United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission - Protecting People and the Environment
Home > NRC Library > Document Collections > Reports Associated with Events > Event Notification Reports > 2018 > January 17

Event Notification Report for January 17, 2018

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center

Event Reports For
01/16/2018 - 01/17/2018

** EVENT NUMBERS **


53090 53155 53156 53167

To top of page
!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED. THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
Power Reactor Event Number: 53090
Facility: GRAND GULF
Region: 4 State: MS
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-6
NRC Notified By: DAVID BURRUS
HQ OPS Officer: DAN LIVERMORE
Notification Date: 11/25/2017
Notification Time: 06:02 [ET]
Event Date: 11/25/2017
Event Time: 02:38 [CST]
Last Update Date: 01/16/2018
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL
Person (Organization):
MICHAEL HAY (R4DO)

Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
1 M/R Y 0 Startup 0 Hot Shutdown

Event Text

MANUAL REACTOR SCRAM DURING STARTUP

"At 0238 [CST] a manual reactor scram was inserted by placing the Reactor Mode Switch in Shutdown. At 0149 [CST], with reactor power just above the point of adding heat, IRM [Intermediate Range Monitor] channels A, C, and D received a spurious upscale trip signal which immediately cleared. Upon investigation, operability of RPS [Reactor Protection System] scram function for Intermediate Range Detectors was placed in question. This event is being reported under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B), as any event or condition that results in actuation of the Reactor Protection System (RPS), when the reactor is critical."

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

* * * UPDATE ON NOVEMBER 26, 2017, AT 1850 FROM GRAND GULF TO MICHAEL BLOODGOOD * * *

"At 0238 [CST] a manual reactor scram was inserted by placing the Reactor Mode Switch in Shutdown. At 0149 [CST], with reactor power just above the point of adding heat, Intermediate Range Monitor neutron flux detector (IRM) channels A, C, and D received a spurious Upscale Trip signal which immediately cleared. Upon investigation, IRM channels A, C, and D were declared Inoperable. IRM G was already Inoperable for another reason. RPS scram function from IRM channels B, E, F, and H was always Operable and available. That event is being reported under 10CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B), as any event or condition that results in actuation of the Reactor Protection System (RPS), when the reactor is critical.

"This Revised Statement to Event Notification # 53090 is being made to make it clear that only four IRM channels (A, C, D, G) were Inoperable and that the IRM RPS SCRAM function was still available from the four remaining Operable IRM channels (B, E, F, and H)."

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

Notified R4DO (O'Keefe)

* * * RETRACTION ON 01/16/2018 AT 1629 EST FROM JASON COMFORT TO DAVID AIRD * * *

"On 11/25/17, at 0149 [CST], with reactor power just above the point of adding heat, Intermediate Range Monitor neutron flux detector (IRM) channels A, C, and D received a spurious Upscale Trip signal which immediately cleared. Upon investigation, IRM channels A, C, and D were declared Inoperable. IRM G was already Inoperable for another reason. At 0238 [CST] a manual reactor scram was inserted by placing the Reactor Mode Switch in Shutdown. RPS scram function from IRM channels B, E, F, and H was always Operable and available. That event was initially being reported under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B), as any event or condition that results in actuation of the Reactor Protection System (RPS), when the reactor is critical.

"After the trip alarms were received, the Operators spent approximately twenty minutes investigating possible causes and implications, and consulted with Reactor Engineering and the Shift Technical Advisor. The investigation showed that the plant was stable and the upscale IRM alarms were spurious. A review of plant technical specifications by the operators determined that a plant shutdown was not required. After further discussions, Operations concluded that a shutdown to allow further investigation of the issue was the prudent course of action. Prior to shutting down, Operations spent approximately twenty minutes reviewing procedures, notifying personnel to exit containment, and conducting a brief. The shutdown was then conducted by inserting a manual reactor scram by placing the reactor mode switch in SHUTDOWN.

"This was initially reported under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) as an actuation of the RPS. Based on the sequence of events, and Operator actions in conducting the shutdown, the event is considered 'part of a pre-planned sequence during testing or reactor operation' as specified in 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) and 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A). In accordance with NUREG-1022, Section 3.2.6, the event is not reportable as an actuation of RPS."

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

Notified R4DO (Taylor).

To top of page
Agreement State Event Number: 53155
Rep Org: TEXAS DEPT OF STATE HEALTH SERVICES
Licensee: ALBEMARLE CATALYSTS LP
Region: 4
City: PASADENA State: TX
County:
License #: L01743
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: GENTRY HEARN
HQ OPS Officer: DONALD NORWOOD
Notification Date: 01/08/2018
Notification Time: 16:40 [ET]
Event Date: 01/07/2018
Event Time: [CST]
Last Update Date: 01/08/2018
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
Person (Organization):
NICK TAYLOR (R4DO)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFICA (EMAI)

Event Text

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - NUCLEAR GAUGE SHUTTER FAILED TO SHUT

The following information was received via E-mail:

"On January 8, 2018, the Agency [Texas Department of State Health Services] received a report from the licensee's radiation safety officer (RSO) stating the shutter on an Ohmart Vega model SH-F1 gauge, containing a 60 milliCurie cesium-137 source, failed to shut during an operational check. Open is the normal operation position of the gauge shutter. No licensee employee received any exposure as a result of this event. The gauge was repaired the following morning. An investigation into this event is ongoing. Additional information will be provided as it is received in accordance with SA-300."

Texas Incident #: I-9529

To top of page
Agreement State Event Number: 53156
Rep Org: LOUISIANA RADIATION PROTECTION DIV
Licensee: EXXONMOBIL REFINING & SUPPLY CO.
Region: 4
City: BATON ROUGE State: LA
County:
License #: LA-1345-L01,
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: JOSEPH NOBLE
HQ OPS Officer: DONALD NORWOOD
Notification Date: 01/08/2018
Notification Time: 17:36 [ET]
Event Date: 01/03/2018
Event Time: [CST]
Last Update Date: 01/08/2018
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
Person (Organization):
NICK TAYLOR (R4DO)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFICA (EMAI)

Event Text

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - NUCLEAR GAUGE INVOLVED IN A FIRE

The following information was received via E-mail:

"The Radiation Safety Officer (RSO), reported Friday, 1/5/2018 that a fire occurred on 1/3/2018 at the refinery in the Coker Unit Drum D. The RSO made the Department [Louisiana Department of Environmental Quality (LDEQ)] notification when the area cooled and he could assess the situation.

"The Louisiana State Police were notified on 1/3/2018 at approximately 1530 CST. The Department was notified at approximately 1330 CST on 1/5/2018 when the situation had been assessed after the unit cooled enough for entry.

"A level/density gauge on Coker Process Drum D was involved in a unit fire. The level/density gauge was an Ohmart-Vega device/source holder, model SHG1-45, S/N 3813CP housing 500 mCi of Cs-137 S/N 26165309.

"On 1/3/2018, ExxonMobil Refining & Supply had a fire on the Coker unit in Drum D. In the assessment process of the radiation sources from becoming a radiation exposure hazard, it was discovered that the gauge/device shielding was compromised through a melted opening in the lead shielding.

"ExxonMobil called a service contractor, BBP Sales, to evaluate the situation and determine the best course of action to correct the problem. The service contractor was unable to repair the device/source holder and determined the source holder would have to be replaced. This is not a radiation exposure hazard and does not pose a health and safety situation for the ExxonMobil employees or the general public.

"The source holder was intact for the most part with the exception of a degraded/melted spot on the shielding. The radiation exposure level from the opening was 30 mR/hr at 1 ft. BBP Sales was notified and called in to make an assessment and recommendation for corrective action of this situation. BBP Sales locked the shutter, secured the device, placed it in a storage container and isolated the storage container. Some additional lead was placed over the opening and the exposure reading was reduced to approximately 4 mR/hr. The storage container was placed behind a radiation labeled barricade. It is considered in storage until it is replaced and the damaged level gauge is shipped for disposal. The 500 mCi Cs-137 source did not appear damaged or compromised. The RSO performed wipes on the device and the wipes were sent to Suntrac Services for analysis.

"This event is considered closed for reporting requirements by LDEQ. This is not equipment failure. This event is a level/density gauge damaged in a refinery fire. This event is being reported to the NRC as required by Regulatory Requirement 10 CFR 30.50(b)(4) and LAC 33:XV.341.B.4"

Louisiana Event Report ID No.: LA-180001; SPOC T182036

To top of page
Power Reactor Event Number: 53167
Facility: DUANE ARNOLD
Region: 3 State: IA
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-4
NRC Notified By: BOB MURRELL
HQ OPS Officer: DONALD NORWOOD
Notification Date: 01/16/2018
Notification Time: 10:06 [ET]
Event Date: 11/30/2017
Event Time: 22:30 [CST]
Last Update Date: 01/16/2018
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.73(a)(1) - INVALID SPECIF SYSTEM ACTUATION
Person (Organization):
DAVID HILLS (R3DO)

Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
1 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation

Event Text

60-DAY OPTIONAL TELEPHONIC NOTIFICATION FOR AN INVALID PRIMARY CONTAINMENT ISOLATION SYSTEM ACTUATION

"This 60-day telephone notification is being made under reporting requirements specified by 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) to describe an invalid actuation of a containment isolation signal affecting more than one system.

"At 2230 CST on November 30, 2017, with the Duane Arnold Energy Center (DAEC) operating at 100 percent power, an invalid Group 3 isolation on the 'B' side of the Primary Containment Isolation System [PCIS] occurred. Group 3 isolation signals were generated for Primary Containment Isolation Valves for Drywell and Torus Ventilation and Purge, Containment Nitrogen Compressor Suction and Discharge, Recirculation Pump Seals, and Post Accident Sample System.

"This event was caused by a fault on the 1D25 Instrument AC Inverter. The fault was caused by an insufficient design clearance to ground and was corrected by increasing the clearance.

"All equipment responded in accordance with the plant design. Specifically, all actuations were complete and successful.

"There were no safety consequences or impacts on the health and safety of the public. The event was entered into DAEC's corrective action program for resolution.

"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."

Page Last Reviewed/Updated Wednesday, January 17, 2018
Wednesday, January 17, 2018