Alert

Due to a lapse in appropriations, the NRC has ceased normal operations. However, excepted and exempted activities necessary to maintain critical health and safety functions—as well as essential progress on designated critical activities, including those specified in Executive Order 14300—will continue, consistent with the OMB-Approved NRC Lapse Plan.

Event Notification Report for August 01, 2018

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center

Event Reports For
7/31/2018 - 8/1/2018

** EVENT NUMBERS **

53485

53521

53523

!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED.THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
Power Reactor	Event Number: 53485
Facility: CALLAWAY Region: 4 State: MO Unit: [1] [] [] RX Type: [1] W-4-LP NRC Notified By: JEREMY CZESCHIN HQ OPS Officer: VINCE KLCO	Notification Date: 07/03/2018 Notification Time: 19:07 [ET] Event Date: 07/03/2018 Event Time: 15:15 [CDT] Last Update Date: 07/31/2018
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY 10 CFR Section: 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) - UNANALYZED CONDITION	Person (Organization): GEOFFREY MILLER (R4DO)

Unit

SCRAM Code

RX Crit

Initial PWR

Initial RX Mode

Current PWR

Current RX Mode

100

Power Operation

100

Power Operation

Event Text

DISCOVERY OF AN UNANALYZED CONDITION THAT SIGNIFICANTLY DEGRADES PLANT SAFETY

"On July 3, 2018, while performing a review of Emergency Operating Procedures, a concern was identified regarding the potential for excessive loss of ultimate heat sink inventory (UHS) through the auxiliary feedwater (AFW) system mini-flow recirculation pathway. This condition would have the potential to prevent the ultimate heat sink from providing an adequate inventory of water for a 30-day mission time.

"The normal water supply for the Callaway AFW system is the condensate storage tank (CST). The CST is a non-safety grade component. The safety-grade supply for AFW is the essential service water (ESW) system. The ESW system is supplied by the UHS. The UHS thermal performance analysis accounts for a loss of UHS inventory to the AFW system up until the point of the accident sequence that the AFW pumps would be secured. The analysis did not include an allowance for loss of UHS inventory through the AFW mini-flow recirculation pathway following the AFW pumps being secured. The EOP guidance that secures the AFW pumps does not isolate the mini-flow recirculation pathway.

"Initial estimates indicate that loss of UHS inventory through the mini-flow recirculation pathway, if not isolated, would preclude the UHS from completing its 30-day mission time. This potential for depletion of the UHS placed the plant in an unanalyzed condition that significantly degraded safety.

"Callaway has issued interim guidance to the on-shift personnel regarding this concern to ensure that the ultimate heat sink water level is maintained at a level that will be adequate to mitigate the potential loss of inventory.

"This condition is reportable per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) for an unanalyzed condition that significantly degrades safety.

"The NRC Resident Inspectors have been notified of this condition."

* * * RETRACTION ON 07/31/2018 AT 1430 EDT FROM LEE YOUNG TO ANDREW WAUGH * * *

"Event Notification (EN) 53485, made on July 3, 2018, is being retracted because re-evaluation performed subsequent to the notification has demonstrated, based on actual plant equipment and environmental conditions, that the unanalyzed inventory losses previously reported by EN 53485 would not have depleted the UHS inventory to an unacceptable level during its 30-day mission time.

"The re-evaluation has led to the conclusion that the previously unanalyzed losses of UHS inventory would not have prevented the UHS from performing its specified safety functions and meeting its 30-day mission time requirements. With the UHS capable of performing its specified safety functions and meeting its 30-day mission time requirements, the systems supported by the UHS would have remained capable of performing their specified safety functions. Based on these considerations, it has been determined that the condition reported in EN 53485 did not result in the plant being in an unanalyzed condition that significantly degraded safety. Consequently, the condition did not meet the criteria for an 8-hour notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) for an unanalyzed condition that significantly degrades safety.

"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified of the Event Notification retraction."

Notified R4DO (Gaddy).

Agreement State	Event Number: 53521
Rep Org: TEXAS DEPT OF STATE HEALTH SERVICES Licensee: AVILES ENGINEERING CORPORATION Region: 4 City: HOUSTON State: TX County: License #: L03016 Agreement: Y Docket: NRC Notified By: KAREN BLANCHARD HQ OPS Officer: DONG HWA PARK	Notification Date: 07/23/2018 Notification Time: 18:33 [ET] Event Date: 07/23/2018 Event Time: 00:00 [CDT] Last Update Date: 07/23/2018
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY 10 CFR Section: AGREEMENT STATE	Person (Organization): HEATHER GEPFORD (R4DO) NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFICATION (EMAIL)

Event Text

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - DAMAGED MOISTURE-DENSITY GAUGE

The following was received from the State of Texas via email.

"On July 23, 2018, the licensee reported that one of its Troxler model 3430 moisture/density gauges (SN: 68529) had been run over and damaged by a dozer at a temporary job site. The licensee's technician was performing a moisture test when he saw a dozer moving backward into the area and toward the gauge. The technician yelled at the dozer driver but was unable to get his attention and there was not enough time for the technician to move the gauge. The gauge was severely damaged. The 40 milliCurie americium-241/beryllium source (SN: 47-21269) remained secure in its shielding. The source insertion rod was bent and broken and the 8 milliCurie cesium-137 source, which was still attached to the rod, could not be retracted. The licensee wrapped the exposed cesium source in lead blankets and placed the gauge back into its transport case. The area and dozer tracks were surveyed--there were no readings above background. The exterior of the transport case was surveyed and the highest reading was 0.4 mR/hr at the blanketed source. The damaged gauge was transported to the manufacturer's service center where a technician made the determination it was not repairable. The licensee is storing the gauge at its facility until arrangements can be made for disposal. An investigation into this event is ongoing. More information will be provided as it becomes available in accordance with SA-300."

Texas Incident #: 9600

Agreement State	Event Number: 53523
Rep Org: OK DEQ RAD MANAGEMENT Licensee: DBI, INC. Region: 4 City: TULSA State: OK County: License #: OK-32174-01 Agreement: Y Docket: NRC Notified By: KEVIN SAMPSON HQ OPS Officer: DONG HWA PARK	Notification Date: 07/24/2018 Notification Time: 13:40 [ET] Event Date: 07/23/2018 Event Time: 20:00 [CDT] Last Update Date: 07/24/2018
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY 10 CFR Section: AGREEMENT STATE	Person (Organization): HEATHER GEPFORD (R4DO) NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFICATION (EMAIL)

Event Text

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - RADIOGRAPHY CAMERA MALFUNCTION

The following report was received via e-mail:

"At approximately [2000 hrs. CDT] last night (July 23) a crew working at the DBI, Inc. facility in Tulsa had a casting they were shooting fall on the guide tube, crushing it, so that the source (28 Ci of Ir-192) could not be retracted. The RSO [Radiation Safety Officer] was notified and responded to the scene. DBI is licensed to perform source recoveries which they successfully did. As far as we [Oklahoma Department of Environmental Quality] know right now, there were no over-exposures as a result of this incident. [The state of Oklahoma] will provide details on the equipment involved when we have them."

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