Event Notification Report for January 26, 2018
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
01/25/2018 - 01/26/2018
Part 21
Event Number: 53193
Rep Org: XCEL ENERGY
Licensee: WESTINGHOUSE ELECTRIC COMPANY
Region: 3
City: MONTECELLO State: MN
County:
License #:
Agreement: Y
Docket: 50-263
NRC Notified By: STEVE SOLLOM
HQ OPS Officer: MARK ABRAMOVITZ
Licensee: WESTINGHOUSE ELECTRIC COMPANY
Region: 3
City: MONTECELLO State: MN
County:
License #:
Agreement: Y
Docket: 50-263
NRC Notified By: STEVE SOLLOM
HQ OPS Officer: MARK ABRAMOVITZ
Notification Date: 02/01/2018
Notification Time: 16:23 [ET]
Event Date: 01/26/2018
Event Time: 00:00 [CST]
Last Update Date: 02/01/2018
Notification Time: 16:23 [ET]
Event Date: 01/26/2018
Event Time: 00:00 [CST]
Last Update Date: 02/01/2018
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
21.21(d)(3)(i) - DEFECTS AND NONCOMPLIANCE
10 CFR Section:
21.21(d)(3)(i) - DEFECTS AND NONCOMPLIANCE
Person (Organization):
BILLY DICKSON (R3DO)
PART 21/50.55 REACTO (EMAI)
BILLY DICKSON (R3DO)
PART 21/50.55 REACTO (EMAI)
PART-21 NOTIFICATION - IMPROPER LUGS IN A BREAKER CUBICLE
The following notification is an excerpt from the received report:
"On November 30, 2017, an internal wire in a 480VAC cubicle, breaker B3424, was discovered to be terminated using incorrect size wire lugs. This deviation was identified by Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant (MNGP) electrical maintenance staff during bench testing of the cubicles in preparation for implementation of a modification.
"The cubicles were received by MNGP in September, 2017 from Westinghouse Electric Co.
"On January 26, 2017, MNGP completed an evaluation of this deviation and concluded this condition represents a significant safety hazard. As a result, this condition is a defect and is reportable pursuant to 10 CFR 21.21 (d)(4).
"Basic Component: Westinghouse: Eaton Breaker Cubicle Part No. 10149D92G05
"On November 30, 2017, an internal wire in a 480VAC cubicle, breaker 83424, was discovered to be terminated using incorrect size wire lugs. This condition was discovered during bench testing in preparation for implementing a modification to the Control Room Ventilation (CRV) system. The wire connection was found loose and was able to be lifted off of the terminal without removing the screw. Upon further examination, the internal diameter of ring termination lugs was found to be too large, providing only a partial surface area for screw head contact.
"The affected lugs were on contactor coil resistor terminations internal to the cubicle. Without sufficient contact area or connection to the wiring on the resistor, control power could be lost to the contactor coil resulting in the fan V-EF-40A not starting, which would prevent proper ventilation to the room housing safety related batteries required to be operable during an accident scenario. Therefore, MNGP determined that a substantial safety hazard could have been created had the breaker cubicle been installed with the defect uncorrected.
"This defect was evaluated according to the station's Part 21 reporting process. The evaluation was completed on January 26, 2018 and the reporting officer was informed on January 30, 2018.
"Westinghouse was notified of this condition and the condition was incorporated into their corrective action program, number 100506324. The Westinghouse contact person is Adam Tokar, 724-722-6042. No further information on the vendor's corrective actions is known.
"MNGP entered the condition into the MNGP Corrective Action Program under 501000005918. Monticello has corrected the lugs on the installed breaker, B4423. The remaining uninstalled cubicles purchased by Monticello are being corrected in accordance with MNGP procedure MWl-8-M-4.06, Conductor Termination, prior in installation in the plant."
The following notification is an excerpt from the received report:
"On November 30, 2017, an internal wire in a 480VAC cubicle, breaker B3424, was discovered to be terminated using incorrect size wire lugs. This deviation was identified by Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant (MNGP) electrical maintenance staff during bench testing of the cubicles in preparation for implementation of a modification.
"The cubicles were received by MNGP in September, 2017 from Westinghouse Electric Co.
"On January 26, 2017, MNGP completed an evaluation of this deviation and concluded this condition represents a significant safety hazard. As a result, this condition is a defect and is reportable pursuant to 10 CFR 21.21 (d)(4).
"Basic Component: Westinghouse: Eaton Breaker Cubicle Part No. 10149D92G05
"On November 30, 2017, an internal wire in a 480VAC cubicle, breaker 83424, was discovered to be terminated using incorrect size wire lugs. This condition was discovered during bench testing in preparation for implementing a modification to the Control Room Ventilation (CRV) system. The wire connection was found loose and was able to be lifted off of the terminal without removing the screw. Upon further examination, the internal diameter of ring termination lugs was found to be too large, providing only a partial surface area for screw head contact.
"The affected lugs were on contactor coil resistor terminations internal to the cubicle. Without sufficient contact area or connection to the wiring on the resistor, control power could be lost to the contactor coil resulting in the fan V-EF-40A not starting, which would prevent proper ventilation to the room housing safety related batteries required to be operable during an accident scenario. Therefore, MNGP determined that a substantial safety hazard could have been created had the breaker cubicle been installed with the defect uncorrected.
"This defect was evaluated according to the station's Part 21 reporting process. The evaluation was completed on January 26, 2018 and the reporting officer was informed on January 30, 2018.
"Westinghouse was notified of this condition and the condition was incorporated into their corrective action program, number 100506324. The Westinghouse contact person is Adam Tokar, 724-722-6042. No further information on the vendor's corrective actions is known.
"MNGP entered the condition into the MNGP Corrective Action Program under 501000005918. Monticello has corrected the lugs on the installed breaker, B4423. The remaining uninstalled cubicles purchased by Monticello are being corrected in accordance with MNGP procedure MWl-8-M-4.06, Conductor Termination, prior in installation in the plant."
Power Reactor
Event Number: 53185
Facility: GINNA
Region: 1 State: NY
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-2-LP
NRC Notified By: JUSTIN KNOWLES
HQ OPS Officer: JEFF HERRERA
Region: 1 State: NY
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-2-LP
NRC Notified By: JUSTIN KNOWLES
HQ OPS Officer: JEFF HERRERA
Notification Date: 01/26/2018
Notification Time: 13:06 [ET]
Event Date: 01/26/2018
Event Time: 08:53 [EST]
Last Update Date: 01/26/2018
Notification Time: 13:06 [ET]
Event Date: 01/26/2018
Event Time: 08:53 [EST]
Last Update Date: 01/26/2018
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(A) - DEGRADED CONDITION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(A) - DEGRADED CONDITION
Person (Organization):
HAROLD GRAY (R1DO)
HAROLD GRAY (R1DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM OPERATIONAL LEAKAGE
"On January 26, 2018, a containment entry was made to identify the source of elevated Unidentified Reactor Coolant System (RCS) operational leakage. A through-wall leak was identified on a Class 1 piping weld on the letdown line at 0853 EST. It was determined that the leak was RCS pressure boundary leakage. Ginna entered Technical Specification (TS) LCO [Limiting Condition for Operation] 3.4.13, RCS Operational Leakage, Condition B. for the existence of pressure boundary leakage. This condition requires the plant to be in MODE 3 within 6 hours and MODE 5 within 36 hours. The leak was isolated and TS LCO 3.4.13 exited at 1015 EST.
"This event is reportable within 8 hours in accordance with 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(ii)(A) for 'Any event or condition that results in: (A) The condition of the nuclear power plant, including its principal safety barriers, being seriously degraded'.
"The Station [Ginna] is developing an evaluation and a repair plan at this time.
"This condition has no impact on public health and safety.
"The licensee has informed the NRC Resident Inspector."
"On January 26, 2018, a containment entry was made to identify the source of elevated Unidentified Reactor Coolant System (RCS) operational leakage. A through-wall leak was identified on a Class 1 piping weld on the letdown line at 0853 EST. It was determined that the leak was RCS pressure boundary leakage. Ginna entered Technical Specification (TS) LCO [Limiting Condition for Operation] 3.4.13, RCS Operational Leakage, Condition B. for the existence of pressure boundary leakage. This condition requires the plant to be in MODE 3 within 6 hours and MODE 5 within 36 hours. The leak was isolated and TS LCO 3.4.13 exited at 1015 EST.
"This event is reportable within 8 hours in accordance with 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(ii)(A) for 'Any event or condition that results in: (A) The condition of the nuclear power plant, including its principal safety barriers, being seriously degraded'.
"The Station [Ginna] is developing an evaluation and a repair plan at this time.
"This condition has no impact on public health and safety.
"The licensee has informed the NRC Resident Inspector."