Event Notification Report for June 04, 2018
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
06/03/2018 - 06/04/2018
Non-Agreement State
Event Number: 53503
Rep Org: TETRA TECH EC, INC.
Licensee: TETRA TECH EC, INC.
Region: 1
City: BRUNSWICK State: ME
County:
License #: 29-31396-01
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: STEVEN ADAMS
HQ OPS Officer: DONALD NORWOOD
Licensee: TETRA TECH EC, INC.
Region: 1
City: BRUNSWICK State: ME
County:
License #: 29-31396-01
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: STEVEN ADAMS
HQ OPS Officer: DONALD NORWOOD
Notification Date: 07/12/2018
Notification Time: 13:30 [ET]
Event Date: 06/04/2018
Event Time: 00:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 07/12/2018
Notification Time: 13:30 [ET]
Event Date: 06/04/2018
Event Time: 00:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 07/12/2018
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
20.2201(a)(1)(ii) - LOST/STOLEN LNM>10X
10 CFR Section:
20.2201(a)(1)(ii) - LOST/STOLEN LNM>10X
Person (Organization):
FRED BOWER (R1DO)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFICATION (EMAIL)
MARK MACDONALD (ILTAB)
CANADA (EMAIL)
FRED BOWER (R1DO)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFICATION (EMAIL)
MARK MACDONALD (ILTAB)
CANADA (EMAIL)
STOLEN RADIOACTIVE CALIBRATION CHECK SOURCES
The following is a synopsis of information received:
This event notification is being made in reference to seven radioactive calibration check sources that were stolen from the Tetra Tech EC, Inc. (TtEC) temporary job site at the former Naval Air Station Brunswick (NASB) in Brunswick, Maine. TtEC currently is performing work at NASB for the U.S. Department of the Navy, Naval Facilities Engineering Command
On the morning of June 4, 2018, Sites 1 and 3 were inspected as part of the follow-up to a May 25, 2018 break-in of the TtEC field trailer. It was observed and reported to the TtEC Project Manager at approximately 0825 EDT that the Navy-owned, locked bunkers (three total), the abandoned Navy warehouse, and TtEC conex box had been broken into sometime after May 25, 2018. The TtEC Project Manager was informed that they were likely broken into during the weekend of June 2 and 3, 2018. Missing from one bunker was a locked safe that contained seven low-level radioactive check sources (five leased from subcontractor RSRS, and two owned by TtEC). The safe had a label bearing the radiation symbol and the words 'CAUTION, RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL,' as was each of the source holders.
At the time of the theft, the sources were locked inside a secure safe, and the safe was, in turn, locked inside a former munitions bunker. The entire safe was stolen from the munitions bunker. The bunker was locked with a heavy-duty keyed padlock issued by the Navy.
The following is a listing of the stolen sources:
ID No. 109402, Sr-90, 0.00065 microCuries
ID No. A2-575, Sr-90, 0.00563 microCuries
ID No. 019-456, Cs-137, 2.72463 microCuries
ID No. 079-705, Cs-137, 5.80465 microCuries
ID No. 129-6119, Cs-137, 2.74557 microCuries
ID No. H7-605, Th-230, 0.01060 microCuries
ID No. 119-706, Th-230, 0.00957 microCuries.
The exposure rate, at 30 centimeters from the safe, is 15 to 16 microroentgens per hour and is not distinguishable from background. If the thieves are successful at opening the safe, they might handle the sources. Of the seven radioactive sources, the cesium-137 source (Identification No. 079-705) would result in the maximum dose to a member of public. An individual would receive a dose of approximately 6 millirem (mrem)/hour if this source was left in a backpack or jacket pocket. The dose rate to an individual 1 foot from this source is 0.041 mrem/hour, and the dose rate to an individual 1 yard from this source is 0.0046 mrem/hour.
A thorough search of the TtEC temporary job site at NASB, including all buildings, bins, and grounds, has been performed in an attempt to recover the sources, but none of the sources were found. The local police have been notified of the theft, and a formal police report was filed. As of today, the sources have not been recovered.
THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL
Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf
The following is a synopsis of information received:
This event notification is being made in reference to seven radioactive calibration check sources that were stolen from the Tetra Tech EC, Inc. (TtEC) temporary job site at the former Naval Air Station Brunswick (NASB) in Brunswick, Maine. TtEC currently is performing work at NASB for the U.S. Department of the Navy, Naval Facilities Engineering Command
On the morning of June 4, 2018, Sites 1 and 3 were inspected as part of the follow-up to a May 25, 2018 break-in of the TtEC field trailer. It was observed and reported to the TtEC Project Manager at approximately 0825 EDT that the Navy-owned, locked bunkers (three total), the abandoned Navy warehouse, and TtEC conex box had been broken into sometime after May 25, 2018. The TtEC Project Manager was informed that they were likely broken into during the weekend of June 2 and 3, 2018. Missing from one bunker was a locked safe that contained seven low-level radioactive check sources (five leased from subcontractor RSRS, and two owned by TtEC). The safe had a label bearing the radiation symbol and the words 'CAUTION, RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL,' as was each of the source holders.
At the time of the theft, the sources were locked inside a secure safe, and the safe was, in turn, locked inside a former munitions bunker. The entire safe was stolen from the munitions bunker. The bunker was locked with a heavy-duty keyed padlock issued by the Navy.
The following is a listing of the stolen sources:
ID No. 109402, Sr-90, 0.00065 microCuries
ID No. A2-575, Sr-90, 0.00563 microCuries
ID No. 019-456, Cs-137, 2.72463 microCuries
ID No. 079-705, Cs-137, 5.80465 microCuries
ID No. 129-6119, Cs-137, 2.74557 microCuries
ID No. H7-605, Th-230, 0.01060 microCuries
ID No. 119-706, Th-230, 0.00957 microCuries.
The exposure rate, at 30 centimeters from the safe, is 15 to 16 microroentgens per hour and is not distinguishable from background. If the thieves are successful at opening the safe, they might handle the sources. Of the seven radioactive sources, the cesium-137 source (Identification No. 079-705) would result in the maximum dose to a member of public. An individual would receive a dose of approximately 6 millirem (mrem)/hour if this source was left in a backpack or jacket pocket. The dose rate to an individual 1 foot from this source is 0.041 mrem/hour, and the dose rate to an individual 1 yard from this source is 0.0046 mrem/hour.
A thorough search of the TtEC temporary job site at NASB, including all buildings, bins, and grounds, has been performed in an attempt to recover the sources, but none of the sources were found. The local police have been notified of the theft, and a formal police report was filed. As of today, the sources have not been recovered.
THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL
Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf
Power Reactor
Event Number: 53443
Facility: BRAIDWOOD
Region: 3 State: IL
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: JACOB EILERTSON
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH
Region: 3 State: IL
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: JACOB EILERTSON
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH
Notification Date: 06/04/2018
Notification Time: 14:00 [ET]
Event Date: 06/04/2018
Event Time: 09:20 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 06/04/2018
Notification Time: 14:00 [ET]
Event Date: 06/04/2018
Event Time: 09:20 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 06/04/2018
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION
Person (Organization):
RICHARD SKOKOWSKI (R3DO)
RICHARD SKOKOWSKI (R3DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | M/R | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 0 | Hot Standby |
MANUAL REACTOR TRIP ON LOWERING STEAM GENERATOR WATER LEVEL
"At 0920 CDT, Braidwood Unit 1 reactor was manually tripped due to lowering steam generator water levels following a trip of the 1C main feedwater pump. The cause of the 1C main feedwater pump trip is unknown at this time and is under investigation.
"Both trains of Braidwood Unit 1 auxiliary feedwater started automatically following the reactor trip to maintain steam generator water levels.
"All systems responded as expected. Steam generator power operated relief valves lifted momentarily and reseated as designed in response to the secondary transient due to the reactor trip. The main steam dump valves are in service to the main condenser to provide heat sink cooling. The plant is being maintained at normal operating pressure and temperature. AC power is being provided by offsite power with the diesel generators in standby and all safety systems available. There is no impact to Unit 2.
"This report is being made per 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) for a RPS actuation, 4-hr. notification, and per 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) for an automatic actuation of the auxiliary feedwater system, 8-hr. notification."
All rods inserted into the core during the trip. Concerning the relief valves momentarily lifting and reseating, there is no known primary-to-secondary leakage.
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
"At 0920 CDT, Braidwood Unit 1 reactor was manually tripped due to lowering steam generator water levels following a trip of the 1C main feedwater pump. The cause of the 1C main feedwater pump trip is unknown at this time and is under investigation.
"Both trains of Braidwood Unit 1 auxiliary feedwater started automatically following the reactor trip to maintain steam generator water levels.
"All systems responded as expected. Steam generator power operated relief valves lifted momentarily and reseated as designed in response to the secondary transient due to the reactor trip. The main steam dump valves are in service to the main condenser to provide heat sink cooling. The plant is being maintained at normal operating pressure and temperature. AC power is being provided by offsite power with the diesel generators in standby and all safety systems available. There is no impact to Unit 2.
"This report is being made per 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) for a RPS actuation, 4-hr. notification, and per 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) for an automatic actuation of the auxiliary feedwater system, 8-hr. notification."
All rods inserted into the core during the trip. Concerning the relief valves momentarily lifting and reseating, there is no known primary-to-secondary leakage.
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.