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Event Notification Report for February 1, 2018

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center

Event Reports For
01/31/2018 - 02/01/2018

** EVENT NUMBERS **


52857 53181 53189

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Part 21 Event Number: 52857
Rep Org: CRANE NUCLEAR, INC.
Licensee: CRANE NUCLEAR, INC.
Region: 3
City: BOLINGBROOK State: IL
County:
License #:
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: SAMSON KAY
HQ OPS Officer: DONG HWA PARK
Notification Date: 07/13/2017
Notification Time: 17:59 [ET]
Event Date: 06/05/2017
Event Time: [CDT]
Last Update Date: 01/31/2018
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
21.21(d)(3)(i) - DEFECTS AND NONCOMPLIANCE
Person (Organization):
ANTHONY DIMITRIADIS (R1DO)
BRIAN BONSER (R2DO)
PART 21/50.55 REACTO (EMAI)

Event Text

PART 21 - DEFECTIVE SAFETY RELATED VALVES

The following was excerpted from a letter by Crane Nuclear, Inc.:

"The plug valve designs provided for XOMOX model figure numbers 037AX, 067EG, and 037. These valves have been identified as used in nuclear and/or safety related applications.

"The stem for the Subject valve models was identified as being undersized based on allowable yield stress analysis of the stem while in torsion. The high stress condition was due to the high torque required to seat/unseat the plug when installed with a Ultra High Molecular Weight Polyethylene (UHMWPE) sleeve material. High friction factor inherent with this material causes torsional stress to exceed the upper limit of yield strength of the valve which could result in fatigue/yielding of the stem, thus preventing the valve from opening and closing while in service. Historical research performed thus far has not identified any notifications from the customer(s) regarding stem failure of the subject valves, indicating that the valves may still be in operation with no performance related or operating issues.

"The corrective action which has been, is being, or will be taken; the name of the individual or organization responsible for the action; and the length of time that has been or will be .token to complete the action.

"Notifications letters have been sent to the affected plants advising them of the condition, and recommending that the sleeve material be replaced with a lower friction Polytetrafluorethylene (PTFE) material that would significantly reduce the required input operating torque, thereby reducing the risk of failure of the stem material.

"XOMOX has been advised to modify design calculations to provide a larger margin for allowable yield strength of the stem material to ensure the stem is properly sized when Ultra High Molecular Weight Polyethylene (UHMWPE) sleeve material is used.

"Crane will continue to review XOMOX records to determine if any other sites are impacted, which we expect to complete by August 31, 2017.

"Should you have any questions regarding this matter, please contact Samson Kay, Manager of Engineering at (630) 226-4983 or Jennifer Bregovy, Manager of Quality and Safety at (630) 226-4949."

The following facilities received these safety related orders: TVA Sequoyah, Pennsylvania Power & Light Susquehanna.

* * * UPDATE AT 1205 EDT ON 8/29/17 FROM SAMSON KAY TO MARK ABRAMOVITZ * * *

The following information was received via fax:

"Crane Nuclear (CNI) has initiate the final phase of the Part 21 research and is currently reviewing over 15,000 documents from the original XOMOX Canada historical archive to determine if any other nuclear sites were impacted by the subject Part 21. The investigation encompasses sales orders spanning from 1968 to 1992. CNI expects to complete the review by 10/30/2017."

Point of Contact: Samson Kay (630-226-4983) or Jennifer Bregovy (630-226-4949)

Notified the R1DO (Cook), R2DO (Lopez), and Part 21 Resources (via e-mail).

* * * UPDATE AT 1627 EDT ON 11/01/17 FROM SAMSON KAY TO S. SANDIN VIA FAX * * *

The following information was provided as an update:

"Crane Nuclear (CNI) has completed approximately 40% of the review of the historical archive and will not be able to complete the review by the previously requested 10/30/2017 deadline.

"The historical review covers the following scope:

-XOMOX UK DEVON, ENGLAND - Safety-Related and N-Stamped Valves/Parts issued between 1987 - 1993
-XOMOX Canada & XOMOX A&M - Safety-Related Parts from 1979 - 1993
-XOMOX Cincinnati TUFFLINE - Safety-Related and N-Stamped Valves and Parts issued between 1970 -1993
-XOMOX Crane Nuclear - Safety-Related and N-Stamped Valves and Parts issued from 2001 until present.

"Note: Parts and valves were no longer supplied by XOMOX as safety-related or nuclear after 1993 until Crane Nuclear acquired XOMOX in June 29, 2001.

"The following sites . . . were identified as a safety-related valves effected by this letter. All sites were supplied to customer 'Delaval' which no longer exists. At the current pace of review, CNI expects to complete the review of the historical archive by 1/30/2018."

Delaval supplied valves to these Original Plant Name(s); TVA (doesn't show which plant), Comanche Peak Units 1&2, Columbia, Cleveland Electric, Midland Nuclear Power Plant Units 1&2 and TVA, - Hartsville and Phipps Bend Nuclear Plants both of which were cancelled before completion.

Notified R1DO (McKinley), R2DO (Ehrhardt), R3DO (Duncan), R4DO (Werner) and Part 21/50.55 Reactors via email.

* * * UPDATE AT 1553 EDT ON 01/31/18 FROM JOYCE HAMMAN TO DONG PARK * * *

The following information was provided as an update via fax:

"The historical research is complete. Our review of the records from 1973 through 2001 identified 25 valves that were supplied with a stem-sleeve material combination that could exceed the upper limit of yield strength of the valve, which could result in fatigue/yielding of the stem, thus preventing the valve from opening and closing while in service. Those valves were supplied to:

"Northeast Utilities, Millstone; Houston Lighting & Power, South Texas Project; Niagara Mohawk, Nine Mile Point; Transamerican Delavel, Oakland; Power Systems, Rocky Mount; Bechtel Energy Corp., 5 Miles West Wadsworth; Pennsylvania Power & Light, Susquehanna; NY Power Authority, Fitzpatrick; TVA, Sequoyah; Omaha Public Power, Ft. Calhoun.

"Notification letters have been sent to some of the affected plants advising them of the condition, and recommending that the sleeve material be replaced with a lower friction Polytetrafluoroethylene (PTFE) material that would significantly reduce the required input operating torque, thereby reducing the risk of failure of the stem material. Crane will complete the notifications to the other sites no later than 2/9/18.

"Should you have any questions regarding this matter, please contact me, Joyce Hamman, Director, Safety & Quality at (678) 451-2280, Burt Anderson, Site Leader, at (630) 226-4990, or Samson Kay, Engineering Manager at (630) 226-4983."

Notified R1DO (Janda), R2DO (Heisserer), R3DO (Dickson), R4DO (Deese) and Part 21/50.55 Reactors via email.

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Agreement State Event Number: 53181
Rep Org: NE DIV OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIALS
Licensee: CRETE COLD STORAGE
Region: 4
City: CRETE State: NE
County:
License #: GL0635
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: MALISA MCCOWN
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH
Notification Date: 01/23/2018
Notification Time: 16:03 [ET]
Event Date: 01/19/2018
Event Time: [CST]
Last Update Date: 01/23/2018
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
Person (Organization):
GREG PICK (R4DO)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFICA (EMAI)
ILTAB (EMAI)

This material event contains a "Less than Cat 3 " level of radioactive material.

Event Text

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - LOST TRITIUM EXIT SIGNS

The following was received from the state of Nebraska via email:

"On 1/19/18, GL0635 [General License] Crete Cold Storage called NEDHHS [Nebraska Department of Health and Human Services], Office of Radiological Health to inquire about reporting requirements if they could not locate GL [generally licensed] devices. Licensee assumed devices were lost during a renovation. Licensee was given reporting instructions via e-mail. On 1/23/18, NEDHHS Office of Radiological Health was notified via letter by GL0635 that four (4) tritium exit signs were reported lost."

All four signs were manufactured by Safety Light Corporation, Model 2040, Serial numbers 252778, 252779, 252781 and 252774. Nominal material content is 11.5 Ci of tritium per sign.

Nebraska NMED Report No.: NE180001

THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL

Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf.

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Power Reactor Event Number: 53189
Facility: QUAD CITIES
Region: 3 State: IL
Unit: [1] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-3,[2] GE-3
NRC Notified By: ANTHONY PARK
HQ OPS Officer: DONG HWA PARK
Notification Date: 01/31/2018
Notification Time: 18:19 [ET]
Event Date: 01/31/2018
Event Time: 13:10 [CST]
Last Update Date: 01/31/2018
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(C) - POT UNCNTRL RAD REL
Person (Organization):
BILLY DICKSON (R3DO)

Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
1 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation
2 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation

Event Text

MOMENTARY LOSS OF SECONDARY CONTAINMENT

"At 1310 hours [CST] on January 31, 2018, the Unit 2B fuel pool radiation monitor spiked high due to an invalid actuation which caused the U1 and U2 reactor building ventilation system to isolate, B train standby gas treatment system (SBGTS) started, and the control room ventilation system also isolated as designed. Secondary containment vacuum was lost for approximately one minute, and then subsequently returned to an acceptable level in accordance with Technical Specification 3.6.4.1, 'Secondary Containment.' As a result of this transient, secondary containment was inoperable for approximately one minute. No emergency conditions were determined to exist. Troubleshooting of the radiation monitor spike is underway.

"Given the temporary loss of secondary containment vacuum, this event is reportable under 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v)(C) as an event or condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of a safety function.

"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."

Page Last Reviewed/Updated Thursday, February 01, 2018
Thursday, February 01, 2018