| U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center Event Reports For
03/16/2018 - 03/19/2018 ** EVENT NUMBERS ** |
 | Non-Agreement State | Event Number: 53245 | Rep Org: INTERNATIONAL ISOTOPES INC.
Licensee: INTERNATIONAL ISOTOPES INC.
Region: 4
City: IDAHO FALLS State: ID
County:
License #: 11-27680-01MD
Agreement: N
Docket:
NRC Notified By: JOHN MILLER
HQ OPS Officer: STEVEN VITTO | Notification Date: 03/05/2018
Notification Time: 13:38 [ET]
Event Date: 02/26/2018
Event Time: [MST]
Last Update Date: 03/16/2018 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
20.2201(a)(1)(ii) - LOST/STOLEN LNM>10X
| Person (Organization):
MICHAEL VASQUEZ (R4DO)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFICA (EMAI)
ILTAB (EMAI)
CNSNS (MEXICO) (EMAI)
|
| This material event contains a "Less than Cat 3 " level of radioactive material. | Event Text IODINE-131 SHIPMENT LOST IN TRANSIT
The following information was received via E-mail:
"A package was shipped on February 22, 2018 with an estimated delivery date of February 26, 2018. The customer requested a morning delivery and contacted us when the package wasn't delivered. We reached out to [the common carrier] the afternoon of February 26. [The common carrier] began tracing the shipment that afternoon. From what [International Isotopes] understands, there may have been a mix-up with the ULD (unit load device) in Oakland. We have provided [the common carrier] with a description of the Type A package. They are very familiar with this package as we ship several of these I-131 Type A's per day. We are still in contact with [the common carrier] daily on this. There are three traces out and all three have hit a dead end. At this point [International Isotopes] would consider the package lost, which in our experience is unusual for [the common carrier]. We have had delays, but after a trace, have been able to locate the package.
"Shipper: International Isotopes Inc.
Idaho Falls, ID 83401
NRC License No.: 11-27680-01MD
"Consignee: Pharmatron
Fresno, CA 93710
California License No.: 7624-10
"The package contained:
1,000 mCi of I-131 solution
Concentration of 4450.0 mCi/mL
Volume = 0.22 mL
Vial was Crimp Top Serum Vials, 2mL."
* * * UPDATE ON 3/16/18 AT 1253 EDT FROM JOHN MILLER TO DAVID AIRD * * *
The following was received via email:
"The lost I-131 shipment had been located at the [common carrier] Memphis HUB and was received at the International Isotopes, Inc. facility today, 03/16/2018."
Notified R4DO (Rollins), NMSS, ILTAB, and CNSNS (Mexico) via email.
THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL
Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf |
| Agreement State | Event Number: 53252 | Rep Org: WA OFFICE OF RADIATION PROTECTION
Licensee: WASHINGTON STATE UNIVERSITY
Region: 4
City: PULLMAN State: WA
County:
License #: WN-C003-1
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: ANDREW HALLORAN
HQ OPS Officer: ANDREW WAUGH | Notification Date: 03/08/2018
Notification Time: 10:57 [ET]
Event Date: 02/14/2018
Event Time: [PST]
Last Update Date: 03/08/2018 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
| Person (Organization):
MICHAEL VASQUEZ (R4DO)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFICA (EMAI)
|
| This material event contains a "Less than Cat 3 " level of radioactive material. | Event Text AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - LEAKING SOURCE
The following was received via email from the state of Washington:
"On 2/15/2018, the RSO [Radiation Safety Officer] for WSU [Washington State University] contacted DOH [Washington State Department of Health] to report a leaking Cf-252 source. The source was received from University of Nevada - Reno and leak tested on arrival. The initial leak test found 0.0066 uCi of removable contamination. Because the amount of removable contamination detected was very close to the leak testing limit, WSU was asked to check their leak testing process and perform another test. On 2/27/2018, WSU confirmed that the source is in fact leaking and both tests provided the same result and that they are holding the leaking source for disposal. DOH is still awaiting further information on the source manufacturer and model number. More information will be provided in a follow-up report."
WA Incident Number: WA-18-007
Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf |
| Fuel Cycle Facility | Event Number: 53266 | Facility: WESTINGHOUSE ELECTRIC CORPORATION
RX Type: URANIUM FUEL FABRICATION
Comments: LEU CONVERSION (UF6 to UO2)
COMMERCIAL LWR FUEL
Region: 2
City: COLUMBIA State: SC
County: RICHLAND
License #: SNM-1107
Agreement: Y
Docket: 07001151
NRC Notified By: NANCY PARR
HQ OPS Officer: THOMAS KENDZIA | Notification Date: 03/16/2018
Notification Time: 11:16 [ET]
Event Date: 03/15/2018
Event Time: 11:30 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 03/16/2018 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
PART 70 APP A (b)(1) - UNANALYZED CONDITION
| Person (Organization):
REBECCA NEASE (R2DO)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFICA (EMAI)
| Event Text UNANALYZED SCENARIO ASSOCIATED WITH URANIUM RECOVERY AND RECYCLE SYSTEM
"On March 15, 2018 during an NRC inspection of the Solvent Extraction area, an inspector identified a potential credible scenario which is not adequately addressed in the applicable Criticality Safety Evaluation (CSE). Plant Environmental Health and Safety (EH&S) staff reviewed the issue and at 1130 [EDT] determined that, based on the available information, the scenario did not appear to be properly analyzed in the CSE and thus the Integrated Safety Analysis (ISA). The scenario is associated with the Uranium Recovery and Recycle System (URRS) 706 hood operation. The process performed in the 706 hood is the transfer of low concentration residues into a container for disposal at a Low Level Radioactive Waste (LLRW) facility. There was no actual event, and no impact to public health and safety, the workers, or the environment.
"The issue revolves around the lack of a specific analysis controlling the handling, transport and replacement of the container, a 55 gallon drum, used in that process. A criticality event for the scenario of an inadvertent container handling upset was identified as incredible in the safety basis documents. However, the accident sequence does not meet the definition of incredible as defined in the license application, and thus appears to be an improperly analyzed scenario.
"While not properly documented, unlikely, independent, and concurrent changes in process conditions would have to occur to result in a criticality accident. Procedural controls and process barriers which are in place were not identified as Items Relied On For Safety (IROFS) for this scenario. There are, however, passive and administrative IROFS in place for other chemical, fire and criticality safety accident sequences that can be applied to this scenario. These IROFS include requirements for mechanical integrity and spill protection techniques to preclude significant loss of uranium bearing liquid material that would have to accumulate in an improperly handled container. Examples of existing IROFS that control process leaks include SOLX-903 and WASH-119, degradation resistant design to prevent leakage from tanks/vessels; SOLX-503, structural integrity of piping; ADUHNP-901, flange guards; ADUHFS-507 and SOLX-505, valve alignments to prevent spills; and DPH-104, piping integrity. In addition, there is annual training and testing on the proper handling of non-favorable geometry containers.
"The hood and associated container were removed from service while the scenario is being evaluated. Issue Report 2018-7306 was entered into our Corrective Action Program, and an extent of condition was performed."
Based on the extent of condition, the cylinder wash area has been identified for additional evaluation.
* * * UPDATE ON 3/16/18 AT 1643 EDT FROM NANCY PARR TO DAVID AIRD * * *
"Based on evaluation of the extent of condition, a similar scenario was identified with the wet combustible trash system in the Uranium Recovery and Recycle System (URRS) area. This event report is updated to include a 24 Hour Event Notification for the wet combustible trash system based on 10 CFR 70 Appendix A(b)(1) 'Any event or condition that results in the facility being in a state that was not analyzed, was improperly analyzed, or is different from that analyzed in the Integrated Safety Analysis, and which results in failure to meet the performance requirements of 10 CFR 70.61.'
"The issue revolves around the lack of a specific analysis controlling the handling and transport of containers, 55 gallon drums, used in the wet combustible trash process. A cylinder wash operation is in the area where the wet combustible trash drums are used. Cylinder wash operations were shutdown to preclude significant loss of uranium bearing liquid material that would have to accumulate in an improperly handled drum. Similar procedural controls, process barriers and IROFS from other accident sequences can be applied to this scenario. Wet combustible trash collection may continue since the potential source of liquid material (cylinder wash) has been shut down."
Notified R2DO (Nease) and NMSS (via email). |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 53267 | Facility: BROWNS FERRY
Region: 2 State: AL
Unit: [1] [2] [3]
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4,[3] GE-4
NRC Notified By: DREW MITCHELL
HQ OPS Officer: DAVID AIRD | Notification Date: 03/16/2018
Notification Time: 22:04 [ET]
Event Date: 03/16/2018
Event Time: 16:04 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 03/16/2018 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) - UNANALYZED CONDITION
| Person (Organization):
REBECCA NEASE (R2DO)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | | 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | | 3 | N | N | 0 | Refueling | 0 | Refueling | Event Text UNANALYZED CONDITION AFFECTING RESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL SYSTEM
"At 1604 [CDT] on March 16, 2018, Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant (BFN) Engineering reported an unanalyzed condition affecting the Residual Heat Removal (RHR) heat exchangers in a postulated fire event. It was discovered that the Residual Heat Removal Service Water (RHRSW) heat exchanger piping associated [with] the credited heat exchangers in the NFPA 805 Nuclear Safety Capability Analysis (NSCA) could experience water hammer damage.
"Fire damage to the cables for the RHRSW outlet motor operated valves could cause the valves to spuriously open and drain the RHRSW piping. Subsequent starting of the RHRSW pumps on the affected header could cause water hammer loads and damage the piping.
"Review of NFPA 805 analyses show the cables associated with this condition are routed in Fire Areas 01-03, 02-03, 02-04, 03-03, 16 and 23. There are 11 cases where the deterministically credited heat exchanger could be affected.
"Compensatory fire watch measures have been established.
"This event requires an 8 hour report in accordance with 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B), 'Any event or condition that results in: (B) The nuclear power plant being in an unanalyzed condition that significantly degrades plant safety.
"CR 1139620 documents this condition in the Corrective Action Program."
The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 53268 | Facility: NORTH ANNA
Region: 2 State: VA
Unit: [1] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] W-3-LP,[2] W-3-LP,[3] M-4-LP
NRC Notified By: DONALD TAYLOR
HQ OPS Officer: DAVID AIRD | Notification Date: 03/18/2018
Notification Time: 12:34 [ET]
Event Date: 03/17/2018
Event Time: 20:07 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 03/18/2018 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
26.719 - FITNESS FOR DUTY
| Person (Organization):
REBECCA NEASE (R2DO)
FFD GROUP (EMAI)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | N | N | 0 | Refueling | 0 | Refueling | | 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | Event Text FITNESS-FOR-DUTY REPORT INVOLVING DISCOVERY OF KOMBUCHA TEA INSIDE THE PROTECTED AREA
"At 2007 [EDT] on 3/17/18, a security Officer reported finding a container of herbal tea (Kombucha) on a platform in the Unit 1 Emergency Switchgear Room, which is located inside the Protected Area. Kombucha tea is a fermented tea containing trace amounts of alcohol, and is legally sold without restrictions. Dominion had previously notified its workforce that Kombucha tea was prohibited from being consumed or carried on-site. This is considered an alcoholic beverage and is being reported under the requirements of 10 CFR 26.719.
"The individual who brought the beverage on-site was identified and escorted out of the Protected Area."
The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. The licensee will also be contacting the County Administrator for Louisa County, Virginia. |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 53269 | Facility: BROWNS FERRY
Region: 2 State: AL
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4,[3] GE-4
NRC Notified By: ANGEL YARBROUGH
HQ OPS Officer: DAVID AIRD | Notification Date: 03/18/2018
Notification Time: 16:16 [ET]
Event Date: 03/18/2018
Event Time: 11:58 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 03/18/2018 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL
50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION
| Person (Organization):
REBECCA NEASE (R2DO)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | A/R | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 0 | Hot Shutdown | Event Text AUTOMATIC REACTOR SCRAM DUE TO TURBINE CONTROL VALVE CLOSURE
"At 1158 CDT on March 18, 2018, the Unit 1 reactor automatically scrammed due to a Reactor Protection System (RPS) signal generated from High Reactor Steam Dome Pressure in response to Turbine Control Valve Closure. The reactor had been operating at 100 percent power. Investigation is in progress.
"All control rods fully inserted into the core. Main Steam Isolation Valves remained open with Main Steam Relief Valves (MSRVs) operating on the initial transient as expected. Main Turbine Bypass Valves are currently controlling reactor pressure. Reactor Feedwater pumps remained in service to control reactor water level.
"Primary Containment Isolation Signals Groups 2, 3, 6, and 8 containment isolation and initiation signals were received. Upon receipt of these signals all required components actuated as required. All safety system operated as expected. At no time was public health and safety at risk.
"This event is reportable within 4 hours per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) 'any event or condition that results in actuation of the Reactor Protection System (RPS) when the reactor is critical except when the actuation results from and is part of a pre-planned sequence during testing or reactor operation.' It is also reportable within 8 hours per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) 'any event or condition that results in valid actuation of any of the systems listed in paragraph (b)(3)(iv)(B) of this section, except when the actuation results from and is part of a pre-planned sequence during testing or reactor operation' and requires an LER within 60 days per 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A)."
The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 53270 | Facility: SEQUOYAH
Region: 2 State: TN
Unit: [1] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: CAL ATCHLEY
HQ OPS Officer: JEFF HERRERA | Notification Date: 03/19/2018
Notification Time: 02:27 [ET]
Event Date: 03/19/2018
Event Time: 00:30 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 03/19/2018 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(xi) - OFFSITE NOTIFICATION
| Person (Organization):
REBECCA NEASE (R2DO)
CHRIS MILLER (NRR)
JEFFERY GRANT (IRD)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | | 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | Event Text TWO CONTRACTORS INJURED BY ARC FLASH
"On 3/16/2018 at approximately 1630 EST, an industrial safety accident occurred at Sequoyah Nuclear Plant that involved an Arc Flash injury of two contract employees. While performing work near a non safety related 6.9kV electrical bus, an arc occurred injuring the two employees. Both personnel were transported to an offsite medical facility for treatment. Neither were contaminated.
"The cause of the arc flash is not understood at this time, an accident investigation has been initiated by TVA. The SQN [Sequoyah Nuclear] NRC Senior Resident Inspector has been notified. No safety related systems required to establish or maintain safe shutdown were affected. Both Unit 1 and 2 remain at 100 [percent] power.
"TVA has received and responded to media inquiries concerning this event. As a result, this event is considered reportable under 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(xi)." | |