Event Notification Report for May 23, 2018
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
05/22/2018 - 05/23/2018
EVENT NUMBERS
53422534235342453425534265342753420
Part 21
Event Number: 53422
Rep Org: WESTINGHOUSE ELECTRIC COMPANY
Licensee: WESTINGHOUSE
Region: 1
City: CRANBERRY TOWNSHIP State: PA
County:
License #:
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: JAMES GRESHAM
HQ OPS Officer: THOMAS KENDZIA
Licensee: WESTINGHOUSE
Region: 1
City: CRANBERRY TOWNSHIP State: PA
County:
License #:
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: JAMES GRESHAM
HQ OPS Officer: THOMAS KENDZIA
Notification Date: 05/23/2018
Notification Time: 14:19 [ET]
Event Date: 05/23/2018
Event Time: 00:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 05/23/2018
Notification Time: 14:19 [ET]
Event Date: 05/23/2018
Event Time: 00:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 05/23/2018
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
21.21(d)(3)(i) - DEFECTS AND NONCOMPLIANCE
10 CFR Section:
21.21(d)(3)(i) - DEFECTS AND NONCOMPLIANCE
Person (Organization):
ANTHONY DIMITRIADIS (R1DO)
EUGENE GUTHRIE (R2DO)
ROBERT DALEY (R3DO)
JASON KOZAL (R4DO)
- PART 21/50.55 REACTORS (EMAIL)
ANTHONY DIMITRIADIS (R1DO)
EUGENE GUTHRIE (R2DO)
ROBERT DALEY (R3DO)
JASON KOZAL (R4DO)
- PART 21/50.55 REACTORS (EMAIL)
PART 21 - WEAR OF THERMAL SLEEVE IN WESTINGHOUSE CONTROL ROD DRIVE MECHANISMS
The following notification is an excerpt from the received report:
"Westinghouse nuclear steam supply system (NSSS) plants that have thermal sleeves in the control rod drive mechanism (CRDM) penetration tubes, wear of the thermal sleeve flange against the tube could have safety consequences that were not previously considered. Recent operating experience, during startup procedures at an Electricite de France (EdF) plant, has shown the possibility for the flange remnant from a thermal sleeve to interfere with control rod movement."
Potential affected plants include, A. W. Vogtle 1 & 2, Braidwood 1 & 2, Byron 1 & 2, Callaway, Catawba 1 & 2, Comanche Peak 1 & 2, Diablo Canyon 1 & 2, McGuire 1 & 2, Millstone 3, Seabrook, Sequoyah 1 & 2, Shearon Harris, South Texas 1 & 2, Watts Bar 1 & 2, Wolf Creek, Beaver Valley 1 & 2, D.C. Cook 1 & 2, Indian Point 2 & 3, North Anna 1 & 2, Point Beach 1 & 2, Prairie Island 1 & 2, R. E. Ginna, Salem 1 & 2, Surry 1 & 2, and Turkey Point 3 & 4.
Name and address of the individual or individuals informing the Commission.
James A. Gresham
Westinghouse Electric Company
1000 Westinghouse Drive, Suite 259 Cranberry Township, Pennsylvania 16066
Direct tel: (412) 374-4643
Direct fax: (724) 940-8560
e-mail: greshaja@westinghouse.com
The following notification is an excerpt from the received report:
"Westinghouse nuclear steam supply system (NSSS) plants that have thermal sleeves in the control rod drive mechanism (CRDM) penetration tubes, wear of the thermal sleeve flange against the tube could have safety consequences that were not previously considered. Recent operating experience, during startup procedures at an Electricite de France (EdF) plant, has shown the possibility for the flange remnant from a thermal sleeve to interfere with control rod movement."
Potential affected plants include, A. W. Vogtle 1 & 2, Braidwood 1 & 2, Byron 1 & 2, Callaway, Catawba 1 & 2, Comanche Peak 1 & 2, Diablo Canyon 1 & 2, McGuire 1 & 2, Millstone 3, Seabrook, Sequoyah 1 & 2, Shearon Harris, South Texas 1 & 2, Watts Bar 1 & 2, Wolf Creek, Beaver Valley 1 & 2, D.C. Cook 1 & 2, Indian Point 2 & 3, North Anna 1 & 2, Point Beach 1 & 2, Prairie Island 1 & 2, R. E. Ginna, Salem 1 & 2, Surry 1 & 2, and Turkey Point 3 & 4.
Name and address of the individual or individuals informing the Commission.
James A. Gresham
Westinghouse Electric Company
1000 Westinghouse Drive, Suite 259 Cranberry Township, Pennsylvania 16066
Direct tel: (412) 374-4643
Direct fax: (724) 940-8560
e-mail: greshaja@westinghouse.com
Power Reactor
Event Number: 53423
Facility: COMANCHE PEAK
Region: 4 State: TX
Unit: [] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: LOREN STUCK
HQ OPS Officer: THOMAS KENDZIA
Region: 4 State: TX
Unit: [] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: LOREN STUCK
HQ OPS Officer: THOMAS KENDZIA
Notification Date: 05/23/2018
Notification Time: 16:10 [ET]
Event Date: 05/23/2018
Event Time: 08:48 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 05/23/2018
Notification Time: 16:10 [ET]
Event Date: 05/23/2018
Event Time: 08:48 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 05/23/2018
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
Person (Organization):
JASON KOZAL (R4DO)
JASON KOZAL (R4DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
LOSS OF EMERGENCY ASSESSMENT CAPABILITY
"At time 0848 (CDT), Main Steamline Radiation Monitor 2-RE-2328 (Main Steamline 2-04) lost communications and was declared non-functional.
"With this radiation monitor non-functional, all of the emergency action levels for a steam generator tube rupture in steam generator 2-04 could neither be evaluated nor monitored. This unplanned condition is reportable as a loss of assessment capability per 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(xiii).
"Comanche Peak Nuclear Power Plant [CPNPP] has assurance of steam generator integrity and fuel cladding integrity and there is a negligible safety significance to the current condition from a public health and safety perspective.
"Additionally, compensatory measures are in place to assure adequate monitoring capability is available to implement the CPNPP emergency plan in the unlikely event of challenges to the steam generator or fuel cladding. The N16 radiation monitor serves as a backup with alarm function and Radiation Protection technicians have been briefed on taking local readings with a Geiger-Mueller tube on MSL 2-04.
"Corrective actions are being pursued to restore 2-RE-2328 to a functional status.
"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."
"At time 0848 (CDT), Main Steamline Radiation Monitor 2-RE-2328 (Main Steamline 2-04) lost communications and was declared non-functional.
"With this radiation monitor non-functional, all of the emergency action levels for a steam generator tube rupture in steam generator 2-04 could neither be evaluated nor monitored. This unplanned condition is reportable as a loss of assessment capability per 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(xiii).
"Comanche Peak Nuclear Power Plant [CPNPP] has assurance of steam generator integrity and fuel cladding integrity and there is a negligible safety significance to the current condition from a public health and safety perspective.
"Additionally, compensatory measures are in place to assure adequate monitoring capability is available to implement the CPNPP emergency plan in the unlikely event of challenges to the steam generator or fuel cladding. The N16 radiation monitor serves as a backup with alarm function and Radiation Protection technicians have been briefed on taking local readings with a Geiger-Mueller tube on MSL 2-04.
"Corrective actions are being pursued to restore 2-RE-2328 to a functional status.
"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."
Power Reactor
Event Number: 53424
Facility: PALO VERDE
Region: 4 State: AZ
Unit: [] [2] []
RX Type: [1] CE,[2] CE,[3] CE
NRC Notified By: DAVID HECKMAN
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH
Region: 4 State: AZ
Unit: [] [2] []
RX Type: [1] CE,[2] CE,[3] CE
NRC Notified By: DAVID HECKMAN
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH
Notification Date: 05/23/2018
Notification Time: 17:37 [ET]
Event Date: 05/23/2018
Event Time: 11:28 [MST]
Last Update Date: 05/23/2018
Notification Time: 17:37 [ET]
Event Date: 05/23/2018
Event Time: 11:28 [MST]
Last Update Date: 05/23/2018
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL
Person (Organization):
JASON KOZAL (R4DO)
JASON KOZAL (R4DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2 | A/R | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 0 | Hot Standby |
AUTOMATIC REACTOR TRIP ON LOW DEPARTURE FROM NUCLEATE BOILING RATIO
"The following event description is based on information currently available. If through subsequent reviews of this event additional information is identified that is pertinent to this event or alters the information being provided at this time a follow-up notification will be made via the ENS or under the reporting requirements of 10CFR50.73.
"On May 23, 2018, at approximately 1128 Mountain Standard Time (MST), the Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station (PVNGS) Unit 2 control room received reactor protection system alarms for low departure from nucleate boiling ratio and an automatic reactor trip occurred. Prior to the reactor trip, Unit 2 was operating normally at 100 percent power. Plant operators entered the reactor trip procedures and diagnosed an uncomplicated reactor trip. All CEAs [control element assemblies] fully inserted into the core. No emergency classification was required per the PVNGS Emergency Plan.
"The Unit 2 safety-related electrical buses remained energized from normal offsite power during the event. There was no impact to the required circuits between the offsite transmission network and the onsite Class 1E Electrical Power Distribution System; the offsite power grid is stable.
"No major equipment was inoperable prior to the event that contributed to the event or complicated operator response. Unit 2 is currently stable in Mode 3 with the reactor coolant system at normal operating temperature and pressure. The cause of the reactor trip is under investigation.
"The event did not result in any challenges to fission product barriers and there were no adverse safety consequences as a result of this event. The event did not adversely affect the safe operation of the plant or the health and safety of the public.
"The NRC Resident Inspector has been informed of the Unit 2 reactor trip."
Decay is being removed via steam dumps to condenser. Units 1 and 3 at Palo Verde were unaffected by the transient and continue to operate at 100 percent power.
"The following event description is based on information currently available. If through subsequent reviews of this event additional information is identified that is pertinent to this event or alters the information being provided at this time a follow-up notification will be made via the ENS or under the reporting requirements of 10CFR50.73.
"On May 23, 2018, at approximately 1128 Mountain Standard Time (MST), the Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station (PVNGS) Unit 2 control room received reactor protection system alarms for low departure from nucleate boiling ratio and an automatic reactor trip occurred. Prior to the reactor trip, Unit 2 was operating normally at 100 percent power. Plant operators entered the reactor trip procedures and diagnosed an uncomplicated reactor trip. All CEAs [control element assemblies] fully inserted into the core. No emergency classification was required per the PVNGS Emergency Plan.
"The Unit 2 safety-related electrical buses remained energized from normal offsite power during the event. There was no impact to the required circuits between the offsite transmission network and the onsite Class 1E Electrical Power Distribution System; the offsite power grid is stable.
"No major equipment was inoperable prior to the event that contributed to the event or complicated operator response. Unit 2 is currently stable in Mode 3 with the reactor coolant system at normal operating temperature and pressure. The cause of the reactor trip is under investigation.
"The event did not result in any challenges to fission product barriers and there were no adverse safety consequences as a result of this event. The event did not adversely affect the safe operation of the plant or the health and safety of the public.
"The NRC Resident Inspector has been informed of the Unit 2 reactor trip."
Decay is being removed via steam dumps to condenser. Units 1 and 3 at Palo Verde were unaffected by the transient and continue to operate at 100 percent power.
Agreement State
Event Number: 53425
Rep Org: VIRGINIA RAD MATERIALS PROGRAM
Licensee: WESTROCK, SEVEN HILLS PAPER
Region: 1
City: LYNCHBURG State: VA
County:
License #: GL-1451
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: ASFAW FENTA
HQ OPS Officer: THOMAS KENDZIA
Licensee: WESTROCK, SEVEN HILLS PAPER
Region: 1
City: LYNCHBURG State: VA
County:
License #: GL-1451
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: ASFAW FENTA
HQ OPS Officer: THOMAS KENDZIA
Notification Date: 05/23/2018
Notification Time: 15:10 [ET]
Event Date: 05/23/2018
Event Time: 00:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 05/23/2018
Notification Time: 15:10 [ET]
Event Date: 05/23/2018
Event Time: 00:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 05/23/2018
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
Person (Organization):
ANTHONY DIMITRIADIS (R1DO)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFICATION (EMAIL)
ANTHONY DIMITRIADIS (R1DO)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFICATION (EMAIL)
AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - SHUTTER FOR FIXED GAUGE WOULD NOT OPEN
The following report was received from the State of Virginia via email:
"On May 23, 2018, the Radiation Safety Officer of the licensee reported to the Agency [Virginia Office of Radiological Health] that an on-site technician noted that the computer system had issued a 'Wheel Stuck' alarm, and found that the shutter of the fixed gauge could not open when ordered to do so due to a broken part in the shutter positioning mechanism. This was discovered on May 19, 2018.
"The gauge is a Valmet Automation Model BWM-T, serial number 18500173, with two 400 milliCurie Krypton-85 sources (IUT Model KR85.1, capsule ID number X9093). The device was repaired by HOOSIER Technical Services, and is currently working correctly.
"More information has been requested by the Agency regarding the root cause of the problem. This report will be updated when any additional information is received."
Virginia Event Report ID No.: VA-18-002
The following report was received from the State of Virginia via email:
"On May 23, 2018, the Radiation Safety Officer of the licensee reported to the Agency [Virginia Office of Radiological Health] that an on-site technician noted that the computer system had issued a 'Wheel Stuck' alarm, and found that the shutter of the fixed gauge could not open when ordered to do so due to a broken part in the shutter positioning mechanism. This was discovered on May 19, 2018.
"The gauge is a Valmet Automation Model BWM-T, serial number 18500173, with two 400 milliCurie Krypton-85 sources (IUT Model KR85.1, capsule ID number X9093). The device was repaired by HOOSIER Technical Services, and is currently working correctly.
"More information has been requested by the Agency regarding the root cause of the problem. This report will be updated when any additional information is received."
Virginia Event Report ID No.: VA-18-002
Power Reactor
Event Number: 53426
Facility: CALLAWAY
Region: 4 State: MO
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: JEREMY CZESCHIN
HQ OPS Officer: THOMAS KENDZIA
Region: 4 State: MO
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: JEREMY CZESCHIN
HQ OPS Officer: THOMAS KENDZIA
Notification Date: 05/23/2018
Notification Time: 18:32 [ET]
Event Date: 05/23/2018
Event Time: 07:30 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 05/23/2018
Notification Time: 18:32 [ET]
Event Date: 05/23/2018
Event Time: 07:30 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 05/23/2018
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
26.719 - FITNESS FOR DUTY
10 CFR Section:
26.719 - FITNESS FOR DUTY
Person (Organization):
JASON KOZAL (R4DO)
FFD GROUP (EMAIL)
JASON KOZAL (R4DO)
FFD GROUP (EMAIL)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
FITNESS FOR DUTY
"On May 23, 2018 Callaway determined that a violation of one provision of the site's Fitness for Duty (FFD) policy occurred. FFD pre-access testing confirmed a test failure for alcohol. The violation was committed by a non-licensed supervisory employee. The individual did not hold unescorted access to the plant but did perform behavioral observation program (BOP) duties. The BOP qualification has been removed.
"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified by the licensee."
"On May 23, 2018 Callaway determined that a violation of one provision of the site's Fitness for Duty (FFD) policy occurred. FFD pre-access testing confirmed a test failure for alcohol. The violation was committed by a non-licensed supervisory employee. The individual did not hold unescorted access to the plant but did perform behavioral observation program (BOP) duties. The BOP qualification has been removed.
"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified by the licensee."
Agreement State
Event Number: 53427
Rep Org: WISCONSIN RADIATION PROTECTION
Licensee: ALTER METAL RECYCLING
Region: 3
City: GREEN BAY State: WI
County:
License #: N/A
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: MEGAN SHOBER
HQ OPS Officer: OSSY FONT
Licensee: ALTER METAL RECYCLING
Region: 3
City: GREEN BAY State: WI
County:
License #: N/A
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: MEGAN SHOBER
HQ OPS Officer: OSSY FONT
Notification Date: 05/25/2018
Notification Time: 18:04 [ET]
Event Date: 05/23/2018
Event Time: 00:00 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 05/31/2018
Notification Time: 18:04 [ET]
Event Date: 05/23/2018
Event Time: 00:00 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 05/31/2018
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
Person (Organization):
ROBERT DALEY (R3DO)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFICATION (EMAIL)
ROBERT DALEY (R3DO)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFICATION (EMAIL)
AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - FOUND SOURCE
The following information was received via E-mail:
"On May 23, 2018, a scrap yard identified a radioactive source in an outgoing load of waste intended for a landfill. The radioactive source is one inch long and approximately one-half inch in diameter. The Wisconsin Department of Health Services responded to the scrap yard on May 25, 2018, and measured a maximum exposure rate of 210 mR/hr on contact with the source. The source was confirmed to not be leaking. There are no markings or numbers on the source, and isotope identification is pending. It is not known how long the scrap yard was in possession of the source. The source is now in secured storage at the scrap yard. Additional updates will be provided as information about the source and possible original device become available."
Wisconsin Event Report ID No.: WI180008
* * * UPDATE FROM KRISTA KUHLMAN TO DONALD NORWOOD AT 1524 EDT ON 5/31/2018 * * *
The following information was received via E-mail:
"On May 31, 2018, the department performed additional characterization of the source at the scrap yard with assistance from the EPA. It has been determined that it is a Ba-133 source, with an activity between 350 - 500 microCuries. The department has not been able to determine the origin of the source. It will continue to work with the scrap yard to determine the proper disposal path."
Notified R3DO (Cameron) and NMSS Events Notification E-mail group.
The following information was received via E-mail:
"On May 23, 2018, a scrap yard identified a radioactive source in an outgoing load of waste intended for a landfill. The radioactive source is one inch long and approximately one-half inch in diameter. The Wisconsin Department of Health Services responded to the scrap yard on May 25, 2018, and measured a maximum exposure rate of 210 mR/hr on contact with the source. The source was confirmed to not be leaking. There are no markings or numbers on the source, and isotope identification is pending. It is not known how long the scrap yard was in possession of the source. The source is now in secured storage at the scrap yard. Additional updates will be provided as information about the source and possible original device become available."
Wisconsin Event Report ID No.: WI180008
* * * UPDATE FROM KRISTA KUHLMAN TO DONALD NORWOOD AT 1524 EDT ON 5/31/2018 * * *
The following information was received via E-mail:
"On May 31, 2018, the department performed additional characterization of the source at the scrap yard with assistance from the EPA. It has been determined that it is a Ba-133 source, with an activity between 350 - 500 microCuries. The department has not been able to determine the origin of the source. It will continue to work with the scrap yard to determine the proper disposal path."
Notified R3DO (Cameron) and NMSS Events Notification E-mail group.
Agreement State
Event Number: 53420
Rep Org: LOUISIANA RADIATION PROTECTION DIV
Licensee: GEORGIA-PACIFIC CONSUMER PRODUCTS, LLC
Region: 4
City: ZACHARY State: LA
County:
License #: LA-2162-L01
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: JAMES PATE
HQ OPS Officer: ANDREW WAUGH
Licensee: GEORGIA-PACIFIC CONSUMER PRODUCTS, LLC
Region: 4
City: ZACHARY State: LA
County:
License #: LA-2162-L01
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: JAMES PATE
HQ OPS Officer: ANDREW WAUGH
Notification Date: 05/23/2018
Notification Time: 10:52 [ET]
Event Date: 05/23/2018
Event Time: 00:00 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 05/23/2018
Notification Time: 10:52 [ET]
Event Date: 05/23/2018
Event Time: 00:00 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 05/23/2018
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
Person (Organization):
JASON KOZAL (R4DO)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFICATION (EMAIL)
JASON KOZAL (R4DO)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFICATION (EMAIL)
AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - THREE FIXED GAUGES WITH STUCK SHUTTERS
The following information was received from the State of Louisiana via email:
"On Friday May 23, 2018 Georgia-Pacific was notified by a third party inspection company performing fixed gauge inspections that three fixed gauges were found with stuck shutters.
"The three gauges were:
1.) Ohmart, Model Number HM-8, S/N: 6563, 100 mCi Cs-137
2.) Ronan, Model Number SA8-C10, S/N: 9775GG, 50 mCi Cs-137
3.) Berthold, Model Number P2608.11, S/N: 773/2-03-11, 1.297 mCi Co-60
"Georgia-Pacific is planning to replace the gauge holders and sources."
Louisiana Event Report ID No.: LA-20180009
The following information was received from the State of Louisiana via email:
"On Friday May 23, 2018 Georgia-Pacific was notified by a third party inspection company performing fixed gauge inspections that three fixed gauges were found with stuck shutters.
"The three gauges were:
1.) Ohmart, Model Number HM-8, S/N: 6563, 100 mCi Cs-137
2.) Ronan, Model Number SA8-C10, S/N: 9775GG, 50 mCi Cs-137
3.) Berthold, Model Number P2608.11, S/N: 773/2-03-11, 1.297 mCi Co-60
"Georgia-Pacific is planning to replace the gauge holders and sources."
Louisiana Event Report ID No.: LA-20180009