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Event Notification Report for March 30, 2018

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center

Event Reports For
03/29/2018 - 03/30/2018

** EVENT NUMBERS **


53196 53275 53278 53279 53280 53281 53299 53300

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!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED. THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
Power Reactor Event Number: 53196
Facility: WATTS BAR
Region: 2 State: TN
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: BRIAN McILNAY
HQ OPS Officer: MARK ABRAMOVITZ
Notification Date: 02/04/2018
Notification Time: 12:00 [ET]
Event Date: 02/04/2018
Event Time: 04:45 [EST]
Last Update Date: 03/29/2018
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(C) - POT UNCNTRL RAD REL
Person (Organization):
JAMIE HEISSERER (R2DO)

Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
1 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation

Event Text

FAILURE OF CONTAINMENT PENETRATION THERMAL RELIEF CHECK VALVES TO MEET SURVEILLANCE ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA

"At 0445 [EST] on February 4, 2018, Watts Bar Unit 1 entered Technical Specification 3.6.1 condition A and 3.6.3 condition A.1 and A.2 due to inoperable containment penetration thermal relief check valves 1-CKV-31-3407 and 1-CKV-31-3421 associated with one train of the Containment Incore Instrument Room Chiller system. During surveillance testing, the thermal relief check valves failed to open and pass flow as required by acceptance criteria. The two penetrations were subsequently drained and isolated in accordance with the surveillance procedure to remove any thermal expansion concerns. Technical Specification 3.6.1 was exited February 4, 2018 at 0512 once the two penetrations were drained and isolated.

"The purpose of the thermal relief check valves is to allow flow from an isolated penetration back into the upstream containment piping to prevent over-pressurization due to thermal expansion. Over-pressurization of an isolated containment penetration could potentially cause the penetration or both of the isolation valves to fail and provide a direct flow path to the environment from the potentially contaminated containment atmosphere under certain Design Basis Accidents. Therefore, failure of the thermal relief check valves to open could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of structures or systems that are needed to control the release of radioactive material.

"This event is being reported pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(C).

"NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."

* * * RETRACTION AT 1336 EST ON 03/29/2018 FROM TONY PATE TO TOM KENDZIA * * *

"The purpose of this notification is to retract ENS notification 53196 made on 2/4/2018 for Watts Bar Nuclear Plant. The previous notification reported a surveillance failure of two containment penetration thermal relief check valves that, at the time of discovery, could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of structures or systems that are needed to control the release of radioactive material.

"After Engineering evaluation, it has been determined there is reasonable assurance the two thermal relief check valves (1-CKV-31-3407 and 1-CKV-31-3421) were capable of performing their specified safety function to isolate containment and act as a thermal relief device during a design basis accident. The basis of the evaluation included:
1. No maintenance activities or interactions with the check valves had occurred since last tested.
2. All surveillance testing for the valves was within required frequency.
3. The opening force for a new check valve of the same size and similar to 1-CKV-31-3407 and 1-CKV-31-3421 is 0.38 pounds. Engineering analysis has determined the minimum failure pressure of the piping systems associated with the containment penetration in question is 450 psig. If it is assumed the force applied on the check valve seat reaches 450 psig, the force applied on the seat would reach 111 pounds or 300 times the force required to open a new, clean check valve. Based on engineering judgement of previous operating experience where the pressure required to open the same stuck check valve was within a safety factor of 6 to potential equipment damage, the thermal relief check valves would have opened prior to equipment damage and thus the identified condition would not have resulted in adversely affecting the containment isolation boundary.

"Entry into Technical Specification (TS) 3.6.1 condition A on 2/4/2018 at 0445 has been retracted. Although not a loss of safety function, the containment penetrations associated with 1-CKV-31-3407 and 1-CKV-31-3421 remain inoperable and are being tracked by TS 3.6.3 condition A.1 and A.2."

The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.

Notified the R2DO (Rose).

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Non-Agreement State Event Number: 53275
Rep Org: 3M CORPORATE
Licensee: 3M CORPORATE
Region: 3
City: SPRINGFIELD State: MO
County:
License #: 22-00057-03
Agreement: N
Docket:
NRC Notified By: MICHAEL LEWANDOWSKI
HQ OPS Officer: ANDREW WAUGH
Notification Date: 03/21/2018
Notification Time: 17:04 [ET]
Event Date: 03/21/2018
Event Time: 03:00 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 03/21/2018
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
30.50(b)(2) - SAFETY EQUIPMENT FAILURE
Person (Organization):
ERIC DUNCAN (R3DO)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFICA (EMAI)

Event Text

GAUGE SHUTTER MALFUNCTION

"On March 21, 2018, at approximately 0300 CDT the shutter on an industrial beta transmission gauge malfunctioned and did not immediately close when commanded to do so. Facility maintenance personnel were able to get the shutter to fully close. The gauge was taken out of service. At approximately 0800 CDT the facility maintenance technician with the most experience working with radiation gauges inspected the device and found that the shutter opened properly, but would not fully close. The licensed service provider under contract to the facility was contacted and provided advice to the facility technician so that the shutter could be fully closed. The facility Radiation Safety Officer verified that the shutter was fully closed using a portable radiation survey meter. Electrical power to the device was locked out to prevent use. The gauge manufacturer was contacted to provide advice and to provide a replacement shutter assembly to be installed by the licensed service provider that the facility uses for more extensive maintenance on radiation gauges.

"Isotope, quantity, chemical and physical form:
"Kr-85, 1000 millicuries on January 8, 2007, encapsulated sealed source, serial number 05-709, QSA Global model KAC.D1, in LFE model SULP-77A beta thickness gauge, serial number 9281

"The event resulted in no radiation exposure to any individual."

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Agreement State Event Number: 53278
Rep Org: OK DEQ RAD MANAGEMENT
Licensee: WESTERN FARMERS ELECTRIC COOP.
Region: 4
City: HUGO State: OK
County:
License #: OK-19428-01
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: JENNIFER MCALLISTER
HQ OPS Officer: DONALD NORWOOD
Notification Date: 03/22/2018
Notification Time: 10:48 [ET]
Event Date: 03/22/2018
Event Time: [CDT]
Last Update Date: 03/22/2018
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
Person (Organization):
JEREMY GROOM (R4DO)
NMSS EVENTS NOTIFICA (EMAI)

Event Text

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - FIXED NUCLEAR GAUGE SHUTTER FAILED CLOSED

The following information was received via E-mail:

The licensee reported on 3/22/2018 that the spring for the shutter cable on a Texas Nuclear Corporation (now TN Technologies) Model 5197 fixed nuclear gauge broke. The shutter is closed and surveys have been taken showing no leakage. The licensee has contacted the manufacturer who will dispatch technicians to repair the device.

Oklahoma Department of Environmental Quality will update this report when more information is known.


* * * UPDATE FROM JENNIFER MCALLISTER TO DONALD NORWOOD AT 1536 EDT ON 3/22/2018 * * *

The following information was received via E-mail:

The event occurred on 3/15/2018. The source is a TN Tech. Model 57157C, 100 mCi, Cs-137 source. The Serial Number of the gauge is B919.

Notified R4DO (Groom) and NMSS Event Notifications.

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Fuel Cycle Facility Event Number: 53279
Facility: GLOBAL NUCLEAR FUEL - AMERICAS
RX Type: URANIUM FUEL FABRICATION
Comments: LEU CONVERSION (UF6 TO UO2)
                   LEU FABRICATION
                   LWR COMMERICAL FUEL
Region: 2
City: WILMINGTON State: NC
County: NEW HANOVER
License #: SNM-1097
Agreement: Y
Docket: 07001113
NRC Notified By: PHILLIP OTIS
HQ OPS Officer: DONALD NORWOOD
Notification Date: 03/22/2018
Notification Time: 16:58 [ET]
Event Date: 03/22/2018
Event Time: [EDT]
Last Update Date: 03/22/2018
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
PART 70 APP A (c) - OFFSITE NOTIFICATION/NEWS REL
Person (Organization):
SHANE SANDAL (R2DO)
NMSS EVENT NOTIFICAT (EMAI)

This material event contains a "Less than Cat 3 " level of radioactive material.

Event Text

CONCURRENT REPORT DUE TO LOST TRITIUM EXIT SIGN TUBE

"At approximately 1645 EDT on 3/22/2018, a report was made to the State of North Carolina Department of Radiation Protection. The report is below:

"At approximately 1600 EDT on 3/22/2018 it was determined that a tube from an Everglo Tritium Exit sign was missing. The other three tubes were in the sign. The discovery was made as the sign was being prepared for shipment to disposal. This report is being made in accordance with 10A NCAC 15.1645(a). There is no suspected excessive exposure to employees or members of the public.

"This report to NRC is being made in accordance with 10 CFR 70 Appendix A(c) - Concurrent Reports, '... notification to other government agencies has been or will be made, shall be reported to the NRC Operations Center concurrent to the news release or other notification.'"

See EN 53282 for corresponding report from the State of North Carolina.

THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL

Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf

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Agreement State Event Number: 53280
Rep Org: LOUISIANA RADIATION PROTECTION DIV
Licensee: CAN USA Inc.
Region: 4
City: HARVEY State: LA
County:
License #: LA-10258-L01,
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: JOSEPH NOBLE
HQ OPS Officer: DONALD NORWOOD
Notification Date: 03/22/2018
Notification Time: 15:12 [ET]
Event Date: 03/22/2018
Event Time: 06:00 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 03/29/2018
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
Person (Organization):
JEREMY GROOM (R4DO)
NMSS EVENT NOTIFICAT (EMAI)

Event Text

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - DISCONNECTED RADIOGRAPHY SOURCE

The following is a synopsis of information received via E-mail:

On March 22, 2018, LA-DEQ (Louisiana Department of Environmental Quality) received an on-line notification that CAN USA Inc. had an incident where a radiography source was irretrievable during operations at a temporary jobsite at the Phillips 66-Alliance Refinery in Belle Chase, LA.

The crew stated they had made an exposure and were performing their post-job survey when the survey meter indicated the source was not in the shielded position. The radiography crew realized the source could not be retracted back into the shielded position and called the assistant RSO (Radiation Safety Officer) for radiation safety assistance.

The assistant RSO arrived at the jobsite at 0615 CDT. The assistant RSO covered the source in the guide tube with lead shot bags to reduce the exposure during the retrieval operation. It was determined that the guide tube had disconnected from the exposure device. The guide tube was reconnected, the source was returned to the shielded position, and an investigation into this incident begun. The assistant RSO completed the retrieval work at approximately 0645 CDT. The assistant RSO's direct read pocket dosimeter had an exposure of approximately 60 mR.

The exposure device and associated equipment (crankout control and source guide tube) were taken to the CAN USA facility for further evaluation. The equipment is a QSA Global Model 880 Delta exposure device, S/N D9222, utilizing a 70.7 Ci Ir-192 source, S/N 63452-G. An internal investigation continues into this irretrievable source incident.

Louisiana Event Report ID No.: LA-180005

* * * UPDATE AT 1730 EDT ON 3/29/18 FROM JOE NOBLE TO JEFF HERRERA * * *

The following update was submitted by the Louisiana Department of Environmental Quality via email:

"Updated information:

"A source retrieval has developed into a situation involving, licensed activities, equipment QC/QA practices and personnel qualifications.

"QSA Global Delta 880, S/N D9222; source [approximately] 70 Ci of Ir-192 s/n 63452-G
Associated Equipment: 3rd party, drive cable and source guide tube. (not Amersham/QSA Global manufactured equipment)
The connector did not appear to be compatible with the exposure device source assembly in the Delta 880 device. (excessive use)
A misconnect/disconnect test was not performed on the source assembly and 3rd party associated equipment (drive cable and guide tube).
Assessment and Evaluation: the exposure device and associated equipment were transferred to QSA Global, Baton Rouge, LA then to QSA Global Burlington, MA.

"CAN USA Inc. was not licensed to perform source retrievals nor did they contact a 'qualified licensed radiation service' company to perform the source retrieval. The Corporate RSO, Jessie Mose, Jr. was available by telephone. There was no site/assistant RSO trained or qualified to perform the source retrieval.

"Disconnect happened on a 15 foot elevated catwalk [at] an Aromatics Extractor unit # 1797. The facility, Phillips 66-Alliance, 15551 Hwy 23, Belle Chase, LA. Phillips 66-Alliance Contact: Larry Poche, EHS Officer

"Personnel:
CAN USA:
Two Radiography Instructors were directly involved in the source retrieval.
Two Carded Radiographers were working with the equipment when it disconnected on the first exposure.
Provided Pocket Dosimeter readings 'provided' were 8 mR, 30 mR, 40 mR and 70 mR.
Landaure whole body badges immediately processes for three individuals, with the Maximum exposure 290 mrem. The acting site RSO's whole body badge is 'lost' in the system.
The individuals involved in the source retrieval are having cytogenetic/chromosomal blood sample analysis by REACTS Medical Dosimetry Dept./ORISE.ORAU; results pending.

"Analytical Stress Employees.
Three non-radiation workers were evacuated from the vicinity of the disconnected source and evaluated by blood sample analysis.

"SWAT Specialty Welding and Turnaround:
One non-radiation worker was evacuated from the vicinity of the disconnected source and evaluated by blood sample analysis.

"The Departmental [Louisiana Department of Environmental Quality] investigation is still incomplete depending on assessment, evaluation and analysis results."

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Agreement State Event Number: 53281
Rep Org: CALIFORNIA RADIATION CONTROL PRGM
Licensee: NBC UNIVERSAL
Region: 4
City: UNIVERSAL CITY State: CA
County:
License #: GL
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: THOMAS GEZA MIKO
HQ OPS Officer: ANDREW WAUGH
Notification Date: 03/22/2018
Notification Time: 21:47 [ET]
Event Date: 03/22/2018
Event Time: [PDT]
Last Update Date: 03/22/2018
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
Person (Organization):
JEREMY GROOM (R4DO)
NMSS_EVENT_NOTIFICAT (EMAI)

Event Text

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - BROKEN TRITIUM EXIT SIGN

The following is a synopsis of information received via E-mail from the State of California:

On March 22, 2018 the Director of Environmental Affairs at NBC Universal (i.e. Universal Studios) in Universal City, California called Los Angeles County Radiation Management to report the discovery of a broken Tritium exit sign. The Tritium sign was subsequently isolated for secure and safe keeping. A Los Angeles County Radiation Management employee will visit Universal Studios on March 23, 2018 to check for Tritium leakage or contamination.

The broken sign is a Forever Lite Inc. Tritium sign, S/N 286342, with an expiration date of March 2027, containing 11.21 Curies.

California 5010 Number: 032218

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Power Reactor Event Number: 53299
Facility: QUAD CITIES
Region: 3 State: IL
Unit: [1] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-3,[2] GE-3
NRC Notified By: MIKEL MOORE
HQ OPS Officer: JEFF HERRERA
Notification Date: 03/29/2018
Notification Time: 16:42 [ET]
Event Date: 03/29/2018
Event Time: 15:00 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 03/29/2018
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(xi) - OFFSITE NOTIFICATION
Person (Organization):
PATRICIA PELKE (R3DO)

Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
1 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation
2 N N 0 Refueling 0 Refueling

Event Text

UNPERMITTED TRITIUM RELEASE WITHIN THE SITE BOUNDARY

"On March 29, 2018, Exelon Generation Company, LLC notified the Illinois Environmental Protection Agency (IEPA) and the Illinois Emergency Management Agency (IEMA) in accordance with state regulations of an unpermitted release of radionuclides at the Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station within the site boundary. There has been no detection of the liquid release beyond the site boundary. No impact to human health or the environment are anticipated.

"This notification is being made to satisfy 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(xi), notification of the NRC for any event related to the health and safety of the public for which a notification to other government agencies has been or will be made."

The source of the Tritium release was from the Rad waste system. The spill was reported to be within the protected area which is within the site boundary. The quantity of the release is unknown at this point as the investigation and spill cleanup is in progress.

The Licensee Notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

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Power Reactor Event Number: 53300
Facility: BROWNS FERRY
Region: 2 State: AL
Unit: [1] [2] [3]
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4,[3] GE-4
NRC Notified By: MARK MOEBES
HQ OPS Officer: THOMAS KENDZIA
Notification Date: 03/29/2018
Notification Time: 22:28 [ET]
Event Date: 03/29/2018
Event Time: 13:44 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 03/29/2018
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) - UNANALYZED CONDITION
Person (Organization):
STEVE ROSE (R2DO)

Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
1 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation
2 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation
3 N N 0 Cold Shutdown 0 Cold Shutdown

Event Text

UNANALYZED CONDITION DUE TO INOPERABILITY OF EMERGENCY EQUIPMENT COOLING WATER PUMP

"At 1344 on March 29, 2018, it was determined [engineering evaluation] that an unanalyzed condition that significantly degraded plant safety previously existed. During a postulated control room abandonment due to a fire, and concurrent with a Loss of Offsite Power (LOOP), the required number of Emergency Equipment Cooling Water (EECW) pumps would not have been available from 10/28/2015 to 3/10/2018.

"On March 8, 2018, during relay functional testing it was discovered that the C3 Emergency Equipment Cooling Water (EECW) pump closing springs did not recharge with the breaker transfer switch in emergency. On August 23, 2012, a wire modification was performed that contained a drawing error resulting in wire placement on the incorrect connection points for the C3 EECW pump. On March 10, 2018, the C3 EECW pump breaker wiring was corrected and subsequent testing was completed satisfactorily.

"Prior to 10/28/2015, Brown's Ferry Nuclear Plant (BFN) adhered to Appendix R fire protection requirements which did not credit the C3 EECW pump for fire protection from the backup control location. On 10/28/2015, BFN transitioned to National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) 805 fire protection requirements which takes credit for the C3 EECW pump from the backup control location.

"This condition is being reported pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B), 'Any event or condition that results in the nuclear power plant being in an unanalyzed condition that significantly degrades plant safety'. This is also reportable as a 60-day written report in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B).

"There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified of this event."

Page Last Reviewed/Updated Friday, March 30, 2018
Friday, March 30, 2018