Event Notification Report for March 19, 2018
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
03/18/2018 - 03/19/2018
EVENT NUMBERS
5327053271532725327453584
Power Reactor
Event Number: 53270
Facility: SEQUOYAH
Region: 2 State: TN
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: CAL ATCHLEY
HQ OPS Officer: JEFF HERRERA
Region: 2 State: TN
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: CAL ATCHLEY
HQ OPS Officer: JEFF HERRERA
Notification Date: 03/19/2018
Notification Time: 02:27 [ET]
Event Date: 03/19/2018
Event Time: 00:30 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 03/19/2018
Notification Time: 02:27 [ET]
Event Date: 03/19/2018
Event Time: 00:30 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 03/19/2018
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(xi) - OFFSITE NOTIFICATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(xi) - OFFSITE NOTIFICATION
Person (Organization):
REBECCA NEASE (R2DO)
CHRIS MILLER (NRR)
JEFFERY GRANT (IRD)
REBECCA NEASE (R2DO)
CHRIS MILLER (NRR)
JEFFERY GRANT (IRD)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
| 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
TWO CONTRACTORS INJURED BY ARC FLASH
"On 3/16/2018 at approximately 1630 EST, an industrial safety accident occurred at Sequoyah Nuclear Plant that involved an Arc Flash injury of two contract employees. While performing work near a non safety related 6.9kV electrical bus, an arc occurred injuring the two employees. Both personnel were transported to an offsite medical facility for treatment. Neither were contaminated.
"The cause of the arc flash is not understood at this time, an accident investigation has been initiated by TVA. The SQN [Sequoyah Nuclear] NRC Senior Resident Inspector has been notified. No safety related systems required to establish or maintain safe shutdown were affected. Both Unit 1 and 2 remain at 100 [percent] power.
"TVA has received and responded to media inquiries concerning this event. As a result, this event is considered reportable under 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(xi)."
"On 3/16/2018 at approximately 1630 EST, an industrial safety accident occurred at Sequoyah Nuclear Plant that involved an Arc Flash injury of two contract employees. While performing work near a non safety related 6.9kV electrical bus, an arc occurred injuring the two employees. Both personnel were transported to an offsite medical facility for treatment. Neither were contaminated.
"The cause of the arc flash is not understood at this time, an accident investigation has been initiated by TVA. The SQN [Sequoyah Nuclear] NRC Senior Resident Inspector has been notified. No safety related systems required to establish or maintain safe shutdown were affected. Both Unit 1 and 2 remain at 100 [percent] power.
"TVA has received and responded to media inquiries concerning this event. As a result, this event is considered reportable under 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(xi)."
Power Reactor
Event Number: 53271
Facility: CATAWBA
Region: 2 State: SC
Unit: [] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: WILL FOWLER
HQ OPS Officer: THOMAS KENDZIA
Region: 2 State: SC
Unit: [] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: WILL FOWLER
HQ OPS Officer: THOMAS KENDZIA
Notification Date: 03/19/2018
Notification Time: 10:49 [ET]
Event Date: 03/19/2018
Event Time: 03:29 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 03/19/2018
Notification Time: 10:49 [ET]
Event Date: 03/19/2018
Event Time: 03:29 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 03/19/2018
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION
Person (Organization):
REBECCA NEASE (R2DO)
REBECCA NEASE (R2DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2 | N | N | 0 | Cold Shutdown | 0 | Cold Shutdown |
UNPLANNED ACTUATION OF AUXILIARY FEEDWATER SYSTEM DURING MAINTENANCE
"Automatic actuation of the 2B CA (Auxiliary Feedwater) System. At 0329 [EDT on] 03-19-18, with Unit 2 in Mode 5, an actuation of the 2B CA (Auxiliary Feedwater) system occurred during maintenance associated with the 2B Main Feedwater Pump.
"The cause of the CA (Auxiliary Feedwater) system automatic start was an unanticipated reset and subsequent trip signal of the 2B Main Feedwater pump during maintenance activities. The 2B CA Pump/Train automatically started as designed when the 'Loss of Both Main Feedwater Pumps' signal was received. The system operated as required. This event is being reported in accordance with 10CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) as an event that results in a valid actuation of the CA System. There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel.
"The NRC Resident has been notified."
"Automatic actuation of the 2B CA (Auxiliary Feedwater) System. At 0329 [EDT on] 03-19-18, with Unit 2 in Mode 5, an actuation of the 2B CA (Auxiliary Feedwater) system occurred during maintenance associated with the 2B Main Feedwater Pump.
"The cause of the CA (Auxiliary Feedwater) system automatic start was an unanticipated reset and subsequent trip signal of the 2B Main Feedwater pump during maintenance activities. The 2B CA Pump/Train automatically started as designed when the 'Loss of Both Main Feedwater Pumps' signal was received. The system operated as required. This event is being reported in accordance with 10CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) as an event that results in a valid actuation of the CA System. There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel.
"The NRC Resident has been notified."
Power Reactor
Event Number: 53272
Facility: GINNA
Region: 1 State: NY
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-2-LP
NRC Notified By: JUSTIN KNOWLES
HQ OPS Officer: DONG HWA PARK
Region: 1 State: NY
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-2-LP
NRC Notified By: JUSTIN KNOWLES
HQ OPS Officer: DONG HWA PARK
Notification Date: 03/19/2018
Notification Time: 13:09 [ET]
Event Date: 03/19/2018
Event Time: 09:30 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 03/19/2018
Notification Time: 13:09 [ET]
Event Date: 03/19/2018
Event Time: 09:30 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 03/19/2018
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
Person (Organization):
RAY MCKINLEY (R1DO)
RAY MCKINLEY (R1DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
TECHNICAL SUPPORT CENTER OUT OF SERVICE
"Emergency Assessment Capability cannot be performed in the Technical Support Center due to an equipment deficiency in the HVAC system which could impact facility habitability. An Alternate Technical Support Center is in place at the Emergency Offsite Facility. Priority maintenance is in progress to correct the deficiency."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
"Emergency Assessment Capability cannot be performed in the Technical Support Center due to an equipment deficiency in the HVAC system which could impact facility habitability. An Alternate Technical Support Center is in place at the Emergency Offsite Facility. Priority maintenance is in progress to correct the deficiency."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
Non-Power Reactor
Event Number: 53274
Rep Org: GENERAL ELECTRIC OF PLEASANTON
Licensee: GENERAL ELECTRIC COMPANY
Region: 0
City: PLEASANTON State: CA
County: ALAMEDA
License #: R-33
Agreement: Y
Docket: 05000073
NRC Notified By: MATT FEYRER
HQ OPS Officer: THOMAS KENDZIA
Licensee: GENERAL ELECTRIC COMPANY
Region: 0
City: PLEASANTON State: CA
County: ALAMEDA
License #: R-33
Agreement: Y
Docket: 05000073
NRC Notified By: MATT FEYRER
HQ OPS Officer: THOMAS KENDZIA
Notification Date: 03/20/2018
Notification Time: 09:52 [ET]
Event Date: 03/19/2018
Event Time: 11:30 [PDT]
Last Update Date: 03/20/2018
Notification Time: 09:52 [ET]
Event Date: 03/19/2018
Event Time: 11:30 [PDT]
Last Update Date: 03/20/2018
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
DUANE HARDESTY (NRR PM)
DUANE HARDESTY (NRR PM)
TEST AND RESEARCH REACTOR - NOTIFICATION OF TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION VIOLATION
At 1130 PST on 3/19/18, with the reactor at 100% power (100 kW thermal), GE Hitachi Vallecitos Nuclear Test Reactor violated their Technical Specifications (NDO 32765, section 6.1.3.1) when the licensed reactor operator became sick, called for the backup licensed reactor operator, and left the control room. The backup licensed operator entered the control room less than 30 seconds after the other operator left. There were other trained but unlicensed operators in the control room. The reactor remained at 100% power with no issues.
This notification is the 24 hour notification required in accordance with GE Hitachi Vallecitos Nuclear Test Reactor Technical Specifications (NDO 32765, section 6.1.3.1). The Technical Specifications also require a 14 day written report which will be submitted. The facility has initiated a corrective action report (28168).
GE Hitachi Vallecitos Nuclear Test Reactor, license R-33, is a 100 kW thermal Light Water Highly Enriched Graphite Moderated Reactor.
The licensee notified their NRC Project Manager.
At 1130 PST on 3/19/18, with the reactor at 100% power (100 kW thermal), GE Hitachi Vallecitos Nuclear Test Reactor violated their Technical Specifications (NDO 32765, section 6.1.3.1) when the licensed reactor operator became sick, called for the backup licensed reactor operator, and left the control room. The backup licensed operator entered the control room less than 30 seconds after the other operator left. There were other trained but unlicensed operators in the control room. The reactor remained at 100% power with no issues.
This notification is the 24 hour notification required in accordance with GE Hitachi Vallecitos Nuclear Test Reactor Technical Specifications (NDO 32765, section 6.1.3.1). The Technical Specifications also require a 14 day written report which will be submitted. The facility has initiated a corrective action report (28168).
GE Hitachi Vallecitos Nuclear Test Reactor, license R-33, is a 100 kW thermal Light Water Highly Enriched Graphite Moderated Reactor.
The licensee notified their NRC Project Manager.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 53584
Facility: NINE MILE POINT
Region: 1 State: NY
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-2,[2] GE-5
NRC Notified By: GREGORY BIXBY
HQ OPS Officer: ANDREW WAUGH
Region: 1 State: NY
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-2,[2] GE-5
NRC Notified By: GREGORY BIXBY
HQ OPS Officer: ANDREW WAUGH
Notification Date: 09/06/2018
Notification Time: 17:18 [ET]
Event Date: 03/19/2018
Event Time: 00:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 09/06/2018
Notification Time: 17:18 [ET]
Event Date: 03/19/2018
Event Time: 00:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 09/06/2018
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.73(a)(1) - INVALID SPECIF SYSTEM ACTUATION
10 CFR Section:
50.73(a)(1) - INVALID SPECIF SYSTEM ACTUATION
Person (Organization):
CHRISTOPHER LALLY (R1DO)
CHRISTOPHER LALLY (R1DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | N | 0 | Cold Shutdown | 0 | Cold Shutdown |
INVALID SPECIFIED SYSTEM ACTUATION
"Pursuant to 50.73(a)(1) the following information is provided as a sixty (60) day telephone notification to the NRC. This notification, reported under 50.73(a)(2)(iv), is being provided in lieu of the submittal of a written LER [Licensee Event Report] to report a condition that resulted in an invalid actuation of the high pressure coolant injection (HPCI). At Nine Mile Point Unit 1, HPCI is a flow control mode of the normal feedwater system and is not an emergency core cooling system.
"On March 19, 2018 Nine Mile Point Unit 1 (NMP1) was at 0 percent power and in cold shutdown in support of a planned maintenance outage. At approximately 0118 [EDT], a reactor water level transient initiated by the fill and vent of 12 Reactor Recirculation Pump (12 RRP) occurred. During the fill and vent, Reactor Pressure Vessel (RPV) level lowered quickly from the initial level of 68 inches and a low level alarm was received. Control Room Operators reduced Reactor Water Clean-Up (RWCU) reject flow to turn the level trend and clear the low level alarm generated off of the compensated, GEMAC, level instrumentation. RWCU reject flow was reduced by 50 percent which caused RPV level to start to rise. RPV level was raised to approximately 72 inches at which time the Reactor Operator began to raise reject flow to reestablish the normal level band. During the RPV level transient, with actual water level at 74 inches on the GEMAC, the Yarway level instrumentation, which is not density compensated and therefore invalid, reached 92 inches causing an invalid high RPV water level turbine trip signal and associated invalid HPCI initiation signal. At no point in time did actual RPV water level reach the high RPV water level turbine trip set point of 92 inches. The potential for a turbine trip signal to occur due to shutdown activities was understood and tags were hung to lockout the Feedwater Pumps to prevent the HPCI start signal. Therefore, no HPCI injection occurred.
"The Licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector."
"Pursuant to 50.73(a)(1) the following information is provided as a sixty (60) day telephone notification to the NRC. This notification, reported under 50.73(a)(2)(iv), is being provided in lieu of the submittal of a written LER [Licensee Event Report] to report a condition that resulted in an invalid actuation of the high pressure coolant injection (HPCI). At Nine Mile Point Unit 1, HPCI is a flow control mode of the normal feedwater system and is not an emergency core cooling system.
"On March 19, 2018 Nine Mile Point Unit 1 (NMP1) was at 0 percent power and in cold shutdown in support of a planned maintenance outage. At approximately 0118 [EDT], a reactor water level transient initiated by the fill and vent of 12 Reactor Recirculation Pump (12 RRP) occurred. During the fill and vent, Reactor Pressure Vessel (RPV) level lowered quickly from the initial level of 68 inches and a low level alarm was received. Control Room Operators reduced Reactor Water Clean-Up (RWCU) reject flow to turn the level trend and clear the low level alarm generated off of the compensated, GEMAC, level instrumentation. RWCU reject flow was reduced by 50 percent which caused RPV level to start to rise. RPV level was raised to approximately 72 inches at which time the Reactor Operator began to raise reject flow to reestablish the normal level band. During the RPV level transient, with actual water level at 74 inches on the GEMAC, the Yarway level instrumentation, which is not density compensated and therefore invalid, reached 92 inches causing an invalid high RPV water level turbine trip signal and associated invalid HPCI initiation signal. At no point in time did actual RPV water level reach the high RPV water level turbine trip set point of 92 inches. The potential for a turbine trip signal to occur due to shutdown activities was understood and tags were hung to lockout the Feedwater Pumps to prevent the HPCI start signal. Therefore, no HPCI injection occurred.
"The Licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector."