Event Notification Report for May 08, 2018
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
05/07/2018 - 05/08/2018
EVENT NUMBERS
53393
!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
Power Reactor
Event Number: 53393
Facility: FARLEY
Region: 2 State: AL
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-3-LP,[2] W-3-LP
NRC Notified By: DOUGLAS HOBSON
HQ OPS Officer: DAN LIVERMORE
Region: 2 State: AL
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-3-LP,[2] W-3-LP
NRC Notified By: DOUGLAS HOBSON
HQ OPS Officer: DAN LIVERMORE
Notification Date: 05/08/2018
Notification Time: 10:38 [ET]
Event Date: 05/08/2018
Event Time: 01:39 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 06/27/2018
Notification Time: 10:38 [ET]
Event Date: 05/08/2018
Event Time: 01:39 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 06/27/2018
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(A) - DEGRADED CONDITION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(A) - DEGRADED CONDITION
Person (Organization):
BINOY DESAI (R2DO)
BINOY DESAI (R2DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | N | 0 | Hot Standby | 0 | Hot Standby |
CONTAINMENT LEAK RATE GREATER THAN TECH SPEC
"On May 8, 2018 at 0139 Central Daylight Time, Farley Nuclear Plant Unit 1 declared containment inoperable due to total containment leak rate greater than technical specifications. The 1B containment cooler had seat leakage of approximately 30 gallons per minute from a service water drain valve.
"Though the containment cooler service water supply is not tested per the Appendix J program, a loss of the containment barrier is possible under accident conditions.
"The service water flow path to the 1B containment cooler has been isolated to exit the condition."
The licensee will notify the NRC resident inspector.
* * * RETRACTION FROM BLAKE MITCHELL TO ANDREW WAUGH AT 2151 EDT ON 6/27/18 * * *
"During the time of the leakage reported in event notification 53393 the system was under administrative control. The containment isolation valves for the 1B containment cooler were closed as restoration of the containment cooler was still in progress following the outage. With the system isolated, operations had identified a 50 drop per minute (dpm) leak downstream of a service water drain valve to the 1B containment cooler. To quantify the leak, operations removed the downstream pipe cap and piping to better measure the leak under system pressure. Upon opening the service water containment isolation valves the leak rate was measured at 30 gpm. Operations re-closed the service water containment isolation valves per the pre-briefed contingency actions. It was determined that the service water drain valve (a ball valve) was not properly seated. This was all performed with operations personnel on station in the containment and in the Main Control Room. At no time were the containment isolation valves degraded. Following closure of the containment isolation valves they were also powered down to prevent inadvertent opening."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
Notified R2DO (Michel).
"On May 8, 2018 at 0139 Central Daylight Time, Farley Nuclear Plant Unit 1 declared containment inoperable due to total containment leak rate greater than technical specifications. The 1B containment cooler had seat leakage of approximately 30 gallons per minute from a service water drain valve.
"Though the containment cooler service water supply is not tested per the Appendix J program, a loss of the containment barrier is possible under accident conditions.
"The service water flow path to the 1B containment cooler has been isolated to exit the condition."
The licensee will notify the NRC resident inspector.
* * * RETRACTION FROM BLAKE MITCHELL TO ANDREW WAUGH AT 2151 EDT ON 6/27/18 * * *
"During the time of the leakage reported in event notification 53393 the system was under administrative control. The containment isolation valves for the 1B containment cooler were closed as restoration of the containment cooler was still in progress following the outage. With the system isolated, operations had identified a 50 drop per minute (dpm) leak downstream of a service water drain valve to the 1B containment cooler. To quantify the leak, operations removed the downstream pipe cap and piping to better measure the leak under system pressure. Upon opening the service water containment isolation valves the leak rate was measured at 30 gpm. Operations re-closed the service water containment isolation valves per the pre-briefed contingency actions. It was determined that the service water drain valve (a ball valve) was not properly seated. This was all performed with operations personnel on station in the containment and in the Main Control Room. At no time were the containment isolation valves degraded. Following closure of the containment isolation valves they were also powered down to prevent inadvertent opening."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
Notified R2DO (Michel).