contacted and advised IEMA [Illinois Emergency Management Agency] at 2150 [CDT]. Agency staff immediately began coordination with Chicago Fire Dept. and licensee personnel. Agency personnel were deployed at 2335 [CDT] for support operations. Licensee staff (authorized for source retrieval) were able to shield the source and subsequently work out the kink in the guide tube so the source could be cranked back into the device. Based on agency inspector observation, it is believed there were no overexposures as the scene was roped off and constant surveillance maintained. Individual dosimeters worn by the licensee staff indicate a maximum exposure of 25 millirem. Reenactments of the incident conducted after source retrieval support this conclusion.

"The licensee contacted IEMA at 0330 [CDT] on 8/17/18 to confirm that the source had been secured at 0204 [CDT]. A written report was received from the licensee on 8/18/18. There was some confusion on the associated reporting requirements with this incident as 350.3048 (10 CFR 34.101) requires a report within 30 days. Additionally, 340.1220 (10 CFR 30.50(b)) requires reporting within 24 hours. Language in 340.1220(a) that is unique to Illinois and differs from its Federal counterpart (30.50(a)), may require reporting immediately. While compliance with this Illinois reporting requirement and the licensee emergency procedures remain under review, this matter is being considered closed."

The device involved was a Delta 880, serial number D8400, equipped with a 52.6 Ci Ir-192 source, serial number 66323G.

Illinois Item Number: IL 180032

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Power Reactor Event Number: 53565
Facility: NINE MILE POINT
Region: 1     State: NY
Unit: [] [2] []
RX Type: [1] GE-2,[2] GE-5
NRC Notified By: HEATH STICKNEY
HQ OPS Officer: ANDREW WAUGH
Notification Date: 08/27/2018
Notification Time: 03:12 [ET]
Event Date: 08/27/2018
Event Time: 00:33 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 08/28/2018
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL
Person (Organization):
DONNA JANDA (R1DO)
Unit SCRAM Code RX Crit Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
2 A/R Y 100 Power Operation 0 Hot Shutdown

Event Text

AUTOMATIC SCRAM DUE TO A GENERATOR TRIP

"At 0033 EDT Nine Mile Point Unit 2 experienced an automatic scram on high reactor pressure due to a turbine trip. The cause of the turbine trip was due to a generator trip. All control rods inserted. There were no safety system actuations. The cause of the generator trip is being investigated.

"This is a 4-Hour report for 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) RPS Actuation.

"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."

Decay heat is being removed via the main condenser. Reactor vessel water level is being maintained by the condensate and feedwater systems.

The licensee will be notifying the state of New York.

* * * UPDATE FROM DANIEL CIFONELLI TO HOWIE CROUCH AT 1653 EDT ON 8/28/18 * * *

After further review, the licensee has determined that the cause of the automatic scram was due to turbine control valve fast closure as a result of the turbine trip, not high reactor pressure, as originally reported.

The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

Notified R1DO (Lilliendahl).

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Part 21 Event Number: 53570
Rep Org: CURTISS WRIGHT NUCLEAR DIVISION
Licensee: SENASYS
Region: 3
City: CINCINNATI   State: OH
County:
License #:
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: TIM FRANCHUK
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH
Notification Date: 08/28/2018
Notification Time: 13:41 [ET]
Event Date: 06/25/2018
Event Time: 00:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 08/28/2018
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
21.21(d)(3)(i) - DEFECTS AND NONCOMPLIANCE
Person (Organization):
RICHARD SKOKOWSKI (R3DO)
- PART 21/50.55 REACTORS (EMAIL)
JON LILLIENDAHL (R1DO)

Event Text

PART 21 NOTIFICATION - SELECTOR SWITCH SHORTED DUE TO INCORRECT HARDWARE

The following information is summarized and was obtained from Curtiss-Wright via fax:

"Curtiss-Wright was notified by Exelon Calvert Cliffs Plant that a Senasys selector switch P/N 910CMC-5240X (previously provided by Curtiss-Wright under Exelon purchase order 00630804), had failed a post-installation test. Calvert Cliffs sent the suspect switch to Exelon Powerlabs where the failure was found to have been caused by an assembly screw that was 1/8 inch too long, allowing it to cut into the coil of the switch, causing an electrical short. Correspondence between Exelon and the manufacturer determined that an inventory error had occurred.

"According to [Curtiss-Wright] records, only one customer and one plant received these defective switches. Exelon Generation's Calvert Cliffs received 5 switches on Exelon PO number 00630804 Rev. 2. Exelon Calvert Cliffs has been notified of this issue.

"Curtiss Wright's dedication plan will be revised to include a note to ensure no selector switches, for this part number, are manufactured with the November and December 2017 date codes.

"If you have any questions pertaining to this information, please contact Timothy Franchuk, Director of Quality Assurance, at 513-201-2176"


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