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Event Notification Report for January 11, 2018

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center

Event Reports For
01/10/2018 - 01/11/2018

** EVENT NUMBERS **


53144 53145 53146 53160 53162

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Agreement State Event Number: 53144
Rep Org: GEORGIA RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL PGM
Licensee: THERAGENICS CORPORATION
Region: 1
City: Buford State: GA
County:
License #:
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: MONICA JOHNSON
HQ OPS Officer: ANDREW WAUGH
Notification Date: 01/03/2018
Notification Time: 09:49 [ET]
Event Date: 12/01/2017
Event Time: [EST]
Last Update Date: 01/03/2018
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
Person (Organization):
DAVE WERKHEISER (R1DO)
GRETCHEN RIVERA-CAPE (NMSS)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFICA (EMAI)

Event Text

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - OVEREXPOSURE EVENT

The following was excerpted from an email received from the state of Georgia:

"On Tuesday, January 2, 2018 it was reported to the Department [Georgia Radioactive Materials Program] by Theragenics Corporation in Buford, GA that an employee's dosimetry report indicated that he had exceeded the annual shallow dose limit of 50 rem. An investigation has been conducted by the employer and it was determined that two abnormal occurrences happened during this wear period:

"1. For approximately 2 hours the technician worked a non-routine job to clean and rebuild the central region of a cyclotron in order to return the cyclotron to operation. This was designated as a high radiation area and exposures of others that worked the same job had high exposures also but no one else exceeded the annual limits.

"2. On November 13, 2017 the cyclotron technician was having difficulty operating the manipulator arms and pneumatic screwdriver within a hot cell so without contacting HP [health physics] or cyclotron management he decided to remove 10 screws in the target rail of the hot cell by hand. He held target rails with his left hand and removed the screws with a screwdriver with his right hand. The projected activity on that day was 62.61 Ci and the job took 1 to 5 minutes.

"Theragenics was notified of the event on December 1, 2017. The report was sent to the department [Georgia Radioactive Materials Program] on December 28, 2017 and was received on January 2, 2018

"The skin exposure to the left extremity was reported as 71.865 rem for the biweekly monitoring period of November 6, 2017 to November 19, 2017."

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Agreement State Event Number: 53145
Rep Org: NJ RAD PROT AND REL PREVENTION PGM
Licensee: ATLANTIC ENGINEERING LABS. INC.
Region: 1
City: AVENEL State: NJ
County:
License #: 506950
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: JACK TWAY
HQ OPS Officer: ANDREW WAUGH
Notification Date: 01/03/2018
Notification Time: 11:03 [ET]
Event Date: 01/02/2018
Event Time: 22:00 [EST]
Last Update Date: 01/03/2018
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
Person (Organization):
DAVE WERKHEISER (R1DO)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFICA (EMAI)

This material event contains a "Less than Cat 3 " level of radioactive material.

Event Text

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - TWO PORTABLE NUCLEAR GAUGES STOLEN

The following was excerpted from an email received from the State of New Jersey:

"RSO [Radiation Safety Officer] reported that 2 portable nuclear gauges were stolen from the lab. A police report has been filed with the Woodbridge, NJ police department."

"The gauges each contain: Cs-137 (10 mCi or under each) and Am/Be-241 (44 mCi or under each)."


* * * UPDATE FROM JACK TWAY TO DONALD NORWOOD AT 1527 EDT ON 1/3/2018 * * *

The following was excerpted from an email received from the State of New Jersey and provides specific information about the gauges that were stolen:

1. Troxler Model 3411B, s/n 16739 containing Cs-137, not to exceed 9 mCi, AEA Technology/QSA, Inc. Model No. CDCW556 or IPL Model No. HEG-137, and Am-241/Be, not to exceed 44 mCi, AEA Technology/QSA, Inc. Model No. AMNV.997 or IPL Model No. AM1.NO2, 3021 or 3027.

2. Troxler Model 3411B, s/n 18556 containing Cs-137, not to exceed 9 mCi, AEA Technology/QSA, Inc. Model No. CDCW556 or IPL Model No. HEG-137, and Am-241/Be, not to exceed 44 mCi, AEA Technology/QSA, Inc. Model No. AMNV.997 or IPL Model No. AM1.NO2, 3021 or 3027.

Notified NRC R1DO (Werkheiser), NMSS Events Notification, and ILTAB via email.

THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL

Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf

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Agreement State Event Number: 53146
Rep Org: ARIZONA RADIATION REGULATORY AGENCY
Licensee: HONEYWELL INTERNATIONAL, INCORPORATED
Region: 4
City: PHOENIX State: AZ
County:
License #: AZ 07-316
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: BRIAN GORETZKI
HQ OPS Officer: DONALD NORWOOD
Notification Date: 01/03/2018
Notification Time: 15:29 [ET]
Event Date: 01/02/2018
Event Time: [MST]
Last Update Date: 01/03/2018
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
Person (Organization):
JAMES DRAKE (R4DO)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFICA (EMAI)

Event Text

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - PACKAGE DAMAGED IN TRANSIT

The following information was received via E-mail:

"This First Notice constitutes early notice of events of possible safety or public interest significance. The information is as initially received without verification or evaluation, and is basically all that is known by the Department [Arizona Department of Health Services] staff at this time.

"On January 2, 2018 at approximately 1745 MST, the Department received notification from the licensee of a damaged package containing ten densometers, with each densometer having an activity of 10 milliCuries of Americium-241. The licensee performed a survey of the package and obtained a reading of 25 mrem/hr on contact at the bottom of the package. The Agency continues to investigate the event."

Arizona First Notice: 18-001

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Power Reactor Event Number: 53160
Facility: MCGUIRE
Region: 2 State: NC
Unit: [ ] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: PHIL BALES
HQ OPS Officer: MARK ABRAMOVITZ
Notification Date: 01/10/2018
Notification Time: 02:13 [ET]
Event Date: 01/09/2018
Event Time: 19:28 [EST]
Last Update Date: 01/10/2018
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
Person (Organization):
FRANK EHRHARDT (R2DO)

Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
2 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation

Event Text

BOTH TRAINS OF CONTAINMENT AIR RETURN FANS INOPERABLE

"During normal power operations at 100 percent power on Unit 2, both trains of Containment Air Return Fans (CARF) were declared inoperable at 19:28 [EST] on January 9, 2018 due to a common issue with control power fuses. The fuses potentially could not handle the in-rush current upon re-energizing the circuits. This condition resulted in a loss of a reasonable expectation that the Unit 2 Containment Air Return Fans would meet their design safety function and mitigate an accident. This loss of safety function is reportable under 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v)(D), 8 hour report. The site entered T.S. 3.0.3 at 19:28 and exited at 20:54 when repairs to 2B CARF were completed. 2A CARF repairs are complete. There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The senior NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."

The licensee verified this problem does not affect unit-1.

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Power Reactor Event Number: 53162
Facility: BROWNS FERRY
Region: 2 State: AL
Unit: [ ] [ ] [3]
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4,[3] GE-4
NRC Notified By: NEEL SHUKLA
HQ OPS Officer: DONALD NORWOOD
Notification Date: 01/10/2018
Notification Time: 13:53 [ET]
Event Date: 01/10/2018
Event Time: 09:28 [CST]
Last Update Date: 01/10/2018
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL
50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION
Person (Organization):
FRANK EHRHARDT (R2DO)

Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
3 A/R Y 73 Power Operation 0 Hot Shutdown

Event Text

AUTOMATIC REACTOR SCRAM DUE TO TURBINE CONTROL VALVE FAST CLOSURE SCRAM SIGNAL

"At 0928 CST on January 10, 2018, the Unit 3 reactor automatically scrammed due to a Reactor Protection System (RPS) signal generated from Turbine Control Valve Emergency Trip System pressure low. The reactor had been operating near 73 percent power for an emergent issue for Turbine Control Valve (TCV) No. 3. With TCV No. 3 out of service and closed, the unit was operating with RPS in a half scram condition. A subsequent failure of the TCV No. 2 sensing line resulted in RPS coincidence logic being met for TCV fast closure SCRAM. The investigation of the TCV No. 2 sensing line failure continues.

"All control rods fully inserted into the core. Main Steam Isolation Valves remained open with Main Turbine Bypass Valves controlling reactor pressure. Reactor Feedwater pumps remained in service to control reactor water level.

"Primary Containment Isolation Signals Groups 2, 3, 6, and 8 containment isolation and initiation signals were received. Upon receipt of these signals all required components actuated as required. Neither High Pressure Coolant Injection nor Reactor Core Isolation Cooling initiation signals were received.

"This event is reportable within 4 hours per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) 'any event or condition that results in actuation of the Reactor Protection System (RPS) when the reactor is critical except when the actuation results from and is part of a preplanned sequence during testing or reactor operation.' It is also reportable within 8 hours per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) and requires an LER within 60 days per 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A).

"The NRC Resident inspector has been notified."

Page Last Reviewed/Updated Thursday, January 11, 2018
Thursday, January 11, 2018